

A
DISCOURSE

Concerning the
Being and Attributes of GOD,
THE
Obligations of Natural Religion,
AND THE
TRUTH and CERTAINTY
OF THE
Christian Revelation.

In Answer to Mr *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, the *Author of the Oracles of Reason*, and other Deniers of Natural and Revealed Religion.

Being sixteen SERMONS, Preach'd in the Cathedral-Church of *St Paul*, in the Years 1704, and 1705, at the Lecture Founded by the Honourable *ROBERT BOYLE*, Esq;

In which is inserted

A DISCOURSE concerning the Connexion of the Prophecies in the Old Testament, and the Application of them to Christ.

There is also,

An ANSWER to a SEVENTH LETTER, concerning, the Argument a priori, in Proof of the Being of GOD.

By *SAMUEL CLARKE*, D. D. late Rector of *St James's Westminster.*

THE NINTH EDITION.

L O N D O N:

Printed by *W. Botham*, for *JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON*, at the Crown in *Ludgate-Street.* MDCCXXXVIII.

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A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
Being and Attributes
OF
G O D.

More Particularly in Answer to
Mr. HOBBS, SPINOZA,
And their FOLLOWERS.

Wherein the Notion of LIBERTY is Stated, and
the Possibility and Certainty of it Proved, in Op-
position to *Necessity and Fate*.

Being the Substance of Eight SERMONS,
Preached in the Cathedral-Church of St Paul, in
the Year 1704, at the Lecture Founded by the
Honourable ROBERT BOYLE, Esq;

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.
late Rector of St James's Westminster.

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Rom. i. 20. *For the invisible things of Him from the Creation of the
World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made;
even his Eternal Power and Godhead: So that they are without
excuse.*

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Printed by W. Botham, for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON,
at the Crown in Ludgate-Street. MDCCXXXVIII.

DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR

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TO THE

Most Reverend Father in God

THOMAS

Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and
Primate of all *England*:

Sir HENRY ASHURST, Baronet;

Sir JOHN ROTHERAM, Knight,
Serjeant at Law;

JOHN EVELIN, Esquire;

Trustees appointed by the Honou-
rable ROBERT BOYLE,
Esquire.

This DISCOURSE is
Humbly Dedicated.

TO THE

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T H E

P R E F A C E.

TH E R E being already published many and good Books, to prove the Being and Attributes of G O D ; I have chosen to contract what was requisite for me to say upon this Subject, into as narrow a Compass; and to express what I had to offer, in as few Words, as I could with Perspicuity. For which Reason I have also confined myself to One only Method or continued Thread of Arguing; which I have endeavoured should be as near to Mathematical, as the Nature of such a Discourse would allow: Omitting some other Arguments, which I could not discern to be so evidently conclusive: Because it seems not to be at any time for the real Advantage of Truth, to use Arguments in its behalf founded only on such Hypotheses, as the Adversaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant. Yet I have not made it my Business, to oppose any of those Arguments; because I think it is not the best way for any one to commend

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commend his own Performance, by endeavouring to discover the Imperfections of Others who are engaged in the same Design with himself, of Promoting the Interest of true Religion and Virtue. But every Man ought to use such Arguments only, as appear to Him to be clear and strong; and the Readers must judge whether they truly prove the Conclusion.

ERRATA

PAGE 58. line 15. *for collocaretur. read collocaretur, p. 96.*
l. 25. *propagibitur r. propagabitur. p. 142. l. 21. terminatum*
r. terminatam. p. 159. l. 25. ἀρχαῖς r. ὀργαῖς. p. 162. l. 36.
ἀνδραποίων r. ἀνδραπείων. p. 209. l. 12. nihil r. nihilo. p. 214.
l. 15. *κῆδος; r. κ' ἔδος.*

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That

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A D E

[1]

A

DEMONSTRATION

OF THE

Being and Attributes

O F

G O D.

More particularly in Answer to Mr. *Hobbes*,
Spinoza, and their Followers.

ALL those who either are or pretend to be *Atheists*; who either disbelieve the Being of God, or would be thought to do so; or, (which is all one,) who deny the Principal Attributes of the Divine Nature, and suppose God to be an Unintelligent Being, which acts merely by Necessity; that is, which, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, acts not at all, but is only acted upon: All Men that are *Atheists*, I say, in this Sense, must be so upon one or other of these three Accounts.

The Introduction.

B

Either,

A Demonstration of the

*Atheism
arises from
stupid Ig-
norance:*

Either, *First*, Because being extremely ignorant and stupid, they have *never duly considered* any thing at all; nor made any just use of their natural Reason, to discover even the plainest and most obvious Truths; but have spent their Time in a manner of Life very little Superiour to that of Beasts.

*Or from
gross Cor-
ruption of
Manners:*

Or, *Secondly*, Because being totally debauched and corrupted in their *Practice*, they have, by a vicious and degenerate Life, corrupted the Principles of their Nature, and defaced the Reason of their own Minds; and, instead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the Rules and Obligations of Nature, and the Reason and Fitness of Things, have accustomed themselves only to mock and scoff at Religion; and, being under the Power of Evil Habits, and the Slavery of Unreasonable and Indulged Lusts, are resolved not to hearken to any Reasoning which would oblige them to forsake their beloved Vices.

*Or from
false Phi-
losophy.*

Or, *Thirdly*, Because in the way of *Speculative Reasoning*, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, they pretend that the Arguments used Against the Being or Attributes of God, seem to them, after the strictest and fullest inquiry, to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which we endeavour to prove these great Truths.

These seem the only Causes that can be imagined, of any Man's disbelieving the Being or Attributes of God; and no Man can be supposed to be an Atheist, but upon one or other of these three Accounts. Now to the *two former* of these three sorts of Men; namely, to such as are wholly ignorant and stupid, or to such as through habitual Debauchery have brought themselves to a Custom of mocking and scoffing at all Religion, and will not hearken to any fair Reasoning; it is *not*

my

my present Business to apply my self. The One of these, wants to be instructed in the first Principles of *Reason*, as well as of *Religion*. The Other disbelieves only for a present false *Interest*, and because he is desirous that the Thing should not be true. The One has *not yet arrived* to the use of his natural Faculties : The Other has *renounced* them ; and declares he will not be argued with, as a rational Creature. 'Tis therefore the *third sort* of Atheists only (namely those who in the way of *Speculative Reasoning*, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, pretend that the Arguments brought Against the Being or Attributes of God, do, upon the strictest and fullest Examination, appear to them to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which these great Truths are attempted to be proved ;) These, I say, are the only Atheistical Persons, to whom my present Discourse can be supposed to be directed, or indeed who are capable of being reasoned with at all.

Now before I enter upon the main Argument, I shall premise several *Concessions*, which these Men, upon their own Principles, are unavoidably *obliged* to make.

And *First*, They must of necessity own, that, *The Being of God is very desirable.* supposing it cannot be proved to be true, yet at least 'tis a thing very *desirable*, and which any wise Man would wish to be true, for the great Benefit and Happiness of Men ; that there was a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to govern the World. Whatever Hypothesis these Men can possibly frame ; whatever Argument they can invent, by which they would exclude God and Providence out of the World ; That very Argument or Hypothesis, will of necessity lead them to this *Concession*. If they argue, that our Notion of God, arises not from Nature and Reason, but

from the Art and Contrivance of *Politicians* ; That Argument itself forces them to confess, that 'tis manifestly for the Interest of Humane Society, that it should be believed there is a God. If they suppose that the World was made by *Chance*, and is every Moment subject to be destroyed by Chance again ; no Man can be so absurd as to contend, that 'tis as comfortable and desirable to live in such an

uncertain State of things, and
 * so continually liable to Ruin, without any Hope of Renovation ; as in a World that were under the Preservation and Conduct of a Powerful, Wise, and Good God. If they argue against the Being of God, from the *Faults* and Defects which they imagine they can find in the Frame and Constitution of the *Visible* and *Material* World ; this Suppositi-

* Maria ac Terras Cœlumq; —
 Una dies dabit exitio, multosq; per annos
 Sustentata ruet moles, & machina Mundi.
 — Dictis dabit ipsa fidem res
 Forsitan, & graviter terrarum motibus orbis
 Omnia conquassari in parvo tempore cernes.

Lucret Lib. 5.

on obliges them to acknowledge, that it would have been better the World had been made by an Intelligent and Wise Being, who might have prevented all Faults and Imperfections. If they argue against Providence, from the Faultiness and Inequality which they think they discover in the Management of the *Moral* World ; this is a plain Confession, that 'tis a thing more fit and desirable in itself, that the World should be governed by a Just and Good Being, than by mere Chance or Unintelligent Necessity. Lastly, if they suppose the World to be eternally and necessarily *Self-existent* ; and consequently that every thing in it is established by a Blind and Eternal Fatality ; no rational Man can at the same time deny, but that Liberty and Choice, or a Free Power of Acting, is a more eligible State, than to be determined

thus in all our Actions, as a Stone is to move downward, by an absolute and inevitable Fate. In word, which way soever they turn themselves, and whatever Hypothesis they make, concerning the Original and Frame of Things; Nothing is so certain and undeniable, as that *Man*, considered without the Protection and Conduct of a Superiour Being, is in a far worse Case; than upon Supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour. Man, of himself, is infinitely insufficient for his own Happiness: * *He is liable to many Evils and Miseries, which he can neither prevent nor redress: He is full of Wants which he cannot supply, and compassed about with Infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to Dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against: He is secure of nothing that he enjoys in this World, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for: He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never able to obtain, &c.* Under which evil Circumstances 'tis evident there can be no sufficient Support, but in the Belief of a Wise and Good God, and in the Hopes which true Religion affords. Whether therefore the Being and Attributes of God can be *demonstrated*, or not; it must at least be confessed by all rational and wise Men, to be a thing very *Desirable*, and which they would heartily *Wish* to be true, that there was a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to Govern the World.

Now the Use I desire to make of this Concession, is only this: That since the Men I am arguing with, are unavoidably obliged to confess, that 'tis a thing very *desirable at least*, that there should be a God; they must of necessity, upon their own Principles, be very willing, nay, desirous above all things, to be convinced that their present Opin-

* Archbp.
Tillotson's
Sermon on
Job xxviii.
28.

nion is an Error, and sincerely hope that the contrary may be demonstrated to them to be true; And consequently they are bound with all seriousness, attention and impartiality, to consider the weight of the Arguments, by which the Being and Attributes of God may be proved to them.

Scoffing at Religion, inexcusable.

Secondly, All such Persons as I am speaking of, who profess themselves to be Atheists, not upon any present Interest or Lust, but purely upon the Principles of Reason and Philosophy; are bound by these Principles to acknowledge, that all *mocking* and *scoffing* at Religion, all jesting and turning Arguments of Reason into Drollery and Ridicule, is the most unmanly and unreasonable thing in the World. And consequently they are obliged to exclude out of their Number, as Irrational and Self-condemned Persons, and unworthy to be argued with, all such Scoffers at Religion, who deride at all adventures without hearing Reason; and who will not use the Means, of being convinced and satisfied. Hearing the Reason of the Case with Patience and Unprejudicedness, is an Equity which Men owe to every *Truth* that can in any manner concern them; and which is necessary to the Discovery of *every Kind of Error*. How much more in things of the utmost Importance!

Virtue and good Manners absolutely necessary.

Thirdly, Since the Persons I am discoursing to, cannot but own, that the Supposition of the Being of God, is in it self most desirable, and for the benefit of the World, that it should be true; They must of Necessity grant further, that, supposing the Being and Attributes of God to be things not indeed Demonstrable to be true, but only *Possible*, and such as cannot be demonstrated to be false; as most certainly they cannot: And much more, supposing them once made to appear *Probable*, and but more likely to be true than the

Being and Attributes of G O D.

7

the contrary Opinion: Nothing is more evident, even upon these Suppositions only, than that Men ought in all reason to live *piously* and *virtuously* in the World; and that Vice and Immorality are, upon all Accounts, and under all Hypotheses, the most absurd and inexcusable Things in Nature.

Thus much being premised, which no Atheist who pretends to be a rational and fair Inquirer into Things, can possibly avoid granting; (and other Atheists, I have before said, are not to be disputed with at all; as being Enemies to *Reason*, no less than to *Religion*, and therefore absolutely Self-condemned:) I proceed now to the main Thing I at first propos'd; namely, to endeavour to show, to such considering Persons as I have already described, that the Being and Attributes of God are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly *demonstrable* to any unprejudiced Mind, from the most uncontestable Principles of Right Reason.

And here, because the Persons I am at present dealing with, must be supposed not to believe any Revelation, nor acknowledge any Authority which they will submit to, but only the bare force of Reasoning: I shall not, at this time, draw any Testimony from Scripture, nor make use of any sort of Authority, nor lay any stress upon any popular Arguments in the Matter before us; but confine my self to the Rules of strict and demonstrative Argumentation.

Now Many Arguments there are, by which the Being and Attributes of God have been undertaken to be *Demonstrated*. And perhaps most of those Arguments, if thoroughly understood, rightly stated, fully pursued, and duly separated from the false or uncertain Reasonings which have sometimes been intermix'd with them; would at length appear to be substantial and conclusive.

But because I would endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid all manner of perplexity and confusion; therefore I shall not at this Time use any Variety of Arguments, but endeavour by One clear and plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected and following one from another, to demonstrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the Necessary Attributes of his Nature, so far as by our Finite Reason we are enabled to discover and apprehend them. And because it is not to my present purpose to explain or illustrate things to Them that Believe, but only to convince Unbelievers, and settle Them that Doubt, by strict and undeniable Reasoning; therefore I shall not alledge any thing, which however really true and useful, may yet be liable to contradiction or dispute; but shall endeavour to urge Such Propositions only, as cannot be denied without departing from that Reason, which all Atheists pretend to be the Foundation of their Unbelief. Only it is absolutely Necessary before all Things, that they consent to lay aside all manner of *Prejudices*; and especially such as have been apt to arise from the too frequent Use of *Terms of Art*, which have no Ideas belonging to them; and from the common receiving certain *Maxims of Philosophy* as true, which at the Bottom seem to be only *Propositions without any Meaning or Signification at all*.

Something
must have
Existed
from Eter-
nity.

I. First then, it is Absolutely and Undeniably certain, that *Something has existed from all Eternity*. This is so evident and Undeniable a Proposition, that no Atheist in any Age has ever presumed to assert the contrary; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the proof of it. For since Something now Is, 'tis evident that Something always Was: Otherwise the Things that

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Now Are, must have been produced out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause : Which is a plain Contradiction in Terms. For, to say a Thing is *produced*, and yet that there is no *Cause* at all of that Production, is to say that Something is *Effected*, when it is *Effected by Nothing* ; that is, at the same time when it is *not Effected at all*. Whatever Exists, has a Cause, a Reason, a Ground of its Existence ; (a Foundation, on which its Existence relies ; a Ground or Reason why it doth *exist*, rather than *not exist* ;) either in the Necessity of its own Nature, and then it must have been *of it self Eternal* : Or in the Will of some Other Being ; and then That Other Being must, at least in the order of Nature and Causality, have Existed before it.

That *Something* therefore *has really Existed from Eternity*, is one of the certainest and most evident Truths in the World ; acknowledged by all Men, and disputed by none. Yet as to the *Manner* how it can be ; there is nothing in Nature more difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive, than this very first Plain and Self-evident Truth. For, *How any thing can have existed eternally* ; that is, *How an Eternal Duration can be now actually Past* ; is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow Understandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an express Contradiction can be imagined to be : And yet to deny the Truth of the Proposition, that *an Eternal Duration is now actually past* ; would be to assert *something still far more Unintelligible*, even a *real and express Contradiction*.

Of the Difficulty of Conceiving Eternity.

The Use I would make of this Observation, is This. That since in all Questions concerning the Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning any thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined ; though we can indeed Demonstrate certain Propositions to be true, yet 'tis impossible for

Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, not to be regarded,
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qual in all
Suppositi-
ons.*

us to comprehend or frame any adæquate or com-
pleat Ideas of the *Manner How* the Things so de-
monstrated can Be : Therefore when once any
Proposition is clearly demonstrated to be true ;
it ought not to disturb us, that there be perhaps
perplexing Difficulties on the other side, which
merely for want of adæquate Ideas of the *Man-
ner* of the Existence of the Things demonstrated,
are not easy to be cleared. Indeed, were it pos-
sible there should be any Proposition which could
equally be *Demonstrated* on *both sides* of the Que-
stion, or which could on *both sides* be *reduced* to
imply a Contradiction ; (as some have very incon-
siderately asserted ;) This, it must be confessed,
would alter the Case. Upon this absurd Suppo-
sition, all Difference of True and False, all
Thinking and Reasoning, and the Use of all our
Faculties would be entirely at an End. But when
to Demonstration on the one side, there are op-
posed on the other, only Difficulties raised from
our want of having adæquate Ideas of the Thing
themselves ; this ought not to be esteemed an Ob-
jection of any real Weight. 'Tis directly and
clearly *Demonstrable*, (and acknowledged to be
so, even by All Atheists that ever lived,) that *Some-
thing has been from Eternity* : All the Objections
therefore raised against the Eternity of any thing,
grounded merely on our want of having an adæ-
quate Idea of Eternity ; ought to be looked upon
as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like
Instances ; 'Tis *Demonstrable*, for example, that
Something must be actually infinite : All the Meta-
physical Difficulties therefore, which arise usually
from applying the Measures and Relations of
Things Finite, to what is Infinite ; and from sup-
posing *Finites* to be [Aliquot] *Parts of Infinite*,
when indeed they are not properly so, but only
as Mathematical Points to Quantity, which have

no Proportion at all : (and from imagining All Infinites to be *Equal*, when in things *disparate* they manifestly are *not* so ; an *infinite Line*, being not only *not equal to*, but *infinitely less* than an *infinite Surface*, and an *infinite Surface* than *Space infinite in all Dimensions* :) All Metaphysical Difficulties, I say, arising from false Suppositions of this Kind, ought to be esteemed vain and of no force. Again : 'Tis in like manner *Demonstrable*, that *Quantity is infinitely Divisible* : All the Objections therefore raised, by supposing the *Sums total of all Infinites* to be *Equal*, when in *disparate Parts* they manifestly are *not* so ; and by comparing the imaginary *Equality or Inequality of the Number* of the Parts of Unequal Quantities, whose Parts have really *no Number at all*, they all having Parts without *Number* ; ought to be look'd upon as weak and altogether inconclusive : To ask whether the Parts of unequal Quantities be *equal in Number* or not, when they have *no Number at all* ; being the same thing as to ask whether two Lines drawn from differently distant Points, and each of them continued infinitely, be *equal in length* or not, that is, whether they *End together*, when neither of them have any *End at all*.

II. *There has Existed from Eternity, * Some One* *Unchangeable and Independent Being.* For since Something must needs have been from Eternity ; as has been already proved, and is granted on all hands : Either there has always Existed some one Unchangeable and *Independent Being*, from which all other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe, have received their Original ; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and dependent

There must have existed from Eternity One Independent Being.

* The Meaning of this Proposition, (and all that the *Argument* here requires,) is, that there must needs have Always been *Some Independent Being, Some One at least.* To show that there can be *no More than One*, is not the Design of this Proposition, but of the *Seventh.*

Beings

Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, *without* any Original Cause at all. Now this latter Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism must in its Account of most things (as shall be shewn hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impossible, and *contradictory* to it self. I shall not argue against it from the *supposed* Impossibility of Infinite Succession, *barely and absolutely considered in it self*; for a Reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider such an infinite Progression, as *One* entire endless *Series* of *Dependent* Beings; 'tis plain this *whole Series* of *Beings* can have no Cause *from without*, of its Existence; because in it are supposed to be included *all Things* that are or ever were in the Universe. And 'tis plain it can have no Reason *within it self*, of its Existence; because no one Being in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self-existent or *Necessary*, (which is the only Ground or Reason of Existence of any thing that can be imagined *within the thing it self*, as will presently more fully appear,) but every one *Dependent* on the foregoing: And where *no Part* is necessary, 'tis manifest *the Whole* cannot be necessary: Absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an *extrinsick, relative, and accidental* Denomination; but an *inward and essential* Property of the Nature of the Thing which so Exists. An infinite Succession therefore of merely *Dependent* Beings, without any Original Independent Cause; is a *Series* of Beings, that has neither Necessity, nor Cause, nor any Reason or Ground *at all* of its Existence, either *within it self* or *from without*: That is, 'tis an express Contradiction and Impossibility; 'tis a supposing *Something* to be *caused*, (because it is granted in every one of its Stages of Succession, *not to be necessa-*

ity and of itself;) and yet that, in the whole, 'tis caused *absolutely* by *Nothing*. Which every Man knows is a Contradiction to imagine done *in Time*; and, because Duration in this Case makes no Difference, 'tis equally a Contradiction to suppose it done *from Eternity*. And consequently there must, *on the contrary*, of necessity have existed from Eternity, *some One Immutable and Independent Being*.

To suppose an *infinite Succession* of changeable and *dependent* Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, *without* any Original Cause at all; is only * a driving back from one step to another, and (as it were) removing out of Sight, the Question concerning the Ground or Reason of the Existence of Things. 'Tis in reality, and in point of Argument, the very same Supposition; as it would be to suppose *One continued Being*, of *beginningless* and endless Duration, neither self-existent

* This matter has been well illustrated, by a late able Writer.

" Suppose a *Chain* hung down
" out of the Heavens, from
" an *Unknown* Height; and,
" though Every link of it gra-
" vitated toward the Earth,
" and what it hung upon was
" not visible, yet it did not
" descend, but kept its situa-
" tion: And, upon This, a
" question should arise, *What*
" supported or kept up this

" Chain? Would it be a sufficient Answer, to say, that the *First* or *Lowest*
" Link hung upon the *Second*, or That next above it; the *Second*, or rather
" the *First and Second together*, upon the *Third*; and so on *in infinitum*?
" For, *What* holds up the *Whole*? A Chain of *ten links*, would fall down;
" unless something able to bear it, hindered. One of *Twenty*; if not staid
" by something of a yet Greater Strength, in proportion to the Increase of
" Weight. And therefore One of *infinite links*, certainly; if not sustained
" by Something *infinitely* strong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight.
" And Thus it is in a *Chain of Causes and Effects*; tending, or (as it were)
" gravitating, towards some End. The Last, or *Lowest*, depends, or (as
" one may say) is *suspended* upon the Cause above it. This again, if it be
" not the *First Cause*, is suspended, as an Effect, upon Something above
" it, &c. And if they should be *infinite*; unless (agreeably to what has
" been said) there is some Cause, upon which *All* hang or depend; they
" would be but an *infinite Effect* without an *Efficient*. And to assert there
" is any such Thing, would be as great an *Absurdity* as to say, that a *finite*
" or *little Weight* wants something to sustain it; but an *Infinite* one (or the
" *Greatest*) does not." *Religion of Nature delineated*, pag. 67.

and

and Necessary in itself, nor having its Existence founded in Any Self-existent Cause. Which is directly absurd and contradictory.

Otherwise, thus. Either there has always existed some One Unchangeable and *Independent* Being, from which all other Beings have received their Original; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and *dependent* Beings, produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all. According to this latter Supposition; there is Nothing, in the Universe, Self-Existent or Necessarily-existing. And if so; then it was originally *equally possible*, that from Eternity there should never have existed any thing at all; as that there should from Eternity have existed a Succession of changeable and dependent Beings. Which being supposed; then, *What* is it that has from Eternity determined such a Succession of Beings to exist, rather than that from Eternity there should never have existed any thing at all? *Necessity* it was not; because it was equally possible, in this Supposition, that they should not have existed at all. *Chance*, is nothing but a mere Word, without any Signification. And *Other Being* 'tis supposed there was none, to determine the Existence of these. Their Existence therefore was determined by *Nothing*; neither by any Necessity in the nature of the Things themselves, because 'tis supposed that none of them are Self-existent; nor by any other Being, because no other is supposed to Exist. That is to say; Of two *equally possible* things, (*viz.* whether *any thing* or *nothing* should from Eternity have existed,) the one is determined, rather than the other, *absolutely by Nothing*: Which is an express Contradiction. And consequently, as before, there must on the contrary, of Necessity have existed from Eternity,

some

existence is di- *some One* Immutable and Independent Being. Which, *what* it is, remains in the next place to be inquired.

III. *That unchangeable and independent Being; The One which has Existed from Eternity, without any external Cause of its Existence; must be Self-Existent, that is, Necessarily-existing.* For whatever Exists, must *Independent Being, must be necessarily Existing.* either have come into Being out of Nothing, absolutely without Cause; or it must have been produced by some External Cause; or it must be Self-Existent. Now to arise out of Nothing, absolutely without any Cause; has been already shown to be a plain Contradiction. To have been produced by some External Cause, cannot possibly be true of every thing; but something must have existed Eternally and Independently; As has likewise been shown already. It remains therefore, that That Being which has existed Independently from Eternity, must of Necessity be Self-existent. Now to be *Self-existent*, is not, to be *Produced by itself*; for that is an express Contradiction. But it is, (which is the only Idea we can frame of Self-existence; and without which, the word seems to have no Signification at all :) It is, I say, to *exist by an Absolute Necessity originally in the Nature of the Thing itself.* And this Necessity, must be *Antecedent*; not indeed in Time, to the Existence of the Being itself; because That is Eternal: But it must be *Antecedent* in the Natural Order of our Ideas, to our *Supposition* of its Being. That is; This Necessity must not barely be *consequent* upon our Supposition of the Existence of such a Being; (For then it would not be a Necessity *Absolutely* such in itself, nor be the Ground or Foundation of the Existence of any thing, being on the contrary only a Consequent of it;) But it must *antecedently* force itself upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are endeavouring

pag. 11,
 &c.

ing to suppose that no such Being Exists. For Example: When we are endeavouring to suppose that there is *no Being* in the Universe that exists Necessarily; we always find in our Minds, (besides the fore-going Demonstration of Something being Self-existent, from the *Impossibility of every Thing's being dependent*;) We always find in our Minds, I say, some Ideas, as of *Infinity* and *Eternity*; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no Being, no Substance in the Universe, to which these Attributes or Modes of Existence are necessarily inherent, is a Contradiction in the very Terms. For Modes and Attributes exist only by the Existence of the Substance to which they belong. Now he that can suppose Eternity and Immensity (and consequently the Substance by whose Existence these Modes or Attributes exist,) removed out of the Universe; may, if he please, as easily remove the Relation of Equality between twice two and four.

That to suppose *Immensity* removed out of the Universe, or not necessarily *Eternal*, is an *express contradiction*; is intuitively evident to every one who attends to his own Ideas, and considers

* Moveantur Partes Spatii
 de Locis suis, & movebuntur
 (ut ita dicam) de Seipsis.
 Newton. Princip. Lib. I. Schol.
 ad Definit. 8.

the Essential Nature of Things. To suppose * *any part* of Space removed, is to suppose it removed from and out of itself: And to suppose the *Whole* to be taken away, is supposing it to be taken

away from itself, that is, to be taken away while it still remains: Which is a *Contradiction in Terms*. There is no Obscurity in This Argument, but what arises to those who think *Immense Space* to be absolutely *Nothing*. Which Notion, is itself likewise an *express contradiction*. For *Nothing*, is That which has *No Properties or Modes whatsoever*. That is to say; 'tis That of which nothing can truly

ly be affirmed, and of which Every thing can truly be denied. Which is not the Case of Immensity or Space.

From this Third Proposition it follows,

1st, That the only true Idea of a Self-existent or *The true*
Necessarily Existing Being, is the Idea of a Being, *Notion of*
the Supposition of whose Not-existing is an express *Self-Exi-*
Contradiction. For since it is absolutely impossible *stence.*
but there must be Somewhat Self-existent; that *pag. 11,*
is, which exists by the Necessity of its own Na- *§ 15.*
ture; 'Tis plain that That necessity cannot be a
Necessity consequent upon any foregoing Suppo-
sition, (because Nothing can be Antecedent to
that which is Self-Existent, no not its own Will,
so as to be the Cause or Ground of its own Ex-
istence,) but it must be a Necessity absolutely such
in its own Nature. Now a Necessity, not rela-
tively or consequentially, but absolutely such in its
own Nature; is nothing else, but its being a plain
Impossibility or implying a Contradiction to sup-
pose the contrary. For Instance: The Relation
of Equality between twice two and four, is an
absolute Necessity; only because 'tis an immedi-
ate Contradiction in Terms to suppose them une-
qual. This is the only Idea we can frame, of
an absolute Necessity; and to use the word in
any other Sense, seems to be using it without any
Signification at all.

If any One now asks, what sort of Idea the I-
dea of that Being is, the Supposition of whose
Not-Existing is thus an express Contradiction: I
answer, 'tis the first and Simplest Idea we can
possibly frame; an Idea necessarily and essentially
included or presupposed, as a *sine quâ non*, in eve-
ry other Idea whatsoever; an Idea, which (unless
we forbear thinking at all) we cannot possibly ex-
tirpate or remove out of our Minds; of a most sim-
ple Being, absolutely Eternal and Infinite, Original and
Independent,

Independent. For, that he who supposes there no *Original Independent* Being in the Universe, supposes a Contradiction; has been shown already. And that he who supposes there may possibly no *Eternal* and *Infinite* Being in the Universe supposes likewise a Contradiction, is evident from hence; (besides that these two Attributes do necessarily follow from Self-originate Independent Existence, as shall be shown hereafter;) that when he has done his utmost, in endeavouring to imagine that no such Being Existeth, he cannot avoid imagining an *Eternal* and *Infinite* † *Nothing*; that is, he cannot

† See the Answer to a Seventh Letter, at the End of this Book.

* page 16. they still continue there. As has been above distinctly explained.

The Error of the Cartesians,

This Argument the *Cartesians*, who suppose the Idea of *Immensify* to be the Idea of *Matter*, have been greatly perplexed with. For, (however in Words they have contradicted themselves yet in Reality) they have more easily been drawn to that most intolerable Absurdity, of asserting

* *Puto implicare contradictionem, ut Mundus sit finitus: i. e. I think it implies a Contradiction, for the World to be finite. Cartes. Epist. 69. primæ partis.*

And his Follower Mr. *Regis*, *Mais peut être* (saith he) *que je raisonne mal*, &c. i. e. But perhaps I argue ill, when I conclude that the Property my Idea hath to represent Extension, [that is, in the sense of the Cartesians, *Matter*;] comes from Extension it self, as its Cause. For, What hinders me from believing that

Matter * to be a Necessary Being; than been able to remove out of their Minds the Idea of *Immensify*, as Existing Necessary and inseparably from *Eternity*. Which Absurdity and inextinguishable Perplexity of theirs, in respect of the Idea of *Immensify*, shews that they found *That* indeed to be Necessary and impossible to be removed; But, in respect of *Matter*, 'twas only a false applying an Idea to an Object, whereto it no ways belongs.

For, that 'tis indeed absolutely impossible and contradictory to suppose *Matter* necessarily-existing, shall be demonstrated presently.

if this Property comes not from my self, yet at least it may come from some Spirit [*or Being*] Superiour to me, which produces in me the Idea of Extension, though Extension does not actually exist? Yet when I consider

the thing attentively, I find that my Conclusion is good; and that no Spirit [*or Being*] how excellent soever, can cause the Idea which I have of Extension, to represent to me Extension rather than any thing else, if Extension does not actually exist; Because if he should do so, the Idea which I should then have of Extension, would not be a representation of *Extension*, but a representation of *Nothing*. Which is impossible.

But it may be I still deceive my self, when I say that the Idea I have of Extension, supposes an Object actually existing. For it seems that I have Ideas, which do not suppose any Object: I have, for Example, the Idea of an Enchanted Castle; though no such thing really Exists. Yet when I consider the Difficulty still more attentively; I find there is this difference between the Idea of Extension, and that of an Enchanted Castle; that the first being natural, that is, independent on my Will, supposes an Object which is necessarily such as it represents; whereas the other being artificial, supposes indeed an Object, but 'tis not necessary that That Object be absolutely such as the Idea represents, because my Will can add to that Object, or diminish from it, as it pleases; as I have before said, and as shall be proved hereafter, when I come to treat of the Origin of Ideas. *Regis Metaphys. Lib. I. Par. 1. Cap. 3.*

2dly, From hence it follows; that *there is no Nothing so Man whatsoever, who makes any use of his Reason, certain as but may easily become more certain of the Being of a the Existence of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of any Supreme independent Cause.* For how much Thought soever it may require to demonstrate the Other Attributes of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest Mathematical Certainties; (of which more hereafter :) Yet, as to its Existence; that there *Is* somewhat Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existing, which must be the Cause and Origin of all other Things; this is one of the First and most natural Conclusions, that any Man, who thinks at all, can frame in his Mind: And no Man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four.

A Demonstration of the

'Tis impossible indeed a Man may in some sense be ignorant of this first and plain Truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all: (For though it is absolutely impossible for him to imagine the Contrary, yet he may possibly neglect to conceive this: Though no Man can possibly Think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not.) But this I say: There is no Man, who thinks or reasons at all, but may easily become more certain, that there is Something Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existing; than he can be certain of any thing else.

*Of the
Idea of
God, in-
cluding
Self-Ex-
istence.*

3dly. Hence we may observe, that Our *firm Certainty of the Existence of God, does not arise from this, that in the Idea our Minds frame of him (or rather in the Definition that we make of the word, God, as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections,) we include Self-Existence: But from hence, that 'tis demonstrable both negatively, that neither can all Things possibly have arisen out of Nothing, nor can they have depended one on another in an endless Succession; and also positively, that there is Something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Not-Existence plainly implies a Contradiction.* The Argument which has by Some been drawn from our including Self-Existence in the *Idea* of God, or comprehending it in the *Definition* or *Notion* in the frame of him; has *This Obscurity and Defect* in it: that it seems to extend only to the *Nominal Idea* or *mere Definition* of a Self-Existent Being, and does not with a sufficiently evident Connection refer and apply That *general Nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion* which we frame in our *own Mind*, to any *Real* particular Being *actually existing without us*. For it is not Satisfactory, that we have in my Mind an *Idea of the Proposition; That*

exists a Being indued with all possible Perfections :
 Or, *There is a Self-Existent Being.* But I must al-
 so have some Idea of the Thing. I must have
 an Idea of Something actually existing without
 me. And I must see wherein consists the Abso-
 lute Impossibility of removing that Idea, and con-
 sequently of supposing the Non-Existence of
 the Thing; before I can be satisfied from that
 Idea, that the thing actually exists. The bare
 having an Idea of the Proposition, *There is a Self-
 Existent Being*, proves indeed the Thing not to be
 impossible; (For of an impossible Proposition,
 there can be no Idea;) But that it actually Is,
 cannot be proved from the Idea; unless the Cer-
 tainty of the Actual Existence of a Necessarily-
 existing Being, follows from the Possibility of the
 Existence of such a Being: Which that it does in
 this particular Case, many Learned Men have in-
 deed thought; and their subtil Arguings upon
 this Head, are sufficient to raise a Cloud not very
 easy to be seen through. But it is a much Clear-
 er and more Convincing way of Arguing, to de-
 monstrate that there does actually exist without
 us a Being, whose Existence is necessary and of
 it self; by showing the evident Contradiction
 contained in the contrary Supposition, (as I have page 11,
 before done;) and at the same time the absolute &c.
 Impossibility of destroying or removing some I-
 deas, as of Eternity and Immensity, which there- page 16.
 fore must needs be Modes or Attributes of a ne-
 cessary Being actually Existing. For if I have
 in my Mind an Idea of a Thing, and cannot
 possibly in my Imagination take away the Idea of
 that Thing as actually existing, any more than I
 can change or take away the Idea of the Equality
 of twice two to four; the Certainty of the Existence
 of that Thing is the same, and stands on the
 same Foundation, as the Certainty of the other
 C 3 Relation.

Relation. For the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, has no other Certainty but this; that I cannot, without a Contradiction, change or take away the Idea of that Relation. We are *Certain* therefore of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause; because 'tis strictly demonstrable, that there is something in the Universe actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Not-existing plainly implies a Contradiction.

* See the Answer to a Seventh Letter at the End of this Book.

Some Writers have contended, that 'tis *preposterous* to inquire in this manner *at all* into the Ground or Reason of the Existence of the First Cause: Because evidently the First Cause can have nothing Prior to it, and consequently must necessarily (they think) exist *absolutely without any Cause at all*. That the First Cause can have no Other Being prior to it, to be the Cause of its Existence; is indeed Self-evident. But if *originally, absolutely, and antecedently* to all Supposition of existence, there be no necessary Ground or Reason why the first Cause does exist, rather than *not exist*; If the First Cause can rightly and truly be affirmed to exist, *absolutely without Any Ground or Reason of existence at all*: It will unavoidably follow, by the same Argument, that it may as well Cease likewise to exist, *without any Ground or Reason of Ceasing to exist*: Which is absurd. The Truth therefore plainly is: Whatever is the True Reason, why the First Cause can never possibly Cease to exist; the Same is, and originally and always was, the True Reason why it always did and cannot but exist: That is, 'tis the True Ground and Reason of its Existence.

That the Material World cannot possibly be the Self-Existent Being.

4thly. From hence it follows, that The Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent, and of it self Eternal. For since it hath been already demonstrated, that Whatever Being hath Existed from Eternity, Independent, and without any External Cause or

its Existence, must be Self-Existent; and that pag. 15.
 Whatever is Self-Existent, must Exist Necessarily
 by an absolute Necessity in the Nature of the
 Thing itself: It follows evidently, that unless the
 Material World Exists Necessarily by an Absolute
 Necessity in its own Nature, so as that it must be
 an Express Contradiction to suppose it not to Ex-
 ist; it cannot be Independent, and of itself Eter-
 nal. Now that the Material World does not Ex-
 ist thus necessarily, is very Evident. For abso-
 lute Necessity of Existing, and a Possibility of
 not Existing, being contradictory Idea's; 'tis ma-
 nifest the Material World cannot Exist Necessari-
 ly, if without a Contradiction we can Conceive
 it either *Not to Be*, or to be in any respect *other-*
wise than it Now is. Than which, nothing is more
 easy. For whether we consider the *Form* of the
 World, with the *Disposition* and *Motion* of its Parts;
 or whether we consider the *Matter* of it, as such,
 without respect to its present Form; Every Thing
 in it, both the *Whole* and every one of its *Parts*,
 their *Situation* and *Motion*, the *Form* and also the
Matter, are the most Arbitrary and Dependent
 Things, and the farthest removed from Necessity,
 that can possibly be imagined. A Necessity in-
 deed of *Fitness*, that is, a Necessity that Things
 should be as they are, in order to the *Well-being* of
 the whole, there may be in all these Things: But
 an absolute Necessity of *Nature* in any of them,
 (which is what the Atheist must maintain,) there is
 not the least appearance of. If any Man will say in
 This sense, (as every Atheist must do,) either that
 the *Form* of the World, or at least the *Matter* and
Motion of it, is necessary; Nothing can possibly be
 invented more Absurd.

If he says, that the particular *Form* is Necessa-
 ry; that is, that the World, and all Things that
 are The Form of
the World
not neces-
sary.

are therein, exist by Necessity of Nature; he must affirm it to be a Contradiction to suppose that any Part of the World can be in any respect *otherwise* than it now is. It must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose *more* or *fewer* Stars, *more* or *fewer* Planets, or to suppose their *Size*, *Figure* or *Motion*, Different from what it now is; or to suppose *more* or *fewer* Plants and Animals upon Earth, or the present ones of different *Shape* and *Bigness* from what they now are. In all which things there is the greatest Arbitrariness, in respect of Power and Possibility, that can be imagined; however necessary any of them may be, in respect of Will, and Preservation of the Beauty and Order of the whole.

Nor its
Motion.

If the Atheist will say, that the *Motion in General* of all Matter is necessary; it follows that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at *Rest*. Which is so absurd and ridiculous, that I think hardly any Atheists, either Antient or Modern, have presumed directly to suppose it.

* Mr. Toland, Lett. III.

One late * Author indeed has ventur'd to assert and pretended to prove, that *Motion*, (that is the *Conatus* to *Motion*, the *Tendency* to move, the *Power* or *Force* that produces actual Motion,) is *essential* to all Matter. But how Philosophically may appear from this One Consideration. The *essential Tendency to Motion*, of every one, or of any one Particle of Matter in this Author's imaginary infinite *Plenum*, must be either a *Tendency* to move some *one* determinate way at once, or to move *every* way at once. A *Tendency* to move some *one* determinate way, cannot be *essential* to any Particle of Matter, but must arise from some External Cause; because there is nothing in the pretended necessary Nature of any Particle,

to determine its Motion necessarily and essentially *one way* rather than *another*. And a *Tendency* or *Conatus* equally to move *every way* at once, is either an absolute Contradiction, or at least could produce nothing in Matter, but an *Eternal Rest* of all and every one of its Parts.

If the Atheist will suppose Motion necessary and essential to *some* Matter, but not to *all*: The same Absurdity, as to the *Determination* of Motion, still follows: And now he *moreover* supposes an Absolute Necessity *not Universal*; that is, that it shall be a Contradiction to suppose some certain Matter at Rest, tho' at the same time some other Matter actually be at Rest.

If he only affirms bare *Matter* to be Necessary: *Nor the bare Matter.* Then, besides the extreme Folly of attributing *Motion* and the *Form* of the World to *Chance*; (which senseless Opinion I think All Atheists have now given up; and therefore I shall not think myself obliged to take any Notice of it in the Sequel of this Discourse:) it may be demonstrated by many Arguments drawn from the Nature and Affections of the Thing itself, that *Matter* is not a *necessary Being*. For Instance, Thus. *Tangibility* or *Resistance*, (which is what Mathematicians very properly call *Vis inertiae*,) is *essential* to *Matter*. Otherwise the word, *Matter*, will have *no determinate* Signification. *Tangibility* therefore, or *Resistance*, belonging to *All Matter*; it follows evidently, that if *All Space* were filled with *Matter*, the *Resistance* of *All Fluids* (for the *Resistance* of the *Parts* of *Hard Bodies* arises from Another Cause) would necessarily be *Equal*. For greater or less degrees of *Fineness* or *Subtilty*, can in this case make no Difference: Because the *smaller* or *finer* the parts of the Fluid are, wherewith any particular Space is filled, the *greater* in proportion is

is the *Number* of the parts ; and consequently the *Resistance* still always Equal. But Experience shows on the contrary, that the *Resistance* of All *Fluids* is not equal : There being large Spaces, in which no sensible *Resistance* at all is made to the swiftest and most lasting Motion of the solidest Bodies. Therefore *All Space* is not filled with *Matter* ; but, of necessary Consequence, there must be a *Vacuum*.

Or Thus. It appears from Experiments of falling Bodies, and from Experiments of *Pendulums*, which (being of equal Lengths and unequal Gravities) vibrate in equal Times ; that All Bodies whatsoever, in Spaces void of sensible *Resistance* fall from the same Height with equal Velocities. Now 'tis evident, that whatever Force causes unequal Bodies to move with equal Velocities, must be proportional to the Quantities of the Bodies moved. The Power of Gravity therefore in All Bodies, is (at equal Distances suppose from the Center of the Earth) proportional to the Quantity of Matter contained in each Body. For if in a Pendulum there were any Matter that did not gravitate proportionally to its Quantity, the *vis inertiae* of that Matter would retard the Motion of the rest, so as soon to be discovered in Pendulums of equal Lengths and unequal Gravities in Spaces void of sensible *Resistance*.

* Neutoni Princip. Philosoph. Edit. 1ma. p. 304. Edit. 2da, p. 272. Edit. 3tia, p. 294.

† Neutoni Princip. Philosoph. Edit. 1ma, p. 411. Edit. 2da, p. 368.

Gravity therefore is in all Bodies proportional to the Quantity of their Matter. And consequently all Bodies not being equally heavy it follows again necessarily, that there must be a *Vacuum*.

Now if there be a *Vacuum* it follows plainly, that *Matter* is not a Necessary Being. For if a *Vacuum* actually be, then 'tis evidently more than possible

ible for Matter *not to Be*. If an Atheist will yet Assert, that Matter may be necessary, though not necessary to be *every where*: I answer, this is an exprefs Contradiction. For *absolute* Necessity, is absolute Necessity *every where alike*. And if it be no Impossibility for Matter to be absent from *one* Place, 'tis no Impossibility (absolutely in the Nature of the Thing; For no Relative or Consequential Necessity, can have any Room in this Argument:) 'Tis no absolute Impossibility, I say, in the Nature of the Thing, that Matter should be absent from any *other* Place, or from *every* Place.

Spinoza's
Opinion
confuted.

Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our Time; who taught that * there is no Difference of Substances, but that the Whole and every Part of *the Material World* is a Necessarily-existing Being; and that † there is no other God, but the Universe: That he might seemingly avoid the manifold Absurdities of that Opinion; endeavours by an Ambiguity of Expression in the Progress of his Discourse, to elude the Arguments by which he foresaw his Assertion would be confuted. For, having first plainly asserted, that † All Substance is Necessarily-existing; he would afterward seem to explain it away, by asserting, that the *Reason why* every thing † exists necessarily and could not possibly have been in any respect different from what it now is, is

* Una substantia non potest
produci ab alia substantia.
Ethic. Par I. Prop 6.

Omnis substantia est necessa-
rio infinita. *Ibid. Prop. 8.*

Ad naturam substantiæ per-
tinet existere. *Ibid. Prop. 7.*

† Præter Deum nulla dari
neq; concipi potest substantia.
Ibid. Prop. 14.

† Ad naturam substantiæ
pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

† Res nullo alio modo, neq;
alio ordine a Deo produci po-
tuerunt, quam productæ sunt.
Prop 33.

Ex Necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

because

because every thing flows from the *Necessity* of the *Divine Nature*. By which if the unwary Reader understands, that he means things are *therefore* Necessarily such as they are, because Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could not possibly make Things but in that Order which is Fittest and Wisest in the Whole; he is very much mistaken. For such a Necessity is not a Natural, but only a Moral and Consequential Necessity, and directly contrary to the Author's true Intention. Further; if the Reader hereby understands, that God was determined, not by a Necessity of Wisdom and Goodness, but by a mere Natural Necessity, exclusive of Will and Choice, to make Things just as they now are; neither is This the whole of *Spinoza's* meaning: For This, as absurd as it is, is still supposing God as a Substance distinct from the material World; Which * He expressly denies. Nay further; if any one thinks his meaning to be, that all *Substances* in the World are only *Modifications* of the *Divine Essence*; neither is This *All*; For thus God may still be supposed as an Agent, acting upon *himself* at least and manifesting *himself* in different manners, ac-

* *Locis supra citatis.*

† Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. *Prop. 32. Corol. 1. & Scholium ad Prop. 17.*

cording to his own Will: Which *Spinoza* expressly denies. But his true Meaning therefore, however darkly and ambiguously he sometimes speaks, must be this; and if he means any thing at all consistent with himself, can be no other than this: That, since 'tis absolutely * impossible for any thing to be created or produced by another; and † also absolutely impossible for God to have caused any thing to be in any respect different from what it now is; every thing that exists, must

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. *Prop. 6.*

† Res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci poterunt quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

need

needs be so a Part † of the Divine Substance, not as a Modification caused in it by any * Will or Good-Pleasure or Wisdom in the whole, but as of Absolute Necessity in itself, with respect to the † manner of the Existence of each Part, no less than with respect to the Self-existence of the whole. Thus the Opinion of *Spinoza*, when expressed plainly and consistently, comes evidently to this: That *the Material World*, and every Part of it, with the *order* and *manner* of *Being* of each Part, is the only Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing Being. And now Consequently, he must of Necessity affirm all the Conclusions, which I have before shown to follow demonstrably from that Opinion. He cannot possibly avoid affirming, that 'tis a Contradiction, (not to the *Perfections* of God; For that's mere senseless Cant and Amusement in Him who maintains that there is but One Substance in the Universe; But he must affirm that 'tis *in itself* and *in Terms* a Contradiction,) for any thing to be, or to be imagined, in any respect otherwise than it now is. He must say 'tis a Contradiction, to suppose the *Number*, or *Figure*, or *Order* of the several Parts of the World, could possibly have been different from what they now are. He must say, Motion is necessarily *of itself*; and consequently that 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest: Or else he must affirm, (which is rather the more absurd of the two; as may appear from what has been already said in proof of the *Second* General Head of *page 11.* this Discourse: And yet he has * chosen to affirm it;) that Motion, as a Dependent Being, has been eternally communicated from one piece of Matter

† Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia: *Prop. 14.*

* Deum non operari ex Libertate voluntatis. *Prop. 32. Corol. 1.*

† Nullo alio *Modo*, neque *Ordine*, &c.

* Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad mo-

rum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

to another; without having at any Original Cause of its Being either within itself or from without. Which, with other the like

Consequences touching the Necessity

of the Existence of Things; (the very mention of which, is a sufficient Confutation of an Opinion they follow from;) do, as I have said, unavoidably follow from the fore-mentioned Opinion of Spinoza. And consequently That Opinion, viz. *That the Universe or Whole World is the Self-existent or Necessarily-existing Being*, is demonstrated to be false.

I have in this Attempt to show that *The Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent, and Self-existing*, designedly omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility, in the Nature of the Thing itself, of the World's being *Eternal*, or having existed thro' an Infinite Succession of Time. And this I have done in the two following Reasons.

Of the Opinion concerning the Eternity of the World.

1st. Because the Question between us and the Atheists, is not *whether the World can possibly be eternal; but whether it can possibly be the Original, Independent and Self-existing Being*: Which is a very different Question. For many, who have affirmed the One, have still utterly denied the Other. And almost all the Antient Philosophers that held the *Eternity* of the World, whose Authority and Reasons our Modern Atheists do so greatly boast and triumph; defend That their Opinion by such Arguments, as show plainly that they did by no means thereby intend to assert, that the Material World was the *Original, Independent, Self-existing Being*, in Opposition to the Belief of the Existence of a Supreme

All-governing *Mind*, which is the Notion of God. So that the Deniers of the Being of God, have no manner of Advantage from that Opinion of the *Eternity* of the World, even supposing it could not be disproved. Almost all the old Philosophers, I say, who held the *Eternity* of the World, did not thereby mean (at least their Arguments do not tend to prove) that it was *Independent* and Self-Existent; but their Arguments are wholly levelled, either to prove barely that *Something* must needs be Eternal, and that the *Universe* could not possibly arise out of Nothing absolutely and without Cause; which is all that *Ocellus Lucanus's* Arguments amount to: Or else that the World is an Eternal and Necessary *Effect*, flowing from the Essential and Immutable Energy of the Divine Nature; which seems to have been *Aristotle's* Opinion: Or else that the World is an Eternal Voluntary Emanation from the All-wise and Supreme Cause; which was the Opinion of many of *Plato's Followers*. None of which Opinions or Arguments, will in the least help out our Modern Atheists; who would exclude Supreme *Mind* and Intelligence out of the *Universe*. For, however the Opinion of the *Eternity* of the World, is really inconsistent with the Belief of its being Created in time; yet so long as the Defenders of that Opinion, either did not think it Inconsistent with the Belief of the World's being the *Effect* and *Work* of an *Eternal, All-wise, and All-Powerful Mind*; or at least could defend that Opinion by such Arguments only, as did not in the least prove the Self-existence or *Independency* of the World, but most of them rather quite the contrary; 'tis with the greatest Injustice and Unreasonableness in the World, that Modern Atheists (to whose purpose the *Eternity* or *Non-Eternity* of the World would signify nothing, unless

unless at the same time the Existence and Sovereignty of Eternal Intelligence or Mind were likewise disproved,) pretend either the Authority or the Reasons of these Men to be on this side.

Ocellus Lucanus, one of the ancientest Authors of the Eternity of the World; (whose Authority and Authority * Mr. Blount opposes to that of *Moses*;) in delivering his Opinion, speaks

* *Oracles of Reason*; Letter to Mr. Gildon, p. 216.

deed like one that believed the Material World

† Ἀγέννητον τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἀνάλε-
θρον.

Ἀναρχον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον.

Κόσμον αὐτὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αἰδώς
ἔστι καὶ αὐτοτελής, ἃ ἀφαιμένων τ'
πάντα αἰῶνα.

Αἰὶ ὂντι τῷ κόσμῳ, ἀναγ-
καῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ συνυπάρ-
χειν. Λέγω ὃ μέρη οὐρανὸν, γῆν,
&c. *Ocell. Lucan. Περὶ τῷ*
παντὸς φύσεως.

his Arguments or Reasons for his Opinion; they are either so very absurd and ridiculous, that even any *Atheist* in this Age ought to be ashamed

* Τὸ ἀναρχον ἔ ἀτελεύτητον
τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τῆς κινήσεως
πιστῆται, διότι ἀγεννητὸν ὁ κόσ-
μος καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν ἥτε γὰρ τοῦ
σχήματος ἰδέα, κύκλῳ. ἔστι ὃ
παντοθεν ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον, διόπερ
ἀναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος. ἢ τε τῆς
κινήσεως, &c. *Ibid.*

Thus Translated: Nay, that the Figure, Motion, &c. thereof, are without Beginning and End; thereby it plainly appears, that the World admitteth neither Production nor Dissolution. For the Figure is Spherical, and conse-

to repeat them; as when he proves * that the World must needs be Eternal, without Beginning and End, because both its Figure and Motion are a Circle, which is neither Beginning nor End: If else they are such Arguments as prove only, what no Man ever really denied; viz. that Something must needs be Eternal, because 'tis impossible for every thing to arise out of Nothing, or to fall into Nothing; As when

he says * that the World must have been Eternal, because 'tis a Contradiction for the Universe to have had a Beginning; since if it had a Beginning, it must have been caused by Some other thing, and then it is not the Universe. To which One Argument, all that he says in his whole Book, is plainly reducible. So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only this; that there must needs be an Eternal Being in the Universe: and not, that Matter is Self-Existent, in Opposition to Intelligence and Mind. For, all that he asserts about the absolute Necessity of the Order and Parts of the World, is confessedly most ridiculous: not at all proved by the Arguments he alledges: And in some Passages of this very Book, as well as in other Fragments, he himself supposes, and is forced expressly to confess, that, however Eternal and Necessary every thing in the World be imagined to be; yet even That Necessity must flow from an * *Eternal and Intelligent Mind*, the necessary Perfections of whose Nature are the Cause † of the Harmony and Beauty of the World, and particularly of Mens having || *Faculties, Organs of Sense, Appetites, &c.* fitted even to *Final Causes*.

διδοῖται συμβέλλειν, ἀλλά, &c. *Idem.* Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντός φύσεως.

Aristotle likewise, was a great Asserter indeed of the Eternity of the World: But not in Opposition to the Belief of the Being, or of the Power, Wisdom, or Goodness of God. On the contrary, He for no other Reason asserted the World to be Eternal, but because he fancied that such

quently on every side equal, and therefore without Beginning or Ending. Also the Motion is circular, &c. *Oracles of Reason*, p. 215.

* Ἀγεννητὸν τὸ πᾶν.—ἐξ ὧς ᾧ γέγονεν, ἐκείνο πρῶτον τοῦ παντός ἐστι.—Τὸ γὰρ ὅτι πᾶν γενόμενον σὺν πᾶσι γίνεται, καὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ ἀδύνατον.—Ἐκτὸς ᾧ τοῦ Παντός, οὐδὲν. *Ocell. Ibid.*

* Τὸ ἀκίνητον θεῖον μὲν, καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἑμφρον. *Ocell. Luc. de Leg. fragm.*

† Συνέχει τὸν κόσμον ἀρμονία. Ταύτης δ' αἰτίας ὁ Θεός. *Ibid.*

|| Τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰς ὁρέξεις ὑπὸ Θεοῦ δεδομένας, ἀνθρώποις, οὐχ ἡδουῆς ἐνεκα

an Effect must needs eternally proceed from such an Eternal Cause. And so far was he from teaching, that Matter is the first and Original Cause of all Things; that, on the contrary, he every where

expressly describes God to be an * *Intelligent Being*: † *Incorporeal*; || *The First Mover of all Things, Himself Immoveable*; and affirms, that † *if there were no thing but Matter in the World, there would be no Original Cause, but an infinite Progression of Causes*; which is absurd.

* Νοῦς.
† Θεὸν ἀσώματος ἀπέφηνε,
Diog. in vita Aristot.
|| Τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν, ἀκίνητον,
Aristot. Metaph.
† Εἰ μὴ ἔσαι παρὰ τὰ αἰοδι-
τὰ ἄλλα, ὅτε ἔσαι ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις,
ἀλλ' αὖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή. *Ibid.*

pag. 25.

As to those Philosophers, who taught plainly and expressly, that Matter was not only Eternal, but also *Self-existent* and intirely Independent, co-existing from Eternity with God, independently, as a Second Principle: I have already shown the Impossibility of this Opinion, at the Entrance upon the present Head of Discourse, where I proved that *Matter* could not possibly be *Self-Existent*. And I shall further demonstrate it to be False, when I come to prove the *Unity* of the *Self-existent Being*.

Plato, whatever his Opinion was about the original *Matter*, very largely and fully declares his Sentiments about the *Formation* of the World viz. That it was composed and framed by an *Intelligent and wise God*. And there is no one of all the Antient Philosophers, who does in all his

Writings speak so excellently and worthily * as He, concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. Yet as to the *Time* of the World beginning to be Formed, he seems to make it indefinite, when he says † *The World must needs have an Eternal Resemblance of the Eternal*

* Ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦδε τῷ πάντῳ.
Ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν, καὶ θεοὺς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν ἑρανῶ καὶ τὰ ἐν αἰθέρι, καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἐργασάμενος.
† Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τοῦδε κόσμου, εἰκόνα τινος εἶναι. *Plato in Timæo. Which Words being very*

not Idea. At least his Followers afterward so understood and explained it, as if, by the Creation of the World, was not to be understood a Creation in Time * ; but only an Order of Nature, Causality and Dependence : That is, that the Will of God, and his Power of Acting, being necessarily as Eternal as his Essence ; † the Effects of That Will and Power might be supposed coæval to the Will and Power themselves ; in the same manner, as Light would eternally proceed from the Sun, or a Shadow from the interposed Body, or an Impression from an imposed Seal, if the respective Causes of these Effects were supposed Eternal.

eos esse cœpisse, & habere initium — Verum id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt [Platonici ;] non esse hoc videlicet Temporis, sed Substitutionis initium. *Ibid. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.*

Sed mundum quidem fuisse semper, Philosophia auctor est ; conditore quidem Deo, sed non ex tempore. *Macrob. in Somn. Scip. Lib. 2. Cap. 10.*

Καὶ ἐν βέλαι, παραδείγματι σὲ τινι τῶν γνωρίμων ξαναγῆσω πρὸς τὸ ζητῆμα. ὅτι καθάπερ αἰτιῶν τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἐκάς σκιάς γίνεται ὁμοχρονὸν ὃ τῷ σώματι ἢ σκιά, καὶ οὐχ ὁμότιμον. ἔγω δὲ καὶ ὁδε ὁ κόσμος παρακολουθεῖ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ συναϊδὸς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, ἕκτε ὃ ὁμοτίμον. *Zacharia Scholast. Disputat.*

Sicut enim, inquiunt [Platonici,] si Pes ex æternitate semper fuisset in p[re]sente, semper ei subesset vestigium ; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret ; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab alio factum esset : Sic, inquiunt, & mundus atq; in illo D[omi]ni creati, & semper existant, semper existente qui fecit ; & tamen facti sunt. *Augustin de Civit. Dei. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.*

From all which, it plainly appears how little Reason Modern Atheists have to boast either of the Authority or Reasons of those Antient Philosophers who held the Eternity of the World.

very imperfect in our Copies of the Original, are thus rendred by Cicero. Si ergo generatus [est mundus ;] ad id effectus est, quod ratione sapientiaq; comprehenditur, atq; immutabili æternitate continetur. Ex quo efficitur, ut sit necesse hunc quem cernimus mundum, simulacrum æternum esse alicujus æterni. Cic. de Univerf.

* Νοῦν πρὸ κόσμου εἶναι, οὐχ ὡς χρόνον πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κόσμος παρὰ νοῦ ἐστὶ, φύσει πρότερον ἐκείνου καὶ αἰτίον τούτου. *Plotinus.*

Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum volunt Temporis habere, sed suæ Creationis initium ; ut, modo quodam vix intelligibili, Semper sit factus. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei. Lib. 11. Cap. 4.*

De mundo, & de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicit

For since these Men neither proved, nor attempted to prove, that the Material World was Original to itself, Independent or Self-existing; but only that it was an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Cause which is God: 'tis evident that this their Opinion even supposing it could by no means be refuted could afford no manner of Advantage to the Cause of Atheists in our days, who, excluding Supreme Mind and Intelligence out of the Universe, would make mere Matter and Necessity the Original and Eternal Cause of all Things.

2dly, The other Reason why (in this Attempt to prove that *the Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent and Self-Existent*;) I have omitted the Argument usually drawn from the *supposed* absolute Impossibility of the World's being Eternal, or having existed through an Infinite Succession of Time, is, *because that Argument can never be so stated, to be of any Use in Convincing or Affecting the Mind of an Atheist*, who must not be supposed to come prepared beforehand with any transcendent Idea of the Eternity of God. For since an Atheist cannot be supposed to believe the Nice and Subtle (and indeed unintelligible) Distinctions of the Schools; 'tis impossible by this Argument to disprove the Possibility of the Eternity of the World, but that an Atheist will understand it to prove equally against the Possibility of a Thing's being Eternal; and consequently that it proves nothing at all, but is only a Difficulty arising from our not being able to comprehend adequately the Notion of Eternity. That the Material World is *not* Self-Existent or Necessarily Existing, but the Product of some distinct superior Agent, may (as I have already shown)

strictly demonstrated by bare Reason against the most obstinate Atheist in the World. But the *Time when* the world was created; or whether its Creation was, properly speaking, *in Time*; is not so easy to demonstrate strictly by bare Reason, (as appears from the Opinions of many of the Antient Philosophers concerning that Matter;) but the Proof of it can be taken only from Revelation. To endeavour to prove, that there cannot possibly be any such thing as *infinite Time* or *Space*, from the Impossibility of an * Addition * Cud. of Finite Parts ever composing or exhausting an worth's Infinite: or from the imaginary *inequality of the System*, Number of Years, Days, and Hours, that would 2. 643. be contained in the one; or of the Miles, Yards, and Feet, that would be contained in the other: is supposing Infinites to be made up of *Numbers* of Finites; that is, 'tis supposing Finite Quantities to be *Aliquot* or *Constituent* Parts of Infinite; when indeed they are not so, but do all *Equally*, whether *Great* or *Small*, whether *Many* or *Few*, bear the very same proportion to an Infinite, as Mathematical Points do to a Line, or Lines to a Superficies, or as Moments do to Time; that is, none at all. So that to argue absolutely against the Possibility of *Infinite* Space or Time, merely from the imaginary inequality of the *Numbers* of their Finite Parts; which are not properly *Constituent* Parts, but mere Nothings in Proportion; is the very same thing as it would be to argue against the Possibility of the Existence of any determinate *Finite* Quantity, from the imaginary Equality or Inequality of the *Number* of the Mathematical Lines and Points contained therein; when indeed neither the one nor the other have (in property of Speech) any *Number* at all, but they are absolutely *without Number*: Neither can any given Number or Quantity be any *Aliquot* or

Constituent Part of Infinite, or be compared at all with it, or bear any kind of Proportion to it; or be the Foundation of any Argument in any Question concerning it.

The Essence of the Self-existent Being, Incomprehensible.

pag. 13,

14, 15.

pag. 22.

IV. *What the Substance or Essence of that Being which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing, is, we have no Idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it.* That there is such a Being actually Existing without us, we are sure (as I have already shown) by strict and undeniable Demonstration. Also *what it is not*; that is, that the Material World is *not* it, as Modern Atheists would have it; has been already Demonstrated. But *what it is*, I mean as to its *Substance* and *Essence*; this we are infinitely unable to comprehend. Yet this does not in the least diminish the Certainty of the Demonstration of its Existence. For 'tis one thing, to know certainly that a Being Exists; and another, to know *what* the Essence of that Being is. And the one may be capable of the strictest Demonstration, when the other is absolutely beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to understand. A Blind or Deaf Man has infinitely more Reason to deny the Being, or the Possibility of the Being, of Light or Sounds, than any Atheist can have to deny, or doubt of the Existence of God. For the One can at the utmost have no other Proof, but credible Testimony, of the Existence of certain Things, whereof 'tis absolutely impossible that he himself should frame any manner of Idea, not only of their Essence, but even of their Effects or Properties. But the other may, with the least Use of his Reason, be assured of the Existence of a Supreme Being, by undeniable Demonstration; and may also certainly know abundance of its Attributes, (as shall be made appear in the following Propositions.)

ons,) though its *Substance* or *Essence* be intirely incomprehensible. Wherefore nothing can be more Unreasonable and Weak, than for an Atheist upon this account to deny the Being of God, merely because his weak and finite Understanding cannot frame to itself any adæquate Notion of the Substance or Essence of that First and Supreme Cause. We are utterly ignorant of the *Substance* or *Essence* of *all other* things; even of those things which we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand best. There is not so mean and contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most enlarged Understanding upon Earth: Nay, even the simplest and plainest of all inanimate Beings, have their *Essence* or *Substance* hidden from Us in the deepest and most impenetrable Obscurity. How weak then and foolish is it, to raise Objections against the Being of God, from the Incomprehensibleness of his *Essence*! and to represent it as a strange and incredible thing, that there should Exist any incorporeal Substance, the *Essence* of which we are not able to Comprehend! As if it were not far more strange, that there should exist numberless Objects of our Senses, things subject to our daily Inquiry, Search, and Examination; and yet we not be able, no not in any Measure, to find out the *real Essence* of any one even of the least of *these* Things.

Nevertheless, 'tis very necessary to observe here by the way, that it does not at all from hence follow, that there *can possibly* be in the *unknown Substance* or *Essence* of God, any thing *contradictory* to our clear Ideas. For as a Blind-man, though he has no *Idea* of *Light* and *Colours*, yet knows certainly and infallibly that there *cannot possibly* be any kind of *Light* which is *not Light*, or any sort of *Colour* which is *not a Colour*: So, though we

have no *Idea* of the *Substance* of God, nor indeed of the *Substance* of any Other Being; yet we are infallibly certain that there cannot possibly be, either in the One or the Other, any *contradiction* Modes or Properties; as if we had the *clearest* and *most distinct* *Idea* of them.

From what has been said upon this Head, we may observe,

Of Infinite Space.

1st. *The Weakness of such, as have presumed to imagine Infinite Space to be a just Representation of the adequate Idea of the Essence of the Supreme Cause.* This is a weak Imagination, arising from hence, that Men using themselves to judge of all things by their Senses only, fancy Spiritual or Immortal *Substances*, because they are not Objects of their Corporeal Senses, to be, as it were, mere Nothing; just as Children imagine Air, because they cannot see it, to be mere Emptiness and Nothing. But the Fallacy is too gross, to deserve being Insisted upon. There are perhaps Numberless *Substances* in the World, whose *Essences* are as intirely unknown and impossible to be represented to our Imaginations, as Colours are to a Man that was born Blind, or Sounds to one that has been always Deaf. Nay, there is no *Substance* in the World, of which we know any thing further, than only a certain Number of its Properties or Attributes; of which we know few in some things, and in Others more. Infinite Space, is nothing else but abstract Immensity or Infinity; even as infinite Duration is abstract Eternity. And it would be just as proper, to say that Eternity is the *Essence* of the Supreme Cause; as to say, that Immensity is so. Indeed they seem Both to be but *Modes* of an *Essence* of a *Substance* Incomprehensible to Us; And when we endeavour to represent the real *Substance*

Any Being whatsoever in our weak Imaginations, we shall find our selves in like manner deceived.

2dly. From hence appears the *Vanity of the Schoolmen*; who, as in other matters, so in their Disputes about the Self-existent Being, when they come at what they are by no means able to comprehend or explain; lest they should seem ignorant of any thing, they give us Terms of Art, and Words of Amusement, mere empty Sounds, which, under pretence of explaining the matter before them, have really no manner of Idea or signification at all. Thus when they tell us concerning the Essence of God, that he is *Purus Actus, mera forma*, and the like; Either the words have no meaning, and signify nothing; or else they express only the Perfection of his Power, and other Attributes; Which is not what these Men intend to express by them.

The Vanity of the Schoolmen.

V. Though the Substance or Essence of the Self-Existent Being, is in it self absolutely Incomprehensible to us; yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature, are strictly Demonstrable, as well as his Existence. Thus, in the first place, the Self-Existent Being must of Necessity be Eternal. The Ideas of Eternity and Self-Existence are so closely connected, that because Something must of necessity be Eternal Independently and without any outward Cause of its Being, therefore it must necessarily be Self-existent; and because 'tis impossible but Something must be Self-existent, therefore 'tis necessary that it must likewise be Eternal. To be Self-existent, is (as has been already shown) to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self. Now this Necessity being Absolute, and not depending upon any thing External, must be always unalterably the same; Nothing being alterable, but what is capable of being

That the Self-existent Being must be Eternal.

pag. 15;
16.

ing affected by somewhat without it self. That Being therefore, which has no other Cause of its Existence, but the absolute Necessity of its own Nature; must of necessity have existed from everlasting, without Beginning; and must of necessity exist to everlasting without End.

*Of the
Manner of
our Conceiving the
Eternity of
God.*

As to the *Manner* of this Eternal Existence; manifest, it herein infinitely transcends the Manner of the Existence of all Created Beings, even of such as shall exist for ever; that whereas 'tis not possible for Their finite Minds to comprehend all that is past, or to understand perfectly all things that are at present, much less to know all that is future, or to have entirely in their Power any thing that is to come; but their Thoughts and Knowledge, and Power, must of necessity have degrees and periods, and be successive and transient as the Things themselves: The Eternal Supreme Cause, on the contrary, (supposing him to be an *Intelligent Being*, which will hereafter be proved in the Sequel of this Discourse,) must of necessity have such a perfect, independent and unchangeable Comprehension of all Things, that there can be no One Point or Instant of his Eternal Duration, wherein all Things that are past, present, or to come, will not be as entirely known and represented to him in one single Thought or View; and all Things present and future, be equally entirely in his Power and Direction; as if there was really no Succession at all, but all things were actually present at once. Thus far we can speak Intelligibly concerning the Eternal Duration of the Self-existent Being; And no *Atheist* can say this is an Impossible, Absurd or Insufficient Account. It is, in the most proper and Intelligible Sense of the Words, to all the purposes of Excellency and Perfection, *Interminable*

illis vitæ tota simul & perfectæ Possessio : the Entire and Perfect Possession of an endless Life.

Others have supposed that the Difference between the *Manner* of the Eternal Existence of the Supreme Cause, and that of the Existence of Created Beings, is this: That, whereas the latter is a continual transient *Succession* of Duration; the former is *one Point* or *Instant* comprehending Eternity, and wherein all Things are really co-existent. But this Distinction I shall not now insist upon, as being of *no Use* in the present Dispute; because 'tis impossible to *prove* and *explain* it in such a manner, as ever to convince an Atheist that there is any thing in it. And besides: As, on the one hand, the *Schoolmen* have indeed generally chosen to defend it: so on the other hand, there * are many Learned Men, of far better *Understanding* and *Judgment*, who have rejected and opposed it.

* *Crucem ingenio figere, ut rem capiat fugientem Captum. — Tam fieri non potest, ut instans [Temporis] coexistat rei successivæ, quam impossibile est punctum coexistere*

[coextendi] lineæ. — Lusus merus non intellectuum verborum. Gassend. Physic. lib. 1.

I shall not trouble you with the inconsistent and unintelligible Notions of the *Schoolmen*; that it [*the Eternity of God*] is *duratio tota simul*, in which we are not to conceive any *Succession*, but to imagin it an *Instant*. We may as well conceive the *Immensity* of God to be a *Point*, as his *Eternity* to be an *Instant*.—And how That can be together, which must necessarily be imagined to be co-existent to *Successions*; let them that can, conceive. *Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 7. Sermon. 13.*

Others say, God sees and knows future Things, by the presentiality and co-existence of all Things in Eternity; For they say, that future Things are actually present and existing to God, though not *in mensura propria*, yet *in mensura aliena*. The *Schoolmen* have much more of this Jargon and canting language. I envy no Man the understanding these Phrases: But to me they seem to signify nothing, but to have been Words invented by idle and corrupted Men; which a great many ever since, lest they should seem to be ignorant, would seem to understand. But I wonder most, that Men, when they have amused and puzzled themselves and others with hard Words, should call this *Explaining* Things. *Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 6. Sermon. 6.*

That the
Self-Ex-
istent Be-
ing must be
Infinite
and Omni-
present.

p. 15, 16.

VI. *The Self-Existent Being, must of necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent.* The Idea of Infinity or Immensity, as well as of Eternity, is so closely connected with that of Self-Existence, that because 'tis impossible but Something must be infinite *independently and of it self*, (for else it would be impossible there should be any Infinite at all unless an Effect could be perfecter than its Cause; therefore it must of necessity be Self-Existent. And because Something must of necessity be Self-Existent, therefore 'tis necessary that it must likewise be Infinite. To be Self-Existent (as has been already shown,) is to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing itself. Now this Necessity being Absolute in it self, and not depending on any Outward Cause; 'tis evident it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, undeniably the same. For a Necessity which is not every where the same, is plainly a Consequent Necessity only, depending upon some External Cause, and not an Absolute one in its own Nature. For a Necessity absolutely such in itself, has no Relation to Time or Place, or any thing else. Whatever therefore Exists by an Absolute Necessity in its own Nature, must needs be Infinite as well as Eternal. To suppose a Finite Being to be Self-Existent; is to say that 'tis a Contradiction for That Being not to Exist, the Absence of which may yet be conceived without a Contradiction. Which is the greatest Absurdity in the World. For if a Being can without a Contradiction be absent from one Place, it may without a Contradiction be absent likewise from another Place, and from all Places: And whatever Necessity it may have of Existing, must arise from some External Cause, and not absolutely from

from itself: And consequently, the Being cannot be Self-Existent.

From hence it follows,

1st. That the Infinity of the Self-Existent Being, must be an Infinity of *Fullness* as well as of *Immensify*; That is, it must not only be without *Limits*, but also without *Diversity*, *Defect*, or *Interruption*: For Instance: Could *Matter* be supposed *Boundless*, it would not therefore follow that it was in this compleat Sense *Infinite*; because, though it had no Limits, yet it might have within itself many assignable Vacuities. But whatever is Self-Existent, must of necessity Exist absolutely in every Place alike, and be equally present every where; and consequently must have a true and absolute Infinity, both of *Immensify* and *Fullness*.

2^{dly}. From hence it follows, that the Self-Existent Being, must be a *most Simple, Unchangeable, Incorruptible* Being; *without Parts, Figure, Motion, Divisibility*, or any other such Properties as we find in Matter. For all these things do plainly and necessarily imply Finiteness in their very Notion, and are utterly inconsistent with complete Infinity. *Divisibility* is a separation of Parts, real or mental: Meaning by *mental Separation*, not barely a *partial Apprehending*; (for *Space*, for instance, which is *absolutely* indivisible and inseparable either really or * mentally, may yet be *partially apprehended*;) but a removing, disjoining, or separating of Parts one from another, even so much as in the *Imagination*. And any such Separation or Removing of Parts one from another, is *really* or *mentally* a setting of Bounds: Either of which, destroys Infinity. *Motion*, for the same reason,

* *Ordo partium Spatii est immutabilis: Moveantur hæc de locis suis, & movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis.* Newton. Princip. Schol. ad Definit. 8.

reason, implies Finiteness: And to have *Parts*, properly speaking, signifies either Difference and Diversity of Existence; which is inconsistent with Necessity: or else it signifies Divisibility, *real or mental* as before, which is inconsistent with complete Infinity. Corruption, Change, or any Alteration whatsoever, implies Motion, Separation of Parts, and Finiteness. And any Manner of Composition, in opposition to the most perfect Simplicity, signifies Difference and Diversity in the manner of Existence; which is inconsistent with Necessity.

Of the
Manner of
our Conceiving the
Immensity
of God.

'Tis evident therefore, that the Self-Existent Being must be *Infinite* in the *strictest* and most complete Sense. But as to the *particular Manner* of his being Infinite or every where present, in opposition to the manner of Created Things being present in such or such finite Places; This is impossible for our finite Understandings to comprehend or explain, as it is for us to form an adequate Idea of Infinity. Yet that the Thing is true, that he is actually *Omnipresent*, we are certain, as we are that there must be Something Infinite; which no Man, who has thought upon these Things at all, ever denied. The Schoolmen indeed have presumed to assert, that the Immensity of God is a *Point*, as his Eternity (they think) is an *Instant*. But, this being altogether Unintelligible; That which we can more safely affirm, and which no Atheist can say is absurd and which nevertheless is sufficient to all wise and good Purposes, is this: That whereas all Finite and Created Beings, can be present but in One definite place at Once, and Corporeal Beings even in That One Place very imperfectly and unequally, to any Purpose of Power or Activity only by the Successive Motion of different Members

bers and Organs; The Supreme Cause on the contrary, being an Infinite and most Simple Essence, and comprehending all things perfectly in himself, is at all times equally present, both in his Simple Essence, and by the Immediate and Perfect Exercise of all his Attributes, to every Point of the Boundless Immensity, as if it were really all but one Single Point.

VII. *The Self-Existent Being, must of necessity be but One.* This evidently follows from his being *Necessarily-Existent*. For *Necessity* Absolute in it self, is *Simple* and *Uniform* and *Universal*, without any possible *Difference*, *Difformity*, or *Variety* whatsoever: And all *Variety* or *Difference* of *Existence*, must needs arise from some *External Cause*, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficiency of That Cause, whatsoever it be. *Absolute Necessity*, in which there can be no *Variation* in any kind or degree, cannot be the Ground of existence of a *Number* of *Beings*, however similar and agreeing: Because, without any *Other difference*, even *Number* is itself a manifest *Difformity* or *Inequality* (if I may so speak) of *Efficiency* or *Causality*.

Again: To suppose *Two* (or more) distinct *Beings* existing of themselves, necessarily, and independent from each other; implies this plain *Contradiction*; that, each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist; and consequently neither of them * will be *Necessarily-Existing*. Whatsoever therefore Exists necessarily, is the *One Simple Essence* of the *Self-Existent Being*; And whatsoever differs from that,

* See This farther explained, in the Answer to the First Letter, at the End of This Book.

is not Necessarily-Existing: Because in absolute Necessity there can be no *Difference*, or *Diversity* of Existence. Other Beings there may be innumerable, besides the One Infinite Self-Existent. But no Other Being can be Self-Existent, because it would be individually the same, at the same time that it is supposed to be different.

From hence it follows,

Of the
Trinity.

1st. That the *Unity* of God, is a *true* and *not figurative*, *Unity*. With which *Prime Foundation of Natural Religion*, how the *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity* perfectly agrees, I have elsewhere indeavoured to show particularly, in its proper place.

The Impossibility of two Independent Principles.

2dly. From hence it follows, That 'tis impossible there should be two different Self-existent Independent Principles, as some Philosophers have imagined such as God and Matter. For since Self-Existence is Necessary-Existence; and since 'tis an express Contradiction (as has already been shown) that two different Beings should each be Necessarily-existing; it evidently follows, that 'tis absolutely impossible there should be Two Independent Self-existent Principles, such as God and Matter.

page 47.

The Error of Spinoza.

3dly. From hence we may observe the Vanities, Folly, and Weakness of Spinoza: who, because the Self-existent Being must necessarily be but One,

Una substantia non potest
produci ab alia. *Ethic. Par.*
1. *Prop. 6.*

Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

Præter Deum nulla dari,
neq; concipi potest substantia.
Prop. 14.

concludes from thence, that the whole World, and every thing contained therein, is one Uniform Substance, Eternal, Uncreated and necessary: Whereas just on the contrary he ought to have concluded, that because all things in the World are very different one from

another, and have all manner of Variety, and the Marks of Will and Arbitrariness and Change,

in absolute
Diversity
be in
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ableness, (and none of Necessity) in them; being plainly fitted with very different Powers, to very different Ends; and distinguished one from another by a diversity, not only of Modes, but also of essential Attributes, and consequently (so far as 'tis possible for us, by the use of our present Faculties, to attain any Knowledge at all of them) of their Substances themselves also; therefore none of these things are necessary or Self-existent, but must needs depend all upon some External Cause, that is, on the One Supreme, Unchangeable, Self-existent Being. That which led Spinoza into his foolish and destructive Opinion, and on which alone all his Argumentation is entirely built, is That absurd

Definition of Substance; * that it is Something, the Idea of which does not depend on, or presuppose, the Idea of any other thing, from which it might proceed; but includes in itself necessary-existence. Which Definition is either false, and signifies nothing; and then his whole Doctrine built upon it, falls

at once to the Ground: Or, if it be true, then neither Matter nor Spirit, nor any Finite Being whatsoever, (as has been before shown,) is in That sense properly a Substance, but (the id est) the Self-existent Being alone: And so it will prove nothing (notwithstanding all his Show and Form of Demonstration,) to his main purpose, which was to make us believe that there is no such thing as Power or Liberty in the Universe, but that

every particular thing in the World is by an Absolute Necessity just what it is, and could not possibly have been in any respect otherwise. Supposing, I say, his Definition of

E

* Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, & per se concipitur; hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat, Definitio 3. Which, presently after he thus explains: Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet Existere; hoc est, ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 7.

† Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci poterunt, quam productæ sunt. Prop. 33.

Substance

pag. 25.
E 44.

Substance to be *true* ; yet even *That* would really conclude nothing to his main Purpose concerning the *Necessity* of *all Things*. For since, according to *That* Definition, neither *Matter* nor *Spirit*, nor any *Finite* Beings whatsoever, are *Substances*, but only *Modes* ; how will it follow, that, because *Substance* is Self-existent, therefore all these *Modes* are so too

* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) sequi debent. Prop. 16.

Why, because * *from an infinite Cause, Infinite Effects must necessarily follow.* Very true ; *supposing*

That Infinite Self-existent Cause not to be a *Voluntary*, but a *necessary Agent*, that is, *no Agent at all* : And supposing also, that in *mere Necessity* there could be *all or any Variety*. Both which Suppositions (in the present Argument) are the Questions begged : And what he afterwards attempts to establish in Proof of them, shall afterwards be considered in its proper place.

That the Self-existent Being must be Intelligent.

VIII. *The Self-existent and Original Cause of things, must be an intelligent Being.* In this Proposition lies the main Question between us and the Atheists. For, that something must be Self-existent and that *That* which is Self-existent, must necessarily be Eternal and Infinite and the Original Cause of all things ; will not bear much Dispute. But Atheists, whether they hold the World to be of *self* Eternal both as to the Matter and Form, whether they hold the Matter only to be Necessary and the Form Contingent, or whatever Hypothesis they frame ; have always asserted and must maintain, either directly or indirectly, that the Self-existent Being is not an *Intelligent Being*, but either pure unactive *Matter*, or (which in other Words is the very same thing) a mere *necessary Agent*. For a mere *necessary Agent* must of necessity, either

plainly and directly in the grossest sense *Unintelligent*; which was the antient Atheists Notion of the Self-existent Being: Or else its Intelligence (which is the Assertion of *Spinoza* and some Moderns,) must be wholly separate from any Power of Will and Choice; which, in respect of any Excellency and Perfection, or indeed to any common Sense, is the very same thing as no Intelligence at all.

Now that the Self-existent Being is not such a Blind and *Unintelligent* Necessity, but in the most proper Sense an *understanding* and *really active* Being; does not indeed so *obviously* and directly appear to Us by Considerations *a priori*; because (through the Imperfection of our Faculties) we know not *wherein* Intelligence consists, nor can see the Immediate and Necessary connexion of it with Self-existence, as we can that of Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c. But *a posteriori*, almost every thing in the World, demonstrates to us this great Truth; and affords undeniable Arguments, to prove that the World, and all Things therein, are the Effects of an *Intelligent* and *Knowing* Cause.

And 1st, Since in general there are manifestly *Proved* in Things, *various kinds* of Powers, and very *different* *Excellencies* and Degrees of Perfection; it must needs be, that, in the Order of Causes and Effects, the Cause must always be more Excellent than the Effect: And consequently the Self-existent Being, whatever that be supposed to be, must of necessity (being the Original of all things) contain in itself the Sum and highest Degree of all the Perfections of all things. Not because That which is Self-existent, must *therefore* have all possible Perfections: (For This, though most certainly true in itself, yet cannot be so easily demonstrated *a priori*;) But because 'tis impossible that any Effect should have any Perfection, which

was not in the Cause. For if it had, then The Perfection would be caused by nothing; which is plain Contradiction. Now an *Unintelligent Being* 'tis evident, cannot be endued with all the Perfections of all things in the World; because *Intelligence* is one of those Perfections. All things therefore cannot arise from an Unintelligent Original. And consequently the Self-existent Being, must necessarily be *Intelligent*.

There is no possibility for an Atheist to avoid the Force of this Argument any other way, than by asserting one of these *two* things: Either that there is *no Intelligent Being at all* in the Universe; or that *Intelligence* is *no distinct Perfection*, but merely Composition of Figure and Motion, as Colour and Sounds are vulgarly supposed to be. Of the *Falseness* of these Assertions, every Man's own *Consciousness* is an abundant Confutation. For they who contend that Beasts are mere Machines, have never presumed to conjecture that *Men* are so too. And that the *Latter* Assertion (in which the main strength of Atheism lies,) is most absurd and impossible; shall be shown presently. Though That Assertion *could* be supposed to be *True*, yet even *still* 'twould unavoidably follow, that the Self-existent Being must needs be *Intelligent*; shall be proved in my *4th Argument* upon the present Head. In the mean time; that the Assertion itself, *viz.* that *Intelligence* is not any *distinct Perfection*, properly speaking, but merely a Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; this Assertion, I say, is most absurd and impossible, will appear from what shall be said in the ensuing Argument.

From the
Intelli-
gence that
is in crea-
ted Beings.

2dly, Since in *Men in particular* there is undeniably that Power, which we call Thought, Intelligence, Consciousness, Perception or Knowledge

ledge; there must of Necessity either have been from Eternity without any Original Cause at all, an infinite Succession of Men, whereof no one has had a Necessary, but every one a Dependent and Communicated Being; or else these Beings, indued with Perception and Consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Sense, Perception or Consciousness; or else they must have been produced by some Intelligent Superiour Being. There never was nor can be any Atheist whatsoever, that can deny but One of these Three Suppositions must be the Truth. If therefore the two former can be proved to be false and impossible, the latter must be own'd to be demonstrably true. Now that the First is impossible, is evident from what has been already said in proof of the Second General Head of this Discourse. And that the Second is likewise impossible, may be thus demonstrated. If Perception or Intelligence, be a distinct Quality or Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; then Beings endued with Perception or Consciousness, can never have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it hath not either actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree. But Perception or Intelligence is a distinct Quality or Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion.

pag. 11,
Sec.

First; If Perception or Intelligence, be any real distinct Quality, or Perfection; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion, then Beings endued with Perception or Consciousness, can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which itself had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness; because nothing can ever give

* *Oracles of Reason*, p. 186. See also *my Letter to Mr. Dodwell, with several Answers and Replies concerning the natural Immortality of the Soul.*

† If with one of *Cicero's* Dialogists they would infer that the *Whole* [of the *World*] must have Understanding, because some *Portions* of it are Intelligent — we may retort with the other Speaker in *Cicero*, that by the same Argument, the *Whole* must be a Courtier, a Musician, a Dancing-Master, or a Philosopher, because many of the *Parts* are such. *Mr. Toland's Letter; Motion essential to Matter.*

to another any Perfection which it hath not either actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree. This is very evident; because, if any thing could give to another any Perfection which it has not in itself, That Perfection would be caused absolutely by *Nothing*; which is a plain Contradiction. If any one here replies, (as *Mr. Gildon* has done * in a Letter to *Mr. Blount*,) that *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, and the like, arise from Figure and Motion, which have no such Qualities in themselves; or that *Figure*, *Divisibility*, *Mobility*, and other Qualities of Matter, are confessed to be given from God, who yet, cannot without extreme Blasphemy, be said to have any such Qualities in himself; and that therefore in like manner, Per-

ception † or Intelligence may arise out of that which has no Intelligence itself: The Answer is very easy: *First*, that *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, and the like, are by no means Effects arising from mere Figure and Motion; their being nothing in the Bodies themselves the Objects of the Senses, that bear any manner of Similitude to any of these Qualities; but they are plainly *Thoughts* or Modifications of the Mind itself, which is a

Intelligent being; and are not properly Causes but only *Occasioned*, by the Impressions of Figure and Motion. Nor will it at all help an Atheist (as to the present Question) though we should here make for him, (that we may allow him the greatest possible Advantage,) even that most absurd Supposition, that the *Mind itself* is nothing but mere Matter, and not at all an Immaterial Substance. For, even supposing it to be mere Matter, yet he must needs confess it to be such Matter,

Matter, Motion, and Per- sent Qu that Co not Qu ceptions arise fro tion, th Square, Secondly that Fig lities o ledge) out extr Qualitie ner, Pa which Still ear and ot real, p only M tions. its Effe yet the ons, I me no Denisib mere l Power Cause shall p and v cano Ha Perce distind of M Matter,

Matter, as is indued not only with Figure and Motion, but also with the Quality of *Intelligence* and *Perception*: And consequently, as to the *present* Question, it will still come to the same thing; that Colours, Sounds, and the like, which are not Qualities of Unintelligent Bodies, but Perceptions of Mind, can no more be caused by, or arise from mere Unintelligent Figure, and Motion, than Colour can be a Triangle, or Sound a Square, or Something be caused by Nothing. Secondly; as to the *other* Part of the Objection; that *Figure, Divisibility, Mobility*, and other Qualities of Matter, are (as we ourselves acknowledge) given it from God, who yet cannot, without extreme Blasphemy, be said to have any such Qualities himself; and that therefore in like manner, *Perception* or *Intelligence* may arise out of that which has no Intelligence itself: The Answer is still easier: That Figure, Divisibility, Mobility, and other such like Qualities of Matter, are not real, proper, distinct and *Positive Powers*, but only *Negative Qualities*, Deficiencies or Imperfections. And though no Cause can communicate to its Effect any real Perfection which it has not itself, yet the Effect may easily have many Imperfections, Deficiencies, or Negative Qualities, which are not in the Cause. Though therefore *Figure, Divisibility, Mobility*, and the like, (which are mere Negations, as all *Limitations* and all *Defects of Powers* are,) may be in the Effect, and not in the Cause; yet *Intelligence*, (which I now suppose, and shall prove immediately, to be a *distinct Quality*; and which no Man can say is a *mere Negation*;) cannot possibly be so.

Having therefore thus demonstrated, that *If Perception* or *Intelligence* be supposed to be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection, (though even but of *Matter* only, if the Atheist pleases,) and not a

mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; then Beings endued with Perception or Consciouſness can never have arisen purely of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciouſness; because nothing can ever give another any Perfection, which it has not itself. *Firstly*, that Perception or Intelligence is really such a distinct Quality or Perfection, and not possibly a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion: And That for plain Reason; because Intelligence is not Figure and Consciouſness is not Motion. For whatever arises from, or be compounded of any Things, is still only those very Things of which it was compounded. And if infinite Compositions or Divisions be made eternally; the Things will still be eternally the same. And all their possible Effects, can never be any thing but Repetitions of the same. For Instance: All possible Changes, Compositions, or Divisions of Figure, are still nothing but Figure: And all possible Compositions or Effects of Motion, can eternally be nothing but Motion. If therefore there ever was a Time when there was nothing in the Universe but Matter and Motion; there never could have been any thing else therein, but Matter and Motion. Anders from would have been as impossible, there should have existed any such thing as Intelligence or Consciouſness; or even any such thing as Light, Heat, or Sound, or Colour, or any of those things which are call Secondary Qualities of Matter; as 'tis not impossible for Motion to be Blue or Red, or for a Triangle to be transform'd into a Sound. This Quality which has been apt to deceive Men in this Matter, is This; that they imagine Compounds, which may be somewhat really different from That of which they are Compounded: Which is a very great Mistake. For all the things, of which Men judge as if

judge; either, if they be *really different*, are not
Compounds nor Effects of what Men judge them
to be, but are something totally distinct; as
when the Vulgar thinks Colours and Sounds to
be Properties inherent in Bodies, when indeed
they are purely Thoughts of the Mind: Or else,
if they be really Compounds and Effects, then
they are *not different*, but exactly the same that
ever they were; as, when two Triangles put to-
gether make a Square; That Square is still no-
thing but two Triangles; or when a Square cut
in halves makes two Triangles, those two Trian-
gles are still only the two halves of a Square; or
when the mixture of a Blue and Yellow Powder
makes a Green, That Green is still nothing but
Blue and Yellow intermixed, as is plainly visible
by the help of Microscopes. And in short, every
thing by Composition, Division or Motion; is
nothing else but the very same it was before,
taken either in Whole or in Parts, or in different
Place or Order. He therefore that will af-
firm *Intelligence* to be the *Effect* of a *System of Un-*
intelligent Matter in Motion, must either affirm *In-*
telligence to be a mere Name or external Denomina-
tion of certain Figures and Motions, and that it dif-
fers from *Unintelligent Figures and Motions*, no other-
wise than as a Circle or Triangle differs from a
Square; which is evidently absurd: Or else he
must suppose it to be a *real distinct Quality*, aris-
ing from certain Motions of a System of Matter
it is *not* in it self intelligent; And then This no less
or for evidently absurd Consequence would follow, that
That Quality inhered in another; For, in That
is Matter, not the Substance itself, the Particles of
which the System consists, but the mere Mode, the
of which particular Mode of Motion and Figure, would be
intelligent. Mr Hobbes seems to have been aware
Men of this: And therefore, though he is very sparing,
judging as it were ashamed to speak out; yet find-
ing

See my
Letter to
Mr. Dod-
well, with
the Four
Defences
of it.

ing himself pressed in his own Mind, with Difficulty arising from the Impossibility of Sense or Consciousness being merely the Effect of Figure and Motion; and it not serving *His Purpose* at all, (were the Thing never so possible,) suppose that God by an immediate and voluntary Act of his *Almighty Power* induces certain Systems of Matter with Consciousness and Thought, which Opinion I shall have occasion to say

something more hereafter;) forced * to have recourse to a prodigiously absurd Supposition that all Matter as Matter, is endued not only with Figure a Capacity of Motion, but with an actual Sense or Perception; and wants only the Organ and Memory of Animals, to press its Sensation.

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eisdemque viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt; *Nec video*, si natura sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur. *quomodo refutari possint*. Sed et si ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum, phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen, remoto objecto, statim cessaret. Nam nisi ad retinendum Motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia; ita tum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recordentur. — Sensatione quæ vulgo ita appellatur necessario adhæret memoria aliqua, &c. *Physic. Cap. 25. Sect. 5.* See also N^o 2 & 11, of the *Appendix* to a Collection of Papers which passed between Mr. *Leibnitz* and Dr. *Clarke*.

From the Beauty, Order, and final Causes of Things. 3dly. That the Self-Existent and Original Cause of all things, is an *Intelligent Being*; appears abundantly from the excellent *Variety, Order, Beauty, and Wonderful Contrivance, and Fitness of Things in the World, to their proper and respective Ends*. This Argument has been so Learnedly and Fully handled both by Ancient and Modern Writers; that I do but just mention it, without enlarging at all upon it. I shall only at this Time make this One Observation; That, whereas *Cartes* and Others have endeavoured to give a *Possible Account*, (Possible, did I say? nay, indeed, a most *impossible and ridiculous Account*

See Mr. Boyle, of final Causes; and Mr. Ray, of the Wisdom of God in the Creation; and Mr. Derham's Physico-Theology.

how the *World* might be formed by the Necessary
 Laws of Motion alone ; they have by so seeming-
 ly vast an Undertaking, really meant no more,
 than to explain philosophically how the *inanimate*
 part, that is, infinitely the least considerable part
 of the *World*, might possibly have been framed.
 For as to *Plants* and *Animals*, in which the Wis-
 dom of the Creator principally appears ; they
 have never in any tolerable manner, or with any
 the least appearance of Success, pretended to give
 an account, how *They* were originally Formed.
 In These things, Matter and the Laws of Mo-
 tion, are able to do nothing at all. And how ri-
 diculous the Epicurean Hypothesis is, of the
 Earth producing them all at first by chance ; (be-
 sides that, I think, it is now given up even by
 all Atheists ;) appears from the late Discovery
 made in Philosophy, that there is no such thing as
 equivocal Generation of any the meanest Animal
 or Plant ; the Sun and Earth and Water, and all
 the Powers of Nature in Conjunction, being able
 to do nothing at all towards the producing any
 thing indued with so much as even a Vegetable
 Life. (From which most excellent Discovery,
 we may, by the way, observe the Usefulness of
 natural and experimental Philosophy, sometimes
 even in Matters of Religion.) Since therefore
 Things are thus, it must unavoidably be granted
 (even by the most obstinate Atheist,) either that
 all *Plants* and *Animals* are originally the Work
 of an *Intelligent Being*, and Created by him in
 Time ; or that having been from Eternity in the
 same Order and Method they now are in, they
 are an Eternal Effect of an *Eternal Intelligent*
 Cause continually exerting his infinite Power
 and Wisdom ; or else that without any Self-exist-
 ent Original at all, they have been derived one
 from another in an Eternal Succession, by an In-
 finite

pag. 11,
 &c.

From the
 Original
 of Motion.

finite Progress of Dependent Causes. The
 of three these ways, is the Conclusion *we* affe
 The *second*, (so far as the Cause of Atheism is c
 cerned,) comes to the very same Thing: And
third I have already shown, (in my Proof of
 Second General Head of this Discourse,) to be
 solutely Impossible and a Contradiction.

4thly. Supposing it was possible that the E
 of the World, and all the Visible things contain
 therein, with the Order, Beauty, and exquisitel
 ness of their Parts; nay, supposing that even Int
 gence itself, with Consciousness and Thought,
 all the Beings we know, could possibly be the
 sult or Effect of mere Unintelligent Matter,
 gure and Motion; (which is the most unrea
 able and impossible Supposition in the World
 Yet even still there would remain an undeni
 Demonstration, that the Self-existent Being, (w
 ever it be supposed to be,) must be *Intellig*
 For even these Principles themselves [*Unintellig*
Figure and Motion] could never have possibly
 isted, without there had been before them an
telligent Cause. I instance in *Motion*. 'Tis
 dent there is Now such a Thing as *Motion* in
 World: Which either began at some Time or
 ther, or was Eternal. If it began at any Tim
 then the Question is granted, that the First C
 is an Intelligent Being: For mere Unintellig
 Matter, and that at Rest, 'tis manifest could
 ver of itself begin to move. On the contr
 if Motion was Eternal, it was either eternally
 fed by some Eternal Intelligent Being, or it
 of itself be Necessary and Self-existent; or
 without any Necessity in its own Nature,
 without any External Necessary Cause, it
 have existed from Eternity by an Endless Succ
 Communication. If Motion was eternally Caus

The by some Eternal Intelligent Being ; this also is
 e aff granting the Question, as to the present Dispute.
 n is If it was of itself Necessary and Self-existent ; then
 And it follows, that it must be a Contradiction in
 of Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest :
 to be And yet at the same time, because the * *Deter-* * pag. 24.
 mination of this Self-existent Motion must be every
 way at once, the Effect of it could be nothing
 the F else but a perpetual *Rest*. Besides, (as there is no
 conta End of Absurdities when they once begin,) it must
 uisite also imply a Contradiction, to suppose that there
 n Int might possibly have been originally *more or less* Mo-
 ught tion in the Universe than there *actually* was :
 e the Which is so very absurd a Consequence, that *Spinoza*
 nreaso himself, though he expressly asserts all Things
 World to be *Necessary*, yet seems asha- * *Spinozæ Ethic. Par. I.*
 ndenia med here * to speak out his Opi- Prop. 33. compared with Part
 , (whi nion, or rather plainly contra- II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.
 ntelligi dictis himself in the Question about the Original of
 ntellig Motion. But if it be said, lastly, that Motion,
 ssibly without any *Necessity* in its own Nature, and with-
 m an out any External Necessary Cause, has existed
 Tis from Eternity, merely by an Endless Successive
 n in Communication ; as † *Spinoza*,
 me or assert : This I have before shown,
 y Tin (in my Proof of the * *Second Ge-*
 ft Ca neral Proposition of this Dis-
 ntellig coue,) to be a plain Contradic-
 ould tion. It remains therefore, that
 contra Motion must of Necessity be Ori-
 ally ginally Caused by Something that
 e it m is Intelligent ; or else there never could have been * pag. 11,
 or el any such Thing as Motion in the World. And &c.
 re, a consequently the Self-existent Being, the Original
 it m Cause of all Things ; (whatever it be supposed to
 uccessi be,) must of Necessity be an *Intelligent Being*.

† Corpus motum, vel quies-
 cens, ad motum vel quietem
 determinari debuit ab alio
 corpore, quod etiam ad mo-
 tum vel quietem determina-
 tum fuit ab alio, & illud ite-
 rum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13.*
Lemma 3.

From hence it follows again, that the *Material World*, cannot possibly be the Original Self-existent Being. For since the Self-Existent Being, is demonstrated to be Intelligent; and the *Material World* plainly is not so; it follows that the *Material World* cannot possibly be the Self-Existent. What Some have fondly imagined concerning a *Soul of the World*; if thereby they mean a Created, Dependent Being; signifies nothing in the present Argument. But if they understand thereby Something Necessary and Self-Existent; then it is nothing else, but a false, rupt, and imperfect Notion of God.

That the Self-existent Being must be a Free Agent.

IX. *The Self-existent and Original Cause of Things, is not a necessary Agent, but a Being independent with Liberty and Choice.* The contrary to this Proposition, is the Foundation and the Summum of what *Spinoza* and his Followers have asserted concerning the Nature of God. What Reasons and Arguments they have offered for their Opinion I shall have occasion to consider briefly in the Proof of the Proposition itself. The Truth of which, appears

This a necessary Consequence of the foregoing Proposition.

1st. In that it is a Necessary Consequence of the foregoing Proposition. For *Intelligence* with *Liberty* (as I there hinted) is really (in respect of any Power, Excellence, or Perfection,) no more than *Intelligence* at all. It is indeed a *Consciousness*, but it is merely a *Passive One*; a *Consciousness*, not *Acting*, but purely of being *Acted upon*. Without *Liberty*, nothing can in any tolerable propriety of Speech, be said to be an Agent, Cause of any thing. For to *Act* necessarily, really and properly not to *Act* at all, but to be *Acted upon*. What therefore *Spinoza* and his Followers assert concerning the Production of

This

Things * from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, is mere Jargon and Words without any meaning at all. For if by the Necessity of the Divine Nature they understand not the Perfection and Rectitude of his Will, whereby God is unalterably determined to do always what is best in the whole; (as confessedly they do not; because this is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Choice;) but, on the contrary, mean an Absolute and strictly Natural Necessity: It follows evidently, that when they say, God by the Necessity of his Nature, is the Cause and Author of all Things; they understand him to be a Cause or Agent in no other sense, than as if a Man should say, that a Stone, by the Necessity of its Nature, is the Cause of its own falling and striking the Ground: Which is really not to be an Agent or Cause at all; But their Opinion amounts to this, that all things are equally Self-Existent, and consequently that the Material World is God: Which I have before proved to be a Contradiction. In like manner, when they speak of the Intelligence and Knowledge of God; they mean to attribute these Powers to him in no other sense, than the antient *Hylæicks* attributed them to *all Matter*; that is, that a Stone, when it falls, has a Sensation and Consciousness; but that That Consciousness is no Cause at all, or Power, of Acting. Which kind of Intelligence, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, is no Intelligence at all. And consequently the Arguments, that proved the Supreme Cause to be properly an Intelligent and Active Being, do also undeniably prove that he is likewise indued with *Liberty* and Choice, which alone is the Power of Acting.

* Ex necessitate Divinae naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

See a very remarkable Passage of Mr Hobbes, cited above. pag. 58.

2dly. If

Proved further from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World; with an Answer to Spinoza's Arguments for the Necessity of all Things.

2dly. If the Supreme Cause, is not a Being induced with *Liberty* and Choice, but a mere Necessary Agent, whose Actions are all as absolute and naturally Necessary as his Existence: This it will follow, that nothing which is not, could possibly have been; and that nothing which could possibly not have been; and that no Mode or Circumstance of the Existence of any thing could possibly have been in any respect other than it now actually is. All which being evidently most false and absurd; it follows on the contrary, that the Supreme Cause is not a mere necessary Agent, but a Being induced with Liberty and Choice.

* Alii putant Deum esse causam liberam, propterea quod potest, ut putant, efficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus; hoc est, quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant; Sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis. — Ego me satis clare ostendisse puto, a summa Dei Potentia Omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno & in æternum sequitur, ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis. *Ethic. Par. I. Schol. ad Prop. 17.*

Omnia ex necessitate naturæ divinæ determinata sunt. non tantum existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum & operandum; nullus datur Contingens. *Demonstrat. Prop. 29.*

Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari, ut naturæ ordo alius esset: ergo Dei etiam natura alia potest esse quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

Quicquid concipimus in Dei Potestate esse, id necessario est. *Prop. 35.*

Deum non operari ex libertate Voluntatis: *Corol. ad Prop. 32.*

Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerant, & productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

The * Consequence; viz. if the Supreme Cause be a Necessary Agent, then nothing which is not, could possibly have been; and nothing which is, could possibly either not have been, or have been different from what it is. This, I say, is expressly owned by Spinoza, to be the unavoidable Consequence of his own Opinion. And accordingly he endeavours to maintain, that no Thing or Mode of Existence of any Thing could possibly have been in any

ing *speciē* different from what it now actually is. His

Reasons are ; (1.) because * *from an Infinitely perfect Nature, infinite Things in infinite Manners, must needs proceed* ; and (2.) † *because, if any thing could possibly be otherwise than it is, the Will and Nature of God must be supposed capable of change* ; and (3.) ‖ *because if all possible Things in all possible Manners do not always and necessarily exist, they never can All exist ; but some Things, that do not exist, will still always be possible only, and never can actually exist ; and so the Actual Omnipotence of God is taken away. The First of these Arguments, is a plain begging of the Question. For, that an infinitely Perfect Nature, is able indeed to produce Infinite Things in Infinite Manners, is certainly true : But that it Must always actually do so, by an absolute*

Necessity of Nature, without any Power of Choice, either as to Time or Manner or Circumstances ; does by no means follow from the Perfection of its Nature, unless it be first supposed to be a Necessary Agent ; and also, that in mere Necessity there must be All (or can be Any) Variety. Both which Suppositions are the very Question begged, that was to be proved. The Second Argument, is (if possible) still weaker : For how does it follow, if God, according to his eternal unerring Purpose and Infinite Wisdom, produces different Things at different Times and in different Manners ; that therefore the Will and Nature of God, is changeable ? It might exactly as well be argued, that if God (according

* Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

† Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari ; ut naturæ Ordo alius esset : Ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse, quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

‖ Immo adversarii, [qui negant ex necessitate divinæ naturæ omnia necessario fluere,] Dei Omnipotentiam negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita creabilia intelligere quæ tamen nunquam creare poterit : Nam alias ; si scilicet omnia, quæ intelligit crearet ; suam, juxta ipsos, exhaustiret Omnipotentiam, & se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum non posse omnia efficere, ad quæ ejus potentia se extendit. *Coroll. ad Prop. 17.*

to Spinoza's Supposition) does *Always* necessarily produce all possible *Differences* and *Varieties* of these Things ; therefore his Will and Nature is *Always* necessarily infinitely *various*, *unequal*, and *different to itself*. And as to the *Third* Argument, (which is mere Metaphysical Trifling ;) it is just such Reasoning as if a Man should argue, that if all possible [*Eternal*] Duration be not *Always* actually exhausted, it never can be *All* Exhausted ; and therefore the Eternity of God is taken away. Which sort of arguing, every one at first sight discerns the Weakness of.

But whatever the Arguments were, and if they were never so much more plausible than they really are ; Yet the *Affertion* itself, [viz.] *That no Thing or Mode of Existence of any Thing, could possibly have been made in any respect different from what actually is ;* is so palpably absurd and false, so contradictory to Experience and the Nature of Things, and to the most obvious and common Reasonings of Mankind ; that of itself it immediately, and upon the first hearing, sufficiently confutes any Principle of which it is a Consequence. For, that things in the World appear plainly to be the most *Arbitrary* that can be imagined ; and to be produced by the Effects, not of *Necessity*, but of *Wisdom* and *Choice*. A *Necessity* indeed of *Fitness* ; that things could not have been *Otherwise* than they are, without diminishing the *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Well-being* of the *Whole* ; there may be some *certainty*, but not such a *Necessity*, as that which is asserted. But this is so far from serving our *Adversary's* Purpose, that, on the contrary, 'tis a direct demonstration that all things were made and ordered by a *Free* and *Wise* Agent. That therefore which I affirm, contradictory to Spinoza's Assertion, is ; that there is not the least appearance of an *Absolute Necessity of Nature*, (so as that

Variation would imply a Contradiction,) in any of these Things. *Motion* itself, and all its Quantities and Directions, with the Laws of *Gravitation*, are intirely Arbitrary; and might possibly have been altogether different from what they now are. The *Number* and *Motion* of the *Heavenly Bodies*, have no manner of Necessity in the Nature of the things themselves. The *Number* of the Planets might have been greater or less. Their *Motion* upon their own Axes, might have been in any proportion swifter or slower than it now is. And the *Direction* of all their progressive Motions, both of the primary and secondary Planets, uniformly from West to East, (when by * the Motion of *Comets* it appears there was no Necessity but that they might as easily have moved in all imaginable transverse Directions;) is an evident proof that these things are solely the Effect of Wisdom and Choice. There is not the least appearance of Necessity, but that all these things might possibly have been infinitely varied from their present Constitution: And (as the late improvements in Astronomy discover)

they are actually liable to very great Changes. Every thing upon *Earth*, is still more evidently arbitrary; and plainly the Product, not of Necessity, but Will. What absolute Necessity, for just such a Number of *Species*, of *Animals* or *Plants*? or who without blushing dare affirm, that † neither the Form, nor Order, nor any the minutest Circumstance or Mode of Existence of any of these Things, could possibly have been in the least diversified by the Supreme Cause?

* Nam dum Cometæ moventur in Orbibus valde eccentricis, undiq; & quoquo-versum in omnes cœli partes; utiq; nullo modo fieri potuit, ut cæco fato tribuendum sit, quod Planetæ in orbibus concentricis Motu consimili ferantur eodem omnes. —

Tam miram uniformitatem in Planetarum Systemate, necessario fatendum est Intelligentia & Consilio fuisse effectam. *Neuton Optic. pag. 345.*

† Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio Ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt Spinoza, ut supra.

To give but one *Instance*. In all the great Species of Animals, Where was the Necessity

* Idemq; dici possit de uniformitate illa, quæ est in corporibus Animalium: viz. Necessario fatendum est, Intelligentia & Consilio fuisse effectam. *Neuton. Optic. pag. 346.*

for that * conformity we observe in the Number and Likeness of all their principal Members? How would it have been a Contradiction, to suppose any of them varied from what they now are? To suppose indeed

continuance of such Monsters, as *Lucretius* imagines to have perished for want of their principal Organs of Life; is really a Contradiction. But how would it have been a Contradiction for the whole Species of *Horses* or *Oxen* to have consisted with *Six Legs*, or *Four Eyes*? But 'tis a Shame to insist longer upon so plain an Argument.

It might have been objected with much Impertinence, that the Supreme Cause cannot be *Free*, because he must needs do always what is Best in the whole. But this would not at all contradict *Spinoza's* Purpose. For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom. A Necessity, consistent with the greatest Freedom and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity, is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a Wise Being to resolve to Act foolishly; or for a Nature infinitely Good, to choose to do what is Evil. Of which I shall have Occasion to speak more hereafter, when I come to deduce the natural Attributes of God.

The same
proved also
from Final
Causes.

3dly. If there be any Final Cause of any thing in the Universe; then the Supreme Cause, is not only Necessary, but a Free Agent. This Consequence is also, *Spinoza* acknowledges to be unavoidable. Therefore he has no other way left, but with

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strange Confidence to * expose all Final Causes, as the Fictions of ignorant and superstitious Men: And to † laugh at those who are so foolish and childish as to fancy, that Eyes were designed and fitted to see with, Teeth to chew with, Food to be eaten for Nourishment, the Sun to give Light, &c. I suppose it will not be thought, that, when once a Man comes to this, he is to be disputed with any longer. Whoever pleases, may for Satisfaction on this Head, consult *Galen de Usu Partium*, *Tully de natura Deorum*. Mr Boyle of Final Causes, and Mr Ray of the Wisdom of God in the Creation. I shall only observe this One thing; that the larger the Improvements and Discoveries are, which are daily made in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy; the more clearly is this Question continually determined, to the Shame and Confusion of Atheists.

4thly. If the Supreme Cause be a mere Necessary Agent, 'tis impossible Any Effect or Product of That Cause should be Finite. For since that which acts necessarily, cannot govern or direct its own Actions; but must necessarily produce whatever can be the Effect or Product of its Nature: 'Tis plain, every Effect of such an Infinite Uniform Nature acting every where necessarily alike, must of Necessity be Immense, or Infinite in Extension: And so no Creature in the Universe could possibly be Finite: Which is infinitely absurd and contrary to Experience. Spinoza, to shuffle off this Absurdity, expresses the Consequence of his Doctrine thus: That || from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, infinite Things

* Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere; & omnes causas Finales, nihil nisi humana esse Figmenta. *Appendix ad Prop. 36.*

† Oculos ad Videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas & animantia ad alimentum, Solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, &c. *Ibid.*

Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales a Fine, quem Deus aut natura in ijs faciendis sibi proposuit, desumemus. *Cartes. Princip. Par. I. §. 28.*

From the finiteness of Created Beings.

|| Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

(meaning infinite in Number) in infinite Matters must needs follow. But whoever reads his Demonstration of this Proposition, can hardly fail to observe, (if he be at all used to such Speculation) that if it proved any thing at all, it would equally prove, that from the Necessity of the Divine Nature only Infinite Things (meaning Infinite in Extension) can possibly arise. Which Demonstration alone is a sufficient Confutation of the Opinion it was designed to establish.

And from
the Impos-
sibility of
an Infinite
Succession
of Causes.

5thly. If the Supreme Cause be not a Free Voluntary Agent; then in every Effect, (for instance, in Motion) there must have been a Progression of Causes in infinitum, without any original Cause at all. For if there be no Cause any where; then there is no Agent; no Mover, Principle, or Beginning of Motion anywhere. Every thing in the Universe must be Passive, and nothing Active: Every thing Motionless, and no Mover: Every thing Effect, and not Cause. Spinoza indeed, (as has been already observed,) refers all things to the Necessity of the Divine Nature, as their real Cause and Origin. But this is mere Jargon, and Words without Signification; and will not at all help him to the present Difficulty. For if by things Existing through the Necessity of the Divine Nature he means Absolutely a Necessity of Existence; so that to make the World and every thing in it existent; then it follows (as I have before shown) that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose Motion, &c. not to Exist: Which Spinoza himself is ashamed to assert. But if there be only the Necessity of the Divine Nature, he means only the Necessary following of an Effect from its Cause, or the Cause necessarily producing its Effect: this Necessity must still always be determined by something antecedent, and so on infinitely.

this, Spinoza (though sometimes he seems to mean the other and equally absurd Sense) expressly owns in some Places to be his Meaning.

* *There can be no Volition, faith he, but from some Cause, which Cause must likewise be caused by some other Cause, and so on infinitely.*

Again; *Will*, † faith he, belongs to the Nature of God, no otherwise than Motion and Rest do; So that God can no more properly be said to act by the Liberty of his Will, than by the Liberty of Motion and Rest.

And what the Original of Motion and Rest is, he tells us in these Words: || *Every Body in Motion, or at Rest, must have been determined to that Motion or Rest by some other Body, which must itself likewise have been determined by a third; and so on in infinitum.*

And thus, since Motion is not in any one of its Stages of Communication a Necessary Self-existent Being, (because the Body moved, may always without a Contradiction, have been imagined to be at Rest, and is supposed not to have Motion from itself, but from another;) the Opinion of Spinoza plainly recurs to an Infinite Succession of dependent Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all. Which Notion I have already (in the Proof of the second General Head of this Discourse) demonstrated to imply a Contradiction. And since therefore there is no other possible way to avoid this Absurdity, but by granting that there must be somewhere a Principle of Motion and Action, which is Liberty; I suppose it by this time sufficiently proved,

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that

* Unaquæq; Volitio non potest existeret, neq; ad operandum determinari; nisi ab alia causa determinetur, & hæc rursus ab alia; & sic porro in infinitum. Prop. 33. Demonstr.

† Voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia; sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut Motus & Quies.

Deus non magis dici potest ex Libertate Voluntatis agere, quam dici potest ex libertate Motus & Quietis agere. Coroll. ad Prop. 32.

|| Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio; & illud iterum ab alio; & sic in infinitum. Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

page 11,
Ec.

that the Supreme Cause must be a Being indu with *Liberty* and Choice.

That Liberty is not in itself an Impossible and contradictory Notion.

From what has been said upon this Head, sufficiently appears, that *Liberty* is not in itself and in the very Notion of the Thing, an absolute Contradiction and Impossibility, as the Pleaders for Necessity and Fate contend that it is, and place the chief Strength of their Argument upon that Supposition. For, that which actually is; certainly not impossible. And it has already been proved, that *Liberty* actually is; nay, 'tis impossible for it not to be, in the first and Supreme Cause. The Principal Argument used by the Maintainers of Fate against the Possibility of *Liberty*, is this: That, since every thing must

* Mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a Causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, & hæc iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 48.*

have a Cause, * every Volition or Determination of the Will of an Intelligent Being, must, as all other things, arise from some Cause, and That Cause from some other Cause, and so on infinitely. But now (besides that

This sort of Reasoning, the Men always ignorantly confound *Moral Motives* with *Physical Efficients*, between which Two things there is no manner of relation: Besides This, (I say,) this very Argument really proves the direct contrary to what they intend. For since every thing must indeed have a Cause of its Being, either from without, or in the Necessity of its own Nature; and 'tis a plain Contradiction (as has already been demonstrated) to suppose an infinite Series of dependent Effects, none of which are Necessary in Themselves or Self-Existent; therefore 'tis impossible but there must be in the Universe some Being, whose Existence is founded in the Necessity of its Own Nature; and

pag. 11,
Etc.

which

which, being acted upon by Nothing beyond it self, must of Necessity have *in itself* a Principle of Acting, or Power of beginning Motion, which is the Idea of Liberty. 'Tis true, this Argument proves only the Liberty of the First and Supreme Cause, and extends not indeed to any Created Being: But it evinces in General (which is sufficient to my present purpose) that Liberty is so far from being impossible and contradictory in itself, that on the contrary 'tis impossible but that it must really *Be* somewhere: And this being once established, it will be easy to show hereafter, that it is a Power capable of being communicated to Created Beings. Of which, in its proper Place.

X. *The Self-Existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all Things, must of Necessity have infinite Power.* *That the Self-existent Being, must be All-powerful. pag. 47.*
 This Proposition is evident, and undeniable. For since nothing (as has been already proved) can possibly be Self-Existent, besides himself; and consequently all Things in the Universe were made by Him, and are entirely dependent upon Him; and all the *Powers* of all Things are derived from Him, and must therefore be perfectly Subject and Subordinate to Him: 'Tis manifest that nothing can make any Difficulty or Resistance to the Execution of his Will; but he must of Necessity have absolute Power to do every thing he pleases, with the perfectest Ease, and in the perfectest Manner, at once and in a Moment, whenever he Wills it. The Descriptions the Scripture gives of *this Power*, are so lively and emphatical, that I cannot forbear mentioning one or two Passages. Thus Job ix. 4. *He is wise in Heart, and mighty in Strength;—which removeth the Mountains, and they know it not; which overturneth them in his Anger. Which shaketh the Earth out*

out of her place, and the Pillars thereof tremble. Which commandeth the Sun, and it riseth not; and sealeth up the Stars. Which alone spreadeth out the Heavens, and treadeth upon the Waters of the Sea. Which doth great things past finding out, yea Wonders without number. Again; Hell is naked before him, and Destruction hath no covering. He stretcheth out the North over the empty place, and hangeth the Earth upon nothing. He bindeth up the Waters in thick Clouds, and the Cloud is not rent under the The Pillars of Heaven tremble, and are astonished at his Reproof. He divideth the Sea with his Power, by his Understanding he smiteth through the Proud. Lo, these are part of his Ways, but how little a Portion is heard of him? But the Thunder of his Power who can understand? Job xxvi. 6. So likewise Isaiab xl. 12. Who has measured the Waters in the Hollow of his Hand, and meted out Heaven with Span; and comprehended the Dust of the Earth in Measure; and weighed the Mountains in Scales, and the Hills in a Balance. Behold, the Nations are as a drop of the Bucket, and are counted as the small Dust of the Balance; behold, he taketh up the Isles as a little thing. All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than Nothing, and vanity. To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto him? But I do not want Authority to the Persons I am at present speaking to. 'Tis sufficiently evident from Reason, that the Supreme Cause must of Necessity be Infinitely Powerful. The only Question is, what the true meaning of what we call Infinite Power, is; and what things it must be understood to extend, or to extend.

Now in determining this Question, there are some Propositions, about which there is no dispute. Which therefore I shall but just mention. As,

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1st, That infinite Power reaches to all *Possible* Of work-
ing Con-
tradictions; things, but cannot be said to extend to the working any thing which implies a *Contradiction*: As, that a Thing should *be* and *not be* at the same time; that the same thing should *be made* and *not be made*, or *have been* and *not have been*; that *twice two* should *not make four*, or that *That which is necessarily False*, should *be True*. The Reason whereof is plain: Because the Power of making a Thing to be, at the same time that it is not; is only a Power of doing that which is Nothing, that is, no Power at all.

2^{dly}, Infinite Power cannot be said to extend to Or Natu-
ral and
Moral
Evils. those things, which imply *Natural* Imperfection in the Being to whom such Power is ascribed: As, that it should destroy its own Being, weaken itself, or the like. These Things imply *Natural* Imperfection, and are by all Men confessed to be such, as cannot possibly belong to the Necessary Self-existent Being. There are also other things which imply Imperfection in another kind, *viz.* *Moral* Imperfection: Concerning which, Atheism takes away the Subject of the Question, by denying wholly the Difference of Moral Good and Evil; and therefore I shall omit the Consideration of them, 'till I come to deduce the *Moral* Attributes of God.

But some other Instances there are, in the Question about the Extent of *Infinite Power*; wherein the Principal Difference between us and the Atheists, (next to the Question, whether the Supreme Cause be an *Intelligent Being*, or not,) does in great measure consist. As

1st, That infinite Power includes a Power of Of the
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Matter. Creating Matter. This has been constantly denied by all Atheists, both Antient and Modern; and as constantly affirmed by all who believe the Being, and have just Notions of the Attributes of

of God. The only Reason which the Atheists have, or can pretend to alledge for their Opinion is, that the Thing is in its own Nature absolutely *Impossible*. But how does it appear to be impossible? Why, only because They are not able to comprehend *How* it can be. For, to reduce it to a Contradiction, (which is the alone real Impossibility) this they are by no means able to do. For, to say that something which once was not, may since have begun to exist; is neither directly, nor by any Consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is Not*; or that That which *is*, can *Not be*, while it *is*. 'Tis true; We, who have been used to converse only with Generation and Corruptions; and never saw any thing Made or Created, but only *Formed* or *Framed*; are apt to endeavour to conform our Idea of Creation to that of *Formation*; and to imagine, that as in *Formations* there is some Pre-existing *Matter*, out of which a thing is *Formed*; so in *Creation* there must be considered a Pre-existing *Nothing*, out of which as out of a real *Material Cause*, a Thing is *Created*: Which looks indeed very like a Contradiction. But this is only a Confusion of Ideas; just like Children's imagining that *Darkness* is some thing, which in the Morning is driven away by Light, or Transformed into it: Whereas the true Notion of Creation, is not a *Forming* Something out of Nothing, as out of a *Material Cause*; but only a bringing something into Being, that before had no Being at all; or a Causing Something to exist Now, that did not Exist Before; or which without this Cause, would not have Existed. Which no Man can ever reduce to a Contradiction; and more than the *Formation* of any thing into a Shape which it had not before, can be reduced to a Contradiction.

But further : The Creation of Matter is a thing not only *not impossible* in itself, but what moreover even by bare Reason is *demonstrated to be True*. For 'tis a Contradiction (as I have shown above) to *suppose Matter necessarily Existing*. pag. 25.

2dly. 'Tis possible to Infinite Power, to Create any Immaterial Cogitative Substance, indued with a Power of beginning Motion, and with a Liberty of Will or Choice. This also has been always denied by all Atheists. And because it is a Proposition of the greatest Consequence to Religion and Morality, therefore I shall be particular in endeavouring the Poof of the several Parts of it.

First: 'Tis possible to infinite Power, to Create any Immaterial Cogitative Substance. That there can be such a Thing as a Cogitative Substance, that is, a Substance indued with Consciousness and Thought, is granted by all ; because every Man's own Experience convinces him, that He himself is such a Substance. Further ; That if there be, or can be, any such thing as Immaterial Substances ; then 'tis most reasonable to believe, that such Substances as are indued with Consciousness and Thought, [Properties the farthest distant from the known Properties of Matter, and the most unlike them, that can possibly be imagined,] are those Immaterial Substances ; this also will, I think, be granted by all Men. The only point therefore, that remains to be proved, is ; That Immaterial Substances are not impossible ; or, that a Substance Immaterial is not a contradictory Notion. Now whoever asserts that it is contradictory : must affirm, that whatever is not Matter, is nothing ; and that, to say any thing Exists, which is not Matter, is saying that there Exists something which is nothing. Which in other Words is plainly this ; That whatever we have not an

Of the Power of Creating Immaterial Cogitative Substances.

Idea, of is nothing, and impossible to Be. For as Light there is no other way to reduce *Immaterial Substance* to a Contradiction, but by supposing *Immaterial* to signify the same as *Having no Existence*. And there is no possible way to prove That, by saying we have no Idea of it, and therefore neither has nor can have any Existence. By the same Argument, *Material Substance* will in the same manner be a contradiction; For of *That* also, of the *Substance* to which *Solidity* belongs) we have *No Idea*. But supposing it were *true* (as 'tis indeed most *false*,) that we had a clearer Idea of the *Substance* of *Matter*, than we have of *Immaterial Substance*; still by the same Argument wherewith an Atheist will prove *Immaterial Substance* to be impossible, a Man born Blind may demonstrate irrefragably, that *Light* or *Colour* is Impossible and Contradictory Notion, because is not a *Sound* or a *Smell*. For the Power of *seeing Light* or *Colour*, is to a Man born Blind, together as incomprehensible and absolutely beyond the reach of all his Ideas, as either the Operations and Perceptions, or even the Simple Existence of a Pure *Immaterial Substance* or *Spirit* can be to any of Us. If therefore the Blind Man's want of Ideas be not a sufficient Proof of the Impossibility or Light of Colour; how can our bare want of Ideas, to be a Demonstration of the Impossibility of the Being of *Immaterial Substances*? A blind Man, they will say, have *Testimony* of the Existence of *Light*: Very true. So also have We, of the Existence of *Immaterial Substances*. But there is this further Advantage on Our side in the Comparison; that a Blind Man, excepting the *Testimony* of *Others*, finds not by Any reasoning within himself, the least likelihood or probability, no not in the lowest possible degree, that there can be any such thing

Be. For as Light or Colour : But We, besides Testimony, have great and strong Arguments both from Experience and Reason, that there *are* such things as *Immaterial* Substances, though we have no Knowledge of their Simple Essence: As indeed of the *Substance* even of *Matter* itself, (its Simple *Substance*, considered as abstract from, and as the Foundation of That Essential *Property* of *Solidity*,) we have no Idea : (For, to say that *Extension* is the Substance of Matter, is the same way of thinking, as to say that *Existence*, or that *Duration*, is the Substance of Matter.) We have, I say, great and strong Arguments both from Experience and Reason, that there *are* such things as *Immaterial* Substances, though we have no Idea of their Simple Essence. Even the very first and most universal Principle of *Gravitation* itself, in *All Matter* ; since it is ever Proportional, not at all to the *Surfaces* of Bodies, or of their *Particles* in any possible Supposition, but exactly to the *Solid Content* of Bodies ; 'tis evident it cannot be caused by *Matter* acting upon the *Surfaces* of *Matter*, which is all *It* can do ; but must (either *immediately* or *mediately*) be caused by something which continually penetrates its *Solid Substance*. But in *Animals*, which have a Power of Self-motion ; and in the perfecter Sorts of them, which have still higher Faculties ; the thing is yet more evident. For we see and feel, and observe daily in ourselves and others, such Powers and Operations and Perceptions, as undeniably evince themselves either to be the Properties of *Immaterial* Substances : Or else it will follow, that *Matter* is something, of whose *Essential Powers*, (as well as of its *Substance* itself,) we have altogether as little Idea, as we have of *Immaterial* Beings : And then how are *Immaterial* Substances more impossible

ble than *Material*? But of this, more hereafter.

Of the Immateriality of Human Souls.

See a Letter to Mr Dodwell, with the Four Defences of it.

From what has been said on this Head, it may be easy to answer all the Objections, that have been brought by any Atheists against the Notion of *Human Souls* being *Immaterial* Substances; distinct from Body. For since 'tis possible there may be such things as *Immaterial* Substances; since, if any such Substance *Can Be*, there is the Reason in the World to believe that *Conscious* and *Thinking* Substance *Is* such; these Properties being the most Remote from the known Properties of Matter, that are possible to be conceived: The Foundation of *all* the Objections against the *Immateriality* of the Soul, is entirely taken away. I shall not here tarry to consider Objections *in particular*, which have been given to and fully answered by learned Pens; but only mention One, on which all the rest depend, and to which they may all be reduced. And this is This: * That seeing the Soul is really means we have of Perception are the Five Senses; and that all plainly depend upon the Organs of the Body; therefore the Soul, without the Body, have no Perception; and consequently is Nothing. Now it is evident that these very Senses, Perceptions, however they may be obstructed by bodily Indisposition, and so do indeed depend upon the Organs of the Body to their present *Exercise*, yet their *Nature* are really entirely distinct Powers, and cannot possibly be destroyed.

* — Si immortalis natura animai est,

Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro;

Quinq; (ut opinor) eam faciundum est Sensibus auctam:

Nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis,

Possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare.

Pictores itaq; & scriptorum secla priora

Sic animas introduxerunt sensibus auctas.

At neque seorsum oculi, &c. —

Nec sensus ipsi seorsum consistere possunt

Naribus atque manu, atque oculis, atq; auribus, atq;

is This: * That seeing the Soul is really means we have of Perception are the Five Senses; and that all plainly depend upon the Organs of the Body; therefore the Soul, without the Body, have no Perception; and consequently is Nothing. Now it is evident that these very Senses, Perceptions, however they may be obstructed by bodily Indisposition, and so do indeed depend upon the Organs of the Body to their present *Exercise*, yet their *Nature* are really entirely distinct Powers, and cannot possibly be destroyed.

bly, as has been * before shown, be absolutely founded in, or arise from, any of the known Properties or Qualities of Matter: Besides this, I say;) of Him that thus argues, I would only ask this one Question: Are our *Five Senses*, by an *Absolute Necessity* in the Nature * pag. 56. of the Thing, *All* and the *only Possible Ways* of Perception? And is it impossible and contradictory, that there should be any Being in the Universe, indued with ways of Perception *different* from these that are the result of *Our present Composition*? Or are these things, on the contrary, purely *Arbitrary*; and the same Power that gave *Us* these, may have given others to *Other Beings*, and might (if he had pleas'd) have given to *Us* others in this *present State*, and may yet have made us capable of different ones in *Another State*? If they be purely *Arbitrary*; then the Want of these, does by no means infer a total want of Perception: But the same Soul, which in the present State has the Powers of *Reflexion*, *Reason* and *Judgment*, which are Faculties entirely different from Sense; may as easily in another State have different ways even of *Perception* also. But if any one will contend, that these Senses of ours are *Necessarily* the *only Ways* of Perception; still the Soul may be capable of having these *very same* ways of Perception at any time *restored* to it. For as That which *sees*, does not cease to exist, when, in the dark, all Objects are removed; so, That which *perceives*, does not necessarily cease to exist, when, by Death, all Organs of Perception are removed. But *what reason* can any Man alledge, why he should imagine these present Senses of ours, to be *necessarily* the *only Ways* of Perception? Is it not infinitely more reason-

Lingua; nec per se possunt sentire, nec esse. *Lucret. lib.*

3. Ὅσων γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνέργεια ἢ σωματικὴ, δὴλον ὅτι τὰς αὐτὰς ἀνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν οἷον βαδίζειν ἀνευ ποδῶν. *Aristot.*

* Has tamen imagines [*mortuorum;*] *Loqui* volebant; quod fieri nec sine lingua, nec sine palato, nec sine faucibus, laterum, pulmonum vi & figura potest. Nihil enim *Animo*, (*speaking of such as attributed to Spirits the same Power, and Senses only, as they saw Men endued with in this present State,*) videre poterant: Ad *Oculos* omnia referebant. Magni autem ingenii est, revocare mentem a sensibus, & cogitationem a consuetudine abducere. *Cicero Tuscul. Qu. 1.*

able to suppose, that this is a mere Prejudice arising from Custom, and an attending to but Sense in opposition to Reason. For, supposing Men had been created only with *Four* Senses and had never known the use of *Sight*; would they not then have had the very same Reason to conclude there were but *Four* possible ways of Perception, as they have Now to fancy that there are but *Five*? And would they not then have thought *Sight* to have been an Impossible, Chimerical and merely imaginary Power; with absolutely the same Reason, as they now presume the Faculties of Immaterial Beings to be so? that is, with *no Reason at all*. One would think, Men should be ashamed therefore to be so Vain, as from their own mere Negative Ignorance, without any appearance or pretence of any *Positive* Argument, to dispute against the *Possibility* of the Being of Things which (excepting only that they cannot frame themselves an *Image* or *Notion* of them) there is a Concurrence of all the Reasons in the World to persuade them that such Things Really are. And then, as to the Difficulty of Conceiving the Nature and Manner of the *Union* between Soul and Body; We know altogether as much of That, as we do of the Nature of the Union or Cohæsion of the infinitely divisible parts of Body; Which no Man doubts of. And therefore our Ignorance can be no more an Argument against the Truth of the One, than it is a Bar to our Belief of the Other.

Secondly, 'Tis possible to Infinite Power, to in- *Of induing*
 duce a Creature with the Power of Beginning Mo- *Creatures*
 tion. This is constantly denied by all Atheists; *with the*
 because the Consequence of it, is a *Liberity of Will*, *Power of*
 of which I shall have Occasion to speak presently. *beginning*
Motion.
 But that the Proposition is true, I thus prove.
 If the Power of Beginning Motion, be in itself
 a *Possible Thing*, and also *Possible to be communi-*
cated; Then a Creature may be indued with That
 Power. Now that the Power of Beginning Mo-
 tion is in itself a *Possible Thing*, I have already
 proved, by showing that there must *Necessarily*
 be *somewhere* a Power of Beginning Motion; be-
 cause otherwise Motion must have been from Eter-
 nity, without any *External Cause* of its Being;
 and yet it is a Thing that has no Necessity of
 Existence in its *own Nature*. So that, if there be
 not *somewhere* a Principle or Power of beginning
 Motion; *Motion* must Exist, without any Cause
 or Reason at all of its Existence either *within* it
 self, or *from without*; Which, as I have before *pag. 11,*
 shown, is an Express Contradiction. Wherefore *Et.*
 a Principle or Power of beginning Motion, there
 must of necessity *Be*, somewhere or other; And
 consequently it is not *in itself* an Impossible Thing.
 I add: As a power of Beginning Motion, is not
in itself an impossible Thing; because it must of
 necessity *Be* in the Supreme Cause: So neither is it
 impossible to be *Communicated* to Created Beings.
 The Reason is plain: Because no Powers are
 Impossible to be Communicated, but only those
 which imply Self-existence and absolute Inde-
 pendency. That a Subordinate Being should be
 Self-existent or absolutely Independent, is indeed a
 Contradiction; but 'tis no Contradiction to sup-
 pose it indued with any Other Power whatsoever,
 separate from these. I know, the Maintainers of

Fate are very confident, that a Power of Beginning Motion, is nothing less than being really Independent, or being able to Act Independently from any Superiour Cause. But this is only a child's trifling with Words. For a Power of Acting independently *in This Sense*, communicated at the Pleasure of the Supreme Cause, and continuing only during the same good Pleasure, is no more a real and absolute Independency; than the Power of *Existing*, (which I suppose the Defenders of *Fate* are not so fond to make a continual Creation as they are to make the Power of Self-motion continual External Impulse;) or than the Power of *being Conscious*, or *any other Power* whatsoever can be said to imply Independency. In reality 'tis altogether as hard to conceive, how *Consciousness* or the Power of *Perception*, should be communicated to a Created Being; as how the Power of *Self-Motion* should be so. Unless *Perception* is Nothing else, but a mere Passive Reception of Impulse; which I suppose is as clear that it is, as that a Triangle is not a Sound, or that a Green is not a Colour. Yet no Man doubts, but that He himself, and all Others, have truly a Power of *Perception*. And therefore in like manner (however hard it may be to Conceive, as to the manner of it; yet since, as has been now proved, it can never be shown to be impossible and expressly contradictory, that a Power of *Self-Motion* should be communicated,) I suppose no considering Man can doubt, but that he actually has also a Power of *Self-Motion*. For the Argument drawn from continual Experience and Observation, to prove that we *have* such a Power, are strong; that nothing less than a strict Demonstration that the thing is absolutely impossible, or that it implies an express contradiction, can move us in the least doubt that we have it not.

have all the same Experience, the same Marks and Evidence exactly, of our having really a Power of Self-motion; as the most rigid Fatalist could possibly contrive to require, if he was to make the *Supposition* of a Man's being indued with that Power. There is no one thing, that such a Man can imagine *ought* to follow from the Supposition of *Self-Motion*, which every Man does not now as much feel and *actually* experience in Himself, as it can possibly be imagined any man *would* do, supposing the Thing were true. Wherefore to affirm, notwithstanding all this, that the Spirits, by which a Man moves the Members of his Body, and ranges the Thoughts of his Mind, are Themselves moved wholly by Air or Subtler Matter inspired into the Body; and That again by other External Matter, and so on; as the Wheels of a Clock are moved by the Weights, and those Weights by Gravitation, and so on; without a Man's having the least Power by any Principle within himself, to think any one Thought, or impell his own Spirits in order to move any Member of his Body: All this is so contrary to Experience and the Reason of Things, that unless the Idea of *Self-Motion* were in itself as evidently and *Clearly* a Contradiction, as that two and two should make five, a Man ought to be ashamed to talk at that Rate. Nay, a Man of any considerable degree of Modesty, would even in That Case be almost tempted rather to doubt the Truth of his Faculties; than take upon him to assert one such intolerable Absurdity, merely for the avoiding of another. There are Some indeed, who denying men the Power of *Beginning Motion*, would yet seem in some manner to account for their Actions, by allowing them a Power of *Determining Motion*. But this also is a mere ludicrous trifling with Words.

For if That Power of *Determining Motion*, be other in a Man, than that which is in a Stone to deflect a Ball *one certain way*; this is just nothing all. But if he has a Power of determining the Motion of his Spirits *any way*, as he himself pleases this is in all Respects the very same, as the Power of *Beginning Motion*.

Of the
Possibility
of enduing
a Creature
with Free-
dom or
Liberty of
Will.

pag. 62.

Thirdly, 'Tis possible to Infinite Power to endue a Creature with *Freedom or Liberty of Will*. It might suffice that this is at once proved by the former Arguments, and in the same Method, as I just now proved *Self-motion*, or a *Power of beginning Motion* to be possible: *viz. because Liberty must of necessity Be in the Supreme Cause*; (as is at large proved in the *Ninth General Head* of this Discourse;) and therefore cannot be impossible and contradictory to the Nature of the thing itself: And, *because it implies no Contradiction to suppose it communicated*; as being no harder to conceive, than the forementioned Power of *Beginning Motion*: And, *because the Arguments drawn from Experience and Observation are stronger on the one side of the Question, than those arising merely from the Difficulty of our apprehending the thing, can be on the other*. But forasmuch as This is the Question of the greatest Concern of all, in Matters both of Religion and Human Life; and both *Spinoza* and Mr. *Hobbes* and their Followers, have with great Noise and Confidence denied it: I shall therefore (not contenting my self with this,) endeavour to show moreover, in particular, the Weakness of the Principal Arguments, by which these Men have pretended to demonstrate, that there cannot possibly be such Power in Man, as a *Liberty of Will*. As to the propriety of the Terms; whether the Will be properly the Seat of Liberty or not, is

now to the Purpose to inquire: The Question being, not *Where* the Seat of Liberty is; but *whether* there be at all in Man any such Power, as a Liberty of Choice and of Determining his own Actions; or, on the contrary, his Actions be all as Necessary as the Motions of a Clock. The Arguments by which *Spinoza* and Mr *Hobbes*, have attempted to maintain this latter side of the Question; are all plainly reducible to these two.

1st, That, since every Effect must needs be produced by some Cause; therefore, as every Motion in a Body must have been caused by the Impulse of some other Body, and the Motion of That by the Impulse of a Third: so every Volition, or Determination of the Will of Man, must needs be produced by some External Cause, and That in like manner be the Effect of some Third. And consequently, that there cannot possibly be any such Thing in Nature, as Liberty or Freedom of Will.

2^{dly}, That Thinking, and all its Modes, as Willing and the like, are Qualities or Affections of Matter. And consequently, since 'tis manifest that Matter has not in itself a Power of Beginning Motion, or giving itself any manner of Determination whatsoever; therefore 'tis evident likewise, that 'tis impossible there should be any such thing as Freedom of Will.

Now to these Arguments I oppose, and shall endeavour briefly to demonstrate, the three following Propositions.

1st. That every Effect cannot possibly be the Product of External Causes; but there must of Necessity be Somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently

An Answer to Mr Hobbes's and Spinoza's Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty.

dently acted upon. And that this Power may be, and is, in *Man*.

2dly, That Thinking and Willing, neither can be, Qualities and Affections of Matter, and consequently are not concluded under the Law thereof.

3dly. That even supposing the Soul not to be a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be, and were indeed, only Qualities or Affections of Matter; yet even this would not at all affect the present Question, nor prove the Freedom of Will to be impossible.

That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation.

pag. 11.
E 62.
E 83.

1st. Every Effect cannot possibly be the Product of external Causes; but there must of necessity be somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently acted upon: And this Power may be, and is, in *Man*. The several Parts of this Proposition have been already proved in the *Second* and *Ninth* General Heads of this Discourse; and in the *Tenth* part of this *Tenth* Head, which is concerning the Possibility of the Power of Self-Motion being communicated to Created Beings. I shall not therefore here repeat the Proofs; but only apply them to *Spinoza's* and *Mr. Hobbes's* Arguments, so far as is necessary to show the weakness of what they have said upon this Head in Opposition to the Possibility of Liberty or Freedom of Will. Not that the manner of their Arguing upon this Head, can possibly be good.

* Quicunq; unquam Effectus productus sit, productus est a causa necessaria. Nam quod productum est, causam habuit integram, hoc est, omnia ea quibus suppositis Effectum non sequi intelligi non possit: ea vero causa necessaria est.

That every Effect must needs be owing to some Cause: and That Cause must necessarily produce the Effect; necessarily cause, if it be a sufficient Cause; Depend the Effect cannot but follow; about any if it be not a sufficient Cause, there is will not be at all a Cause of the Second

Hobbes Philosophia prima, cap. 9.

Thing

Thing. Thus for instance, * what-
ever Body is moved, must be moved
by some other Body, which itself
must be moved by some Third,
and so on without End. That the
Will, in like manner, of any vo-
luntary Agent, must of necessity be
determined to some external Cause,
and not by any Power of determi-
ning itself, inherent in itself: And
That External Cause, must be de-
termined necessarily by some other
Cause, External to It; and so on
without End. From all which it
evidently appears, that All that
these Men urge against the Pos-
sibility of Freedom, extends
equally to all other Beings (not
excepting the Supreme) as well as
to Men: And † Spinoza in ex-
press Words confesses it. Where-
fore consequently, whatever noise
they make of the Strength and
Demonstrative Force of their Ar-
guments; all that they say, a-
mounts at last to no more but this
One most absurd Conclusion;
That there neither is any where, nor
can possibly be, any Principle of
Motion or Beginning of Operation at
all; but every Thing is caused ne-
cessarily, by an eternal Chain of
Dependent Causes and Effects, with-
out any Independent Original. All their Arguments
therefore on this Head are already answered in the
Second and Ninth General Heads of this Discourse; pag. 11,
(where I proved that there must of necessity be
an Original, Independent, and Free Principle of

* Corpus motum vel quies-
cens, ad motum vel Quietem
determinari debuit ab alio cor-
pore, quod etiam ad Motum vel
Quietem determinatum fuit ab
alio, & illud iterum ab alio, &
sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethic.*
Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

† Unaquæque Volitio non
potest Existere, neq; ad operan-
dum determinari, nisi ab alia
causa determinetur, & hæc
rursus ab alia; & sic porro in
infinitum. *Id Ethic. Par. I.*
Prop. 32. Demonstr.

I conceive nothing taketh
beginning from itself, but from
the Action of some immediate
Agent without itself. And that
therefore, when first a Man had
an Appetite or Will to some-
thing, to which, immediately
before, he had no Appetite or
Will; the Cause of his Will,
is not the Will itself, but some-
thing else not in his own dis-
posing. *Hobbes's Debate with*
Bp. Bramhall. p. 289.

In mente nulla est absoluta
sive libera voluntas: sed mens
ad hoc vel illud volendum de-
terminatur a causa, quæ etiam
ab alia determinata est, & hæc
iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum.
Spinoza, Ethic. Par. II.
Prop. 48.

|| See above, pag. 72.

† Hinc sequitur, Deum non
operari ex libertate voluntatis.
Ethic. Par. I. Coroll. ad Prop.
32.

Thing

Motion

Motion or Action; and that, to suppose an endless Succession of Dependent Causes and Effects without any Original or First and Self-actuating Principle, is supposing a *Series* of *dependent* Things to be *from Eternity* produced by *Nothing*; which is the very same Absurdity and Contradiction, as to suppose Things produced by Nothing at any *finite* Time; the Ability of Nothing to produce any thing, being plainly the same in *Time* or *Eternity*.) And I have moreover proved *ex abundanti*, in the foregoing part of this *Tenth* Head; that the Power of beginning Motion is not only possible and *certain* in itself, but also *possible to be communicated* to Finite Beings; and that it *actually* is in Man.

pag. 83.

That
Thinking
and Willing,
neither are,
nor can be
Affections
of Matter.
* pag 77.

pag. 56.
pag. 53.

2dly, Thinking and Willing neither are, nor can be, Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; and consequently are not concluded under the Laws thereof. That 'tis possible there * may be Immaterial Substances, the Notion not implying a Contradiction in itself; hath already been shown under the preceding General Proposition. Further, that Thinking and Willing are Powers entirely different from Solidity, Figure and Motion; and if they be different, then they cannot possibly arise from them, or be compounded of them; hath likewise been already proved under the *Eighth* General Head of this *Discourse*. It follows therefore, that Thinking and Willing *may possibly be*, nay that they *certainly and necessarily are*, Faculties or Powers of Immaterial Substances: seeing they *cannot possibly be* Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; unless we will conform (as some have done) the Ideas of things; as we mean by *Matter*, not what That Word in all other cases signifies, a *solid Substance* capable of Division, Figure and Motion, and of whatever Properties can arise from the Modifications thereof; but *Substance in general*, capable of what

known

known Powers or Properties entirely different from
 them, and from whatever can possibly result from
 them. In which confused Sense of the Word,
Matter be supposed never so capable of
 Thinking and Willing; yet in That Sense, (as I
 shall show presently,) it would signify nothing at
 all to the Purpose or Advantage of our Adver-
 saries. In the mean time, how great an Absurdi-
 ty it is to suppose Thinking and Willing to be
 Qualities or Affections of *Matter*, in the Proper
 and Usual Sense of the Word; may sufficiently
 appear, without any foreign Argument, from the
 Senselessness of Mr. Hobbes's Own Explication of
 the Nature and Original of Sensation and Con-
 sciousness. *The immediate Cause of Sensation,*

* *saith he, is this: The Object, or
 Something flowing from it, presseth
 the outermost part of the Organ,
 and That Pressure is communicated
 to the innermost Parts of the Or-
 gan; Where, by the Resistence or
 Reaction of the Organ, causing a
 Pressure outwards contrary to the
 Pressure of the Object inwards, there
 is made up a Phantasm, or Image:
 Which Phantasm, † saith he, is
 the Sensation itself. Again; The
 Cause of Sensation, ‖ saith he, is*

* Ex quo intelligitur, Sen-
 sionis immediatam causam esse
 in eo, quod Sensionis Organum
 primum & tangit & premit.
 Si enim organi pars extima
 prematur; illa cedente, pre-
 metur quoq; pars quæ versus
 interiora illi proxima est; &
 ita propagibitur pressio, sive
 Motus ille, per partes Organi
 omnes, usq; ad intimam.—
 Quoniam autem motui ab Ob-
 jecto per media ad Organi par-
 tem intimam propagato, fit ali-
 qua totius Organi resistentia
 sive reactio, per motum ipsius
 Organi internum naturalem; fit propterea conatui ab Objecto, conatus ab Or-
 gano contrarius. Ut, cum conatus ille ad intima, ultimus actus sit eorum
 qui fiunt in actu Sensionis; tum demum ex ea reactione aliquandiu durante,
 existant *Phantasma*; quod propter conatum versus externa, semper vi-
 detur tanquam aliquid situm extra Organum. *Hobbes de Sensone & motu animali.*
 † *Phantasma est sentiendi Actus. Id. Ibid.*

‡ *Causa Sensionis est Externum Corpus sive Objectum quod premit Organum
 proprium; & premendo, (mediantibus Nervis & Membranis,) continuum
 efficit Motum introrsum ad Cerebrum & inde ad Cor; unde nascitur Cordis
 resistentia & contra-pressio seu *avritoria*, sive Conatus Cordis liberantis se a
 pressione per motum tendentem extrorsum; qui motus propterea apparet
 tanquam aliquid externum: Atq; Apparitio hæc, sive Phantasma, est id quod
 vocamus *Sensationem*. *Leviathan. Cap. 1.**

an Object pressing the Organ; which Pressure is means of the Nerves conveyed to the Brain, and the Heart; where, by the Resistence or Counter-pressure of the Heart outwards, is made an Image or Phantasm, which is Sensation. Now what is it in all this, that does in any the least measure to explain or make intelligible the real and outward Nature of Sense or Consciousness? The Object, by communicating a Pressure through the Organ to the Sensory, does indeed raise a Phantasm or Image, that is, make a certain Impression on the Brain: But *Wherein* consists the Power of Perceiving this Impression, and of being Sensible to it? Or What Similitude hath this Impression to the Sense itself, that is, to the Thought excited in the Mind? Why, exactly the very same, that a Square has to Blueness, or a Triangle to Sound, or a Needle to the Sense of Pain; or the Reflecting a Tennis-Ball, to the Reason and Understanding of a Man. So that Mr Hobbes's Definition of Sensation; that it is itself, the inmost and formal Nature of it, nothing but the Phantasm or Image made in the Brain by the Pressure communicated from the Object; is, in other Words, defining Blueness to be the Image of a Square, or Sound the Picture of a Triangle, or Pain the Similitude of a Sharp-pointed Needle. I do not here misrepresent him in the least. For He himself expressly confesses

* Quæ qualitates Omnes nominari solent sensibiles, & sunt in ipso Objecto nihil aliud præter materiæ motum, quo Objectum in Organa Sensuum diversimode operatur. Neque in Nobis aliud sunt, quam diversi motus. Motus enim nihil generat præter motum. *Leviathan. cap. 1.*

† See Four Defences of a Letter to Mr Dodwell.

* that all Sensible Qualities, as Colour, Sound, and the like, are in the Objects themselves nothing but Motion; And, because Motion can produce † Nothing but Motion (as likewise 'tis evident that Figure and all its possible Compositions can produce nothing but Figure,) therefore in Us also Perceptions of these sensible Qualities

are nothing but different Motions. If then the Phantasm, that is, the Image of the Object made in the Brain by Figure and Motion, be (as he says) the Sensation itself; is not Sensation, bare Figure and Motion? And are not all the forementioned Absurdities, unavoidable Consequences of his Opinion?

Mr Hobbes, (as I have elsewhere observed,) seems indeed not to have been altogether unaware of this insuperable Difficulty; But he industriously endeavours to conceal it from his Readers, and to impose upon them by the Ambiguity of the Word *Phantasm*. Yet for a Reserve, in case

he should be too hard pressed, * he gives us a Hint, that possibly Sensation may be something more, viz. a Power of Perception or Consciousness naturally and essentially inherent in all Matter; only that it wants the Organs and Memory of Animals to express its Sensation: And † that, as a Man, if he were supposed to have no other Sense but Seeing, and That so ordered as that his Eyes were always immoveably fixed upon one and the same Object, and That also unchangeable and without any the least variety; such a Man could not properly be said to See, but only to be under an unintelligible kind of Amazement: So

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eisdemq; viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt. Nec video, si natura sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum, phantasma aliquod nasceretur; illud tamen, remoto objecto, statim cessaret. Nam nisi ad retinendum Motum impressum, etiam remoto Objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recorderentur.—Sensationi ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adhæret memoria aliqua, &c. Hobbes *Physic. Cap. 25. Sect. 5.* See also N^o. 2 & 11, of the Appendix to a Collection of Papers which passed between Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke.

Itaq; & Sensationi adhæret proprie dictæ, ut ei aliqua insita sit perpetua phantasmatum varietas; ita ut aliud ab alio discerni possit. Si supponemus eum esse hominem, oculis quidem claris, cæterisq; videndi organis recte se habentibus compositum, nullo autem alio sensu præditum, eumq; ad eandem rem eodem semper colore & specie sine ulla vel minima varietate apparentem conversum esse; mihi certe, quicquid dicant alii, non *Videre* videretur.—Admirandum esse, & fortasse Aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem. Adeo *Sentire semper idem, & Non Sentire*, ad idem recidunt. *Ibid.*

all unorganized Bodies may possibly have Sensation Perception; but because for want of Organs there is no Variety in it, neither any Memory or means of expressing that Sensation, therefore to Us it seems as if they had no such thing at all. This Opinion, I find Mr Hobbes mentions as possible: But he does it with such Hesitancy, Diffidence and Sparingness, shows plainly that he meant it only as a last Subterfuge to recur to, when he should be pressed with the fore-mentioned Absurdities, unavoidably consequent upon the Supposition of Sensation being only Figure and Motion. And indeed well might he be sparing, and, as it were, ashamed of this Subterfuge. For it is a Thing altogether as absurd as even the other Opinion itself, of Thought being mere Motion. For, what can be more ridiculous than to imagin that Matter is as essentially Conscious, as it is extended? Will it not follow from that Supposition, that every piece of Matter, being made up of endlessly *separable* parts, (that is, parts which are as really distinct Beings, notwithstanding their Contiguity, as if they had been never so great a distance one from another,) made up also of innumerable Consciousnesses an Infinite Confusion? But 'tis a shame to trouble the Reader with so much as the Mention of any of the Numberless Absurdities following from that Monstrous Supposition. Others therefore who would make Thinking to be an Affection of Matter, and yet are ashamed to use Either of the forementioned ways; contend that God by his Almighty and Supreme Power induces certain Systems of Matter with a Faculty of Thinking, according to his own Good Pleasure. But this all amounts to Nothing. For (besides the Absurdity of supposing God to make an innumerable company of distinct Beings, such as the Particles of every System of Matter necessarily are, to be

at the same time *One Individual* Conscious Being :
 Besides this, I say,) either our Idea of *Matter*, is
 a true and distinct Idea ; or it is not. If it be a
 true and distinct Idea ; that is, if our Idea, (not
 of the *Substance* of *Matter* ; for of simple *Sub-*
stance we have no Idea ; but if our Idea of the
Properties which *essentially distinguish and denominate*
 the *Substance*,) be a right Idea ; viz. that *Matter*
 is nothing but a Solid Substance, capable only of
 Division, Figure and Motion, with all the possi-
 ble Effects of their several Compositions ; as to
Us appears to be, upon the Best Examination we
 are able to make of it ; and the greatest part of
 our Adversaries themselves readily allow : Then
 'tis absolutely Impossible for Thinking to belong
 to *Matter* ; because Thinking, as has been before pag. 56,
 shown, cannot possibly arise from any *Modifica-* 91, 92.
tion, or Composition of any or all of these Qualities.
 But if any Man will say that our *Idea* of *Matter*
 is wrong ; and that by *Matter* he will not here
 mean, as in all other cases, a Solid Substance, ca-
 pable only of Division, Figure and Motion, with
 all the possible Effects of their several Composi-
 tions ; but that he means *Substance in general*, ca-
 pable of Thinking and of numberless unknown
 Properties besides : then he trifles only, in put-
 ting an ambiguous Signification upon the Word
Matter, where he ought to use the word *Sub-*
stance. And, in *That Sense*, to suppose Thinking,
 or any other Active Property, possible to be in
Matter, as signifying only *Substance in general*, of
 whose Powers and Capacities we have no certain
 Idea ; would make nothing at all to the *Present*
 Purpose, in our Adversaries Advantage ; and is
 at least *Not a clearer and more Intelligible* way of
 Talking, than to attribute the same Properties
 to an *Immaterial* Substance, and keep the Idea of
Matter

Matter and its Properties clear and distinct. For affirm,

That if Thinking and Willing were Qualities of Matter, yet nevertheless Liberty might be possible.
Pag. 53.
56, 91, 92.

3dly. That even supposing (in these Mensured way) that the Soul was really not a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be and were indeed only Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; yet even *This* would not all affect the present Question about *Liberty*, to prove Freedom of Will to be an impossible Thing. For, since it has been already demonstrated, that Thinking and Willing cannot possibly be Effects or Compositions of Figure and Motion; Who ever will make Thinking and Willing to be Qualities or Affections of *Matter*, must suppose *Matter* capable of certain Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion. And if it be capable of Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion, then it can never be proved from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all Necessary, that the Effects of other and totally distinct Properties must likewise be Necessary.

A shameful Fallacy of Mr Hobbes and his Followers.

Mr *Hobbes* therefore, and his Followers, are guilty of a most shameful Fallacy in that Argument, wherein they place their main chief strength. For, supposing *Matter* to be capable of Thinking and Willing, they conclude that the Soul is mere *Matter*; and, knowing that the Effects of Figure and Motion must needs be all necessary, they conclude that the Operations of the Mind must All therefore be Necessary. That is: When they would prove the Soul to be mere *Matter*; then they suppose *Matter* capable not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown Properties: And when they would prove the Will, and all other Operations of the Soul to be Necessary; then they devest *Matter* of all its Unknown Properties, and make

more Solidity, endued only with Figure and Motion again. Wherefore, distinguishing their ambiguous and confused Use of the Word *Matter*: they are unavoidably reduced to one of these two Concessions. If, by *Matter*, they mean a Solid Substance endued only with Figure and Motion, and all the possible Effects of the Variations and Compositions of these Qualities; then the Soul cannot be mere Matter; because (as Mr *Hobbes* himself * confesses) Figure and Motion can never produce any thing but Figure and Motion; and consequently (as hath been † before demonstrated) they can never produce so much as any Secondary Quality, [*Sound, Colour, and the like,*] much less Thinking and Reasoning: From whence it follows, that the Soul being unavoidably a Substance Immaterial, they have no Argument left to prove that it cannot have a *Power of Beginning Motion*; which is a plain Instance of *Liberty*. But if, on the other Hand, they will by *Matter* mean Substance in general, capable of unknown Properties, totally different from Figure and Motion; then they must no longer argue against the Possibility of *Liberty*, from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all unavoidably Necessary; because Liberty will not consist in the Effects of Figure and Motion, but in those Other Unknown Properties of Matter, which these Men can no more explain or argue about, than about Immaterial Substances. The Truth therefore is; They must needs suppose Thinking to be merely an Effect or Composition of Figure and Motion, if they will give any strength to their Arguments against *Liberty*: And then the Question will be, not Whether God can make *Matter* think, or no; (for in That Question they only trifle with a word, abusing the Word *Matter* to signify Substance in general;) but the Question will be, Whether

* *Motus*
nihil ge-
nerat præ-
ter Motum.
Leviath.
Cap. I.
† pag. 56,
91, 92.

ther *Figure* and *Motion*, in any Composition or Division, can possibly be *Perception* and *Thought*. Which (as has been before said) is just such a Question, as if a Man should ask, Whether it is possible that a *Triangle* should be a *Sound*, or a *Globe* a *Colour*. The Sum is this: If the Soul be an *Immaterial* Substance, (as it must needs be, if we have any true Idea of the Nature and Properties of *Matter*;) then Mr *Hobbes's* Arguments against the Possibility of *Liberty*, drawn all from the Properties of *Matter*, are vain and nothing to the Purpose. But if our Adversaries will be as absurd as to contend, that the Soul is nothing but mere *Matter*; Then, either by *Matter* they must understand *Substance* in general, Substance indeed with unknown Powers, with *Active* as well as *Passive* Properties; which is confounding and taking away our Idea of *Matter*, and at the same time destroying all their own Arguments against *Liberty*, which they have founded wholly on the known Properties of *Matter*: Or else they must speak (as they really mean,) that *Thinking* and *Willing* are nothing but Effects and Compositions of *Figure* and *Motion*; which I have already shown to be a Contradiction in Terms.

pag. 54,
56, 91, 92,
93.

There are some other Arguments against the Possibility of *Liberty*, which Men by attempting to answer, have made to appear considerable; when in reality they are altogether beside the Question. For Instance, those drawn from the *Necessity* of the *Will's* being determined by the last Judgment of the *Understanding*; and from the *Certainty* of the *Divine Præscience*.

Of the Will
being necessarily
determined
by the last
Judgment.

As to the former, viz. the *Necessity* of the *Will's* being determined by the last Judgment of the *Understanding*: This is only a *Necessity* upon Supposition; that is to say, a *Necessity* that a man should

Should Will a Thing, when 'tis supposed that he ^{of the Un-} does Will it : Just as if one should affirm, that e- ^{derstand-} very thing which Is, is therefore Necessary to Be, ^{ing.} because, when it Is, it cannot but Be. 'Tis exactly the same Kind of Argument, as That by which the True Church is proved to be Infallible : Because Truth cannot err ; and they who are in the Right, cannot possibly, while they are so, be in the Wrong. Thus, whatever a man at any time freely Wills or Does ; 'tis evident (even upon Supposition of the most perfect Liberty,) that he cannot (at That time) but will or do it ; because 'tis impossible any thing should be willed and not willed, (whether it be freely or necessarily,) or that it should be done and not done, at the same time. The necessity therefore of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding, is (I say) only a Necessity upon Supposition ; a Necessity that a Man should Will a thing, when 'tis supposed that he does Will it. For, the last Judgment of the Understanding, is nothing else but a Man's final Determining, (after more or less Consideration,) either to Choose or not to Choose a thing ; that is, 'tis the very same with the Act of Volition. Or else, if the Act of Volition be distinguished from the last Judgment of the Understanding ; then the Act of Volition, or rather the Beginning of Action, consequent upon the last Judgment of the Understanding, is not determined or caused by that last Judgment, as by the physical Efficient, but only as the Moral Motive. For the true, proper, immediate, physical Efficient Cause of Action, is the Power of Self-motion in Men, which exerts itself freely in consequence of the last Judgment of the Understanding. But the last Judgment of the Understanding, is not itself a physical Efficient, but merely a Moral Motive, upon which the physical Efficient or motive Power begins to Act. The Necessity

cessity therefore, by which the *Power of Acting* follows the *Judgment of the Understanding*, is only *Moral Necessity*; that is, *no Necessity at all*, in the Sense wherein the Opposers of Liberty understand *Necessity*. For *Moral Necessity*, is evident consistent with the most perfect *Natural Liberty*. For instance: A Man intirely free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, judges it unreasonable for him to Hurt or Destroy himself; And being under no Temptation or External Violence he *cannot possibly* act contrary to this Judgment not because he wants a *Natural or Physical Power* to do, but because 'tis absurd and mischievous and *morally impossible*, for him to Choose to do Which also is the very Reason, why the most perfect rational Creatures superiour to Men, *do not* do Evil: Not because they want a *Natural Power* to perform the Material Action; but because 'tis *morally impossible*, that, with a perfect Knowledge of what is Best, and without a Temptation to Evil, their Will should determine itself to Choose to Act Foolishly and Unreasonably. Here therefore seems at last really to be the Fundamental Errour, both of those who argue against the *Liberty of the Will*, and of those who but too confusedly defend it: They do not make a clear distinction between *moral Motives* and *Causes Physically Efficient*; Which Two things have no similitude at all. Lastly; if the Maintainers of Fate shall alledge, that, after all, they think a man, free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, is under not only a *Moral* but also a *Natural* Impossibility of hurting or destroying himself; because neither his *Judgment* nor his *Will*, without some *Impulse External* to both, can any more possibly be determined to any Action than one Body can begin to move, without being impelled by another: I answer; This is forsaking

the Argument drawn from the Necessity of the *Will* following the *Understanding*, and recurs to the former Argument of the absolute Impossibility of there being any where a *first Principle of Motion* at all: Which has been abundantly answered already.

* p 83.

Some ingenious and able Writers have spoken with much Confusedness upon This Head, by mistaking (as it seems to Me) the Subject of the Question, and *Wherein* the Nature of *Liberty* consists.

For it being evident, that a *Free Agent* cannot choose whether he shall have a *Will* or *no Will*; that is, whether he shall be what he is, or *no*; but (the Two Contradictories of *Acting* or *not Acting*, being always necessarily before him,) he must of Necessity, and essentially to his being a *Free Agent*, perpetually *Will* one of these two things, either to *Act* or to *Forbear Acting*; This has raised in the Minds, even of Some considerate Persons, great Doubts concerning the Possibility of *Liberty*.

But This Difficulty (if it be any Difficulty,) arises merely from not apprehending rightly *What Liberty* is. For the Essence of *Liberty* consists, not in the Agents choosing whether he shall have a *Will* or *No Will*; that is, whether he shall be at all an *Agent*, or *no*; whether he shall be what he is, or *no*: But it consists in his being an *Agent*, that is, in his having a continual Power of choosing, whether he shall *Act*, or whether he shall *forbear Acting*. Which Power of *Agency* or *Free Choice*, for These are precisely identical Terms, and a Necessary Agent is an express Contradiction,) is not at all prevented by Chains or Prisons: For a Man who chooses to endeavour to move out of his Place, is therein as much a *Free Agent*, as he that actually moves out of his Place. Nor is this *Free Agency*

at all diminished, by the impossibility of his choosing two Contradictories at once; or by the Necessity, that one of Two Contradictories must always be done. A Man that Sits; whether he be or be not a Free Agent, cannot possibly both sit and rise at the same time: Nor can he possibly choose both to act and not to act at the same time. Not, for want of Freedom; but because the Exercise of True Freedom, his freely choosing the One, does itself necessarily make the contrary to be at That time impossible. Nor does Freedom of Will, in any manner suppose a Power in the Agent, of choosing whether he shall Will at all, or no. For a Free Agent may be, and indeed essentially every Free Agent must be, necessarily Free; that is, has it not in his Power, not to be Free.

God is, by Necessity of Nature, a Free Agent. And he can no more possibly cease to be so, than he can cease to exist. He must of Necessity, every moment, either choose to act, or choose to forbear acting; because Two Contradictories cannot possibly be true at once. But Which of these Two he shall choose, in This he is at perfect Liberty: And to suppose him not to be so, is contradictorily supposing him not to be the First Cause, but to be acted by some Superiour Power, so as to be Himself no Agent at all.

Man also is by necessity, (not in the nature of Things, but through God's appointment) a Free Agent. And 'tis no otherwise in his Power to cease to be such, than by depriving himself of Life.

The Necessity therefore of continually choosing one of the Two, either to act or to forbear acting; (Which necessity, nothing but a Free Agent can possibly be capable of: For Necessary Agents, as they are called, can neither choose to act, nor to forbear acting; they being indeed No Agents at all:)

all) The *Necessity*, I say, of continually *choosing* one of the two, either to *act* or to *forbear acting*, is not *inconsistent* with, or an *Argument against*, *Liberty*; but is *itself* the very *Essence* of *Liberty*.

The *Other Argument* which I said has also frequently been urged against the Possibility of *Liberty*, is the *Certainty of the Divine Præscience*. But this also is entirely besides the Question. For if there be no *Other Arguments*, by which it can be proved antecedently, that all *Actions* are *Necessary*; 'tis certain it can never be made to appear to follow from *Præscience alone*, that they must be so. That is: If upon *Other Accounts* there be no *Impossibility*, but that the *Actions* of Men may be free; the bare *Certainty of the Divine Fore-knowledge* can never be proved to destroy That Freedom, or make Any Alteration in the Nature of Men's *Actions*: And consequently the certainty of *Præscience*, separated from *Other Arguments*, is altogether besides the Question concerning *Liberty*. As to the *Other Arguments*, usually intermingled with this Question; they have all, I think, been answered already. And now, that the bare certainty of the divine fore-knowledge (if upon *Other Accounts* there be no *Impossibility* for the *Actions* of Men to be free,) can never be proved to destroy that Freedom; is very Evident. For bare *Fore-knowledge*, has no influence at all in any Respect; nor affects, in any measure, the manner of the Existence of any thing. All that the greatest Opposers of *Liberty* have ever urged, or can urge, upon this Head, amounts only to This; that *Fore-knowledge* implies *Certainty*, and *Certainty* implies *Necessity*. But neither is it true, that *Certainty* implies *Necessity*; neither does *Fore-knowledge* imply any other *Certainty*,

tainty, than such a *Certainty* only, as would be equally in Things, though there was no *Fore-knowledge*.

For (1st.) The *certainty of Fore-knowledge* does not cause the *certainty of Things*, but is itself founded on the reality of their Existence. What ever now *Is*, 'tis *certain* that it *Is*; and it was yesterday and from Eternity as *certainly* true, that the thing *would be* to day, as 'tis now *certain* that it *Is*. And This *certainty of Event* is equally the same, whether it be supposed that the thing could be *Fore-known*, or not. For whatever at any time *Is*; 'twas *certainly* true from Eternity, as to the Event, that That Thing *would be*: And this certain Truth of every future Event, would not at all have been the less, though there had been no such thing as *Fore-knowledge*; Bare *Præscience* therefore, has *no Influence at all* upon any thing; nor contributes in the least, towards the making it *Necessary*. We may illustrate this in some measure, by the Comparison of our own Knowledge. We know *certainly*, that some things *Are*; and when we know that they are, they cannot but *Be*: Yet 'tis evident our Knowledge does not at all affect the Things, to make them more *Necessary* or more *Certain*. Now *Fore-knowledge in God*, is the very same as Knowledge. All things are to him as if they were equally present, to all the Purposes of Knowledge and Power. He knows perfectly every thing that *Is*: And he knows whatever shall be, in the same Manner as he knows what *Is*. As therefore *Knowledge* has no Influence on things that *are*; so neither has *Fore-knowledge*, on things that *shall be*. 'Tis true: The Manner how God can foresee Future things, without a Chain of *Necessary Causes*; is impossible for us to explain *distinctly*. Tho' some sort of

general

general Notion, we may conceive of it. For, as a Man who has no Influence over another Person's Actions, can yet often perceive before-hand what That Other will do; and a *Wiser* and more experienced Man, will still with *greater probability* foresee what Another, whose Disposition he is perfectly acquainted with, will in certain Circumstances do. And an *Angel*, with still much *Less degrees of* *Enour*, may have a *further* Prospect into Mens future Actions: So 'tis very reasonable to apprehend, that *God*, without influencing Mens Wills by his Power, yet by his Foresight cannot but have as much *Certainer* a knowledge of future free Events, than either Men or Angels can possibly have; as the *Perfection* of *His* Nature is greater than that of *Theirs*. The *Distinct Manner how* he foresees these things, is indeed *impossible* for *Us* to *explain*. But so also are Numberless other things, which yet no Man doubts the Truth of. And if there *were* any Strength in this Argument; it would prove, not against *Liberty*, but against *Præscience* itself. For if these two things were *really inconsistent*, and one of them must be destroyed; the introducing an absolute and universal Fatality, which evidently destroys all Religion and Morality, would tend more of the two to the Dishonour of God, than the denying him a Fore-knowledge, which upon this Supposition would be impossible and imply a Contradiction to conceive him to have; and the denying of which, would in such case be no more a Diminution of his *Omniscience*, than the denying him the Power of working Contradictions, is taking away his *Omnipotence*. But the Case is not thus. For though we cannot indeed clearly and distinctly explain the *Manner* of God's foreseeing the Actions of Free-Agents, yet thus much we know, that the bare Fore-

P. 72.

Fore-knowledge of any Action that would up-
 all other Accounts be Free, cannot alter or di-
 nish That Freedom ; it being evident, that For-
 knowledge adds no other Certainty to any thing
 than what it would equally have, though there w
 no Fore-knowledge. Unless therefore we be an-
 cedently certain, that nothing can possibly
 free ; and that Liberty is in itself absolutely
 Inconsistent and Contradictory Notion, (as I ha
 above shown that it is not ;) bare Fore-knowledge
 which makes no alteration at all in any thing, w
 not be any way Inconsistent with Liberty ; ho
 great Difficulty so ever there may be, in comp
 hending the *manner* of such Fore-knowledge
 For if Liberty be in itself possible ; The ba
Fore-sight of a free Action *before it be done*, is a
 thing different (to any purpose in the prese
 Question,) from a simple *Knowledge* of it, *wh*
it is done : Both these kinds of Knowledge, impl
 ing plainly a *Certainty only* of the Event, (whic
 would be the same though there was no fu
 Knowledge ;) and not at all any *Necessity* of t
 Thing.

For (2dly,) As *Fore-knowledge* implies not a
 other Certainty, than such as would be equal
 in things, though there was no *Fore-knowledge*
 So neither does this *certainty of Event*, in any
 imply *Necessity*. For, let a Fatalist *suppose*, (wh
 he does not yet *grant*,) that there was in Man
 (as we assert,) a Power of beginning Motion
 that is, of *acting freely* ; and let him suppose fu
 ther, if he please, that those Actions could no
 possibly be Fore-known : Will there not yet
 notwithstanding this Supposition, be in the Na
 ture of things the same *certainty of Event* in ever
 one of the Man's Actions, as if they were new
 so Fatal and necessary ? For instance ; Suppo

Man by an internal Principle of Motion, and an absolute *Freedom* of Will, without any External Cause or Impulse at all, does some particular *Action to Day*; and suppose it was not possible that this Action should have been fore-seen *Yesterday*; was there not nevertheless the same *certainty of Event*, as if it had been fore-seen? That is; would it not, notwithstanding the *supposed Freedom*, have been as *certain a Truth Yesterday* and from Eternity, that this Action was in *Event to be performed to Day*, (though supposed never so impossible to have been Fore-known,) as 'tis now a *certain and infallible Truth* that it Is performed? More *certainty of Event* therefore, does not in any measure imply *Necessity*: And consequently *Fore-knowledge*, however difficult to be explained as to the *Manner* of it, yet, (since 'tis manifest it implies no other Certainty, but only That Certainty of Event which the Thing would equally have without being Fore-known,) 'tis evident that *It* also implies no necessity.

And now having, as I hope, sufficiently proved *Of the* both the Possibility and the real Existence of *Liberty*: I shall, from what has been said on this *Original* Head, draw only this one Inference; that hereby we are enabled to answer that Antient and great Question, [Πόθεν τὸ κακόν:] What is the Cause and *Original of Evil*. For Liberty implying a *Natural Power* of doing Evil, as well as Good; and the imperfect Nature of Finite Beings, making it possible for them to abuse This their Liberty to an actual Commission of Evil; and it being Necessary to the Order and Beauty of the Whole, and for displaying the Infinite Wisdom of the Creator, that there should be different and various degrees of Creatures, whereof consequently some must be *less Perfect* than others; Hence there
neces-

necessarily arises a Possibility of Evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely Good. In short, thus. All that we call *Evil*, is either *Evil of Imperfection*, as the *Want of certain Faculties and Excellencies which other Creatures have*; *Natural Evil*, as *Pain, Death*, and the like; *Moral Evil*, as all kinds of *Vice*. The *First* of these, is not properly an Evil. For every Power, Faculty or Perfection, which any Creature enjoys, being the Free Gift of God, which he is no more obliged to bestow, than he was to confer Being or Existence itself; 'tis plain, the Want of any certain Faculty or Perfection in any kind of Creatures, which never belong'd to their Nature, is no more an Evil to Them, than their never having been Created or brought into Being at all, could properly have been called an Evil. The *Second* kind of Evil, which we call *Natural Evil*, is either a Necessary Consequence of the former; as *Death*, to a Creature on whose Nature Immortality was never conferred; and 'tis no more properly an Evil, than the Form of a Creature. Or else 'tis counterpoised in the whole, with great or greater Good; as the *Afflictions and Sufferings of Good Men*; and then also it is not properly an Evil: Or else lastly, 'tis a *Punishment* for some Fault; and then 'tis a Necessary Consequent of the Fault. The *Third* and last sort of Evil, viz. *Moral Evil*. And this arises wholly from the abuse of *Liberty*; which God gave to his Creatures for other Purposes, and which 'twas reasonable and fit to give them for the Perfection and Order of the whole Creation. Only They, contrary to God's Intention and Command, have abused what was Necessary for the Perfection of the whole, to the Corruption and Depravation of themselves. And thus all sorts of Evils have entered into the World, without

Dimin

Diminution to the Infinite Goodness of the Creator and Governour thereof.

XI. *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be infinitely Wise.* This Proposition is evidently Consequent upon those that have already been proved: And those being established, This, as admitting no further Dispute, needs not to be largely insisted upon. For nothing is more evident, than that an *Infinite, Omnipresent, Intelligent Being*, must know perfectly *all Things that are*; And that He who alone is *Self-Existent and Eternal, the sole Cause and Author of all Things; from whom alone all the Powers of all Things are derived, and on whom they continually depend*; must also know perfectly all the Consequences of those Powers, that is, *all Possibilities of Things to come*, and what in every respect is Best and Wisest to be done: And that, having infinite *Power*, he can never be controuled or prevented from doing what he so knows to be Fittest. From all which, it manifestly follows, that every Effect of the Supreme Cause, must be the Product of Infinite Wisdom. More particularly: The Supreme Being, because he is *Infinite*, must be every where present: And because he is an *Infinite Mind or Intelligence*, therefore wherever he Is, his Knowledge Is, which is inseparable from his Being, and must therefore be infinite likewise: And wherever his Infinite Knowledge is, it must necessarily have a *full and perfect* Prospect of all Things, and nothing can be conceal'd from its Inspection: He includes and surrounds every thing with his boundless Presence; and penetrates every part of their Substance with his All-seeing Eye: So that the inmost Nature and Essence of all things, are Perfectly Naked and Open to his View; and even the deepest Thoughts of Intelligent Beings themselves, manifest

That the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be infinitely Wise.

manifest in his sight. Further ; All Things being not only present to him, but also entirely depending upon him, and having *received* both their Being itself, and all their Powers and Faculties from Him ; 'tis manifest that, as he knows all Things that *are*, so he must likewise know all Possibilities of things, that is, all Effects that *Can be*. For, being himself Alone Self-Existent, and having Alone *given* to all Things all the Powers and Faculties they are endued with ; 'tis evident He must of Necessity know perfectly what All and Each of those Powers and Faculties, which are *derived wholly from himself*, can possibly Produce. And Seeing at one boundless View, all the possible Compositions and Divisions, Variations and Changes, Circumstances and Dependencies of Things ; all their possible Relations one to another, and their Dispositions or Fitnesses to certain and respective Ends, he must, without Possibility of Errour, know exactly what is Best and Properest in every one of the Infinite Possible Cases or Methods of Disposing things ; and understand perfectly how to order and direct the respective Means, to bring about what he so knows to be, in its Kind, or in the Whole, the Best and Fittest in the End. This is what we mean by *Infinite Wisdom*. And having before shown, (which indeed is also evident of itself,) that the Supreme Cause is moreover *All-Powerful* ; so that He can no more be prevented by Force or Opposition, than he can be hindered by Error or Mistake, from *Effecting* always what is absolutely Fittest and Wisest to be done : It follows undeniably, that he is *actually and effectually*, in the highest and most complete sense, *Ininitely Wise* ; and that the World, and all Things therein, must be and are Effects of Infinite Wisdom. This is Demonstration *à priori*. The Proof *à posteriori*, of the In-

finite Wisdom of God, from the Consideration of the Exquisite Perfection and Consummate Excellency of his Works ; is no less strong and undeniable. But I shall not inlarge upon This Argument ; because it has often already been accurately and strongly urged, to the everlasting Shame and Confusion of Atheists, by the ablest and learnedest Writers both of Antient and Modern Times. I shall here observe only this One Thing ; That the older the World grows, and the deeper Men inquire into Things, and the more Accurate Observations they make, and the more and greater Discoveries they find out ; the stronger this Argument continually grows : Which is a certain Evidence of its being founded in Truth. If *Galen* so many Ages since, could find in the Construction and Constitution of the parts of a Human Body, such undeniable marks of Contrivance and Design, as forced him *Then* to acknowledge and admire the Wisdom of its Author ; What would he have said, if he had known the *late* Discoveries in Anatomy and Physick, the Circulation of the Blood, the exact Structure of the Heart and Brain, the Uses of Numberless Glands and Valves for the Secretion and Motion of the Juices in the Body ; besides several Veins and other Vessels and Receptacles not at all known, or so much as imagined to have any Existence, in *His Days* ; but which *Now* are discovered to serve the wisest and most exquisite Ends Imaginable ? If the Arguments against the Belief of the Being of an All-wise Creator and Governour of the World, which *Epicurus* and his Follower *Lucretius* drew from the *Faults* which they imagined they could find in the Frame and Constitution of the *Earth*, were so Poor and Inconsiderable , that, even

See *Galen de Usu Partium*,
Tully de natura Deorum, Boyle
of Final Causes, Mr Ray *of the*
Wisdom of God in the Creation,
Mr Derham's *Physico-Theology*,
&c.

Opinio-
num Com-
menta de-
let dies,
naturæ ju-
dicia con-
firmat.
Cicero.

even in that Infancy of Natural Philosophy, the generality of Men contemned and despised them as of no force ; How would they have been ashamed, if they had lived in These Days ; when those very things, which they thought to be Faults and Blunders in the Constitution of Nature, are discovered to be very useful and of exceeding Benefit to the Preservation and Well-Being of the whole ? And to mention no more : If Truth be from the partial and very imperfect Knowledge of Astronomy, which *His* Times afforded, could he be so confident of the Heavenly Bodies being Disposed and Moved by a Wise and Understanding Mind, as to declare, that, in his Opinion, who

* Cœlestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio & salus omnium omnino oritur, qui vacare mente putat ; is ipse mentis expers habendus est. *De Natura Deorum, lib. 2.*

ever asserted the contrary, was himself * void of all Understanding ; What would He have said if he had known the *Modern Discoveries* in Astronomy ? The *Immense Greatness* of the World ; the mean of that Part of it, which falls under our Observation ;

which is now known to be as much greater than what in His Time they imagined it to be, as the World itself, according to their System, was greater than *Archimedes's* Sphere ? The *Exquisite Regularity* of all the Planets Motions, without Epicycles, Stations, Retrogradations, or any other Deviation or Confusion whatsoever ? The *inexpressible Nicety* of the Adjustment of the Primary Velocity and Original Direction of the Annual Motion of the Planets, with their distance from the Central Body and their force of Gravitation towards it ? The *wonderful Proportion* of the Diurnal Motion of the Earth and other Planets about their own Centers, for the Distinction of Light and Darkness ; without that monstrously disproportionate Whirling of the whole Heavens,

which

which the Antient Astronomers were forced to suppose? The *exact Accommodation* of the * *Densities* of the Planets to their Distances from the Sun, and consequently to the Proportion of Heat which each of them is to bear respectively; so that neither those which are nearest to the Sun, are destroyed by the Heat; nor those which are farthest off, by the Cold; but each one enjoys a Temperature suited to *its* proper Uses, as the Earth to *ours*? The *Admirable Order, Number and Usefulness*, of the several

* Planetarum densitates fere sunt, ut radices diametrorum apparentium applicatæ ad diametros veras, hoc est, reciproce ut distantia Planetarum a sole, ductæ in radices diametrorum apparentium. Collocavit igitur Deus Planetas in diversis distantis a Sole, ut quilibet, pro gradu densitatis, calore Solis majore vel minore fruatur. Newton. Princip. Lib. 3. Prop. 8.

Mans, (as I may very properly call them,) never dreamt of by Antiquity, but now by the Help of Telescopes *clearly and distinctly seen* to move about their respective Planets; and whose Eclipses are as certainly calculated and foretold, as those of our own Moon? The *strange Adjustment* of our Moon's Motion about its own Center once in a Month, with its Motion about the Earth in the same Period of Time, to such a degree of Exactness, that *by that means* the same Face is always obverted to the Earth without any sensible Variation? The wonderful Motions of the *Comets*, which are Now known to be as exact, regular, and periodical, as the Motions of Other Planets? Lastly; the Preservation of the *several Systems*, and of the *several Planets and Comets* in the same *System*, from falling upon each other; which in infinite past Time, (had there been no *Intelligent Governour* of the *Whole*;) could not but have been the Effect of the smallest possible *Resistance* made by the *finest Æther*, and even by the *Rays of Light themselves*, to the *Motions* (supposing it possible

there ever could have been any *Motions*) of the Bodies? What (I say) would Tully, that great Master of Reason, have thought and said; these and other newly discovered Instances of the inexpressible Accuracy and Wisdom of the Works of God, had been found out and known in that Time? Certainly Atheism, which *Then* was altogether unable to withstand the Arguments drawn from This Topick; must *now*, upon the additional Strength of these later Observations, (which are *every one* an unanswerable Proof of the incomprehensible Wisdom of the Creator,) be utterly ashamed to show its Head. We *Now* see, how great reason the Author of the Book of *Job*, *ecclesiasticus*, after he had described the Beauty of the Sun and Stars, and all the then visible Works of God in Heaven and Earth; concluded, *ch. x. v. 32*, (as *We*, after all the Discoveries of later Ages, may no doubt still truly say;) *There are far more things than these, and we have seen but a few of his Works.*

The Supreme Author of all Things must be infinitely Good, Just and True.

XII. Lastly; *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of necessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections; such as Become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the World.* That there are different Relations of Things one towards another, is as certain as that there are *Different Things* in the World. That from these *Different Relations* of *Different Things*, there necessarily arises an Agreement or Disagreement of some things to others, a *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of the Application of Different Things or Different Relations, one to another; is likewise as certain, as that there is a Difference in the Nature of Things, or that Different Things do Exist. Further; that there is a *Fitness* or *Suitableness* of certain *Circumstances*

certain *Persons*, and an *Unsuitableness* of Others, founded in the *Nature of Things* and in the *Qualifications of Persons*, antecedent to *Will*, and to All *Arbitrary or Positive Appointment whatsoever*; must unavoidably be acknowledged by every one, who will not affirm that 'tis *equally Fit and Suitable*, in the *Nature and Reason of Things*, that an Innocent Being should be *extremely and eternally Miserable*, as that it should be Free from such Misery. There is therefore such a thing as *Fitness* and *Unfitness*, eternally, necessarily, and unchangeably in the *Nature and Reason of Things*. Now What these *Relations of Things*, absolutely and necessarily, *Are* in Themselves; That also they *Appear to be*, to the Understanding of all Intelligent Beings; except Those only, who understand Things to Be what they are not, that is, whose Understandings are either very imperfect or very much depraved. And by this *Understanding or Knowledge* of the *Natural and Necessary Relations of Things*, the *Actions likewise* of all Intelligent Beings are constantly Directed, (which *by the way* is the true Ground and Foundation of all *Morality* :) unless their *Will* be corrupted by particular *Interest or Affection*, or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing Lust. The Supreme Cause therefore, and Author of all Things, since (as has already been proved) he must of necessity have Infinite *Knowledge*, and the Perfection of *Wisdom*; so that 'tis absolutely impossible he should *Err*, or be in any respect *Ignorant* of the True Relations and Fitness or Unfitness of things, or be by any means *Deceived* or imposed upon herein: And since he is likewise *Self-Existent*, absolutely *Independent* and *All-Powerful*; so that, having no want of any thing, 'tis impossible his *Will* should be influenced by any wrong *Affection*; and having no *Dependence*, 'tis impossible his *Power* should be limited

Pag. 109.

pag. 100.

by any Superiour Strength; Tis evident He must be infinitely of necessity, (meaning, not a *Necessity* of Force, but such a *Moral Necessity* as I before said was consistent with the most perfect Liberty,) Do always what he *Knows* to be *Fittest to be done*; That He must act always according to the strictest Rule of Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other *Moral Perfections*. In Particular: The Supreme Cause must in the first place be infinitely Good; that is, he must have an unalterable Disposition to Do and to Communicate Good or Happiness: Because, being himself necessarily Happy in the Eternal Injoyment of his own infinite Perfections, he cannot possibly have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that he may communicate to Them his Own Perfections; according to their different Capacities, arising from that Variety of Natures, which it was for Infinite Wisdom to produce; and according to their different Improvements, arising from that Liberty which is essentially Necessary to the Constitution of Intelligent and Active Beings. That he must be infinitely Good, appears likewise further from hence; that, being necessarily All-Sufficient, he must consequently be infinitely removed from all Malice and Envy, and from all other possible Causes or Temptations of doing Evil; which 'tis evident, can only be Effects of Want and Weakness, of Imperfection or Depravation. Again The Supreme Cause and Author of all things must in like manner be infinitely Just: Because the Rule of Equity being nothing else but the very Nature of Things, and their necessary Relation one to Another; And the Execution of Justice being nothing else but a suiting the Circumstances of Things to the Qualifications of Persons, according to the Original Fitness and Agreeableness, which I have before shewn to be *Necessarily in Nature*

antecedent to *Will* and to all positive Appointment ;
 'Tis manifest, that He who knows Perfectly this
 Rule of Equity, and necessarily judges of Things as
 they are ; who has compleat Power to Execute Jus-
 tice according to that Knowledge, and No possible
 Temptation to deviate in the least therefrom ; who
 can neither be imposed upon by any Deceit, nor sway-
 ed by any Byass, nor awed by any Power ; must, of
 necessity, do always that which is Right ; without
 Iniquity, and without Partiality ; without Preju-
 dice, and without Respect of Persons. Lastly,
 That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things,
 must be *True and Faithful*, in all his Declarations
 and all his Promises ; is most evident. For the
 only Possible Reason of Falsifying, is either *Rash-
 ness* or *Forgetfulness*, *Inconstancy* or *Impotency*, *Fear*
of Evil, or *Hope of Gain* ; From

* all which, an Infinitely *Wise*,
All-Sufficient and *Good Being*,
 must of Necessity be infinitely re-
 moved ; And consequently, as
 'tis impossible for him to be de-
 ceived himself, so neither is it pos-
 sible for him in any wise to deceive
 Others. In a Word : All Evil

and all Imperfections whatsoever, arise plainly either
 from *Shortness of Understanding*, *Defect of Power*,
 or *Faultiness of Will* ; And this last, evidently from
 some *Impotency*, *Corruption*, or *Depravation* ; be-
 ing nothing else, but a direct Choosing to Act con-
 trary to the known Reason and Nature of Things.
 From all which, it being manifest that the Supreme
 Cause and Author of all Things, cannot but be in-
 finitely removed ; it follows undeniably, that he
 must of Necessity be a *Being of Infinite Goodness*,
Justice, and *Truth*, and all other *Moral Perfections*.

* Οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἵνα καὶ ἀνὰ θεὸς
 ψεύδοιτο. — Κορινθ. ἄρα ὁ θε-
 ὸς ἀπλὸν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐν τε ἔργῳ καὶ
 ἐν λόγῳ. Καὶ ὅτε αὐτὸς μετρίσα-
 ται, ὅτε ἄλλως ἐκπατᾷ, ὅτε
 κατὰ φαντασίας, ὅτε κατὰ λόγους,
 ὅτε κατὰ σημείων πομπῆς, ὅδ'
 ὑπάρχει ὁ ἵνα Plato de Repub.
 Lib. 2. sub finem.

To this Argumentation *a priori*, there can be opposed but one Objection that I know of drawn on the contrary *a posteriori*, from Experience and Observation of the Unequal Distributions of Providence in the World. But (besides the just Vindication of the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence in its Dispensations, even with Respect to this *Present* World only, which *Plutarch* and other Heathen Writers have judiciously made,) the Objection itself is entirely wide of the Question. For concerning the Justice and Goodness of God (as of any Governour whatsoever,) no Judgment is to be made from a partial View of a few small Portions of his Dispensations, but from an entire Consideration of the Whole; And consequently not only the short Duration of this present State but moreover all that is past and that is still to come, must be taken into the Account: And then every thing will clearly appear just and right.

From this Account of the Moral Attributes of God, it follows;

The Necessity of God's Moral Attributes, consistent with perfect Liberty.
* pag. 100.

pag. 62.

1st. That though All the Actions of God, are entirely *Free*; and consequently the Exercise of his Moral Attributes cannot be said to be Necessary, in the same Sense of Necessity as his Existence and Eternity are Necessary; yet these Moral Attributes are *really and truly* Necessary, by such a Necessity, as, though it be * not at all inconsistent with Liberty, yet is equally Certain, Infallible, and to be depended upon, as even the Existence itself, or the Eternity of God. For though nothing is more Certain (*as has been already proved in the Ninth Proposition of this Discourse*) than that God acts, *not necessarily*, but *voluntarily*, with particular intention and design, knowing that he does

Good,

Good, and intending to do so, freely and out of choice, and when he has no other constraint upon him but this, that his Goodness inclines his Will to communicate himself and to do Good ; so that the Divine Nature is under no Necessity, but such as is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and freest Choice : (which is the Ground of all our Prayers and Thanksgivings ; the Reason, why we *pray* to him to be *good to us* and *gracious*, and *thank* him for being *just* and *merciful* ; whereas no Man *prays* to him to be *Omnipresent*, or *thanks* him for being *Omnipotent*, or for *knowing all Things* :) Though nothing, I say, is more certain, than that God acts, not *necessarily*, but *voluntarily* ; yet 'tis nevertheless as *truly and absolutely impossible* for God not to do (or to do any thing contrary to) what his Moral Attributes require him to do ; as if he was really, not a Free, but a Necessary Agent. And the Reason hereof, is plain : Because Infinite Knowledge, Power, and Goodness in Conjunction, may, notwithstanding the most perfect Freedom and Choice, act with altogether as much *Certainty and Unalterable Steadiness* ; as even the Necessity of Fate can be supposed to do. Nay, these Perfections cannot possibly but so act ; because Free Choice, in a Being of Infinite Knowledge, Power and Goodness, can no more choose to act contrary to these Perfections ; than *Knowledge* can be *Ignorance*, *Power* be *Weakness*, or *Goodness* *Malice* : So that *Free Choice*, in Such a Being, may be as *Certain* and *Steady* a Principle of Action, as the Necessity of Fate. We may therefore as certainly and infallibly rely upon the *Moral*, as upon the *Natural* Attributes of God : It being as absolutely impossible for Him to Act contrary to the One, as to Divest himself of the Other ; And as much a Contradiction, to suppose him Choosing to Do

any thing inconsistent with his Justice, Goodness and Truth; as to suppose him divested of Infinity, Power, or Existence. The one is contrary to the *Immediate and Absolute Necessity of his Nature*; The other, to the unalterable *Rectitude of his Will*. The One, is in itself an *Immediate Contradiction in the Terms*; The Other, is an *express Contradiction to the Necessary Perfections of the Divine Nature*. To suppose the One, is saying absolutely that *Something is, at the same Time that it is not*: To suppose the Other, is to say that *Infinite Knowledge can Act Ignorantly, Infinite Power Weakly, or that Infinite Wisdom and Goodness can do things Not Good or Wise to be done*. All which are *equally Great, and equally manifest Absurdities*. This, I conceive, is a very Intelligible Account of the Moral Attributes of God; satisfactory to the Mind, and without Perplexity and Confusion of Ideas. I might have said it at once (as the Truth most certainly is,) that Justice, Goodness, and all the other Moral Attributes of God, are as *Essential* to the Divine Nature, as the Natural Attributes of Eternity, Infinity, and the like. But because all Atheistical Persons, after they are fully convinced that there must needs be in the Universe some one Eternal, Necessary, Infinite and All-powerful Being; will still with unreasonable Obstinacy contend, that they can by no means see any necessary Connexion of *Goodness, Justice, or any other Moral Attribute, with these Natural Perfections*; therefore I chose to endeavour to demonstrate the Moral Attributes by a particular deduction, in the manner I have now done.

Of the Necessity of God's doing always

2dly. From hence it follows, that though God is a most perfectly *free* Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is *Best* and *Wise*st in the whole.

The

The Reason is evident ; because Perfect Wisdom and Goodness, are as *Steady and Certain Principles* of Action, as Necessity itself. And an Infinitely Wise and Good Being, indued with the most perfect Liberty, can no more choose to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness ; than a Necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity, by which it is acted : It being as great an Absurdity and Impossibility *in Choice*, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act Unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not Good ; as it would be *in Nature* for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no *Necessity in Nature*, that God should at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Beings at all ; because he is in Himself infinitely Happy, and All-sufficient. There was also no *Necessity in Nature*, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created ; because he would be as Self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was Fit, and Wise, and Good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself. And therefore it was *Necessary* (in the *Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of,*) that Things should be made at such time, and continued so long, and indued with various Perfections in such Degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it Wisest and Best that they should. And *when* and *whilst* things are in Being, the same Moral Perfections make it Necessary, that they should be disposed and governed according to the exactest and most unchangeable Laws of Eternal Justice, Goodness and Truth ; Because, while *Things* and their *several Relations* are, they cannot but *be* what they are ; and an infinitely Wise Being, cannot but *know* them to be what they are, and *judge* always *rightly* concerning

*what is
Best and
Fittest in
the whole.*

concerning the several Fitnesses or Unfitnesses of them; and an Infinitely Good Being, cannot but *choose* to *act* always according to this Knowledge of the respective Fitness of Things: It being as truly impossible for such a *Free Agent*, who is absolutely incapable of being Deceived or Depraved, to *Choose* by acting contrary to these Laws, to destroy its own *Perfections*; as for *Necessary Existence* to be able to destroy its own *Being*.

Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil.

3dly. From hence it follows, that though God is both Perfectly *Free*, and also Infinitely *Powerful*, yet he cannot Possibly do any thing that is *Evil*. The Reason of this also, is Evident. Because, 'tis manifest Infinite Power cannot extend to Natural Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of that very Power by which they must be supposed to be effected; so neither can it extend to Moral Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of some other Attributes, as necessarily belonging to the Divine Nature as Power. I have already shown, that Justice, Goodness and Truth, are necessarily in God; even as necessarily, as Power, and Understanding, and Knowledge of the Nature of Things. 'Tis therefore as Impossible and Contradictory, to suppose *his Will* should *Choose* to do any thing contrary to Justice, Goodness or Truth; as that *his Power* should be *able*, to do any thing inconsistent with Power. 'Tis no Diminution of Power, not to be able to *Do* things which are no Object of Power: And 'tis in like manner no Diminution either of Power or Liberty, to have such a Perfect and Unalterable Rectitude of Will, as never Possibly to *Choose* to do any thing inconsistent with that Rectitude.

That Liberty is not in itself an Imperfection, but 'a Perfection.

4thly. From hence it follows that Liberty, properly speaking, is not in itself an Imperfection, but a Perfection. For it is in the highest and com-

completeſt degree, in *God himſelf*: Every Act, wherein He exerciſes any Moral Attribute, as Goodneſs, Juſtice or Truth, proceeding from the moſt Perfect Liberty and Freeſt Choice; without which, Goodneſs would not be Goodneſs, nor Juſtice and Truth any Excellencies; theſe things, in the very Idea and formal Notion of them, utterly excluding all Neceſſity. It has indeed been ſometimes taught, that Liberty is a great *Imperfection*; becauſe it is the Occaſion of all Sin and Miſery. But, if we will ſpeak properly, 'tis not Liberty that expoſes us to Miſery, but only the Abufe of Liberty. 'Tis true, Liberty makes Men *capable* of Sin, and conſequently liable to Miſery; neither of which they could poſſibly be, without Liberty. But he that will ſay every thing is an Imperfection, by the Abufe whereof a Creature may become more unhappy, than if God had never given it that Power at all; muſt ſay that a *Stone* is a more excellent and Perfect Creature than *Man*, becauſe it is not capable of making itſelf miſerable, as Man is. And, by the ſame Argument, Reason and Knowledge, and every other Perfection, nay even Exiſtence itſelf, will be proved to be an Imperfection; becauſe 'tis That, without which a Creature could not be miſerable. The Truth therefore is; The Abufe of Liberty, that is, the Corruption and Depravation of That, without which no Creatures could be happy, is the alone Cauſe of their Miſery: But as for Liberty itſelf, it is a great Perfection: And the more Perfect any Creature is, the more perfect is its Liberty: And the perfecteſt Liberty of all, is ſuch Liberty, as can never by any Ignorance, Deceit or Corruption, be byaſſed or diverted from Choofing, what is the Proper Object of Free Choice, the greateſt Good.

5thly.

That the
highest
Moral
Perfections
of Rational
Creatures, do
not exclude
Natural
Liberty.

5thly. From hence it follows, that though probably no Rational Creature can be, in a strict Philosophical sense, *Impeccable*; yet we may easily conceive, how God can place such Creatures, as he judges worthy of so excellent a Gift, in such a State of Knowledge and near Communion with himself, where Goodness and Holiness shall appear so amiable, and where they shall be exempt from all means of Temptation and Corruption; that it shall never be possible for them, notwithstanding the Natural Liberty of their Will, to be seduced from their unchangeable Happiness in the Everlasting Choice and Enjoyment of their greatest Good. Which is the State of good Angels, and of the Saints in Heaven.

That the
Grounds of
all Moral
Obligations
are eternal
and necessary,
and depend
not on any
Laws.

* P. 114,
115.

Lastly: From what hath been said upon this Head, it follows, that the true Ground and Foundation of all Eternal Moral Obligations, is This; that the same Reasons, (*viz.* the forementioned * necessary and eternal *different Relations* which *different Things* bear one to another; and the consequent *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of the Application of *different Things*, or *different Relations*, one to another, unavoidably arising from that Difference of the Things themselves;) these very same Reasons, I say, which always and necessarily *do* determine the Will of God, as hath been before shown; *ought* also constantly to determine the Will of all Subordinate Intelligent Beings. And when they do not; then such Beings, setting up their own unreasonable Self-Will in opposition to the Nature and Reason of Things, endeavour (as much as in them lies) to make Things be what they are not and cannot be: Which is the highest Presumption and greatest Insolence imaginable: 'Tis acting contrary to their own Reason and Knowledge; 'Tis an attempting to destroy that Order, by which the

Universe

Universe subsists; and 'tis also, by consequence, offering the highest affront imaginable to the Creator of all things, who himself governs all his Actions by these Rules, and cannot but require the same of all his reasonable Creatures. They who found all Moral Obligations ultimately in the *Will* of God, must recur at length to the same thing; only with this difference, that they do not clearly explain how the *Nature and Will of God himself* must be necessarily Good and Just, as I have endeavoured to do. They who found all Moral Obligations, only upon *Laws* made for the good of Societies; hold an Opinion, which (besides that 'tis fully confuted by what has been already said concerning the eternal and necessary difference of Things,) is moreover so directly and manifestly contradictory and inconsistent with itself, that it seems strange it should not have been more commonly taken notice of. For if there be no difference between Good and Evil, antecedent to all Laws; there can be no Reason why any Laws should be made at all, when all things are naturally indifferent. To say that Laws are necessary to be made for the good of Mankind, is confessing that certain Things tend to the Good of Mankind, that is, to the preserving and perfecting of their Nature; which Wise Men *therefore* think necessary to be established by Laws. And if the reason why certain Things are established by wise and good Laws, is because those Things tend to the good of Mankind; 'tis manifest they were good, antecedent to their being confirmed by Laws. Otherwise, if they were not good antecedent to all Laws, 'tis evident there could be no Reason why Such Laws should be made, rather than the contrary. Which is the greatest Absurdity in the World.

A N D

The Con-
clusion.

AND now from what has been said upon this Argument, I hope 'tis in the whole sufficiently clear, that the Being and Attributes of God, are, to attentive and considering Minds, abundantly capable of just Proof and Demonstration; and that the Adversaries of God and Religion, have no *Reason* on their side, (to which they would pretend to be strict Adherers,) but merely vain Confidence, and great Blindness and Prejudice: when they desire it should be thought, that, in the Fabrick of the World, God has left himself wholly without Witness; and that all the Arguments of Nature, are on the side of Atheism and Irreligion. Some Men, I know, there ~~are~~, who having never turned their Thoughts to Matters of this Nature, think that these Things are all absolutely above our Comprehension; and that we talk about we know not what, when we dispute about these Questions. But since the most considerable Atheists that ever appeared in the World, and the Pleaders for Universal Fatality, have All thought fit to argue in this Way, in their Attempts to remove the First Foundations of Religion; 'tis Reasonable and Necessary, that they should be opposed in their own Way: it being most certain, that no Argumentation, of what kind soever, can possibly be made use of on the side of Errour, but may also be used with much greater Advantage on the behalf of Truth.

2. From what has been said upon this Argument, we may see how it comes to pass, that though nothing is so certain and undeniable as the Necessary Existence of God, and the consequent Deduction of all his Attributes; yet Men, who have never attended to the Evidence of Reason, and to the Notices that God hath given us of Himself, may easily be in great measure ignorant of

Both.

Both. That the three Angles of a Triangle are Equal to two right ones, is so certain and evident, that whoever affirms the contrary, affirms what may very easily be reduced to an express Contradiction: Yet whoever turns not his Mind to consider it at all, may easily be ignorant of This and numberless other the like Mathematical and most infallible Truths.

3. Yet the Notices that God has been pleased to give us of himself, are so many and so obvious; in the Constitution, Order, Beauty, and Harmony of the several Parts of the World; in the Frame and Structure of our own Bodies, and the wonderful Powers and Faculties of our Souls; in the unavoidable Apprehensions of our own Minds, and the common Consent of all other Men; in every thing within us, and every thing without us: that no Man of the meanest Capacity and greatest Disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial Observation of the Works of God, and the lowest and most obvious attendance to the Reason of Things, can be ignorant of *Him*; but he must be utterly without Excuse. Possibly he may not indeed be able to understand, or be affected by, nice and Metaphysical Demonstrations of the Being and Attributes of God: But then, for the same Reason, he is obliged also not to suffer himself to be shaken and unsettled, by the subtle Sophistries of Sceptical and Atheistical Men; which he cannot perhaps answer, because he cannot understand. But he is bound to adhere to those Things which he knows, and those Reasonings he is capable to judge of; which are abundantly sufficient to determine and to guide the Practice of sober and considering Men.

4. But this is not all. God has moreover finally, by a clear and express *Revelation* of Himself, brought

brought down from Heaven by his own Son, our Blessed Lord and Redeemer ; and suited to every Capacity and Understanding ; put to Silence the Ignorance of Foolish, and the Vanity of Sceptical and Profane Men. And, by declaring to himself his own Nature and Attributes, he has effectually prevented all Mistakes, which the Weakness of our Reason, the Negligence of our Application, the Corruption of our Nature, or the false Philosophy of wicked and profane Men, might have led us into ; And so has infallibly furnished us with sufficient Knowledge, to enable us to perform our Duty in this Life, and to obtain our Happiness in that which is to come. But this exceeds the Bounds of my present Subject, and deserves to be handled in a particular Discourse.

F I N I S.



A
DISCOURSE

Concerning the
Unchangeable Obligations

O F
NATURAL RELIGION,

AND THE
TRUTH and CERTAINTY
O F THE

Christian Revelation.

Being Eight S E R M O N S Preach'd at the Cathed-
ral Church of St PAUL, in the Year 1705,
at the Lecture Founded by the Honourable
ROBERT BOYLE Esq;

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D.
late, Rector of St James's Westminster.

The NINTH EDITION, Corrected.

Iſa. v, 20. *Wo unto them that call Evil Good, and Good Evil; that
put Darkneſs for Light, and Light for Darkneſs; that put Bitter
for Sweet, and Sweet for Bitter.*

Rom. i, 22. *Profeſſing themſelves to be Wiſe, they became Fools.*

1 Cor. ii, 10. *But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit.*

L O N D O N :

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at the Crown in Ludgate-Street. MDCCXXXVIII.

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T O T H E

Most Reverend Father in G O D

T H O M A S

Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and
Primate of all *England* :

Sir H E N R Y A S H U R S T, Baronet ;

Sir J O H N R O T H E R A M, Knight,
Serjeant at Law ;

J O H N E V E L I N, Esquire ;

Trustees appointed by the Honou-
rable R O B E R T B O Y L E,
Esquire.

This D I S C O U R S E is Humbly
Dedicated.

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T H E

P R E F A C E.

I Should not have presumed to publish these Papers in Vindication of Natural and Revealed Religion, after so many excellent Discourses already written upon that Subject; had I not thought my self obliged to it, in order to pursue more fully the Design of the Honourable Founder of this Lecture, and to answer the Expectation of the Most Reverend and the Honourable Trustees appointed by him. The Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq; was a Person no less zealously solicitous for the propagation of true Religion, and the practice of Piety and Virtue; than diligent and successful in improving Experimental Philosophy, and enlarging our Knowledge of Nature. And it was his settled Opinion, that the advancement and increase of Natural Knowledge, would always be of Service to the Cause and Interest of true Religion, in opposition to Atheists and Unbelievers of all sorts. Accordingly he in his Life-time made excellent Use of his own Observations to this purpose, in all his Writings; and made Provision after his Death, for carrying on the same Design perpetually. In pursuance of which End I endeavoured, in my former Discourse, to strengthen and confirm the Arguments which prove to us the Being and Attributes of God, partly by metaphysical Reasoning, and partly from the Discoveries (principally those that have been lately made) in Natural Philosophy. And in the present Treatise, I have attempted,

tempted, in a plainer and easier Method, to establish the Unalterable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation. If what I have said, may in any measure promote the Interest of true Religion in this sceptical and profane Age, and answer the Design for which this Lecture was founded; I have my End.

It may perhaps be expected, that I should take notice of certain Remarks, which have been published upon my former Sermons. Had the Author of the Remarks entered into the Merits of the Cause, or offered any considerable Reasons in opposition to what I had laid down; I should have thought my self obliged to give him a particular Answer. But since his Book is made up chiefly of Railing, and gross Misconstructions; and All that he pretends to say by way of Argument, depends entirely upon Supposition of the Truth of the Cartesian Hypothesis, which the best Mathematicians in the World have demonstrated to be false. I presume it may be sufficient, to show here the Inconsistency of that Author, and the Weakness of his Reasoning, by a few brief Observations.

The only Argument he alledges against me in the whole Book, is This: That if we know not distinctly

*what the * Essence of God, and what the Essence of Matter is: we cannot possibly demonstrate them at all, to be two different Essences.*

* Note; that in this whole Question, the Word *Essence* is not to be taken in the proper Metaphysical Sense of the Word, as signifying *That by which a thing is what it is*: For in That Sense, the Attributes of God do constitute his Essence; and *Solidity*, or *Impenetrability* is the Essence of Matter. But *Essence*, is all along to be understood, as signifying here the same with *Substance*.

To which I answer. 'Tis plain, we know not the Essences of Things by Intuition; but can only reason about them, from what we know of their different Properties or Attributes. Now from the demon-

demonstrable Attributes of God, and from the known Properties of Matter, we have an unanswerable Reason to convince and satisfy us that their Essences are entirely different, though we know not distinctly what these Essences are; as our Faculties can afford us, in judging of any the certainest things whatsoever. For Instance: The demonstrable Attributes of God, are, that He is Self-Existent, Independent, Eternal, Infinite, Unchangeable, Incorruptible, Intelligent, Free, All-Powerful, Wise, Just and Good: The known Properties of Matter are, that it is not Necessary or Self-Existent, but Dependent, Finite, (say, that it fills but a few very small and inconsiderable portions of Space,) that it is Divisible, Passive, Unintelligent, and consequently incapable of any Active Powers. Now nothing can be more certain and evident, than that the Substances to which these incompatible Attributes or Properties belong, or the Essences from which they flow, are entirely different one from the other; though we do not distinctly know, what the inmost Substances or Essences themselves are. If any Man will think a mere Hypothesis (the Cartesian or any other) concerning the inmost Nature of Substances, to be a more satisfactory Discovery of the different Essences of Things, than we can attain by reasoning thus from their demonstrable Properties; and will choose rather to draw fond Consequences from such Hypotheses and Fictions founded upon no Proof at all, than to make use of such Philosophy as is grounded only upon clear Reason or good Experiments; I know no help for it, but he must be permitted to enjoy his Opinion quietly.

The rest of the Book, is All either an indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned Mr. Locke: from whom I neither cited any one Passage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any Argument from him; And

therefore is altogether Impertinent. Or else it consists of gross Misrepresentations of my Sense, and very unjust Constructions and false Citations of my Words; of which I shall presently give some Instances.

The first 8, and the 35th and 36th Pages of the Remarks, are spent in attempting to prove, that we do not first know what the Essence of God, and what the Essence of Matter, is; (that is, if the Cartesian Hypothesis or Fiction concerning the Essences of Spiritual and Material Substance, be not granted to be true;) there is no way left, by which it can be proved at all, that the Essence of God and Matter is not one and the same. To which I have already given an answer: viz. that from the demonstrable Attributes of God, and from the known Properties of Matter (being incompatible with each other;) we have as absolute certainty of their Essences or Substances being different, though we do not distinctly know what those Essences are; as our Faculties enable us to attain in any Metaphysical Question. For, incompatible Properties can no more possibly be in any unknown, than in any known Subject.

Pag. 12. The Author of the Remarks asserts, that Des-Cartes and his Followers have Mathematically proved, that the Essence of Matter consists in Length, Breadth, and Depth. And upon this confident Assertion, his whole Book depends in every part. To this therefore I answer, that That Hypothesis is really so far from being Mathematically proved to be True, that on the contrary He cannot but know (if he knows any thing of these Matters,) that the greatest Mathematicians in the present Age, Men confessedly greater in that Science than any that ever lived before them have clearly proved (as I

The PREFACE.

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before said) that it is * absolutely False. And not to take the least notice of This throughout his whole Book, argues either great Insincerity, or great Ignorance.

* See Sir Isaac Newton's Principia, pag 384, & 402. Edit. tert.
tia.

I had affirmed, that, to Imagine an Eternal and Infinite Nothing, was being reduced to the Necessity of Imagining a Contradiction or Impossibility. For this, he argues against me (Remark. pag. 14,) as if I had asserted, that it was possible to imagine an Eternal and Infinite Nothing; whereas I asserted that it was impossible, and an express Contradiction so to do. This is great Insincerity.

I had charged the Cartesians with being unavoidably reduced to the Absurdity of making Matter a necessarily-existing Being. In citing this Passage, (Remark. pag. 14 and 15,) he ridiculously represents me as saying, that this Absurdity consisted in making Extension necessary; Though he knew, that in that very Passage, I supposed Matter and Extension to be intirely different Things. This likewise is great Insincerity.

I have said, that the Idea of Immenfity was an Idea that no way belonged to Matter. Instead of this, he cites me asserting senselessly (Remark. pag. 15,) that Extension no way belongs to Matter. As if that which is not Immense or Infinite, is therefore not extended at all. This is the greatest Disingenuity in the World.

Remark. pag. 15. He says: I am sure this Author cannot produce One, no not One Cartesian, that ever made Matter a necessarily-existing Being; that ever contradicted himself in Words, upon this Subject; that ever was mightily, or not mightily,
or

or at all perplexed with what *Mr Clarke* calls his Argument; nay, that ever heard of that Thing he calls his Argument. Why are they thus misrepresented and imposed upon? *To this I answer: It had been sufficient to make good my charge, to have shown, that from the Cartesian Hypothesis it follows by unavoidable consequence, that Matter must be a necessarily-existing Being; though the Cartesians themselves had not seen that Consequence. Yet I cited more than ever a Passage out of Regis; wherein 'tis plain he perceived and owned that Consequence. But because the Remarker seems not satisfied with this, and pretends to triumph here with great pleasure and assurance, I will for once comply with his Challenge, and produce him Another, and That an unexceptionable Cartesian, even Des-Cartes himself, who Was greatly perplexed with the Argument I mentioned, and was unavoidably reduced to make Matter a necessarily-existing Being, and at the same time did contradict himself in Words upon this Subject. It was ob-*

* *Quæro an a Deo fieri possit, ut mundus esset finitus, Epist. ad Cartesium 68, Partis primæ.*

Nondum illud possum con-
coquere, eam esse inter res
corporeas connexionem, ut nec
mundum Deus creare potuerit
nisi infinitum, nec ullum cor-
pus in nihilum redigere, quin
eo ipso teneatur aliud paris
quantitatis statim creare. *Epist.*
5. *Partis secundæ.*

† *Puto implicare Contradictionem, ut Mundus sit finitus. Cartes. Epist. 69. Partis primæ.*

Mihi autem non videtur de
ulla unquam re esse dicendum,
ipsam a Deo fieri non posse.
Cum enim Omnis Ratio Veri

*jected to Des-Cartes by some very learned Men, that * if Extension and Matter were the same thing, it seemed to them to follow, that God could neither possibly make the World finite; nor annihilate any part of Matter, without creating at the same time just as much more to supply its Place. To this he answers: † that, according to his Hypothesis, it does indeed imply a contradiction to suppose the World to be Finite, or to suppose God annihilating any part of Matter; but yet he will not say God cannot do it, or that God cannot cause*

that Two and Three shall not make Five, or any other Contradiction whatsoever. *Is not this making Matter a necessarily-existing Being, to own that 'tis a Contradiction to suppose God annihilating it, or setting bounds to it? Is not this Contradicting himself, for a Man to affirm (as Cartes does in all his Writings) that the World was Created by God and Depends upon him, and yet at the same time to declare that it implies as plain a Contradiction to suppose any part of Matter annihilable by the Power of God, as to suppose that Two and Three should not make Five? Is not this really a ridiculing of the Power of God? And was not Des-Cartes therefore greatly perplexed with the Argument I mentioned? And is not an Hypothesis, from which such Consequences unavoidably and confessedly follow, a find Land-mark of Distinction between Spiritual and Material Substances? And whatever opposes this Hypothesis, a * depriving us of the * Remark Means of proving the Existence of the one only true God?* pag. 25.

The Remarker humbly desires his Reader (pag. 16.) to be perswaded, that he is of no particular Sect in Matters of Philosophy, but only of the Party of Truth where-ever he meets with it. Yet the same Man had declared before (pag. 12.) that he believed Des-Cartes had Mathematically proved his Hypothesis; and takes not the least Notice of its having since been fully confuted by Mathematicians confessedly far more eminent in that Science, than Des-Cartes was. This is a very singular Mark of Impartiality, and of being addicted to no Party in Matters of Philosophy.

Speaking

Et Boni ab ejus Omnipotentia dependeat; ne quidem dicere ausim, Deum facere non posse ut Mons sit sine Valle, vel ut Unum & Duo non sint Tria; sed tantum dico, talia implicare contradictionem in meo conceptu. Quod idem etiam de Spatio, quod sit plane vacuum, &c. Epist. 6. Partis secundæ.

Speaking of the Cartesian Argument drawn from the Idea of God, I had used these Words : Our Certainty of the Existence of God, arises from this ; that in the Idea we frame of him in our Minds, or rather in the Definition that we make of the word [God,] as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections, we include Self-Existence : But, &c. Meaning, that, according to The Argument, Self-Existence was rather made only a part of the Definition of the word, than proved to be a real Attribute of the Being itself. Instead of this, the Remarker (pag. 17 and 19.) by a childish misunderstanding of the Syntax of the Sentence, and referring the Particle [or] to a wrong Member of the Period, cites my Words in a quite different manner, as if I had said, In the Idea we frame of God in our own Minds, or rather in the Idea we frame of him in the Definition that we make of the Word, &c. And he is very facetious (pag. 17 and 19,) in ridiculing this framing of an Idea in a Definition ; which he calls, as it truly is, a Real Piece of Nonsense. But when, upon the review, he finds himself the true and only Author of it, for want of understanding Grammar ; I suppose it will make him more modest and careful.

*He accuses me (Remark. pag. 18, 20, &c.) of not understanding the Cartesian Argument drawn from the Idea of God. I confess my self very ready to submit to this Charge ; And I can show him much more Learned Writers than either of Us, who have likewise * not understood that Argument. If He does understand it, he will do the World a very acceptable piece of Service to make it out.*

* See Cudworth's System, pag. 721. &c.

What he says in his 21st, 22d, 23d, and 24th pages, is such a heap of Misconstructions, and so entirely void of Sense ; that I confess I cannot at all tell what he means.

From my using the word Mere Matter, he concludes (pag. 29,) that I imagine there is another sort of Matter, which is not a mere, bare, pure incoognitive Matter ; and that These Terms necessarily import this Sense. Whereas in every one of the places he cites, 'tis as express and evident as Words can make it, that by Mere Matter I understand the Matter of which the World consists, not as opposed to Another sort of Matter ; but either as opposed to Motion and to the Form of the World, or as considered by itself and without the Government and Direction of a Supreme Intelligent Mind. This therefore is the highest degree of Insincerity.

He charges me, (pag. 4, and 29, and 30,) with making a Translation quite different from Spinoza's Sense and Words. How I could mistranslate what I did not translate at all, I understand not : But whether I have misrepresented Spinoza's Sense, or no, (as I think I have not,) This I can only leave to the learned World to judge.

*I reduced Spinoza's Opinion to this ; That the Material World, and every part of it, with the Order and Manner of Being of each Part, is the only Self-Existing or Necessarily-Existing Being. And this I think is as clearly contained in the * Words I cited from him, as any thing can be. Here the Remarker asserts (pag. 30.) that Spinoza never thought this*

* Præter Deum nulla dari
neq; concipi potest substantia.
Spinoz. Ethic. Par. Prop. 14.

Una substantia non potest

Doctrine ;

produci ab alia substantia.
Prop. 6.

Kes nullo alio modo neq;
alio ordine a Deo produci po-
tuerunt quam productæ sunt.

Prop. 33.

Ad naturam substantiæ per-
tinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

* Omnes qui naturam di-
vinam aliquo modo contem-
plati sunt, Deum esse Corpore-
um negant. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop.*
15. Schol.

ed evidently, that Spinoza, by denying God to be
Corporeal, meant only fallaciously to deny his being

† Per Corpus intelligimus
quamcunque quantitatem lon-
gam, latam, & profundam,
certa aliqua figura terminatum;
quo nihil absurdius de Deo,
ente scilicet absolute infinito, di-
ci potest. *Ibid.*

‖ Substantiam Corpoream,
quæ non nisi infinita concipi
potest, nulla ratione natura di-
vina indignam esse dici potest.

† Schol. ad
Prop. 15.
Par. I.

whole of that very † Scholium, from whence the Re-
marker has with the greatest Insincerity taken the pre-
sent Objection. But besides: Suppose Spinoza had not
explained himself in this place, and had in this single
Passage contradicted what he had plainly taught
throughout the rest of his Book; would this have been
any just Reason to say, that Spinoza never taught the
Doctrine I imputed to him? nay, that he taught the
quite contrary.

He charges me (pag. 32.) with arguing only
against the Accessories of Atheism, and leaving the
Essential Hypothesis in its full force; nay, with

Doctrine; nay, that he taught the
quite contrary. To prove which
he cites a Passage, where Spinoza
affirms, that * All who have in
any degree considered the Divine
Nature, deny that God is Corpo-
real. Now this also is extremely
Insincere. For had this Author
cited here the whole Sentence of Spi-
noza; as he had cited it before in his
26th page; it would have appear-
ed, that Spinoza, by denying God to be
any particular Piece of Matter
any † Finite Body, and of a cer-
tain Figure. For, that He be-
lieved infinite Corporeal Substance
that is, the whole Material Uni-
verse, to be God; (besides the Place
I had cited from him,) he in ex-
press Words acknowledges, in a pas-
sage which this very Author cites in
the 4th page of his Remarks: And

He maintains it at large through the

confir-
Atheism
proving
but a
by a
Mind,
Godne-
cessorie
theis o
establish
Eternity
intelligi
Imagin
Eternity
me, on
in man
as is th
Agent
be, v
Goodne
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confirming and establishing (pag. 11.) Spinoza's *Atheism*. It seems, in the Opinion of this Author, that proving the *Material World* to be, not a *Necessary* but a *Dependent Being*, made, preserved and governed, by a *Self-Existent, Independent, Eternal, Infinite Mind*, of perfect *Knowledge, Wisdom, Power, Justice, Goodness and Truth*; is arguing only against the *Accessories of Atheism*: And that the *Essential Hypothesis of Atheism* is left untouched, nay confirmed and established, by all who will not presume to define the *Essence of that Supreme Mind* according to the *Unintelligible Language of the Schools*, and the groundless *Imagination of Des-Cartes concerning the Substance or Essence of Matter and Spirit*. I confess it appears to me, on the contrary, that the *Essence of Atheism* lies in making *God* either an *Unintelligent Being* [such as is the *Material World*,] or at least a *Necessary Agent* [such as Spinoza makes his *One Substance* to be,] void of all *Freedom, Wisdom, Power and Goodness*; and, that *Other Metaphysical Disputes* are only about the *Accessories*: And that there is much more Ground, on the other side, to suspect That very Hypothesis, of which this Writer is so fond, to be *fatal* to the *Atheists main Purpose*. For if from *Des-Cartes's Notion of the Essence of Matter*, it follows (as he himself, in the *Places now cited*, confesses in express words,) that it implies a *Contradiction to suppose the Material World Finite*, or to suppose any part of *Matter* can be annihilated by the *Power of God*; I appeal to this Author, whether This does not naturally tend to make men think *Matter* a *Necessary and Self-Existent Being*.

He charges me (pag. 33.) with falsely accusing Spinoza, of making *God* a mere *Necessary Agent*; and cites a passage or two out of Spinoza, wherein that Author seems to assert the contrary. The words which

which I cited from Spinoza, do as clearly express what I charged him with, as 'tis possible for any thing

* A summa Dei potentia
Omnia necessario effluxisse.

Omnia ex Necessitate Divinae
Naturae determinata sunt, &c.

Quicquid concipimus in
Dei potestate esse, id necessario
est.

Res nullo alio modo, neque
alio ordine, a Deo produci
potuerunt, quam productae
sunt.

Deum non operari ex Liber-
tate Voluntatis.

All this the Remarker very insincerely passes over without the least Notice. And the words which he cites out of Spinoza, do not at all prove the contrary

† Sequitur, solum Deum esse
causam Liberam.

Deus ex solis suae naturae
legibus, & a nemine coactus
agit.

to what I asserted. For when Spinoza says, that † God alone is a Free Cause; and that God acts by the Laws of his own Nature without being forced by Any
'Tis evident, he does not there mean a Freedom of Will; but only fallaciously signifies, that the Necessity by which all things exist in the manner they do, is an inward Necessity in the Nature of the Things themselves, in opposition to any Force put upon them from without: Which external Force 'tis plain indeed that [the τὸ πᾶν] the whole Universe (the God of Spinoza) cannot be subject to; because it is supposed to contain All things, within itself. But he sides: Supposing (as I said before) that Spinoza has directly contradicted himself in this one passage; how would that have proved my charge against him to have been false?

He says (pag. 34.) that I am guilty my self, of what I groundlessly imputed to Spinoza; viz. of making

God a mere Necessary Agent : Namely, by affirming that there is a Necessary Difference between Good and Evil, and that there is such a thing as Fitness and Unfitness, Eternally, Necessarily, and Unchangeably, in the Nature and Reason of things, antecedently to Will and to all Positive or Arbitrary Appointment whatsoever. This, he says, is a groundless and positive Assertion ; and plainly imports the Eternal Necessary Co-existence of all things, as much as Spinoza's Hypothesis does. Is not this an admirable Consequence ? Because I affirm the Proportions of things, and the Differences of Good and Evil, to be Eternal and Necessary ; that therefore I affirm the Existence of the Things themselves, to be also Eternal and Necessary ? Because I affirm the Proportion, suppose between a Sphere and a Cylinder, to be Eternal and Necessary ; that therefore I affirm the Existence of Material Spheres and Cylinders, to be likewise Eternal and Necessary ? Because I affirm the Difference between Virtue and Vice, to be Eternal and Necessary ; that therefore I affirm Men, who practise Virtue or Vice, to have existed Eternally ? This Accusation shows but extreme Ignorance, and great Malice, in the Author of the Remarks.

I had used these word. (Demonstrat. pag. 9.) How an Eternal Duration can now be actually past, is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow Understandings to comprehend, as any thing, that Is not an express Contradiction, can be imagined to be ; And yet, to deny the Truth of the Proposition, that an eternal Duration is now actually past, is to assert something still far more unintelligible, even a real and express Contradiction. Instead of this, the Remarker (pag. 39.) citing my Words, with extreme Disingenuity leaves out one half of the Sentence, and makes me to say absolutely, that something is still
L far

far more unintelligible than that which is utterly impossible to be understood. *Such gross Misrepresentations as these, in leaving out one part of a Sentence to make the rest Nonsense ; can very hardly proceed but from want of Honesty.*

Lastly, (pag. 41.) he says that in my Sermon there is not one Argument offered, to prove against Spinoza, that God is a Spirit. I persuaded my self that the proving God to be a Being absolutely distinct from the Material World, Self-existent, Intelligent, Free, All-powerful, Wise, and Good ; had been proving him to be a Spirit. But it seems, no Proof of any Force with this Author, if it be not agreeable to the Cartesian Philosophy, in which alone he seems to have any knowledge. To this therefore, I am not oblig'd to trouble either my self or the Reader, with giving any further Answer.



A

DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Unalterable Obligations

OF

NATURAL RELIGION,

AND THE

TRUTH and CERTAINTY

OF THE

Christian Revelation.

HAVING in a former Discourse endeavour'd to lay firmly the first Foundations of Religion, in the certainty of the Existence and of the Attributes of God ; by proving severally and distinctly : *The Introduction.*

That Something must needs have existed from Eternity : And how great soever the Difficulties are, which perplex the Conceptions and Apprehensions we attempt to frame of an eternal Duration ; yet they neither ought nor can raise in any Man's Mind

any Doubt or Scruple concerning the truth of the Assertion itself, that *Something has really been eternal.*

That there must have existed from Eternity *some One Unchangeable and Independent Being*; because, to suppose an eternal succession of merely dependent Beings, proceeding one from another in an endless progression without any original Independent Cause at all, is supposing things that have in their own Nature no Necessity of Existing, to be *from Eternity* caused or produced by nothing; which is the very same Absurdity and express Contradiction as to suppose them produced by Nothing at any *terminate time.*

That That unchangeable and independent Being which has existed from eternity, without any eternal Cause of its existence; must be *Self-existing*; that is, *Necessarily-existing.*

That it must of necessity be *Infinite* or ever where present; a Being most *Simple, Uniform, Invariable, Indivisible, Incorruptible*, and infinitely removed from all such Imperfections, as are the known Qualities and inseparable Properties of the *Matterial World.*

That it must of necessity be but *One*; because to suppose two, or more, different Self-Existing independent Principles, may be reduced to a direct contradiction.

That it must necessarily be an *Intelligent Being.*

That it must be a *Free and voluntary*, not a *Necessary Agent.*

That this Being must of necessity have *Infinite Power*; and that in this Attribute is included particularly, a Possibility of creating or producing Things, and also a Possibility of communicating to Creatures the *Power of Beginning Motion*, and Possibility

Possibility of enduing them with *Liberty* or *Freedom of Will*; which Freedom of Will is not inconsistent with any of the *Divine Attributes*.

That He must of Necessity be infinitely *Wise*.

And lastly, That He must necessarily be a Being of infinite *Goodness, Justice, and Truth*, and all other moral Perfections; such as become the Supreme Governour and Judge of the World.

It remains now, in order to compleat my design of proving and establishing the Truth and Excellency of the whole Superstructure of our most Holy Religion; that I proceed upon this Foundation of the certainty of the *Being and Attributes of God*, to demonstrate in the next place the *unalterable Obligations of Natural Religion*, and the certainty of *Divine Revelation*; in opposition to the vain arguings of certain vitious and profane Men, who, merely upon account of their Incredulity, would be thought to be strict Adherers to Reason, and sincere and diligent Inquirers into Truth; when indeed on the contrary there is but too much cause to fear, that they are not at all sincerely and really desirous to be satisfied in the true State of Things, but only seek, under the pretence and cover of Infidelity, to excuse their Vices and Debaucheries; which they are so strongly inflaved to, that they cannot prevail with themselves upon any account to forsake them: And yet a rational Submitting to such Truths, as just Evidence and unanswerable Reason would induce them to believe, must necessarily make them uneasy under those Vices, and self-condemned in the practice of them. It remains therefore (I say) in order to finish the Design I proposed to my self, of establishing the Truth and Excellency of our Holy Religion, in oppo-

sition to all such vain Pretenders to Reason as these; that I proceed at this time, by a continuation of the same method of arguing, by which I before demonstrated the Being and Attributes of God, to prove distinctly the following Propositions.

I. *That the same necessary and eternal different Relations, that different Things bear one to another; and the same consequent Fitness or Unfitness of the Application of different Things or different Relations one to another, with regard to which the Will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to choose to act only what is agreeable, to Justice, Equity, Goodness and Truth, in order to the Welfare of the whole Universe; ought likewise constantly to determine the Wills of all subordinate rational Beings, to govern all their Actions by the same Rules, for the Good of the Publick in their respective Stations. That is; these eternal and necessary differences of Things, make it fit and reasonable for Creatures so to act; they cause it to be their Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, so to do; even separate from the consideration of these Rules being the positive Will or command of God; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension, of any particular, private and personal Advantage or Disadvantage, Reward or Punishment, either present or future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointments, to the practising or neglecting those Rules.*

II. *That though these eternal moral Obligations are indeed of themselves incumbent on all rational Beings, even antecedent to the consideration of their being the positive Will and Command of God; yet that which most strongly confirms,*

and in practice most effectually and indispensably inforces them upon us, is this ; that both from the Nature of Things, and the Perfections of God, and from several other collateral considerations, it appears, that as God is himself necessarily Just and Good in the exercise of his infinite Power in the Government of the whole World, so he cannot but likewise positively *Require* that all his rational Creatures should in their Proportion be so too, in the exercise of each of their Powers in their respective Spheres. That is ; As these eternal moral Obligations are really in perpetual Force merely from their own Nature and the abstract Reason of Things ; so also they are moreover the express and unalterable *Will, Command, and Law of God* to his Creatures, which he cannot but expect should, in Obedience to his Supreme Authority, as well as in compliance with the Natural Reason of Things, be regularly and constantly observed through the whole Creation.

III. *That* therefore, though these eternal moral Obligations are also incumbent indeed on all rational Creatures, antecedent to any respect of Particular Reward or Punishment ; yet they *must* certainly and necessarily be attended with *Rewards and Punishments*. Because the same Reasons, which prove God himself to be necessarily Just and Good ; and the Rules of Justice, Equity and Goodness, to be his unalterable Will, Law and Command, to all Created Beings ; prove also that he cannot but *be pleased with* and *approve* such Creatures as imitate and obey him, by observing those Rules, and *be displeased* with such as act contrary thereto ; and consequently that he cannot but some way or other make a *suitable Difference* in his Dealings with them ; and manifest his Supreme Power and absolute Authority, in finally supporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the Honour of these his

Divine Laws ; as becomes the Just and Righteous Governour and Disposer of all things.

IV. *That* consequently, though in order to establish this suitable difference between the Fruits or Effects of Virtue and Vice, so reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the Vindication of the Honour of God ; the Nature of Things, and the Constitution and Order of God's Creation, was originally such, that the observance of the eternal Rules of Justice, Equity and Goodness, does indeed of itself tend by direct and natural consequence to make all Creatures happy ; and the contrary practice, to make them miserable. Yet since through some great and general Corruption and Depravation, (whencesoever *That* may have arisen ; the particular Original whereof could hardly have been known *Now* without Revelation ;) since, I say, the condition of Men in this present State is such, that the natural Order of Things in this World is in event manifestly perverted, and Virtue and Goodness are visibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due Effects in establishing men's Happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice ; therefore 'tis absolutely impossible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final Design, of God's creating such rational Beings as Men are, and placing them in this Globe of Earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (may we not say) the only Inhabitants, for whose sake alone This part at least of the Creation is evidently fitted up and accommodated ; 'tis absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole of God's Design in all this, should be nothing more, than to keep up eternally a succession of such short-lived Generations of Men as at present Are ; and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly State of Things, as we see the World is now in ; without any due

obser-

observation of the eternal Rules of Good and Evil, without any clear and remarkable Effect of the great and most necessary Differences of Things, and without any final vindication of the Honour and Laws of God in the proportionable reward of the best, or punishment of the worst of Men. And consequently 'tis certain and necessary, (even as certain as the moral Attributes of God before demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal succession of new Generations in the present Form and State of Things, there must at some time or other be such a Revolution and Renovation of Things, such a *future State* of existence of the same Persons, as that by an exact distribution of Rewards or Punishments therein, all the present Disorders and Inequalities may be set right; and that the whole Scheme of Providence, which to us who judge of it by only one small Portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and much confused; may appear at its consummation to be a Design worthy of Infinite Wisdom, Justice and Goodness.

V. *That*, though the indispensable necessity of all the great and moral Obligations of Natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, be thus in general deducible even demonstrably, by a Chain of clear and undeniable reasoning: Yet, (in the present State of the World, by what means soever it came originally to be so corrupted, of which more hereafter,) such is the *Carelessness, Inconsiderateness, and Want of Attention* of the greater part of Mankind; so many the *Prejudices and false Notions* imbibed by evil Education; so strong and violent the unreasonable *Lusts, Appetites and Desires* of sense; and so great the *Blindness*, introduced by *superstitious Opinions, vicious Customs, and debauched Practices* through the World; that very Few are

are able, in reality and effect, to discover these Things clearly and plainly for themselves; but Men have great need of particular *Teaching*, and much *Instruction*, to convince them of the Truth and *Certainty* and *Importance* of these things; to give them a due *Sense*, and clear and just *Apprehensions* concerning them; and to bring them effectually to the *practice* of the plainest and most necessary Duties.

VI. *That*, though in almost every Age there have indeed been in the Heathen World some wise and brave and good Men, who have made it their Business to study and practise these things themselves and to teach and exhort others to do the like; who seem therefore to have been raised up by Providence as Instruments to reprove in some measure and put some kind of check to the extreme Superstition and Wickedness of the Nations wherein they lived. Yet none of these have ever been able to reform the World, with any considerably great and universal Success; Because they have been but very few, they have in earnest set themselves about this excellent Work; and they that have indeed sincerely done it, have themselves been intirely ignorant of some Doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others absolutely necessary for the bringing about the great End; and those things which they have been certain of and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and explain clearly enough; and those that they have been able both to prove and explain by sufficiently clear reasoning, they have not yet had Authority enough to inforce and inculcate upon men's Minds with so strong an impression, as to influence and govern the general Practice of the World.

VII. *That* therefore there was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of

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universally degenerate Estate, into a State
ble to the original Excellency of their Na-
: Which Divine Revelation, both the Necessi-
s of Men and their natural Notions of God,
e them reasonable ground to expect and hope
As appears from the Acknowledgments which
best and wisest of the Heathen Philosophers
selves have made, of their *Sense* of the necessity
want of such a Revelation; and from their
pressions of the hopes they had entertained, that
would some time or other vouchsafe it unto
m.

VIII. *That there is no other Religion now in the*
world, but the Christian, that has any just pre-
e or tolerable appearance of Reason to be
emed such a Divine Revelation: And therefore
Christianity be not true, there is no Revelation
the Will of God at all made to Mankind.

X. *That the Christian Religion*, considered in
primitive Simplicity, and as taught in the Holy
aptures, has all the Marks and Proofs of its
ng actually and truly a Divine Revelation,
Any Divine Revelation, supposing it was
e, could reasonably be imagined or desired to
e.

X. *That the practical Duties* which the Christian
igion enjoins, are all such, as are most agree-
e to our natural Notions of God, and most per-
ive of the Nature, and conducive to the Hap-
ess and Well-being of Men. That is; Chri-
quity even in this single respect, as containing
ne and in one consistent System All the Wise
d good Precepts, (and those improved, aug-
mented, and exalted to the highest degree of Per-
fection,) that ever were taught singly and scatter-
y, and many times but very corruptly, by the
eral Schools of the Philosophers; and this
hout any mixture of the fond, absurd and su-
perstitious

perstitious Practices of any of those Philosophers ought to be embraced and practised by all rational and considering Deists, who will act consistently and steddily pursue the consequences of their own Principles ; as at least the best Scheme and Sect of Philosophy, that ever was set up in the World ; and highly probable, even though it had no external evidence, to be of Divine Original.

XI. *That* the *Motives*, by which the Christian Religion inforces the practice of these Duties ; and such as are most suitable to the excellent Wisdom of God, and most answerable to the natural Expectations of Men.

XII. *That* the peculiar *Manner and Circumstances* with which it enjoins these Duties, and urges these Motives ; are exactly consonant to the Dictates of sound Reason, or the unprejudiced Light of Nature ; and most wisely perfective of it.

XIII. *That* all the [*Credenda*, or] *Doctrines* which the true, simple, and uncorrupted Christian Religion teaches ; (that is, not only those plain Doctrines, which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal Salvation, but even *All* the Doctrines which it teaches as *Maxims* of Truths ;) are, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare Reason unassisted with Revelation, yet, when discovered by Revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound unprejudiced Reason ; have every one of them a natural tendency, and a direct and powerful influence to reform mens Lives and correct their Manners ; and do together make up an infinitely more consistent and rational Scheme of Belief, than any that the wisest of the antient Philosophers ever did, or the cunningest of modern Unbelievers can invent or contrive.

XIV. *That* as this Revelation, to the Judgment of Right and sober Reason, appears every

itself highly credible and probable ; and abundantly recommends itself in its native Simplicity, merely by its own intrinsic Goodness and Excellency, to the practice of the most rational and considering Men, who are desirous in all their Actions to have satisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the Conscience of what they do : So it is moreover positively and directly proved, to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible *Signs and Miracles*, which the Author of it worked publicly as the Evidence of his Divine Commission ; by the exact completion both of the *Prophecies* that went before concerning him, and of those that He himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after ; and by the *Testimony* of his Followers : Which in all its Circumstances was the most credible, certain, and convincing Evidence, that was ever given to any Matter of Fact in the World.

XV. And Lastly ; *That* they who will not, by such Arguments and Proofs as these, be convinced of the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion, and be persuaded to make it the Rule and Guide of all their Actions ; *would not be convinced*, (so far as to influence their Hearts, and reform their Lives,) by *any other Evidence* whatsoever ; no, not though one should rise on purpose from the Dead, to endeavour to convince them.

I might here, before I enter upon the particular Proof of these several Propositions, justly be allowed to premise, that having *Now* to deal with *another sort* of Men, than those against whom my former Discourse was directed ; and being consequently in some parts of this Treatise to make use of some *other kinds* of Arguments than those which the Nature of that Discourse permitted and required ;

Of the several Sorts of Deists.

required; the same *demonstrative* force of reasoning, and even *Mathematical* certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to be obtained, ought not here to be expected; but that for *moral* Evidence, or mixt Proofs from Circumstances and Testimony, as most Matters of Fact are only capable of, and wise and honest Men are always satisfied with, ought to be accounted sufficient in the present Case. Because all the Principles indeed upon which *Atheists* attempt to build their Schemes, are such as may by plain force of Reason, and undeniably demonstrative Arguments, be reduced to express and direct Contradictions. But *Deists* pretend to own all the Principles of Reason, and would be thought to desire nothing but what depends entirely on Testimony and Evidence of Matter of Fact, which they think they can easily evade.

But, if we examine things to the bottom, we shall find that the Matter does not in reality lie here. For I believe there are in the World, at least in any part of the World where the Christian Religion is in any tolerable Purity professed, very Few such Deists, as will truly stand to all the Principles of unprejudiced Reason, and sincerity both in Profession and Practice own all the Obligations of Natural Religion, and yet oppose Christianity merely upon account of their not being satisfied with the strength of the Evidence of *matter of Fact*. A constant and sincere observance of all the Laws of Reason, and Obligations of Natural Religion, will unavoidably lead a Man to *Christianity*; if Christianity be fairly proposed to him in its natural Simplicity, and he has due opportunities of examining things, and will steadily pursue the Consequences of his own Principles. And all Others, who pretend to be Deists without coming up to this, can have no fixt and settled

of reason, which is obtained, that such circumstances of Fact as Men are contented with the Principles to build upon force of Arguments, & Contradict the Principles at to deny Testimonies which the bottom, reality of the World, & the Christian profession, & to all sincere & the Obligations of the Christian religion, & the purpose of Christianity, & the not being the cause of many of the necessary and unintelligent causes, that, without the immediate interposition of his Almighty power upon every particular occasion, they should regularly by the virtue of that original Disposition, have produced Effects worthy to proceed from the Direction and Government of infinite wisdom: Though this, I say, may possibly by

Some Men would be thought to be *Deists*, Of the first sort of *Deists*. And because they pretend to believe the Existence of an Eternal, Infinite, Independent, Intelligent Being; and, to avoid the name of Epicurean *Atheists*, teach also that this Supreme Being made the World: Though at the same time they agree

with the Epicureans in this, that

they fancy * God does *not at all*

inter himself in the Government

of the World, nor has any re-

spect to, or care of, what is done

therein But, if we examine

things duly, this Opinion must

inevitably terminate in *absolute*

Atheism. For though to ima-

gine that God at the Creation of

the World, or at the Formation

of any particular part of it, could

have pleased,) by his infinite

wisdom, Foresight, and uner-

redesigning Design, have originally so

ordered, disposed, and adapted

the Springs and Series of fu-

ture necessary and unintelligent

causes, that, without the imme-

mediate interposition of his Almighty

power upon every particular oc-

casione, they should regularly by

the virtue of that original Dispo-

sition, have produced Effects worthy to proceed

from the Direction and Government of infinite

wisdom: Though this, I say, may possibly by

very

* Omnis enim per se Divum
natura necesse est

Immortali ævo summa cum
pace fruatur.

Semota a nostris rebus, se-
juncta; longe.

Nam privata dolore omni,
privata periclis,

Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil
indiga nostri,

Nec bene promeritis capitur,
nec tangitur ira.

Lucret. lib. 1.

Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον, ὅτι
αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, ὅτι ἄλλω
παρίχει ὥστε ἔτε ἀργαῖς, ὅτι χά-
ρισι συνέχεται. Laert in vita
Epicuri.

Nor is the doctrine of those
Modern Philosophers, much
different; who ascribe every
thing to Matter and Motion,
exclusive of Final Causes; and
speak of God as an Intelligentia
Supramundana: Which is the
very Cant of Epicurus and Lu-
cretius.

very nice and abstract reasoning be reconcilable with a firm Belief both of the Being and Attributes of God, and also with a consistent Notion even of *Providence* itself; yet to fancy that God originally created a *certain Quantity of Matter in Motion*, and left them to frame a World at adventures, without any determinate and particular view, design or direction; this can no way be defended consistently, but must of necessity recur to *downright Atheism*: As I shall show presently; after I have made only this One Observation, that as That Opinion is impious in itself, so the late improvements in Mathematicks and natural Philosophy have discovered, that, as things Now are, That Scheme is plainly false and impossible in Fact. For, not to say, that, seeing Matter is utterly incapable of obeying any Laws, the very original Laws of Motion themselves cannot continue to take place, but by something Superadded to Matter, *continually* exerting on it a certain Force or Power according to such certain and determinate Laws; 'tis now evident beyond question that the Bodies of all *Plants* and *Animals*, must be the most considerable parts of the World, cannot possibly have been formed by mere Matter according to any general Laws of Motion. And not only so; but That most universal Principle of *Gravitation* itself, the Spring of almost all the great and regular inanimate Motions in the World answering (as I hinted in my former Discourse) not at all to the *Surfaces* of Bodies, (by which alone they can act one upon another,) but entirely to their *Solid Content*; cannot possibly be the result of any Motion originally impressed on Matter, but must of necessity be caused (either immediately or *mediately*) by something which penetrates the very Solid Substance of all Bodies, and continually puts forth in them a Force or Power

entire

irely different from that by which Matter acts
 Matter. Which is, by the way, an evident
 nonstration, not only of the World's being
 originally by a supreme Intelligent Cause ;
 moreover that it depends every Moment on
 the Superior Being, for the *Preservation* of its
 same ; and that all the great Motions in it, are
 moved by *some* Immaterial Power, not having ori-
 ginally impressed a *certain Quantity of Motion* up-
 on Matter, but *perpetually and actually* exerting it-
 every Moment in every part of the World.
 which *Preserving and Governing Power*, whether
 be *immediately* the Power and Action of the
 the Supreme Cause that created the World, of
 him *without whom not a Sparrow falls to the Ground,*
 and *with whom the very Hairs of our Head are all*
numbered ; or whether it be the Action of some
 subordinate *Instruments* appointed by Him to di-
 rect and preside respectively over certain parts
 thereof ; does either way equally give us a very
 plain Idea of *Providence*. Those Men indeed,
 who, merely through a certain vanity of Philoso-
 phizing, have been tempted to embrace that o-
 ther Opinion, of all things being produced and
 continued only by a *certain Quantity of Motion*,
 originally impressed on *Matter* without any deter-
 minate Design or Direction, and left to itself to
 form a World at adventures ; Those Men, I say,
 who, merely through a vanity of Philosophizing,
 have been tempted to embrace that Opinion,
 without attending whither it would lead them ;
 might not, indeed, to be directly charged with
 the *Consequences* of it. But 'tis certain, that
 many under that cover, have really been Athe-
 ists ; and the *Opinion itself* (as I before said) leads
 necessarily, and by unavoidable consequence, to
Atheism. For if God be an All-powerful,
 omnipresent, Intelligent, Wise and Free Being,

(as it hath been before demonstrated that he necessarily Is;) he cannot possibly but *know*, at all times and in all places, every thing that *is*; and *foreknow* what at all times and in all places 'tis fit to be, and what *should be*; and have perfect Power without the least labour, difficulty or opposition, to *order and bring to pass* what he so judges fit to be accomplished: And consequently 'tis impossible

* Quo confesso, confitendum est Eorum consilio mundum administrari. *Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 2.*

but * he must actually direct and appoint every particular thing and circumstance that is in the World or ever shall be, excepting

only what by his own pleasure he puts under the Power and Choice of subordinate Free Agents. If therefore God does not concern himself in the Government of the World, nor has any regard to what is done therein; it will follow that he is not an Omnipresent, All-powerful, Intelligent and Wise Being; and consequently, that he is not at all. Wherefore the Opinion of this sort of Deists, stands not upon any certain consistent Principles, but leads unavoidably to *downright*

† Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos, re sustulisse. *Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 2.*

Atheism; And, † however in Words they may confess a God, yet in *reality* and in truth they deny him.

Humane Affairs, not beneath the regard of Providence.

If, to avoid this, they will own God's Government and Providence over the *greater and more considerable* parts of the World, but deny his Inspection and Regard to *humane Affairs* here upon

* Εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ νομίζουσιν ἵνα τὰ θεῖα, καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ περὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτὰ ἐξηγήσῃ, ἀγαθὰ, καὶ δυνάμει ἔχοντα τὴν ἀκροτάτην, καὶ γνώσιν τὴν τελειοτάτην. τῶν μὲντοι ἀνθρώπων καταφρονεῖν, ὡς μικρῶν καὶ ἐυτελῶν ὄντων, καὶ ὀναξίων τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελείας. *Simplic. in Epictet.*

Earth, as being * too minute and small for the Supreme Government of all things to concern himself in; This still amounts to the same. For if God be omnipresent, All-knowing, and All-powerful; he cannot but equally

know

and with equal Ease be to direct and govern, * all as any, and the † minuteſt as the greateſt. So that if as no regard, nor concern, theſe things; his Attributes as before, be denied; and frequently his Being. But be- Human Affairs are by no the minuteſt and moſt in- derable part of the Crea- For, (not to conſider Now, Excellency of Human Na- which Chriſtianity diſcovers;) let a Deift ſuppoſe the ſe as large as the wideſt Hy- ſis of Astronomy will give leave to imagine; or let him ſe it as immente as he him- pleases, and filled with as

numbers of rational Creatures as his own y can ſuggeſt; Yet the System wherein we are d, will, at leaſt for ought he can reaſona- ſuppoſe, be as conſiderable as any other ſingle n; and the Earth whereon we dwell, as con- ble as moſt of the other Planets in this Sys- And Mankind manifeſtly the only conſide- Inhabitants on this Globe of Earth. Man fore has evidently a better claim to the par- regard and concern of Providence, than hing elſe in this Globe of ours; And this our of Earth, as juſt a pretence to it, as moſt Planets in the System; And this System, as an one, as far as we can judge, as any System e Univerſe. If therefore there be any Pro- ce at all, and God has any concern for any of the World; Mankind, even ſeparate from conſideration of that Excellency of Humane

* Deorum providentia mun- dus adminiſtratur; iidemq; conſulunt rebus humanis; neq; ſolum univerſis, verum eti- am Singulis. Cic. de Divinat. lib. 1.

† 'Αλλ' ἔδεν τάχ' ἀν' ὧς εἴη χαλεπὸν εἰδιῆσθαι τοῦτόγε, ὥς ἐπιμελεῖς σμικρῶν εἰς ἑοῖ, ἔκ ἥτιον ἢ τῶν μεγάλων ἀεφείρονται. Plato de Leg. Lib. 10.

Ἐι ἡ τοῦ ὅλης κόσμου ὁ θεὸς ἐ- πιμελεῖται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν μικρῶν αὐτοῦ προνοεῖν; ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ τέχ- ναι ποιοῦσι. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρὸς τοῦ ὅλης σώματος ἐπιμελεσθῆναι προ- δέμειν, ὅταν ἀν' ἀμελήσειε τῶν μικρῶν οὐδὲ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ οἰκονό- μῳ, ἢ πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ. τῶν ἡδ' μικρῶν ἀμελεσθῆναι, ἀνάγκη χει- ρόνως τὸ ὅλον ἀετιδεσθαι. Simp- pl. c in Epiſtēt.

Nature which the Christian Doctrine discovers to us, may as reasonably be supposed to be under particular Care and Government, as any other part of the Universe.

*Of the
Second Sort
of Deists.*

2. Some others there are, that call themselves *Deists*, because they believe, not only the Being but also the Providence of God ; that is, that every *natural* thing that is done in the World, is produced by the Power, appointed by the Wisdom, and directed by the Government of God. Though, not allowing any difference between *moral Good* and *Evil*, they suppose that God takes no notice of the *morally good* or *evil* Actions of Men ; these Things depending, as they imagine, merely on the arbitrary Constitution of Human Laws. But how handsomely soever These Men may seem to speak, of the *natural Attributes* of God, of his Knowledge, Wisdom and Power, yet neither can This Opinion be settled on any certain Principles, nor defended by any consistent Reasoning ; nor can the *natural Attributes* of God be so separated from the *moral*, but that He who denies the latter, may be reduced to a necessity of denying the former likewise. For since (as I have formerly proved,) there cannot but be eternal and necessary Differences of different things one from another ; and from these necessary Differences of things, there cannot but arise a Fitness or Unfitness of the Application of different Things to different Relations one to another ; and infinite Knowledge can no more fail to Know, or infinite Wisdom to Choose, or infinite Power to Act according to these eternal Reasons and Proportions of things, than Knowledge can be Ignorance, Wisdom be Folly, or Power Weakness ; and consequently the Justice and Goodness of God, are certain and necessary, as his Wisdom and Power. It follows unavoidably, that he who denies

Justice or Goodness of God, or, which is all one, denies his exercise of these Attributes in inspecting and regarding the moral Actions of Men; must also deny, either his Wisdom, or his Power, or both; and consequently must needs be driven into *absolute Atheism*. For though in *some* moral Matters, Men are not indeed to be judged of by the *Consequences* of their Opinions, but by their Profession and Practice; yet in the present Case it * matters not at all what Men affirm, or how honourably they may seem to speak of some particular Attributes of God; what, notwithstanding such Profession, must needs in all reason be supposed to be their true Opinion; and their *Practice* generally appears answerable to it.

For, concerning *these two* sorts of Deists, 'tis *Prophane* and observable, that as their Opinions can terminate *and debauched* consistently in nothing but *downright Atheism*; so their *Practice and Behaviour* is generally agreeable *Deists, not capable of being argued with.* to that of the most openly professed *Atheists*. They not only oppose the *Revelation* of Christianity, and reject all the *moral* Obligations of *Natural Religion*, as such; but generally they despise the Wisdom of all *Humane Constitutions* made for the order and benefit of Mankind, and are as much contemners of *common Decency* as they are of *Religion*. They endeavour to ridicule and banish all *Humane* as well as *Divine* Accomplishments; all *Virtue* and Government of a Man's self, all *Learning* and Knowledge, all *Wisdom* and *Honour*, and every thing for which a *Man* can justly be commended or be esteemed more excellent than a *Beast*. They pretend commonly in their Discourses and Writings, to expose the Abuses and Corruptions of Religion; but (as is too manifest in some of their Books, as well as in their

* Quasi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget: Illud quæro, quid ei consentaneum sit dicere, qui, &c. Cic. de Finib. lib. 2.

Talk,) they aim really against all Virtue in general, and all good Manners, and against whatever is truly valuable and commendable in Man. They pretend to ridicule certain Vices and Follies of ignorant or superstitious Men; But the more they very profane and very lewd Images, with which they industriously affect to dress up their Discourse, show plainly that they really do not much intend to expose and deride any Vice or Folly, as on the contrary to foment and please the debauched and vicious Inclinations of Others as void of shame as Themselves. They discern clearly, that they have no sense at all of the Dignity of Humane Nature, nor of the Superiority and Excellency of their Reason above even the meanest of the Brutes. They will sometimes in words seem to magnify the Wisdom, and other natural Attributes of God; but in reality, by ridiculing whatever bears any resemblance to it in Men, they show undeniably that they do not indeed believe there is any real difference in Things, or any true excellency in one thing more than another. By turning every thing alike, and without exception, into ridicule and mockery; they declare plainly, that they don't believe any thing to be wise, any thing decent, any thing commendable or praise-worthy at all. They seem not to have any esteem or value, for those distinguishing Powers and Faculties; by induing them wherever God has taught them more than the Beasts of the Field, and made them wiser than the Fowls of the Air. In a word: *Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, there be any Virtue, if there be any Praise; these things they make the constant Subject of their mockery and abuse, ridicule and raillery.* On the contrary

Job xxxv.
11.

Phil. iv. 8.

contrary; whatsoever things are profane, impure, filthy, dishonourable and absurd; these things they make it their business to represent as harmless and indifferent, and to laugh Men out of their natural shame and abhorrence of them; nay, even to recommend them with their utmost Wit. Such Men as these, are not to be argued with, till they can be persuaded to use *Arguments* instead of *Drollery*. For *Banter* is not capable of being answered by *Reason*: Not because it has any strength in it; but because it runs out of all the bounds of Reason and good Sense, by extravagantly joining together such Images, as have not themselves any manner of Similitude or Connection; by which means all things are alike easy to be rendered ridiculous, by being represented only in an absurd Dress. These Men therefore are first to be convinced of the true Principles of *Reason*, before they can be disputed with; and then they must of Necessity either retreat into downright *Atheism*, or be led by undeniable Reasoning to acknowledge and submit to the Obligations of *Morality*, and heartily repent of their profane Abuse of *Religion*.

Another sort of *Deists* there are, who having *Of the third sort of Deists.* great Apprehensions concerning the *natural Attributes* of God, and his All-governing Providence; seem also to have some Notion of his moral Perfections also. That is; As they believe him to be a Being infinitely Knowing, Powerful and Wise; so they believe him to be also in some sense a Being of infinite Justice, Goodness and Truth; and that he governs the Universe by these Perfections, and expects suitable Obedience from his rational Creatures. But then, having a Prejudice against the Notion of the *Immortality of humane Souls*, they believe that Men perish intirely at Death, and that one Generation shall perpetually

tually succeed another, without any thing remaining of Men after their departure out of this Life and without any future restoration or renovation of things. And imagining that Justice and Goodness in God, are not the same as in the Ideas we frame of these Perfections when we consider them in Men, or when we reason about them abstractly in themselves; but that in the Supreme Government of the World they are something *Transient*, and of which we cannot make any true Judgment, nor argue with any certainty about them; They fancy, though there does not indeed seem to Us to be any Equity or Proportion in the distributions of Rewards and Punishments in the present Life, yet that We are not sufficient Judges concerning the Attributes of God, to argue from thence with any assurance for the certainty of a future State. But neither does This Opinion stand on any consistent Principles. For if Justice

and Goodness be not * the same in God, as in our Ideas; then we mean nothing, when we say that God is necessarily Just and Good: And for the same Reason

* Καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ
ἐστὶ τῶν μακαρίων πάντων ὡς
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν.
Orig. contr. Cels. lib. 4.

it may as well be said, that we know not what we mean, when we affirm that he is an Intelligent and Wise Being; And there will be no Foundation at all left, on which we can fix any thing. Thus the *moral Attributes* of God, however they be acknowledged in Words, yet in reality they are by these Men entirely taken away; and, upon the same grounds, the *natural Attributes* may also be denied. And so upon the whole, This Opinion likewise, if we argue upon it consistently, must finally recur to absolute Atheism.

*Of the
fourth Sort
of Deists.*

4. The last sort of *Deists* are those, who, they did indeed believe what they *pretend*, have

and right Notions of God, and of all the Di-
 vine Attributes in every respect: Who declare
 they believe, *that* there is One, Eternal, Infinite,
 Intelligent, All-powerful and Wise Being; the
 Creator, Preserver, and Governour of all Things;
That this Supreme Cause, is a Being of infinite
 Justice, Goodness and Truth, and all other moral
 as well as natural Perfections: *That* he made the
 World for the manifestation of his Power and
 Wisdom, and to communicate his Goodness and
 Happiness to his Creatures: *That* he preserves it
 by his continual All-wise Providence, and governs
 according to the Eternal Rules of infinite Ju-
 stice, Equity, Goodness, Mercy and Truth:
That all created rational Beings, depending conti-
 nually upon him, are bound to adore, worship
 and obey him; to praise him for all things they
 enjoy, and to pray to him for every thing they
 want: *That* they are All obliged to promote, in
 their proportion, and according to the extent of
 their several powers and abilities, the general good
 and welfare of those Parts of the World, where-
 in they are placed; in like manner as the Divine
 Goodness is continually promoting the Universal
 Benefit of the Whole: *That* Men in particular,
 are every one obliged to make it their Business,
 to show an universal Benevolence, to promote the Hap-
 piness of all others: *That*, in order to this, every
 man is bound always to behave himself so to-
 wards Others, as in reason he would desire they
 should in like circumstances deal with Him: *That*
 therefore, he is obliged to obey and submit to his
 superiours in all just and right things, for the
 preservation of Society, and the peace and bene-
 fit of the Publick; to be just and honest, equi-
 table and sincere, in all his dealings with his E-
 quals, for the keeping inviolable the everlasting
 Rule of Righteousness, and maintaining an uni-
 versal

versal trust and confidence, friendship and affection amongst Men; and, towards his Inferiors, to be gentle and easy and affable, charitable and willing to assist as many as stand in need of his help, for the preservation of universal Love and Benevolence amongst Mankind, and in imitation of the Goodness of God, who preserves and does good to all Creatures, which depend entirely upon Him for their very Being and all that they enjoy. *That*, in respect of Himself, every man is bound to preserve, as much as in him lies, his own Being, and the right Use of all his Faculties, so long as it shall please God, who appointed him his Station in this World, to continue him therein: *That* therefore he is bound to have an exact Government of his Passions, and carefully to abstain from all Debaucheries and Abuses of himself, which tend either to the Destruction of his own Being, or to the disordering of his Faculties, and disabling him from performing his Duty, or hurrying him into the practice of unreasonable and unjust things: Lastly, *That* accordingly as Men regard or neglect these Obligations, so they are proportionably acceptable or displeasing unto God; who being Supreme Governour of the World, cannot but testify his Favour or Displeasure at some time or other; and consequently, since this is not done in the present State, therefore there must be a future State of Rewards and Punishments in a Life to come. But All this, the Men we are now speaking of, *profess to believe* only so far, as 'tis discoverable by the Light of Nature alone; without believing any Divine Revelation. These, I say, are the only *True Deists*; and indeed the only Persons who ought in reason to be argued with in order to convince them of the Reasonableness, Truth, and Certainty of the *Christian Revelation*.

* pag. 158. But alas, there is, as I * before said, too much

reason

reason to believe, that there are very few *such* De-
 niers as these, among modern Deniers of Revelati-
 on. For such Men as I have now described, if
 they would at all attend to the Consequences of
 their own Principles, could not fail of being quick-
 ly persuaded to embrace *Christianity*. For, being
 fully convinced of the *Obligations of Natural Re-*
ligion, and the Certainty of a *future State of Re-*
wards and Punishments; and yet observing at the
 same time, how little Use men generally are able
 to make of the Light of Reason, to discover the
 one, or to convince themselves effectually of the
 certainty and Importance of the *other*; 'tis im-
 possible but they must be sensible of the want of
 Revelation; 'tis impossible but they must ear-
 nestly desire God would be pleased, by some di-
 rect discovery of his Will, to make these things
 more *clear* and *plain*, more *easy* and *obvious*, more
 certain and *evident* to all Capacities; 'tis impossible
 but they must wish, God would be pleased parti-
 cularly, to signify expressly the acceptableness of
 Repentance, and his willingness to forgive return-
 ing Sinners; 'tis impossible but they must be very
 solicitous, to have some more particular and
 certain information concerning the nature of that
 future State, which Reason teaches them in gene-
 ral to expect. The Consequence of this, is;
 that they must needs be possessed beforehand with
 a strong Hope, that the Christian Revelation may
 upon a due examination appear to be true. They
 must be infinitely far from ridiculing and despi-
 sing any thing that claims to be a Divine Reve-
 lation, before they have sincerely and thoroughly
 examined it to the bottom. They must needs
 be before-hand very much disposed in its favour;
 and be very willing to be convinced, that, what
 tends to the advancing and perfecting the Obliga-
 tions of natural Religion, to the securing their
 great

great Hopes, and ascertaining the Truth of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; and can any way be made appear to be worthy of God, and consistent with his Attributes; and has Any reasonable Proof of the Matters of Fact it depends upon; is really and truly, what it pretends to be a *Divine Revelation*. And now, is it possible that any Man with these opinions and these dispositions, should continue to reject *Christianity*, when proposed to him in its original and genuine Simplicity, without the Mixture of any corruptions or inventions of Men? Let him read the Sermons and Exhortations of our Saviour, as delivered in the *Gospels*; and the Discourses of the Apostles preserved in their *Acts* and their *Epistles*; and try if he can withstand the Evidence of such a Doctrine, and reject the hopes of such a glorious Immortality so discovered to him. The *Heathen Philosophers*, those few of them, who taught and lived up to the Obligations of natural Religion, had indeed a consistent Scheme of Deism so far as it went; and they were very Brave and Wise Men, if any of them could keep steady and firm to it. But the Case is not so *Now*. The same Scheme of Deism is not any longer consistent with its own Principles, if it does not now lead men to embrace and believe *Revelation*, as it *They* taught them to *hope* for it. *Deists*, in Our days, who obstinately reject Revelation when offered to them, are not such Men as *Socrates* and *Tully* were; but, under pretence of Deism, 'tis plain they are generally Ridiculers of all that is truly excellent even in natural Religion itself. Could we see a Deist, whose Mind was heartily possessed with worthy and just apprehensions of all the Attributes of God, and a deep Sense of his Duty towards that Supreme Author and Preserver of his Being: Could we see a Deist, who lived in an

That there
is now no
consistent
Scheme of
Deism in
the World.

exact performance of all the Duties of natural Religion; and by the practice of Righteousness, Justice, Equity, Sobriety and Temperance, expressed in his Actions, as well as Words, a firm belief and expectation of a future State of Rewards and Punishments: In a word, could we be a Deist, who with reverence and modesty, with sincerity and impartiality, with a true and hearty desire of finding out and submitting to Reason and Truth, would inquire into the Foundations of our belief, and examine thoroughly the pretensions which pure and uncorrupt Christianity has to be received as a Divine Revelation; I think we could not doubt to affirm of such a Person, as our Saviour did of the young Man in the Gospel, that *he was not far from the Kingdom of God*; and that, *being willing to do his Will, he should know of the Doctrine, whether it was of God*. But, as I have said, there is great reason to doubt, there are few or none such Deists as these, among the Infidels of our Days. This indeed is what they sometimes pretend, and seem to desire should be thought to be their Case. But alas, their trivial and vain Cavils; their mocking and ridiculing, without and before examination; their directing the whole stress of their Objections, against particular Customs, or particular and perhaps uncertain Opinions, or explanations of Opinions, without at all considering the main Body of Religion; their loose, vain, and empty Discourses; and, above all, their vitious and immoral Lives; show plainly and undeniably, that they are not really *Deists*, but mere *Atheists*; and consequently not capable to judge of the Truth of Christianity. If they were truly and in earnest such *Deists*, as they pretend and would sometimes be thought to be; those Principles (as has been already shown in part, and will more fully appear in

in the following Discourse ;) would unavoidably lead them to *Christianity*. But, being such as they really are, they cannot possibly avoid recurring to downright *Atheism*.

* Ita fit, ut si ab illa rerum *Summa*, quam superius comprehendimus, aberraveris ; omnis ratio intereat, & ad nihilum omnia revertantur. *Lactant* lib. 7.

The Sum is this. There is now * no such thing, as a consistent Scheme of *Deism*. That which alone was once such, namely the Scheme of the best *Heathen Philosophers* ; ceases now to be so, after the appearance of

Revelation : Because (as I have already shown, and shall more largely prove in the sequel of this Discourse,) it directly conducts Men to the belief of *Christianity*. All other Pretences to *Deism*, may by unavoidable consequence be forced to terminate in absolute *Atheism*. He that cannot prevail with himself to obey the *Christian Doctrine*, and imbrace those Hopes of *Life and Immortality*, which our Saviour has brought to Light through the Gospel ; cannot Now be imagined to maintain with any firmness, steddiness and certainty, the belief of the *Immortality of the Soul*, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments after death ; Because all the main difficulties and objections, lie equally against Both. For the same reason, he who disbelieves the immortality of the Soul, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments ; cannot defend, to any effectual purpose, or enforce with any sufficient strength, the *Obligations of Morality and Natural Religion* ; notwithstanding that they are indeed incumbent upon men, from the very nature and reason of the things themselves. Then ; he who gives up the obligations of Morality and natural Religion, cannot possibly have any just and worthy notion of the moral Attributes of God, or any true Sense of the Nature and necessary differences of things. And he

that once goes thus far ; has no foundation left, upon which he can be sure of the *natural Attributes* or even of the *Existence* of God : Because, to deny what unavoidably follows from the Supposition of his Existence and natural Attributes, is in reality denying those natural Attributes, and that Existence itself. On the contrary : He who believes in the *Being and natural Attributes* of God, must of necessity (as has been shown in my former Discourse) confess his *moral Attributes* also. Next ; he who owns and has just notions of the *moral Attributes* of God, cannot avoid acknowledging the *Obligations of Morality and natural Religion*. In the manner ; he who owns the Obligations of Morality and natural Religion, must needs, to support those Obligations and make them effectual in practice, believe a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*. And finally ; he who believes in the Obligations of natural Religion, and the certainty of a future State of Rewards and Punishments ; has no manner of reason left, why he should reject the *Christian Revelation*, when proposed to him in its original and genuine Simplicity. Wherefore since those Arguments which demonstrate to us the Being and Attributes of God, are so closely connected with those which prove the reasonableness and certainty of the Christian Revelation, that there is Now no consistent Scheme of Deism left ; all modern Deists being forced to shift from one Cavil to another, and having no fixt and certain Set of Principles to adhere to : I thought I could no way better prevent their ill Designs, and obviate all their different Shifts and Objections ; than, by imitating, in the same method of reasoning by which I before demonstrated the *Being and Attributes of God* ; to prove in like manner, by one direct and continued thread of Arguing, the reasonableness

sonableness and certainty of the Christian Revelation also.

To proceed therefore to the proof of the Propositions themselves.

I. *The same necessary and eternal different Relations, that different Things bear one to another; and the same consequent Fitness or Unfitness of the Application of different things or different Relations one to another; with regard to which, the Will of God always and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to Justice, Equity, Goodness and Truth, in order to the Welfare of the whole Universe; ought likewise constantly to determine the Will of all subordinate rational Beings, to govern all their Actions by the same Rules, for the Good of the Publick, in their respective Stations. That is; these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for Creatures so to act; they cause it to be their Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, so to do, even separate from the consideration of these Rules being the positive Will or Command of God; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension, of any particular private and personal Advantage or Disadvantage, Reward or Punishment, either present or future; annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those Rules.*

The several Parts of this Proposition, may be proved distinctly, in the following manner.

That there are eternal and necessary differences of things.

I. That there are Differences of things; or different Relations, Respects or Proportions, of things towards others; is as evident and undeniable, as that one magnitude or number, is greater, equal to, or smaller than another. That from these different Relations of different things, there necessarily arises an agreement or disagreement of some things with others, or a fitness or unfitness

the application of different things or different relations one to another; is likewise as plain, as that there is any such thing as *Proportion* or *Disproportion* in *Geometry* and *Arithmetick*, or *Uniformity* or *Diffor-*
mity in comparing together the respective *Figures* of *Bodies*. Further, that there is a *Fitness* or *Suita-*
bleness of certain *Circumstances* to certain *Persons*, and *Unsuitableness* of others; founded in the nature of *Things* and the *Qualifications* of *Persons*, antecedent to all positive appointment whatsoever; Also that from the different relations of *different Persons* one to another, there necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness of certain *manners of Behaviour* of some persons towards others: Is as manifest, as that the *Properties* which flow from the *Essences* of different *mathematical Figures*, have different *congruities* or *incongruities* between themselves; or that, in *Mechanicks*, certain *Weights* or *Powers* have very different *Forces*, and different *Effects* one upon Another, according to their different *Distances*, or different *Positions* and *Situations* in respect of each other. For instance: That *God* is infinitely superior to *Men*; as clear, as that *Infinity* is larger than a *Point*, *Eternity* longer than a *Moment*. And 'tis as certainly *Fit*, that *Men* should honour and worship, obey and imitate *God*, rather than on the contrary in all their *Actions* endeavour to dishonour and disobey him; as 'tis certainly *True*, that they have an entire dependence on *Him*, and *He* on the contrary can in no respect receive any advantage from *Them*; and not only so, but also that his *Will* is as certainly and unalterably *just* and *equitable* in giving his *Commands*, as his *Power* is *irresistible* in requiring submission to it. Again; That it is a thing absolutely and necessarily *Fitter* in itself, that the *Supreme Author* and *Creator* of the *Universe*, should govern, order and direct all things to certain and constant *regular Ends*; than

that every thing should be permitted to go on as Adventures, and produce uncertain Effects merely by *chance* and in the utmost *confusion*, without any determinate View or Design at all. 'Tis a Thing manifestly *Fitter* in it self, that the All-powerful Governour of the World, should do always what is *Best* in the whole, and what tends most to the universal *Good* of the whole Creation, than that he should make the Whole continually *miserable*; or that, to satisfy the unreasonable Desires of any particular depraved Natures, he should at any time suffer the Order of the Whole to be *altered* and *perverted*. Lastly, 'tis a thing evidently and infinitely more *Fit*, that any one particular *innocent and good Being*, should by the Supreme Ruler and Disposer of all things, be placed and preserved in an *easy and happy Estate*, than that, without any fault or demerit of its own, it should be made *extremely, remedilessly, and endlessly miserable*. In like manner; in *Mens* dealing and conversing one with another; 'tis undeniably more *Fit*, absolutely and in the Nature of the thing it self, that all Men should endeavour to promote the *universal good and welfare of All*; than that all Men should be continually contriving the *ruin and destruction of All*. 'Tis evidently more *Fit*, even *before* all positive Bargains and Compacts, that Men should deal one with another according to the known Rules of *Justice and Equity*, than that every Man for his own present Advantage, should without scruple disappoint the most *reasonable and equitable Expectations* of his Neighbours, and *cheat and defraud*, or *spoil by violence* all others without restraint. Lastly, 'tis without dispute more *Fit* and reasonable in it self, that he should *preserve the Life* of an innocent Man, than that he should happen at any time to be in my Power; or that I should ever him from any imminent danger, tho' I have power

ever made any promise so to do; than that I should suffer him to perish, or *take away his Life*, without any reason or provocation at all.

These things are so notoriously plain and self-evident, that nothing but the extremest stupidity of Mind; corruption of Manners, or perverse-ness of Spirit, can possibly make any Man enter-
in the least doubt concerning them. For a Man endued with *Reason*, to deny the Truth of these Things; is the very same thing, as if a Man that has the use of his *Sight*, should at the same time that he beholds the *Sun*, deny that there is any such thing as *Light* in the World; or as if a Man that understands *Geometry* or *Arithmetick*, should deny the most obvious and known *Pro-
portions* of *Lines* or *Numbers*, and perversely con-
tend that the *Whole* is not *equal to all its parts*, or that a *Square* is not *double to a Triangle* of equal base and height. Any Man of ordinary capacity, and unbiassed judgment, plainness and simplicity; who had never read, and had never been told, that there were Men and Philosophers, who had earnestly asserted and attempted to prove, that there is no natural and unalterable difference between *Good and Evil*; would at the first hearing be as hardly perswaded to believe, that it could ever really enter into the Heart of any Intelligent Man, to deny all natural difference between *Right and Wrong*; as he would be to believe, that ever there could be any *Geometer*, who would seriously and in good earnest lay it down as a first Principle, that a *crooked Line* is as *straight* as a *right* one. So that indeed it might justly seem altogether a needless undertaking to attempt to prove and establish the *eternal difference* of *Good and Evil*; had there not appeared certain Men, as Mr. *Hobbes* and some few others, who have presumed, contrary to the plainest and most obvious reason of Man-

The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and necessary differences of things.

kind, to assert, and not without some Subtlety
 indeavoured to prove, that there is no such real
 Difference *originally, necessarily, and absolutely* in
 the Nature of Things; but that all Obligation of
Duty to God, arises merely from his absolute ir-
 resistable Power; and all *Duty towards Men*, merely
 from *positive Compact*: And have founded their
 whole Scheme of Politicks upon that Opinion.
 Wherein as they have contradicted the judgment
 of all the Wisest and soberest part of Mankind,
 so they have not been able to avoid contradicting
 themselves also. For, (not to mention now, that
 they have no way to show how *Compacts* them-
 selves come to be *obligatory*, but by inconsistently
 owning an eternal *original Fitness* in the thing it-
 self, which I shall have occasion to observe here-
 after: Besides This, I say,) if there be *natural*
 and *absolutely* in things themselves, no difference
 between *Good* and *Evil*, *Just* and *Unjust*; then in
 the State of Nature, before any compact be made
 'tis equally as good, just and reasonable, for one
 Man to destroy the Life of another, not only
 when 'tis necessary for his own Preservation, but
 also arbitrarily and without any * provocation
 all, or any appearance of advantage to himself
 as to preserve or save another Man's Life, when
 he may do it without any hazard of his own. The
 consequence of which, is; that not only the first
 and most obvious way for every particular Man
 to secure himself effectually, would be (as Mr
Hobbes teaches) to endeavour to prevent and cut
 off all others, but also that Men might destroy
 one another upon every foolish and peevish or
 arbitrary Humour, even when they did not think
 any such thing necessary for their own preserva-
 tion. And the effect of this practice must needs
 be, that it would terminate in the destruction of
 all Mankind. Which being undeniably a great

* See
Hobbes de
Cive. c. 3.
 §. 4.

and unsufferable Evil; Mr. *Hobbes* himself confesses
 reasonable, that, to prevent this Evil, Men
 should enter into certain Compacts to preserve
 one another. Now if the destruction of Man-
 kind by each other's Hands, be such an Evil,
 that to prevent it, it was *fit* and *reasonable* that
 Men should enter into Compacts to preserve each
 other; then, *before* any such Compacts, it was
 manifestly a thing *unfit* and *unreasonable* in it self,
 that Mankind should all destroy one another.
 And if so, then for the same reason it was also
unfit and *unreasonable*, antecedent to all Compacts,
 that any one Man should destroy another *arbitra-*
ry and without any provocation, or at any time
 when it was not *absolutely* and *immediately* necessary
 for the preservation of himself. Which is direct-
 ly contradictory to Mr. *Hobbes's* first Supposition,
 * there being no natural and
 absolute difference between Good
 and Evil, Just and Unjust, ante-
 cedent to positive Compact. And
 in like manner All others, who
 upon any pretence whatsoever,
 teach that Good and Evil depend originally on
 the Constitution of *positive Laws*, whether *Divine*
Humane; must unavoidably run into the same
 absurdity. For if there be no such thing as
 Good and Evil in the Nature of Things, antece-
 dent to all Laws; then neither can any one Law
 be better than another; nor any one thing what-
 ever, be more justly established, and enforced by
 Laws, then the contrary; nor
 † any reason be given, why
 any Laws should ever be made at
 all: But all Laws equally, will
 be either || arbitrary and tyranni-
 cal, or frivolous and needless;
 because the contrary might with

* Ex his sequitur injuriam
 nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quo-
 cum initur pactum. *De Cive*
 c. 3. §. 4. where see more to
 the same purpose.

† Manifestum est rationem
 nullam esse Lege prohibendi
 noxas tales, nisi agnoscant
 tales Actus, etiam anteceden-
 ter ad ullam Legem, mala
 esse. *Cumberl. de Leg. Nat.*
 pag. 194.

|| Nam stoliditas inveniri
 equal

quæ inanior potest, quam mala esse nulla contendere, & tanquam malos perdere & condemnare peccantes? *Arnob. advers. Gentes. Lib. 2.*

equal Reason have been established, if before the making of the Laws, all things had been alike indifferent in their own Nature.

There is no possible way to avoid this Absurdity, but by saying, that out of things in their own Nature absolutely indifferent, those are chosen by wise Governours to be made obligatory by Law, the practice of which they judge will tend to the publick benefit of the Community. But this is an express Contradiction in the very Terms. For if the practice of certain things tends to the publick benefit of the World, and the contrary would tend to the publick disadvantage; then those things are not in their own nature indifferent, but were good and reasonable to be practised before any Law was made, and can only for that very reason be wisely enforced by the Authority of Laws. Only here it is to be observed,

* Qui autem *Civium* rationem dicunt habendam, *Externorum* negant; dirimunt hi communem generis humani societatem; qua sublata, justitia funditus tollitur. *Cic. de Offic. Lib. 3.*

that by the publick Benefit must * not be understood the interest of any one particular Nation, to the plain injury or prejudice of the rest of Mankind; and more than the interest of one Country or Family, in opposition to the Neighbours of the same Country.

But those things only are truly good in their own Nature, which either tend to the universal benefit and welfare of all Men, or at least are not destructive of it. The true State therefore of the Case, is plainly this. Some things are in their own nature Good and Reasonable and Fit to be done; such as keeping Faith, and performing equitable Compacts, and the like; And these receive not their obligatory power, from any Law or Authority; but are only declared, confirmed, and enforced by penalties, upon such as would not

... be governed by right Reason only. Other things are in their own nature *absolutely Evil*; such as *breaking Faith, refusing to perform equitable compacts, cruelly destroying those who have neither directly nor indirectly given any occasion for any such treatment, and the like*; And these cannot by any Law or Authority whatsoever, be made fit and reasonable, or excusable to be practised. Lastly, other things are in their own Nature *Indifferent*; that is, (not *absolutely* and *strictly* so; as such trivial Actions, which have no way any tendency at all either to the publick welfare or damage; For concerning such things, it would be childish and foolish to suppose any Laws to be made at all; but they are) such things, whose tendency to the publick benefit or disadvantage, is either so *small* so *remote*, or so *obscure and involved*, that the generality of People are not able of themselves to discern on which side they ought to act: And these things are made obligatory by the Authority of Laws; Though perhaps every one cannot distinctly perceive the reason and fitness of their being enjoined: Of which sort are many particular *penal Laws*, in several Countries and Nations. It is not to proceed.

The principal thing that can, with any colour of Reason, seem to countenance the Opinion of those who deny the natural and eternal difference of Good and Evil; (for Mr. *Hobbes's* false Reasonings, I shall hereafter consider by themselves;) is the difficulty there may sometimes be, to define exactly the bounds of right and wrong: the variety

* of Opinions, that have obtained even among understanding and learned Men concerning certain Questions of just and unjust, especially in political Matters: And the many contrary Laws that

An Answer to the Objection drawn from the Variety of the Opinions of learned Men, and the Laws of different Nations concerning right and wrong.

* Τα ὅ καλὰ ἔ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ἃν ἡ πόλις σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἔ πλάνην. ὥς δὲ δοκεῖν νόμον εἶναι, φύσει ὅ μὴ. *Aristot. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 1.*

have been made in divers Ages and in different Countries, concerning these Matters. But as, in *Painting*, two very different Colours, by diluting each other very slowly and gradually, may from the highest intenseness in either extreme, terminate in the midst insensibly, and so run one into the other, that it shall not be possible even for a skillful Eye to determine exactly where the one ends and the other begins; and yet the Colours may really differ as much as can be, not in degree only but entirely in kind, as red and blue, or white and black; So, though it may perhaps be very difficult in some nice and perplexed Cases (which yet are very far from occurring frequently,) to define exactly the bounds of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust; and there may be some latitude in the judgment of different Men, and the Laws of divers Nations; yet *Right* and *Wrong* are nevertheless in themselves totally and essentially different; even altogether as much, as *White* and *Black*, *Light* and *Darkness*. The *Spartan* Law

* Κλέπειν νόμιμον τὰς ἐλευ-
θέρων παίδας, ὃ τί τις δύναται.
Plutarch. Apophthegmatata La-
conica.

perhaps, which * permitted their Youth to *Steal*; may, as absurd as it was, bear much dispute whether it was absolutely *Unjust* or no; because every Man having

an absolute Right in his own Goods, it may seem that the Members of any Society may agree to transfer or alter their own Properties upon what Conditions they shall think fit. But if it could be supposed that a Law had been made at *Sparta* or at *Rome*, or in *India*, or in any other part of the World; whereby it had been commanded or allowed, that every Man might Rob by *Violence* and *Murder* whomsoever he met with; or that *no Faith* should be kept with any Man, nor any *equitable Compacts* performed; no Man, with any tolerable use of his Reason, whatever divers

of Judgment might be among them in o-
 r matters, would have thought that such a
 w could have authoris'd or excus'd, much less
 e justified such Actions, and have made them
 ome good: Because 'tis plainly not in mens
 wer to make *Falsehood* be *Truth*, though they
 y alter the *Property of their Goods* as they please.
 w if in *flagrant Cases*, the natural and essential
 ference between Good and Evil, Right and
 rong, cannot but be confes'd to be plainly and
 denyably evident; the difference between them
 st be also essential and unalterable in all even
 e smallest and nicest and most intricate Cases,
 ough it be not so easy to be discern'd and ac-
 ately distinguish'd. For if from the difficulty
 determining exactly the bounds of Right and
 rong, in many *perplex'd Cases*, it could truly be
 cluded that Just and Unjust were not essential-
 ly different by Nature, but only by positive Con-
 stitution and Custom; it would follow equally,
 at they were not really, essentially, and unal-
 ably different, even in the *most flagrant Cases*
 e can be suppos'd. Which is an assertion so
 y absurd, that Mr. *Hobbes* himself could hardly
 ut it without blushing, and discovering plainly,
 his shifting Expressions, his secret Self-con-
 demnation. There *Are* therefore certain *necessary*
 eternal differences of things; and certain conse-
 quent *fitnesses* or *unfitnesses* of the application of
 ferent Things or different Relations one to ano-
 er; not depending on any positive Constitutions,
 founded unchangeably in the nature and reason
 of things, and unavoidably arising from the dif-
 ferences of the things themselves. Which is the
 Branch of the general Proposition I propos'd
 to prove.

2. Now what these eternal and unalterable Re- *That the*
 lations, *Respects*, or *Proportions* of things, with *Will of*
 their *God al-*

*ways deter-
mines it
self to act
according
to the eter-
nal reason
of things.*

their consequent *Agreements* or *Disagreements*, *F*
nesses or *Unfitnesses*, absolutely and necessarily *A*
in themselves; *That* also they *appear to be*, to *t*
Understandings of all Intelligent Beings; except
those only, who *understand* things to be what they
are not, that is, whose *Understandings* are either
very imperfect, or very much depraved. And
by this Understanding or Knowledge of the nat-
ural and necessary relations, fitnesses, and pro-
portions of things, the *Wills* likewise of all Inte-
ligent Beings are constantly directed, and must
needs be determined to act accordingly; except
those only, who *Will* things to be what they
are not and cannot be; that is, whose *Wills* are
corrupted by particular Interest or Affection
or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing
Passion. Wherefore since the *natural* Attributes
of God, his infinite Knowledge, Wisdom and
Power, set Him infinitely above all Possibility
being *deceived by any Errour*, or of being *influenced*
by any wrong Affection; 'tis manifest His Divine
Will cannot but always and necessarily determine
it self to choose to Do what in the whole is ab-
solutely Best and Fittest to be done; that is, to act
constantly according to the eternal Rules of in-
finite Goodness, Justice, and Truth. As I have
endeavoured to show distinctly in my former Dis-
course, in deducing severally the *Moral* Attributes
of God.

*That all
rational
Creatures
are obliged
to govern
themselves
in all their
Actions, by
the same e-
ternal rule
of Reason.*

3. And now, that the same *Reason of Things*
with regard to which the Will of God always
necessarily *Does* determine it self to act in constant
conformity to the eternal Rules of Justice, Equi-
ty, Goodness, and Truth; *ought* also constantly
determine the Wills of all Subordinate Rational
Beings, to govern all *Their* Actions by the same
Rules; is very evident. For, as 'tis absolutely
impossible in Nature, that God should be *deceived*

any Error, or influenced by any wrong Affection :
 'tis very unreasonable and blame-worthy in Prac-
 tice, that any Intelligent Creatures, whom God has
 made so far like unto himself, as to endue them
 with those excellent Faculties of Reason and Will,
 whereby they are enabled to distinguish Good from
 evil, and to chuse the one and refuse the other ;
 should either negligently suffer themselves to be im-
 pected upon and deceived in Matters of Good and
 evil, Right and Wrong ; or wilfully and perversely
 allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd Passi-
 ons, and corrupt or partial Affections, to act contra-
 ry to what they know is Fit to be done. Which
 are two Things, viz. negligent Misunderstanding and wil-
 ful Passions or Lusts, are, as I said, the only Causes
 which can make a reasonable Creature act contra-
 ry to Reason, that is, contrary to the eternal
 Rules of Justice, Equity, Righteousness and
 Truth. For, was it not for these inexcusable cor-
 ruptions and depravations ; 'tis impossible but the
 same Proportions and Finesses of things, which
 have so much Weight and so much Excellency
 and Beauty in them, that the All-powerful Crea-
 tor and Governour of the Universe, (who has the
 absolute and uncontrollable Dominion of all things
 in his own Hands, and is accountable to none for
 what he does, yet) thinks it no diminution of his
 power to make this Reason of Things the unaltera-
 ble Rule and Law of his own Actions in the
 Government of the World, and does nothing by
 mere Will and Arbitrariness ; 'tis impossible (I
 say,) if it was not for inexcusable corruption and
 depravation, but the same eternal Reason of Things
 must much more have Weight enough to deter-
 mine constantly the Wills and Actions of all Sub-
 ordinate, Finite, Dependent and Accountable Be-
 ings. For originally and in reality, 'tis as natural
 and (morally speaking) necessary, that the Will

Proved
 from the
 original
 Nature of
 things.

should

should be determined in every Action by the Reason of the Thing, and the Right of the Case; as natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary, the Understanding should submit to a demonstrative Truth. And 'tis as absurd and blame-worthy, to mistake negligently plain Right and Wrong, that to understand the Proportions of things in Morals to be what they are not; or wilfully to act contrary to known Justice and Equity, that is, to make things to be what they are not and cannot be, as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a Man in Arithmetical Matters, ignorantly to believe that *Twice Two is not equal to Four*; or wilfully and obstinately to contend, against his own clear Knowledge, that *the whole is not equal to all its Parts*. The only difference is, that Assent to a plain speculative Truth, is not in a Man's Power to withhold; but to Act according to the plain Right Reason of things, this he may, by the natural Liberty of his Will, forbear. But the One he ought to do; and 'tis as much his plain and indispensable Duty; as the other he cannot but do, and by the Necessity of his Nature to do it. He that wilfully refuses to Honour and obey God, from whom he received his Being, and to whom he continually owes his Preservation; is really guilty of equal absurdity and inconsistency in Practice; as he that in Speculation denies the Effect to owe anything to its Cause, or the Whole to be bigger than its Part. He that refuses to deal with All Men equally, and with every Man as he desires they should deal with him: is guilty of the very same unreasonableness and contradiction in one Case; as that in another Case should affirm one Number of Quantity to be equal to another, and yet that Number at the same time not to be equal to the first. Lastly, he that acknowledges himself obliged to the practice of certain Duties both towards

towards *Men*, and yet takes no care either to
 preserve his own Being, or at least not to preserve
 himself in such a state and temper of Mind and
 Body, as may best enable him to perform those
 duties; is altogether as inexcusable and ridiculous,
 as he that in any other matter should *affirm* one
 thing at the same time that he *denies* another, with-
 out which the former could not possibly be *true*;
 or undertake one thing, at the same time that he
 eternally *omits* another, without which the for-
 mer is by no means *practicable*. Wherefore all ra-
 tional Creatures, whose Wills are not constantly
 and regularly determined, and their Actions go-
 verned, by right Reason and the necessary differ-
 ences of Good and Evil, according to the eternal
 and invariable Rules of Justice, Equity, Good-
 ness and Truth; but suffer themselves to be swayed
 by unaccountable arbitrary Humours, and rash
 passions, by Lusts, Vanity and Pride; by private
 interest, or present sensual Pleasures; These, set-
 ting up their own unreasonable Self-will in opposi-
 tion to the Nature and Reason of Things, endea-
 vor (as much as in them lies) to make things be
 what they are not, and cannot be. Which is the
 greatest Presumption and greatest Insolence, as well
 as the greatest Absurdity, imaginable. 'Tis acting
 contrary to that Understanding, Reason and Judg-
 ment, which God has implanted in their Natures
 for purpose to enable them to discern the difference
 between good and evil. 'Tis attempting to destroy
 the Order, by which the Universe subsists. 'Tis
 offering the highest affront imaginable to the Crea-
 tor of all things, who made things to be what they
 are, and governs every thing himself according to
 the Laws of their several Natures. In a word; All
 that wickedness and perversion of Right, is the
 same Insolence and Absurdity in *Moral Mat-
 ters*;

ters ; as it would be in *Natural things*, for a man to pretend to alter the certain Proportions of Numbers, to take away the Demonstrable Relations and Properties of Mathematical Figures ; to make Light Darkneſs, and Darkneſs Light ; or to call Sweet Bitter, and Bitter Sweet.

And from the Sense, that all even wicked Men unavoidably have, of their being under such an Obligation.

Further : As it appears thus from the *abstract* and *absolute* Reason and nature of things, that all rational Creatures *Ought*, that is, *are obliged* to take care that their Wills and Actions be constantly determined and governed by the eternal rule of Right and Equity : So the certainty and universality of that *Obligation* is plainly confirmed, and the force of it particularly discovered and applied to every Man, by This ; that in like manner as no one who is instructed in Mathematicks, can forbear giving his Assent to every Geometrical Demonstration, of which he understands the Terms, either by his own Study, or by having had them explained to him by others ; so no man, who either has patience and opportunities to examine and consider things himself, or has the means of being taught and instructed in any tolerable manner by Others concerning the necessary relations and dependences of things ; can avoid giving his *Assent* to the fitness and reasonableness of his governing all his Actions by the Law or Rule before mentioned, even though his *Practice*, through the prevalence of brutish Luſts, be most absurdly contradictory to that *Assent*. That is to say : By the Reason of his mind he cannot but be compelled to own and acknowledge, that there is really such an *Obligation* indispensably incumbent upon him ; even at the same time that in the *Actions of his Life* he is endeavouring to throw it off and despise it. For the Judgment and Conscience of a Man's own Mind, concerning the Reasonableness and Fitness of the thing, is

Actions should be conformed to such or such a Rule or Law; is the truest and formallest *Obligation*; even more properly and strictly so, than any Opinion whatsoever of the Authority of the Giver of a Law, or any Regard he may have to its Sanction by Rewards and Punishments. For whoever is contrary to this sense and conscience of his own mind, is necessarily self-condemned; And the truest and strongest of all *Obligations* is that, which a Man cannot break through without condemning himself. The 'dread of superiour Power and Authority, and the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments; however indeed absolutely necessary to the Government of frail and fallible Creatures, and truly the most effectual means of keeping Them to their Duty; is yet really in itself, only a *secondary* and *additional* Obligation, or *Inforcement* of the first. The original *Obligation* of all, (the ambiguous use of which Word as a *Term of Art*, has caused some perplexity and confusion in this matter,) is the eternal *Reason* of Things; *That Reason*, which God himself who has no Superiour to direct him, and to whose Happiness nothing can be added, nor any thing diminished from it, yet constantly engages himself to govern the World by: And the Rules are excellent and perfect (or the freer from Corruption and Depravation) any Creatures are, they are cheerfully and steddily are their Wills always determined by this *Supreme Obligation*, in conformity to the Nature, and in imitation of the most perfect Will of God. So far therefore as Men are conscious of what is right and wrong, so far they are under an *Obligation* to act accordingly; And consequently That eternal Rule of Right, which I have been hereto describing, 'tis evident *Ought* as indispensably to govern mens Actions, as it *Cannot* necessarily determine their Assent.

Now

And from
the judg-
ment of
Mens Con-
sciences up-
on their
own past
Actions.

Now that the Case is truly thus ; that the eternal differences of Good and Evil, the unalterable Rule of Right and Equity, do necessarily and unavoidably determine the Judgment, and force the Assent of all Men that use any Consideration ; undeniably manifest from the universal Experience of Mankind. For no Man *willingly and deliberately* transgresses this Rule, in any *great and considerable* Instance ; but he acts contrary to the Judgment and Reason of his own Mind, and secretly reproaches himself for so doing. And Man observes and obeys it steddily, especially in Cases of *difficulty and Temptation*, when it interferes with any present Interest, Pleasure or Passion ; his own Mind commends and applauds him for his Resolution, in executing what his Conscience does not forbear giving its assent to, as just and right. And this is what St Paul means, when he says (Rom. ii. 14, 15.) that *when the Gentiles who have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves ; which shew the work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their Thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.*

Of that
natural
knowledge
which Plato
thought
to be remi-
niscence.

It was a very wise Observation of Plato, which he received from Socrates ; that if you take a young Man, impartial and unprejudiced, one that never had any Learning, nor any Experience of the World ; and examine him about the natural relations and proportions of things, [or the natural differences of Good and Evil ;] you may, only asking him Questions, without teaching him anything at all directly, cause him to express in his Answers just and adæquate Notions of Geometrical Truths, [and true and exact determinations concerning Matters of Right and Wrong.] From whence He thought it was to be concluded, that all Knowledge

age and Learning is nothing but Memory, of
 y a recollecting upon every new occasion, what
 been before known in a state of Præ-existence.
 and some Others both Ancients and Moderns,
 ve concluded that the *Ideas* of all first and sim-
 Truths, either natural or moral, are *Innate*
 originally *impressed* or *stamp* upon the Mind.
 their Inference from the Observation, the Au-
 rs of Both these Opinions seem to be mistaken.
 thus much it proves unavoidably; That the
 ferences, relations, and proportions of things
 h natural and moral, in which all unprejudi-
 Minds, thus naturally agree, are certain, un-
 rable, and real *in the things themselves*; and
 not at all depend on the variable Opinions,
 cies, or Imaginations of Men prejudiced by
 ucation, Laws, Customs, or evil Practices: And
 that the Mind of Man naturally and unavoid-
 y gives its *Assent*, as to natural and geometrical
 uth, so also to the moral differences of things,
 to the fitness and reasonableness of the Obliga-
 of the everlasting Law of Righteousness,
 whenever fairly and plainly proposed.

Some Men indeed, who, by means of a very
 and vicious Education, or through a long
 bit of Wickedness and Debauchery, have ex-
 mely corrupted the Principles of their Nature,
 have long accustomed themselves to bear
 wn their own Reason, by the force of Preju-
 e, Lust, and Passion; that they may not be
 ce to confess themselves self-condemned, will
 confidently and absolutely contend that they do
 really see any natural and necessary difference
 ween what we call *Right* and *Wrong*, *Just* and
Unjust; that the Reason and Judgment of their
 n Mind, does not tell them they are under any
 indispensable Obligations, as we would en-
 vour to persuade them; and that they are not

*The most
 profligate
 Men, not
 utterly in-
 sensible of
 the differ-
 ence of
 Good and
 Evil.*

sensible

sensible they ought to be governed by any other Rule than their own Will and Pleasure. But even the Men, the most abandoned of all Mankind; however industriously they endeavour to conceal and deny their self-condemnation; yet they cannot avoid making a discovery of it sometimes when they are not aware of it. For Example: There is no Man so cruel and desperate, who commits at any time a Murder

* Quis est enim, aut quis unquam fuit, aut avaritia tam ardentis, aut tam effrænatæ cupiditatis, ut eandem illam rem, quam adipisci scelere quovis velit, non multis partibus malit ad sese, etiam omni impunitate proposita, sine facinore, quam illo modo pervenire? Cic. de Finib. lib. 3.

and Robbery, with the most unrelenting Mind; but * would choose if such a thing could be proposed to him, to obtain all the same profit or advantage, whatsoever it is that he aims at, *without* committing the Crime, rather than *with* it, even though he was sure to be unpunished for committing the Crime. Nay, I believe, there is no Man, even in Mr Hobbes's State

of Nature, and of Mr Hobbes's own Principles, but if he was equally assured of securing his end, his Self-preservation, by either way; would choose to preserve himself rather *without* destroying all his Fellow-Creatures, than *with* it; even supposing all Impunity, and all other future convenience of Life, equal in either Case. Mr Hobbes's Scheme, of Men's agreeing by Compact to preserve one another, can hardly be Supposed without it. And this plainly evinces, that the Mind of Man unavoidably acknowledges a natural and necessary difference between Good and Evil, antecedent to all arbitrary and positive Constitution whatsoever.

Mens natural Sense of eternal moral Obligations, proved from the Judgment

But the Truth of this, that the Mind of Man naturally and necessarily Assents to the eternal Law of Righteousness; may still better and more clearly and more universally appear, from the Judgment that Men pass upon each Others Actions, than from what we can discern concerning their Conscience.

their Own. For Men may dissemble and con- ^{they all pass}
 from the World, the judgment of their own ^{upon the}
 conscience; nay, by a strange partiality, they may ^{Actions of}
 impose upon and deceive *Themselves*; (For who ^{Others.}
 there, that does not sometimes allow himself, nay,
 even justify himself in that, wherein he con-
 demns Another?) But Mens Judgments concerning
 Actions of *Others*, especially where they have no
 relation to Themselves, or repugnance to their Inte-
 rest, are commonly impartial; And from this we
 judge, what Sense Men naturally have of the
 considerable difference of Right and Wrong. Now
 Observation which every one cannot but make
 in this Matter, is This; that *Virtue* and true
Wisdom, *Righteousness* and *Equity*, are things so
 very noble and excellent, so lovely and venerable
 to themselves, and do so necessarily approve them-
 selves to the Reason and Consciences of Men; that
 in those very persons, who, by the prevailing
 power of some Interest or Lust, are themselves
 turned aside out of the Paths of
 virtue, † can yet hardly ever
 bear to give it its true Charac-
 ter and Commendation in *Others*.
 And this Observation holds true,
 not only in the generality of Viti-
 cious Men, but very frequently even in the worst
 of them, viz. those who persecute others for
 doing better than themselves. Thus the Officers
 who were sent by the *Pharisees* to apprehend our
 Saviour, could not forbear declaring, that *he spake* Joh. vii:
as never Man spake: And the Roman Governour, 46.
 when he gave Sentence that he should be Crucified,
 could not at the same instant forbear openly de-
 claring, that he *found no fault in him*. Even in Joh. xviii:
 this case, Men cannot chuse but think well of 38.
 those Persons, whom the *dominion of their Lusts*
 will not suffer them to imitate, or whom their pre-
 sent

† [Placet suapte natura, a
 deoque gratiosa virtus est, ut
 infitum etiam sit Malis pro-
 bare meliores. Senec. de Benef.
 l. 4.

sent Interest and the Necessity of their Worldly Affairs compels them to discourage. They cannot but desire, that they themselves were the Men they are not; and wish with *Balaam*, that though they *imagine not the life*, yet at least they might *die the death of the Righteous*, and that their *last end* might be like theirs. And hence it is that *Plato* judiciously ob-

* Οὐ γὰρ ὅσον ἐσίας ἀρετῆς
ἐπισφαλῆμοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ
πολλοί, τοσούτον καὶ τῷ κρίνειν
τὰς ἄλλας οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἀχρηστοί.
Θεῖον δὲ τι καὶ εὐσεχὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖ-
σι κακοῖς ὥστε πάντες πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν
σφόδρα κακῶν, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ
δόξαις ἀγαυοῦνται τὰς ἀμεινὰς τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἐν τὰς χεῖρας. *Plato*
de Leg. lib. 12.

serves, that * even the worst of Men seldom or never make a wrong Judgment concerning *Persons*, as they do concerning *Things*; there being in *Virtue* an unaccountable and as it were *divine* force, which, whatever confusion Men endeavour to introduce in *Things* by their vitious Discourses and debauched Practices, yet almost always compels them to distinguish

right concerning *Persons*, and makes them admire and praise Just and Equitable and Honest Men. On the contrary; *Vice* and *Injustice*, *Profaneness* and *Debauchery*, are things so absolutely odious in their own Nature, that, however they *insinuate* themselves in the practice, yet they can never gain over to themselves the judgment of Mankind. They who do evil, yet See and Approve what is good; and condemn in others, what they blindly allow in themselves; nay, and very frequently condemn even themselves also, not without great disorder and easiness of Mind, in those very things wherein they allow themselves. At least, there is hardly a wicked Man, but when his own Case is represented to him under the Person of another, will free enough pass Sentence against the wickedness which himself is guilty of; and, with sufficient severity, exclaim against all Iniquity. This shows abundantly, that all variation from the eternal Rule of Right, is absolutely and in the nature of the

self to be abhorred and detested; and that the prejudiced mind of Man, as naturally *disapproves* Justice in moral matters, as in natural things it does not but *dissent from falsehood*, or *dislike incongruity*.

Even in reading the Histories of past and distant Ages, where 'tis plain we can have no concern for the *events of things*, nor prejudices concerning the *Characters of Persons*; Who is there, who does not praise and admire, nay highly esteem and in his imagination love (as it were) the Equity, Justice, Truth, and Fidelity of some Persons; and with the greatest Indignation and Hatred, detest the Inequality, Injustice, and Treachery of others? Nay, who does not, When the prejudices of corrupt Minds lie on the side of Injustice; as when we have obtained some very great profit or advantage through Another Man's Treachery or Breach of Faith; yet who is there, that upon That ve-

occasion does not (even to a proverb) dislike the *Person* and the *Event*, how much soever he may prize at the *Event*? But when we become *our selves* to *suffer* by In-

equity, *Then* where are all the Arguments and Sophistries, by which Unjust Men, while they are oppressing Others, would persuade themselves that they are not sensible of any natural difference between good and evil? When it comes to be these Men's Case, to be oppressed by Violence, or over-ruled by Fraud; where *Then* are all their Pleas against the eternal distinction of Right and Wrong? Now, on the contrary, do they then cry out for Equity, and exclaim against Injustice! How do they *Then* challenge and object against Providence, and think neither God nor Man severe enough, in punishing the Violaters of Right and Truth! Whereas, if there was no natural and eternal difference between Just and Unjust; no man could

* Quis Pullum Numitorem, Fregellanum proditorem, quamquam Reipublicæ nostræ profuit, non odit? Cic. de Finib. lib. 5.

*An Answer
to the Ob-
jection
drawn
from the
total igno-
rance of
some bar-
barous Na-
tions in
matters of
Morality.*

have any reason to complain of Injury, any other than what Laws and Compacts made so; which in innumerable Cases will be always to be evaded. There is but one thing, that I am sensible of which can here with any Colour be objected against what has been hitherto said concerning the Necessity of the Mind's giving its Assent to the eternal Law of Righteousness; And that is, the *total Ignorance*, which some whole Nations are reported to lie under, of the nature and force of their moral Obligations. I am not satisfied, the Matter of Fact is true. But if it was; yet *mere Ignorance* affords no just Objection against the *Certainty* of any Truth. Were there upon Earth a *Nation* of rational and considerate Persons, whose Notions concerning moral Obligations, and concerning the Nature and Force of them, were universally and directly contrary to what I have hitherto represented; this would be indeed a *weighty* Objection. But *Ignorance* and *Stupidity* are no Arguments against the *Certainty* of any thing. There are many Nations and People almost totally ignorant of the plainest Mathematical Truths, as, of the proportion, for Example, of a *Square* to a *Triangle* of the same Base and Height: And yet these Truths are such, to which the Mind cannot but give its assent necessarily and unavoidably, as soon as they are distinctly proposed to it. All that this Objection proves therefore, supposing the Matter of it to be true, is only this; not, that the mind of man can ever dissent from the rule of Right; much less, that there is no necessary difference in nature, between moral Good and Evil: nor any more than it proves, that there are no certain and necessary proportions of Numbers, Lines, and Figures: But this it proves only, that Men have a great need to be taught and instructed in some very plain and easy, as well as certain Truths; and if they be important Truths, that then men have

and also to have them frequently inculcated, and strongly inforced upon them. Which is very true : And is (as shall hereafter be particularly made to appear) one good Argument for the reasonableness of expecting a *Revelation*.

4. Thus it appears *in general*, that the mind of Man cannot avoid giving its *Assent* to the eternal Law of Righteousness ; that is, cannot but acknowledge the reasonableness and fitness of Men's governing all their Actions by the Rule of Right or Equity : And also that this *Assent* is a *formal Obligation* upon every Man, actually and constantly to conform himself to that Rule. I might now from hence deduce *in particular*, all the several Duties of Morality or Natural Religion. But because this would take up too large a portion of my intended Discourse, and may easily be supplied abundantly by several late excellent Writers ; I shall only mention the three great and principal Branches, from which all the other and smaller instances of Duty do naturally flow, or may without difficulty be derived.

First then, in respect of God, the Rule of Righteousness is ; that we keep up constantly in our Minds, the highest possible Honour, Esteem, and Veneration for him ; which must express itself in proportion and respective influences upon all our Passions, and in the suitable direction of all our Actions : That we worship and adore Him, and Him alone, as the Supreme Author, Preserver and Governour of all Things : That we employ our whole Beings, and our Powers and Faculties, in his Service, and for his Glory ; that is, in encouraging the practice of universal Righteousness, and promoting the Designs of his infinite Goodness amongst Men, in such way and manner as shall at any time appear to be his Will we should do. And finally, that, to enable us to do this continually, we pray unto him constantly for whatever we stand

Of the principal Moral Obligations in particular.
Of Piety, or Mens Duty towards God.

in need of, and return him continual and hearty Thanks for whatever good things we at any time receive. There is no Congruity or Proportion, in the uniform disposition and correspondent order of any Bodies or Magnitudes; no Fitness or Agreement in the application of similar and equal Geometrical Figures one to another, or in the comparing them one with another; so visible and conspicuous, as is the Beauty and Harmony of the exercise of God's several Attributes, meeting with suitable returns of Duty and Honour from all his rational Creatures throughout the Universe. The consideration of his Eternity and Infinity, his Knowledge and his Wisdom, necessarily commands our highest Admiration. The sense of his Omnipresence, forces a perpetual awful Reverence towards him. His Supreme Authority, as being the Creator, Preserver, and absolute Governour of all Things, obliges us to pay him all possible Honour and Veneration, Adoration and Worship; And his Unity requires, that it be paid to Him alone. His Power and Justice, demand our Fear. His Mercy and Placableness, encourage our Hope. His Goodness necessarily excites our Love. His Veracity and Unchangeableness secure our Trust in him. The sense of our having received our Being and all our Powers from him, makes it infinitely reasonable that we should employ our whole Beings and all our Faculties in his Service. The Consciousness of our continual Dependence upon him, both for our Preservation and the Supply of every thing we want; obliges us to constant Prayer. And every good thing we enjoy, the Air we breathe, and the Food we eat, the Rain from Heaven, and the fruitful Seasons, all the Blessings and Comforts of the present time, and the Hopes and Expectations we have of what is to come

* Quem vero Astrorum Ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium

do * all demand our heartiest Gratitude and Thanksgiving to him. The Suitableness and Proportion

Correspondency and Connexion of each of these things respectively, is as plain and conspicuous, as the shining of the Sun at Noon-day ; And 'tis the most Absurdity and Perverseness in the World, for Creatures endued with *Reason*, to attempt to break through and transgress the necessary Order and Dependence of things. All *Inanimate* and all *Irrational* Beings, by the Necessity of their Nature, constantly obey the Laws of their Creation ; and tend regularly to the Ends, for which they were appointed. How monstrous then is it, that *Reasonable* Creatures, merely because they are not Necessitated, should arrogate that glorious privilege of *Liberty*, by which they are exalted in dignity above the rest of God's Creation, to make themselves the alone *Unreasonable* and disorderly part of the Universe ! That a *Tree* planted in a fruitful Soil, and watered continually with the Dew of Heaven, and cherished constantly with the kindly warmth and benign influence of the Sun's beams, should yet never bring forth either *Leaves* or *Fruit* ; is in no degree so irregular and contrary to Nature, as that a *Rational Being*, created in the Image of God, and conscious of God's design in every thing for him, that becomes the *Relation* of an infinitely good and bountiful *Creator* to his *Creatures* ; should yet never on *His* part make any turn of those Duties, which arise necessarily from the *Relation of a Creature to his Creator*.

Secondly. In respect of our *Fellow-creatures*, the *Of Righteousness* of Righteousness is ; that in particular *we so deal* *of Righteousness, or the Duty of Men one towards another.* with every Man, as in like Circumstances we could reasonably expect he should deal with Us ; and that in general we endeavour, by an universal Benevolence, to another.

promote

temperatio, quemq; ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non Gratum esse cogant ; hunc Hominem omnino numerare qui decet ? Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.

* Εἰ γὰρ νοῦν εἶχομεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰδὴ ἡμᾶς ποιῆν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας ; Οὐκ εἶδεν καὶ σκοπιόντας καὶ ἀραῦντας καὶ ἐθελόντας ἀδελφὸν τὸν ὕμνον τὸ εἰς τὸ θεόν. Μήγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέχεν ὅργανα ταῦτα δι' ἃν τὴν γῆν ἐργασώμεθα ; Μήγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι χεῖρας δίδωκεν, &c. Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 16.

promote the welfare and happiness of all Men. The former Branch of this Rule, is *Equity*; the latter is *Love*.

Of Justice and Equity. As to the former, viz, *Equity*: The Reason which obliges every Man in *Practice*, so to deal always with another, as he would reasonable expect that Others should in like Circumstances deal with Him; is the very same, as That which forces him in *speculation* to affirm, that if one Line or Number be equal to another, That other is reciprocally equal to It. *Iniquity* is the very same in *Action* as *Falsity* or *Contradiction* in *Theory*; and the same cause which makes the one *absurd*, makes the other *unreasonable*. Whatever relation or proportion one Man in any Case bears to another; the same That Other, when put in like Circumstances bears to Him. Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for Me; That, by the same Judgment, I declare reasonable or unreasonable, that I in the like Case should do for Him. And to deny this either in Word or Action is as if a Man should contend, that, though *two* and *three* are equal to *five*, yet *five* are not equal

* Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam Omnes inter nosmetipsos sumus. Quod si depravatio consuetudinum, si opinionum vanitas, non imbecillitatem animorum torqueret, & flecteret quocumque; capisset; sui nemo ipse tam similis esset; quam omnes sunt omnium; — & coleretur Jus æque ab omnibus. Cic. de leg. lib. 1.

to *two* and *three*. Wherefore * were not Men strangely and most unnaturally corrupted, perverted and unaccountably false opinions, and monstrous evil customs and habits, prevailing against the clearest and plainest reason in the World: It would be impossible that universal Equity should be practised by all Mankind; especially among *Equals*, who

the proportion of Equity is simple and obvious and every Man's own case is already the same with all others, without any nice comparing or transposing of Circumstances. It would be as impossible

* a Man, contrary to the equal Reason of things, should be to gain some small profit Himself, by doing violence and damage to his Neighbour; as he should be willing to be deprived of Necessaries himself, to satisfy the unreasonable Covetousness or Ambition of another. In a word; it would be impossible for Men not to be as much ashamed of *Doing Iniquity*, as they are of *Being Contradictions*. In considering indeed the Duty of *Superiours* and *Inferiours* in various Relations, the proportion of Equity is somewhat more complex; But still it may always be deduced from the Rule of *doing as we would be done by*, if care and Regard be had at the same time to the *difference of Relation*: That is, if in considering what is fit for you to do to another, you always take into the account, not only every Circumstance of the *Action*, but also every Circumstance wherein the *Person* differs from you; And in judging what you would desire of that Another, if your Circumstances were transferred, should do to you; you always consider, not what any unreasonable Passion or private Interest would prompt you, but what impartial Reason should dictate to you to desire. For example: A *Magistrate*, in order to deal equitably with a *Criminal*, is not to consider what *Fear* or *Self-Love* would cause Him, in the Criminal's Case, to desire; but what *Reason* and the *publick Good* would oblige him to *acknowledge* was fit and just for him to *expect*. And the same Proportion is to be observed, in deducing the Duties of *Parents* and *Children*, of *Masters* and *Servants*, of *Governours* and *Subjects*, of *Citizens* and *Foreigners*; in what manner every person is obliged by the Rule of Equity, to behave himself in each of these and all other Relations, In the regular and uniform Practice of

all

* Hoc exigit ipsa Naturæ ratio, quæ est lex divina & humana; cui parere qui velit, nunquam committet ut *alienum appetat*, & id, quod *alteri detraxerit, sibi assumat*. Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.

all which Duties among all Mankind, in their several and respective Relations, through the whole Earth; consists That *Universal Justice*, which is the Top and Perfection of all Virtues: *Which*, if

* Διὸς γὰρ ἂν παρήκεν ἔρωτας, ἔστι τείλειον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς ἐκείνων παρήκετο, &c. Plat. in Phæd.

Quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sui. Cic. de Offic. l. 1.

Oculorum est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus; Quàm illa ardentis amores excitaret sui, si videretur! Id. de fin. l. 2.

† Αυτὴ μὲν ἐν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία· καὶ ἔστι Ἐσπερίῳ ἔστι Ἐῶος ἔτω διαυμαστόν. Eth. lib. 5. c. 3.

admirably regular and harmonious, nor the brightness of the Sun and Stars so ornamental to the visible fabrick of the World, as the universal practice of this illustrious Virtue would be conducive to the glory and advantage of the rational part of this lower Creation: *Which*, lastly, is so truly noble and excellent in its own Nature, that the wisest and most

as * Plato says, it could be represented visibly to mortal Eyes would raise in us an inexpressible Love and Admiration of it. *Which* would introduce into the World such a glorious and happy State, as the antient Poets have attempted to describe in their Fiction of a golden Age: *Which* itself, is so truly beautiful and lovely, that, as † Aristotle elegantly expresses it, the Motions of the heavenly Bodies are not

|| Non enim mihi est vita mea utilior, quàm animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.

Detrahare aliquid alteri, & hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum, magis est contra naturam, quàm mors, quàm paupertas, quàm dolor, quàm cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere, aut rebus externis. Id.

† Καὶ τὸ παράπαν ζῆν, μέγιστον μὲν κακόν, ἢ ζυμπαντα χρόνον ἀθάνατον ὄντα, καὶ κεντη-

considering Men have always declared, that || neither Life itself nor † all other possible Enjoyments in the World, put together; are of any value or esteem in comparison of, or in competition with, that right temper and disposition of Mind, from which flows the practice of this universal Justice and Equity. On the contrary: *Injustice* and *Iniquity*, Violence, Fraud, and Oppression; the universal confusion of right and wrong, and the general neglect

lect and contempt of all the
ies arising from mens several
ations one to another ; is the
atest and most unnatural cor-

μὲν πάντα τὰ λογόμενα ἀγα-
θα, πλὴν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀρε-
τῆς ἀπάσης. Plato de Leg.
lib. 2.

tion of God's Creation, that 'tis possible for de-
ved and rebellious Creatures to introduce : As
y themselves, who practise iniquity most, and
most desirous to defend it, yet, whenever it
es to be their own turn to suffer by it, are not
y backward to acknowledge. To comprize this
atter therefore in one word : What the Sun's
aking that equal Course, which now by diffu-
g gentle warmth and light, cherishes and invi-
ates every thing in a due proportion through
whole System ; and on the contrary, his burn-
up, by an irregular and disorderly Motion,
ne of the Orbs with insupportable heat, and
wing others to perish in extream cold and dark-
: What this, I say, would be to the *natural*
orld ; That very same thing, Injustice and Ty-
ny, Iniquity and all Wickedness, is to the *mo-*
and *rational* part of the Creation. The only
erence, is this : That the one is an *obstinate and*
ful Corruption, and most *perverse* depravation of
atures made after the Image of God ; and a
lating the *eternal and unalterable* Law or Rea-
of Things, which is of the utmost Impor-
ce : Whereas the other would be only a revo-
on or change, of the *arbitrary and temporary*
me of Nature.

The Second Branch of the Rule of Righteous-
s with respect to our Fellow-creatures, I said,
s *universal Love or Benevolence* ; that is, not on-
the doing barely what is just and right, in our
lings with every man ; but also a constant in-
avouring to promote in general, to the utmost
our power, the welfare and happiness of all
n. The obligation to which duty also, may

*Of univer-
sal mutual
Benevo-
lence.*

eatly

easily be deduced from what has been already laid down. For if (as has been before proved) there be a natural and necessary difference between Good and Evil; and that which is Good is fit and reasonable, and that which is Evil is unreasonable to be done; and that which is the greatest Good, is always the most fit and reasonable to be chosen. Then, as the Goodness of God extends itself universally over all his Works through the whole Creation, by doing always what is absolutely best in the whole; so every rational Creature ought in its Sphere and Station, according to its respective powers and faculties, to do all the Good it can to all its Fellow-creatures. To which end, *universal Love and Benevolence* is as plain as the most direct, certain, and effectual means;

* Universaliter autem verum est, quod non certius, *fluxus puncti* Lineam producit, aut *additio numerorum* Summam, quam quod *Benevolentia* effectum præstat bonum. *Cumberland. de Leg. Naturæ. pag. 10.*

Pari sane ratione [ac in *Arithmeticis operationibus*] doctrinæ Moralis veritas fundatur in immutabili cohærentia inter *Felicitatem Summam* quam hominum vires assequi valent, & *Actus benevolentie universalis*. *Id. ibid. pag. 23.*

Eadem est mensura *Boni Malique*, quæ mensura est *veri falsique* in propositionibus pronuntiantibus de efficacia *Motuum* ad rerum aliarum *conservationem*, & *corruptionem* faciendum. *Id. pag. 30.*

† Angusta admodum est circa nostra tantummodo commoda, Lætitie materia; sed eadem erit amplissima, si ali-

* in Mathematicks the *flowing* a Point, is, to produce a Line or in Arithmetick, the *Addition of Numbers*, to produce a Summ or in Physicks, *certain kinds of Motions*, to preserve certain Bodies which other kinds of Motion tend to corrupt. Of all which the Mind of Man is so naturally sensible, that, except in such manner whose Affections are prodigiously corrupted by most unnatural and habitual vicious practices, there is no Duty whatsoever, the performance whereof affords a man so ample pleasure and satisfaction, and fills his mind with so comfortable a sense, of his having done the greatest Good he was capable to do, of his having answered the ends of his Creation and nearliest imitated the Perfection

ions of his Creator, and consequently of his having fully complied with the highest and principal Obligations of his Nature; the performance of this one duty, of *universal Love and Benevolence*, naturally affords. But whether: The Obligation to this Duty, may also otherwise be deduced from the *Nature of*

Man, in the following manner. Next to that natural *Self-love*, or Care of his own Preservation, which every one necessarily has in the first place for himself; there is in all Men a certain natural affection for their *Children and Posterity*, who are a dependence upon them; and for their near *Relations and Friends*, who have an intimacy with them. And because the Nature of Man is such, that they cannot live comfortably in independent families, without still further Society and Commerce with each other; therefore they naturally are to increase their dependencies, by multiplying Affinities; and to enlarge their Friendships, mutual good Offices; and to establish Societies, by a communication of Arts and Labour; Till * by degrees the Affection of *single Persons*, becomes a Friendship of *Families*; and this enlarges it self to Society of *Towns and Cities and Nations*; and terminates in the *agreeing Community of all Mankind*. The Foundation, Preservation, and Perfection of which universal Friendship or Society, is *mutual Love and Benevolence*. And nothing hinders the World from be-

orum omnium Felicitas cordi nobis sit. Quippe hæc ad illam, eandem habebit proportionem, quam habet immensa Beatitudo Dei, totiusque humani generis, ad curtam illam fictæ felicitatis suppellectilem, quam uni homini, ejque invidio & malevolo, fortunæ bona possint suppeditare. Id. ibid. pag. 214.

* In omni honesto, nihil est tam illustre, nec quod latius pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, & quasi quædam societas & communicatio utilitatum, & ipsa Charitas generis humani; quæ nata a primo fatu, quo a procreatoribus nati diliguntur, ——— serpit sensim foras, *cognitionibus* primum, ——— deinde *totius complexu gentis humanæ*. Cic. de Finib. lib. 5.

ing

ing *actually* put into so happy a state, but pervading Iniquity, and unreasonable want of mutual Charity. Wherefore since Men are plainly so constituted by Nature, that they stand in need of each other's assistance to make themselves easy in the World; and are fitted to live in Communities, and Society is absolutely necessary for them; mutual Love and Benevolence is the only possible means to establish this Society in any tolerable

* Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmetipsos sumus. Quod nisi depravatio, &c. sui nemo ipse tam similis esset, quam omnes sunt omnium. *Cic. de Legib. lib. i.*

† Impellimur autem Natura, ut prodesse velimus quamplurimum. *Cic. de Finib. lib. 3.*

‖ Hominem esse quasi partem quandam civitatis & universi generis humani, eumque esse conjunctum cum hominibus Humana quadam Societate. *Cic. Quæst. Academ. lib. i.*

** Homines hominum causa sunt generati, ut ipsi inter se alii aliis prodesse possint. *Cic. de Offic. lib. i.*

Ad tuendos conservandosque homines, hominem natum esse. *Cic. de Finib. lib. 3.*

†† Omnes inter se naturali quadam indulgentia & benevolentia contineri. *Cic. de Legib. lib. i.*

‡ Ex quo efficitur, hominem naturæ obedientem, homini nocere non posse. *Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.*

endurable manner; and in this Respect * All Men stand upon the same level, and have the same natural wants and desires, and are in the same need of each other's help, and are equally capable of enjoying the benefit and advantage of Society: 'Tis evident every Man is bound by the Law of his Nature, and as he is prompted by the † Inclination of his uncorrupted Affections, to look upon himself as a part and member of that one universal body or community, which is made up of all Mankind; to think himself ** born to promote the publick good and welfare of his Fellow creatures; and consequently obliged, as the necessary and only effectual means to that End, to †† embrace them with universal Love and Benevolence: So that he ‡ cannot, without acting contrary to the Reason of his own mind, and transgressing the plain and known Law of his Being, do willingly any hurt and mischief to a

in; no, * not even to those
to have first injured him; but
ht, for the publick benefit,
endeavour to appease with gen-

ess, rather than exasperate with retaliations;

finally, to comprehend all in one word,

which is the top and compleat Perfection of this

at Duty,) ought to † *Love all*

ers as himself. This is the Ar-

umentation of that great Mas-

Cicero: Whose knowledge

understanding of the true

of Things, and of the ori-

al Obligations of human Na-

was as much greater than Mr *Hobbes's*; as

helps and advantages to attain that knowledge,

is less.

Thirdly, with respect to *our selves*, the Rule of *Of Sobrie-*

teousness is; that *every Man preserve his* ty, or mens

Being, as long as he is able; and take care to Duty to-

himself at all times in such temper and dispositi- wards

both of Body and Mind, as may best fit and enable themselves;

to perform his Duty in all other Instances. That and of the

he ought to bridle his Appetites, with Tempe- ness of Self-

; to govern his Passions, with Moderation; murder.

to apply himself to the business of his present Sta-

in the World, whatsoever it be, with Attention

Contentment: That every Man ought to pre-

his own Being as long as he is able, is evi-

; because what he is not himself the Author

Giver of, he can never of himself have just

er or Authority to take away. He that sent

to the World, and alone knows for how long

he appointed us our Station here, and when we

finished all the business he intended we should

can alone judge when 'tis fit for us to be ta-

hence, and has alone Authority to dismiss and

charge us. This Reasoning has been admirably

P

applied

* Οὐτε ἀπὸ ἀνταδινῶν διί, ἕτε
κακῶς ποιεῖν ἔδνα ἀνθρώπων, ἔδ
ἀν ἐτίσιν πάχυντα αὐτῶν. Plato
in Critone.

† Tum illud effici, quod
quibusdam incredibile videat-
tur, fit autem necessarium,
ut nihil sese plus quam alte-
rum diligat. Cic. de Legib.
lib. 1.

applied by *Plato*, *Cicero*, and others of the best Philosophers. So that though the *Stoicks* of old and the *Deists* of late, have in their ranting Discourses, and some few of them in their rash Practice, contradicted it; yet they have never been able, with any colour of reason, to answer or evade the force of the Argument: Which indeed to speak the Truth, has been urged by the former mentioned Philosophers, with such singular Beauty, as well as invincible Strength, that it seems not capable of having any thing added to it.

Wherefore I shall give it you, only in some of their own Words. *We*

* Ἐν τινε φέρει ἔσθλη οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύει, ἐδ' ἀποδιόρασκεν.

— Οἷός ἐστιν ἡμῶν τὰς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὰς ἀνθρώπων ἐν τῇ κτήματων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. — Οὐκ ἐν καὶ σὺ ἄν, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸ κτημάτων ἐστὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτείνουσι, μὴ σημανάντος σε ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνήσκειν, καλεπάνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰ τίνα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἂν; *Plato in Phaed.*

(says * *Plato* in the person of *Crates*,) are all, by the appointment of God, in a certain Prison or Custody, which we ought not to break out of, and run away. We are as Servants, or as Cattle, in the hand of God. And would not one of Us, saith he, if one of our Servants should, contrary to our direction, and to escape out of Service, kill himself; think that

had just reason to be very angry, and, if it were in our Power, punish him for it? So likewise *Cicero*

God, says † he, the Supreme Ruler and Governour of all things, forbids us to depart hence without his Order. And though, when the divine Providence does it self offer us an occasion of leaving this World, when a Man chooses to suffer Death rather than commit Wickedness,) a wise Man will therefore indeed depart joyfully, as out of a place of Sorrow and Darknes

† Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injussu hinc nos suo demigrare. Cum vero causam justam Deus ipse dederit, nã ille medius fidius vir sapiens, lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit; Nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant; sed tanquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a Deo evocatus, atque emissus, exierit. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.*

as to break his Prison contrary to Law; will go when God calls him, as a Prisoner when dismissed by the Magistrate or lawful Power. Again:

short remainder of Life, faith which old Men have a prof- of, they ought neither too eager- desire, nor yet on the contrary reasonably and discontentedly de- themselves of it: For, as Py- goras teaches, 'tis as unlawful a Man, without the command

God, to remove himself out of the World; as for a Soldier to leave his Post without his General's Or-

And in another place: Un- That God, faith † he, whose ple and Palace this whole World discharges you himself out of the on of the Body; you can never ceived to his Favour. Where- you, and all pious Men, ought ave patience to continue in the as long as God shall please, sent us hither; and not force selves out of the World, be he calls for you; lest you be d Deserters of the Station appointed you of God.

to mention no more: That Excellent Au-

Arrian: Wait, faith ** he, good pleasure of God: When signifies it to be his Will, that should be discharged from this vice, then depart willingly; in the mean time, have Pati- and tarry in the place where as appointed you: Wait, and not hurry yourselves away wil-

and unreasonably. The Objections, which Author of the Defense of Self-Murder prefixed

* Illud breve vitæ reliquum nec avidè appetendum sensibus, nec sine causâ deserendum est; Vetatque Pythagoras injussu Imperatoris, id est, Dei, de præsidio & statione vitæ decedere. Cic. de Senect.

† Nisi enim Deus is, cujus hoc Templum est omne quod conspicias, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit; huc tibi aditus patere non potest.— Quare & tibi & piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est nobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est; ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse videamini. Cic. Somn. Scipion.

** Ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν· ὅταν εἰ καὶ σημήνη ἢ ὑπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπερησίας τότ' ὑπολύετε πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐπὶ ᾧ τὸ παρίντ' ἀνάγκησθε οἰοκῶντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς ἣν ἐκείν' ὑμᾶς ἔταξεν. Μένετε, μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπέλθῃτε. Arrian. lib. 1.

to the *Oracles of Reason*, has attempted to advance against this Argument; are so very weak and childish, that 'tis evident he could not, at the time he wrote them, believe in earnest that there was any force in them: As when he says, that the reason why 'tis not lawful for a Centinel to leave his Station without his Commander's Order, is because he entered into the Service *by his own Consent*; as if God had not a just Power to lay his Commands upon his Creatures, without their *Consent*: Or when he says, that there are many lawful ways to seek Death in; as if, because a Man may lawfully *venture his Life* in many publick Services, therefore it was lawful for him directly to *throw it away* upon any foolish discontent. But the Author of that Discourse has since been so just, as to confess his Folly, and retract it publicly himself. Wherefore, to proceed. For the same reason, that a Man is obliged to prefer his own *Being* at all; he is bound likewise to preserve himself as far as he is able, in the right Use of all his *Faculties*: that is, to keep himself constantly in such temper both of Body and Mind by regulating his Appetites and Passions, as may best fit and enable him to perform his Duty in other instances. For, as it matters not whether a Soldier deserts his Post, or by Drunkenness renders himself incapable of performing his Duty in it: So for a Man to disable himself by any Intemperance or Passion, from performing the necessary Duties of Life; is, at least for that time, the same thing as depriving himself of Life. And neither is This all. For great Intemperance and ungoverned Passions, not only incapacitate a Man to perform his Duty; but also expose him to run headlong into the commission of the greatest enormities: There being no Violence or Injustice whatsoever, which a Man who has deprived him

of his Reason by Intemperance or Passion, is capable of being tempted to commit. So all the additional Obligations which a Man is way under, to forbear committing the most grant Crimes; lie equally upon him to govern Passions and restrain his Appetites: Without which, he can never secure himself effectually, from being betray'd into the commission of Iniquity. This is indeed the great difficulty of life, to subdue and conquer our unreasonable Appetites and Passions. But 'tis absolutely necessary

to be done: And 'tis * moreover

the bravest and most glorious conquest in the World. Lastly:

For the same Reason that a Man is obliged not to depart wilfully from this Life, which is the general Station that God has appointed him; he is obliged likewise to

perform the Duties of that particular Station or condition of life, whatsoever it be, wherein Providence has at present placed him; with diligence, and contentment: Without being either uneasy and discontented, that Others are placed by Providence in different and superiour Stations in the World; or so extremely and unreasonably solicitous to change his State for the future, as thereby to neglect his present Duty.

From these three great and general Branches, all the smaller and more particular Instances of Moral obligations, may (as I said) easily be deduced.

5. And now this, (This eternal Rule of Equity, which I have been hitherto describing,) is That Right Reason, which makes the principal Distinction between Man and Beasts. This is the Law of

Nature, which (as Cicero excellently expresses it) is † of universal extent, and everlasting duration.

* Οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἐνεκα πάλης καὶ δρόμων καὶ τοιούτων, ἐτόλμησαν ἀπέχεσθαι. — Οἱ δὲ ἡμέτεροι πάντες, ἀδυνατήσαντες καρτερεῖν, πολὺ καλλίον ἐνεκα νίκης. *Plato de Legib. lib. 8.*

The Law of Nature eternal, universal, and absolutely unchangeable.

† Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, on;

sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo; vetando, a fraude deterreat. — Huic legi nec obrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. *Cic. de Repub. lib. 3. fragment.*

— ἀγραπτα καὶ σφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα.

‘Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε καὶ χθές, ἀλλ’ αἰεί ποτε

Ζῇ τὰντα, καὶ δὲ; οἶδεν εἰς ὅτε φάνη.

Τέτων ἐνὶ ὅσῳ ἔμελλον, ἀνδρὸς ἐδεδόξεν

Φρόνημα δέισας, ἐν θεοῖσι τὴν δίκην

Δύσει. — *Sophocl. Antig. 464.*

* Lex quæ seculis omnibus ante nata est, quam scripta lex ulla, aut quam omnino civitas constituta. *Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.*

† Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitaram, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regat. *Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.*

|| Nec si, regnante Tarquinio, nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sextus Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens, & a delicto avocans; quæ non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est: orta autem simul est cum mente divina. *Cic. de Legib. lib. 2.*

** In judicio de bonitate harum rerum, æque omnes ubique conveniunt, ac omnia Animalia in motu Cordis & Arteriarum pulsu, aut omnes homines in opinione de nivis candore & splendore Solis. *Cumberl. de Leg. Naturæ, pag. 167.*

on; which can neither be wholly abrogated, nor repealed in any part of it, nor have any Law made contrary to it, nor be dispensed with by any Authority: Which * was in force, before ever any Law was written, or the Foundation of any City or Commonwealth was laid: Which † was not invented by the Wit of Man, nor established by the Authority of any People; but its Obligation was from eternity, and the Force of it reaches throughout the Universe: Which being founded in the Nature and Reason of Things, did not then begin to be a Law, when it was first written and enacted by Men; but is of the same original with the eternal Reasons or Proportions of things, and the Perfections or Attributes of God himself; So || that if there was no Law at Rome against Rapes, at that time when Tarquin offered violence to Lucretia, it does not therefore follow that he was at all the more excusable, or that his Sin against the eternal Rule of Equity was the less heinous. This is that Law of Nature, ** to which the

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Reason of all Men every where as naturally and necessarily assents, as all Animals conspire in the Pulse and Motion of their Heart and Arteries, or as all Men agree in their Judgment concerning the whiteness of Snow, or the Brightness of the Sun. For though in some nice Cases, the Bounds of right and wrong may indeed (as was before observed) be somewhat difficult to determine; and, in some few even plainer Cases, the Laws and Customs of certain barbarous Nations may be contrary one to another; (which Some have been so weak as to think a just Objection against there being any natural difference between Good and Evil at all;) yet in reality, *this** no more disproves the natural Assent of all mens unprejudiced Reason to the Rule of Right and Equity, than the difference of mens Countenances in general, or the deformity of some few Monsters in particular, proves that there is no general Likeness or Uniformity in the Bodies of Men. For, whatever difference there may be in some particular Laws, 'tis certain as to the main and principal Branches of Morality, there never was any Nation upon Earth, but owned, that to Love and Honour God, to be grateful to Benefactors, to perform Equitable Compacts, to preserve the Lives of innocent and harmless Men, and the like; were things fitter and

hæc Religionum, per omnes gentes communia. — Deum eo ipso, quod homines fecerit rationales, hoc illis præcepisse, & cordibus omnium insculpsisse, ne quisquam cuiquam faceret, quod alium sibi facere iniquum duceret. Hobbes, de Homine, cap. 14. [Inconsistently enough with his own Principles.]

* Hoc tamen non magis tollit consensum hominum de generali Natura Boni, ejusque partibus vel speciebus præcipuis, quam levis vultuum diversitas tollit convenientiam; inter homines in communi hominum definitione, aut similitudinem inter eos in partium principalium conformatione & usu. Nulla gens est, quæ non sentiat actus deum diligendi, &c. Nulla gens non sentit gratitudinem erga parentes & benefactores, toti humano generi salutarem esse. Nulla temperamentorum diversitas facit ut quisquam non bonum esse sentiat universis, ut singulorum innocentium vitæ, membra, & libertas conserventur. Cumberland de Legib. Naturæ, pag. 166.

Neque enim an honorifice de Deo sentiendum sit, neque an sit amandus, timendus, colendus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim

better to be practised, than the contrary. In fine: This is that *Law of Nature*, which, being founded in the eternal Reason of Things, is as absolute-

* Nam ut vera & falsa, ut consequentia & contraria, sua sponte, non aliena, judicantur: sic constans & perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ est virtus; itemque inconstantia, quod est vitium; sua natura probatur. Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.

† Quod verè dicimus, etiam si a nullo laudetur, laudabile esse natura. Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.

shall be accounted the Virtue of a Man depends merely

|| Hæc autem in opinione existimare, non in natura ponere, dementis est. Nam nec Arboris nec Equi virtus, quæ dicitur, in opinione sita est, sed in natura. Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.

thority of Men,

** Jam vero stultissimum illud; existimare omnia iusta esse, quæ scita sunt in populorum institutis aut legibus. Etiamne si quæ sunt tyrannorum leges, si triginta illi Athenis leges imponere voluissent, aut si omnes Athenienses delectarentur tyrannicis legibus, num idcirco hæ leges justæ haberentur? Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.

†† Quod si populorum justis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum, jura constituerentur; jus esset latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus est-

ly unalterable, as natural Good and Evil, as * Mathematical or Arithmetical Truths, as Light and Darknes, as Sweet and Bitter, as Pleasure and Pain. The † Observance of which, tho' no man should commend it, would yet be truly commendable in it self. Which to suppose depending on the Opinions of Men, and the Customs of Nations; that is, to suppose that What shall be accounted the Virtue of a Man depends merely on Imagination or Custom to determine; is || as absurd, as it would be to affirm, that the Fruitfulness of a Tree or the Strength of a Horse, depends merely on the Imagination of those who judge of it. In a word; 'Tis That Law, which if it had its original from the Authority of Men, and could be changed by it, then ** all the Commands of the cruellest and most barbarous Tyrants in the World, would be as just and equitable, as the wisest Laws that ever were made; and †† to murder Men without distinction, to confound the Rights of all Families by the grossest Forgeries, to rob with unrestrained Violence, to break Faith continually, and defraud and cheat without reluctance, might by the decrees and ordinances of a mad Assembly be made lawful and honest. In which matters if any man thinks that

that the Votes and Suffrages of Fools have such Power, as to be able to change the Nature of Things; why do they not likewise decree (as Cicero admirably expresses himself) that poisonous things may become wholesome; and that any other thing, which is now destructive of Mankind, may become preservative of it.

6. Further yet: As this Law of Nature is infinitely superiour to all Authority of Men, and independent upon

it; so its obligation, primarily and originally, is antecedent also even to this Consideration, of its being the positive Will or Command of God himself. For, † as the Addition of certain Numbers, necessarily produces a certain Sum; and certain Geometrical or Mechanical Operations, give a constant and unalterable Solution of certain Problems or Propositions: So in moral Matters, there are certain necessary and unalterable Respects or Relations of Things, which have not their Original from arbitrary and positive Constitution, but are of eternal necessity in their own Nature. For

menta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum sententiis atq; jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciant, ut quæ mala perniciosaq; sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutaribus; aut cur, cum jus ex injuriâ lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? Id. ibid.

Eternal Moral Obligations, antecedent in some respect, even to this consideration, of their being the Will and Command of God himself.

* Virtutis & Vitiorum, sine ulla Divina ratione, grave ipsius conscientiæ pondus est. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3.

† Deniq; nequis obligationem Legum naturalium arbitrariam & mutabilem a nobis fingi suspicetur, hoc adjiciendum censui; Virtutum exercitium, habere rationem mediæ necessarii ad finem, (seposita consideratione Imperii Divini,) manente rerum natura tali qualis nunc est. Hoc autem ita intelligo, uti agnoscunt pleriq; omnes, Additionem duarum unitatum duabus prius positis, necessario constituere numerum quaternarium; aut, uti praxes geometricæ & mechanicæ, prob-

mata proposita solvunt immutabiliter; adeo ut nec sapientia nec voluntas Divina cogitari possit quicquam in contrarium constituere posse. Cumber-land de Legib. Naturæ, pag. 231.

Example:

* Τὸ ὁρώμενον, οὐ διότι ὁρώμενον γέ ἐστι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὁράται· ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον, διότι ὁράται, ἀπὸ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον [Note, these Words are by Ficinus ridiculously translated, *videtur* and *visum est*]· Οὐκ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, διότι ὅσιον ἐστὶ, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν· ἀλλὰ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἀπὸ τοῦτο ὅσιον ἐστὶ. Plato in *Euthyphr.*

ly and Good, because 'tis commanded to be done; but is therefore commanded of God, because 'tis Holy and Good. The Existence indeed of the Things themselves, whose Proportions and Relations we consider, depend entirely on the mere arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of God; who can create Things when he pleases, and destroy them again whenever he thinks fit. But when things are created, and so long as it pleases God to continue them in Being; their Proportions, which are absolutely of eternal Necessity, are also in the Things themselves absolutely unalterable. Hence God himself, though he has no Superiour, from whose Will to receive any Law of his Actions; yet disdains

† Καθ' ἡμᾶς ᾧ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ τῶν μακαρίων πάντων· ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπου καὶ Θεοῦ. Origen. *advers. Celsum.* lib. 4.

Ezeklviii. Judgments. To this Law, the infinite Perfections of his Divine Nature make it necessary for him (as has been before proved,) to have constant regard: And (as a learned Prelate of our own || has excellently shown,) not barely his infinite Power, but the Rules of

|| Dictamina Divini Intellectus fanciuntur in Leges apud ipsum valituras, per immutabilitatem suarum perfectionum.

Example: * As in Matters of Sense, the reason why a thing is visible, is not because 'tis Seen; but 'tis therefore Seen, because 'tis visible: So in Matters of natural Reason and Morality, that which is Holy and Good (as Creatures depending upon and worshipping God, and practising Justice and Equity in their dealings with each other, and the like,) is not therefore Holy

not to observe the Rule of Equity and Goodness, as † the Law of all his Actions in the Government of the World; and condescends to appeal even to Men, for the Equity and Righteousness of his

his eternal Law, are the true Foundation and the Measure of his Dominion over his Creatures. For if *infinite Power* was the *Rule and Measure of Right*, 'tis evident that *Goodness* and *Mercy* and all *Other* Divine Perfections, would be *empty words* without any *Signification* at all.) Now for the same Reason that *God* who hath no *Superiour* to determine him, yet constantly directs all his own Actions by the eternal Rule of Justice and Goodness; 'tis evident all *Intelligent Creatures* in their several Spheres and Proportions, *ought* to obey the same Rule according to the Law of their Nature; even though it could be supposed separate from that additional Obligation, of its being the positive Will and Command of *God*. And doubts there have been many Men in all Ages in many parts of the heathen World, who not having Philosophy enough to collect from mere Nature any tolerably just and explicit Apprehensions concerning the *Attributes of God*; much less having been able to deduce from thence, any clear and certain knowledge of his *Will*; have yet had a very great sense of *Right* and *Truth*, and been fully persuaded in their own Minds, of many unalterable Obligations of *Morality*.

Cumberland de Leg. Naturæ, pag. 343.

Solebam ipse quidem, cum aliis plurimis, antequam dominii jurisq; omnis originem universaliter & distincte considerassem: *dominium Dei*, in *Creationem* velut integram ejus *originem*, resolvere. Verum quoniam, &c. — in hanc tandem concessi sententiam, *dominium Dei* esse jus vel potestatem ei a sua Sapientia & Bonitate, velut a *Lege*, datam ad regimen eorum omnium quæ ab ipso unquam creata fuerint vel creabuntur. — Nec poterit quisquam merito conqueri, *dominium dei* intra nimis *angustos limites* hac explicatione coerceri; qua hoc unum dicitur, illius nullam partem consistere in potestate quicquam faciendi contra finem optimum, Bonum commune. *Idem. pag. 345, 346.*

Contrà autem, *Hobbiana* resolutio *dominii Divini* in *potentiam ejus irresistibilem* adeo aperte ducit ad, &c. — ut mihi dubium non sit, illud ab eo fictum fuisse, Deoque attributum, in eum tantum finem, ut juri suo omnium in omnia patrocineretur. *Id. pag. 344.*

Nos e contrario, fontem indicavimus, e quo demonstrari potest, *Justitiam universalem*, omnemq; adeo *Virtutem moralem*, quæ in Rectore requiritur, in *Deo* præ cæteris refulgere, *eadem planè methodo*, qua homines ad eas excolendas obligari ostendimus. *Id. pag. 347.*

ality. But this Speculation, though necessary to be taken notice of in the distinct Order and Method of Discourse, is in itself too dry, and of less use to Us, who are abundantly assured that all moral Obligations are moreover the plain and declared Will of God: As shall be shown particularly, in its proper place.

The Law of Nature obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of particular Rewards and Punishments.

7. Lastly, *This Law of Nature* has its full obligatory Power, antecedent to all Consideration of any particular private and personal Reward or Punishment, annexed either by natural Consequence, or by positive Appointment, to the Observance or Neglect of it. This also is very evident: Because, if Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Fitness and Unfitness of being practised, be (as has been shown) originally, eternally, and necessarily, in the nature of the Things themselves; 'tis plain that the view of particular Rewards or Punishments, which is only an After-consideration, and does not at all alter the nature of Things, cannot be the original Cause of the Obligation of the Law, but is only an additional Weight to enforce the practice of what men were before obliged to by right Reason. There is no Man, who has any just Sense of the difference between Good and Evil, but must needs acknow-

* Dignæ itaq; sunt, quæ propter intrinsicam sibi perfectionem appetantur, etiam si nulla esset naturæ Lex, quæ illas imperaret. *Cumberland de Leg. Nat. pag. 281.*

ledge, that Virtue and Goodness are truly amiable, and to be chosen for their own sakes and intrinsick worth; though a man had no prospect of gaining any particular Advantage to himself by the Practice of them: And

that, on the contrary, Cruelty, Violence and Oppression, Fraud, Injustice, and all manner of Wickedness, are of themselves hateful, and by all means to be avoided; even

though

though a Man had absolute Assurance, that he should bring no manner of inconvenience upon himself by the Commission of any or all of these Crimes. This likewise is excellently and admirably expressed by Cicero: *Virtue, with † he, is that, which, though Profit or Advantage whatsoever, was to be expected to a Man's self from the Practice of it, yet must without all Controversy be acknowledged to be truly desirable for its own sake alone. And accordingly || all good Men love Right and Equity; and do many things without any prospect of Advantage at all, merely because they are just and right, and fit to be done. On the contrary; Vice is so odious in its own Nature, and so fit to be avoided, even though no Punishment was to ensue; that † no Man, who has made any tolerable Proficiency in Moral Philosophy, can in the least doubt, but, if he was sure the thing could be for ever concealed entirely both from God and Men, so that there should not be the least Suspicion of its being ever discovered;*

estum est; etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. Id. de Finib. lib. 2.

† Satis enim nobis, (si modo aliquid in philosophia profecimus,) persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesq; celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. *Id. de Offic. lib. 3.*

Si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidem fit, quum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris; si id Diis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne facturus? *Id. ibid.*

* Ἄνθρωπος δίκαιός ἐστιν, ὅχι ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν,

Ἀλλ' ὅστις ἀδικεῖν δυνάμεναι μὴ βέλεται.

Οὐδ' ὅς τὰ μικρὰ λαμβάνειν ἀπέχεται,

Ἀλλ' ὅς τὰ μεγάλα καρτερεῖ μὴ λαμβάνων,

ἔχειν δυνάμεναι, καὶ κρατεῖν ἀζημίως.

Οὐδ' ὅς γε ταῦτα πάντα διατηρεῖ μόνον,

Ἀλλ' ὅστις ἀδολον γνησίαν τ' ἔχων φύσιν,

ἔστι δίκαιος, καὶ οὐ δοκεῖν εἶναι θέλει.

Philemonis Fragmenta.

† Honestum id intelligimus; quod tale est, ut detractâ omni utilitate, sine ullis præmiis fructibusque, per seipsum possit jure laudari. *Cic. de Finib. lib. 2.*

Atque hæc omnia propter se solum, ut nihil adjungatur emolumenti, petenda sunt. *Id. de Inventione, lib. 2.*

Nihil est de quo minus dubitari possit, quam & honesta expetenda per se, & eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda. *Id. de Finib. lib. 3.*

|| Jus & omne honestum, sua sponte est expetendum. Etenim omnes viri boni, ipsam æquitatem & jus ipsum amant. *Id. de Legib. lib. 1.*

Optimi quiq; permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum. *Id. de Finib. lib. 2.*

yet he ought not to do any thing unjustly, covetously, wilfully, passionately, licentiously, or any way wickedly.

* Itaque si vir bonus habeat hanc vim; ut, si digitis concupuerit, possit in locupletum testamenta nomen ejus irrepere; hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem unquam suspicaturum. — Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quis sit vir bonus, nescire fatetur. *Idem. de Offic. lib. 3.*

† Κάεν εἰ μὴ δυνατόν εἶν ταῦτα λαοφάνειαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ὅμως ὁπόσιον εἶναι, τὸ λόγῳ ἐνεκα εἶν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτῇν κρείττειν. *Plato de Republ. lib. 10.*

justice, is made to appear more clearly and undeniably.

Yet it does not follow thence at all, either that a good Man ought to have no respect to Rewards and Punishments, or that Rewards and Punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the practice of Virtue in this present World.

Thus far is clear. But now from hence it does not at all follow, either that a good Man ought to have no respect to Rewards and Punishments, or that Rewards and Punishments are not absolutely necessary to maintain the practice of Virtue and Righteousness in this present World. 'Tis certain indeed, that Virtue and Vice are eternally and necessarily different; and that the one truly deserves to be chosen for its own sake, and the other ought by all means to be avoided, though a Man was sure for his own particular, neither to gain nor lose any thing by the practice of either. And if this was truly the state of Things in the World; certainly That Man must have a very corrupt Mind indeed, who could in the least doubt, or so much as once deliberate with himself, which he would choose. But the Case does not stand thus. The Question Now in the gene-

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ral practice of the World, supposing all expectation of Rewards and Punishments set aside, will not be, whether a Man would choose Virtue for its own sake, and avoid Vice ; But the practice of Vice, is accompanied with great Temptations and Allurements of Pleasure and Profit ; and the practice of Virtue is often threatned with great Calamities, Losses, and sometimes even with Death itself. And this alters the Question, and destroys the practice of that which appears so reasonable in the whole Speculation, and introduces a necessity of Rewards and Punishments. For though Virtue is unquestionably *worthy to be chosen for its own sake*, even without any expectation of Reward ; yet it does not follow that it is therefore entirely *Self-sufficient*, and able to support a Man under all kinds of Sufferings, and even Death itself, for its sake ; without any prospect of future recompence. Here therefore began the Error of the *Stoicks* ; who taught that the bare practice of Virtue, was itself the chief Good, and able of itself to make a Man happy, under all the Calamities in the World. Their defence indeed of the Cause of Virtue, was very brave : They saw well that its excellency was intrinsick, and founded in the Nature of Things themselves, and could not be altered by any outward Circumstances ; That therefore Virtue must needs be desirable for its own sake, and not merely for the Advantage it might bring along with it ; And if so, then consequently neither could any external Disadvantage, which it might happen to be attended with, change the intrinsick worth of the Thing itself, nor ever make it cease to be truly desirable. Wherefore, in the Case of Sufferings and Death for the sake of Virtue ; not having any *certain* knowledge of a future State of Reward, (though the wisest of them did indeed hope for it, and think it

it highly *probable* ;) they were forced, that they might be consistent with their own Principles, to suppose the practice of Virtue a sufficient Reward to itself in all Cases, and a full compensation for all the Sufferings in the World. And accordingly they very bravely indeed taught, that the Practice

* Est autem unus dies bene & ex preceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati anteponendus. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. 5.*

† Quæro si duo sint, quorum alter optimus vir, æquissimus, summa justitia, singulari fide; alter insigni scelere & audacia: Et si in eo sit errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum, sceleratum, facinorosum, nefarium putet; contra autem qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse summa probitate ac fide: proque hac opinione omnium civium, bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat; postremo, jure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur; contra autem ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes denique copiae conferantur, vir denique optimus omnium æstimatione, & dignissimus omni fortuna judicetur: Quis tandem erit tam *demens*, qui dubitet utrum se esse malit? *Idem. de Republ. lib. 3. fragment.*

of Virtue was not only * infinitely to be preferred before all the sinful Pleasures in the World; but also † that a Man ought without Scruple to chuse, if the Case was proposed to him, rather to undergo all possible sufferings with Virtue, than to obtain all possible worldly Happiness by Sin. And the suitable Practice of some few of them, as of *Regulus* for instance, who chose to die the cruellest Death that could be invented, rather than break his Faith with an Enemy; is indeed very wonderful and to be admired. But yet, after all this, 'tis plain that the general Practice of Virtue in the World, can never be supported upon this Foot. The Discourse is admirable, but it seldom goes further than mere Words: And the Practice of those few who have acted accordingly, has not been imitated by the rest of the World. Men never will generally, and indeed 'tis not very reasonably to be expected they should, part with all the Comforts of Life, and even Life itself; without expectation of

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any future Recompence. So that, if we suppose no future State of Rewards ; it will follow, that God has endued Men with such Faculties, as put them under a necessity of approving and chusing Virtue in the Judgment of their own Minds ; and yet has not given them wherewith to support themselves in the suitable and constant Practice of it. The Consideration of which inexplicable Difficulty, ought to have led the Philosophers to a firm belief and expectation of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, without which their whole Scheme of Morality cannot be supported. And, because a thing of such necessity and importance to Mankind, was not more clearly and directly and universally made known ; it might naturally have led them to some farther Consequences also, which I shall have occasion particularly to deduce hereafter.

Thus have I endeavoured to deduce the *original Obligations of Morality*, from the *necessary and eternal Reason and Proportions of Things*. Some have chosen to found * all Difference of Good and Evil, in the mere positive Will and Power of God : But the Absurdity of This, I have shown elsewhere. Others have intended, that all Difference of Good and Evil, and all Obligations of Morality, ought to be founded originally upon Considerations of Publick Utility. And true indeed it is, in the whole ; that the Good of the universal Creation, does always coincide with the necessary Truth and Reason of Things. But otherwise, (and separate from This Consideration, that God will certainly cause Truth and Right to terminate in Happiness ;) what is for the Good of the whole Creation, in very many Cases, none but an infinite Understanding can possibly judge.

* Cum omnis ratio Veri & Boni ab ejus Omnipotentia dependeat. Cartes. Epist. 6, partis secundæ.

† Pag. 218, 219, 237, 238, 239, 240.

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Publick Utility, is one thing to One Nation, and the contrary to Another : And the Governours of every Nation, will and must be Judges of the *Publick Good* : And by *Publick Good*, they will generally mean the *Private Good* of that Particular Nation. But *Truth* and *Right* (whether *Publick* or *Private*) founded in the *eternal and necessary Reason of Things*, is what every Man can judge of, when laid before him. 'Tis necessarily One and the Same, to every man's Understanding ; just as *Light* is the Same, to every man's Eyes.

He who thinks it *Right* and *Just*, upon account of *Publick Utility*, to break *Faith* (suppose) with a Robber ; let him consider, that 'tis much more useful to do the same by a Multitude of Robbers, by Tyrants, by a Nation of Robbers : And then, all *Faith* is evidently at an end. For, — *mutato nomine de Te*. What *Fidelity* and *Truth* are, is understood by every Man ; but between two Nations at War, who shall be Judge, which of them are the Robbers ? Besides : To rob a Man of *Truth* and of *eternal Happiness*, is worse than robbing him of his *Money* and of his *temporal Happiness* : And therefore it will be said that Hereticks may even more justly, and with much greater *Utility to the Publick*, be deceived and destroyed by Breach of *Trust and Faith*, than the most cruel Robbers. Where does this terminate ?

The manifold Absurdities of Mr Hobbes's Doctrines concerning the original of Right, shown in particular.

And now, from what has been said upon this Head, 'tis easy to see the Falsity and Weakness of Mr Hobbes's Doctrines ; That there is no such thing as *Just* and *Unjust*, *Right* and *Wrong* originally in the Nature of Things ; That Men in their natural State antecedent to all Compacts, are not obliged to universal Benevolence, nor to any moral Duty whatsoever ; but are in a state of War, and have every one a Right to do whatever he has Power to do ; And that, in Civil Societies, it depends wholly upon positive Laws or the

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Will of Governours, to define what shall be Just or Unjust. The contrary to all which, having been already fully demonstrated; there is no need of being large, in further disproving and confuting particularly these Assertions themselves. I shall therefore only mention a few Observations, from which some of the greatest and most obvious Absurdities of the chief Principles, upon which Mr *Hobbes* builds his whole Doctrine in this Matter, may most easily appear.

1. First then; the Ground and Foundation of Mr *Hobbes's* Scheme, is this; that

All Men, being equal by nature, and naturally desiring the same things, have † every one a Right to every Thing; are every one desirous to have absolute Dominion over all others; and may every One justly do whatever at any time is in his Power, by violently taking from Others either their Possessions or Lives, to gain to himself that absolute Dominion. Now this is exactly the same

thing, as if a man should affirm, that a *Part* is equal to the *Whole*, or that *one Body* can be present in a *Thousand Places at once*. For, to say that one man has a *full Right* to the same individual things, which another man at the same time has a *full Right*

to; is saying that two *Rights* may be || contradictory to each other; that is, that a thing may be *Right*, at the same time that 'tis confessed to be *Wrong*. For Instance; If every Man has a *Right* to preserve his own Life, then † 'tis

* Ab æqualitate Naturæ oritur unicuique ea, quæ cupit, acquirendi Spes. *Leviath. c. 13.*

† Natura dedit unicuique jus in omnia. Hoc est; in statu merè naturali, sive antequam homines ullis pactis sese invicem obstrinxissent, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque & in quoscunque libebat; & possidere, uti, frui omnibus, quæ volebat & poterat. *De Cive, c. 1. § 10.*

|| Si impossibile sit singulis, omnes & omnia sibimet subicere; ratio quæ hunc finem proponit singulis, qui uni tantum contingere potest, sæpius quam millies proponeret impossibile, & semel tantum possibile. *Cumberl. de Leg. Nat pag. 217.*

† Nec potest cuiusquam jus seu libertas ab ulla lege relicta eo extendere, ut liceat oppugnare ea, quæ aliis eadem Lege imperantur facienda. *Id. p. 219.*

manifest I can have no *Right* to take any man's Life away from him, unless he has first forfeited his *own Right*, by attempting to deprive me of mine. For otherwise, it might be *Right* for me to do That, which at the same time, because it could not be done but in breach of another Man's *Right*, it could not be *Right* for me to do: Which is the greatest Absurdity in the World. The true State of this Case therefore, is plainly this. In Mr. *Hobbes's* State of Nature and Equality; every Man having an *equal* right to preserve his own Life, 'tis evident every man has a right to an equal proportion of all those things, which are either necessary or useful to Life. And consequently so far is it from being true, that any One has an original right to possess *All*; that, on the contrary, whoever first attempts, without the *consent* of his Fellows, and except it be for some *publick Benefit*, to take to himself more than his *Proportion*, is the Beginner of Iniquity, and the Author of all succeeding Mischief.

2. To avoid this Absurdity therefore, Mr *Hobbes* is forced to assert in the next place, that since every Man has confessedly a right to preserve his own Life, and consequently to do every thing that is necessary to preserve it; and since in the State of Nature, men will necessarily have * *perpetual jealousies and suspicions of each other's In-croaching*; therefore just precaution gives every one a *Right* to † *endeavour, for his own Security, to prevent, oppress, and destroy all others, either by secret Artifice or open Violence, as it shall happen at any time to be in his Power*; as being the ‖ *only certain means of Self-preservation*. But this is even a plainer

* *Omnium adversus omnes, perpetuæ Suspiciones, ——— Bellum omnium in Omnes. De Cive, c. 1. § 12.*

† *Spes unicuique securitatis conservationisq; suæ in eo sita est, ut viribus artibusque propriis proximum suum vel palam vel ex insidiis præoccupare possit. Ibid. c. 5. § 1.*

‖ *Securitatis viam meliorem habet nemo Anticipatione. Leviath. c. 13.*

plainer Absurdity, if possible, than the former. For (besides that according to Mr *Hobbes's* Principles, Men, before positive Compacts, may justly do what mischief they please, even *without* the pretence of *Self-preservation*;) what can be more ridiculous, than to imagin a *War of All Men against All*, the directest and certainest Means of the *Preservation* of all? Yes, says he, because it leads Men to a necessity of entring into *Compact* for each other's Security. But then to make these *Compacts* obligatory, he is forced (as I shall presently observe more particularly) to recur to an * antecedent * See, de *Law of Nature*: And this destroys all that he had *Cive*, c. 3. before said. For the same *Law of Nature* which § 1. obliges Men to *Fidelity*, after having made a Compact; will unavoidably, upon all the same Accounts, be found to oblige them, *before* all Compacts, to *Contentment* and mutual *Benevolence*, as the readiest and certainest Means to the *Preservation* and *Happiness* of them All. 'Tis true, men by entring into *Compacts* and making *Laws*, agree to Compel one another to do what perhaps the mere sense of Duty, however really obligatory in the highest degree, would not, without such Compacts, have force enough of itself to hold them to in Practice: And so, Compacts must be acknowledged to be *in fact* a great Addition and Strengthening of Mens Security. But this Compulsion makes no alteration in the *Obligation itself*; And only shows, that That *entirely lawless* State, which Mr *Hobbes* calls the *State of Nature*, is by no means truly *Natural*, or in any sense suitable to the Nature and Faculties of Man; but on the contrary, is a State of extremely *unnatural* and *Intolerable Corruption*: As I shall presently prove more fully from some other Considerations.

3. Another notorious Absurdity and Inconsistency in Mr *Hobbes's* Scheme, is this: That he all along supposes Some particular Branches of the Law of Nature, (which he thinks necessary for the Foundation of some parts of his own Doctrine,) to be originally obligatory from the bare Reason of Things; at the same time that he denies and takes away innumerable others, which have plainly in the Nature and Reason of things the same Foundation of being obligatory as the former, and without which the obligation of the former can never be solidly made out and defended. Thus he supposes that in the State of Nature, be-

* *Unicuique licebat facere quæcunq; libebat. De Cive, c. 1. § 10.*

† Consequens est, ut *Nihil dicendum sit Injustum. Nomina Justi & Injusti, locum in hac conditione non habent. Leviath. c. 13.*

‖ Ex his sequitur, Injuriam nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quocum initur pactum. ——— Siquis alicui noceat, quocum nihil pactus est; *damnum ei infert, non Injuriam.* ——— Etenim si is qui *damnum recipit*, injuriam expostularet; is qui fecit sic diceret, *quid tu mihi? quare facerem ego tuo potius, quam meo libitu? &c.* In qua ratione, ubi nulla intercesserunt pacta, non video quid sit quod possit reprehendi. *De Cive, c. 3. § 4.*

‡ Prima & fundamentalis Lex Naturæ est, *quærendam esse pacem, ubi haberi potest, &c. De Cive, c. 2. § 2.*

** Sec, *de Cive, c. 2. § 3.*

fore any Compact be made, every * *Man's own Will is his only Law*; that † *nothing a Man can do, is Unjust*; and that ‖ *whatever Mischief one man does to another, is no Injury nor Injustice; neither has the Person, to whom the Mischief is done, how great soever it be, any just Reason to complain of Wrong*; (I think it may here reasonably be presumed, that if Mr *Hobbes* had lived in such a State of Nature, and had happened to be himself the Suffering Party, he would in this case have been of another Opinion:) And yet at the same time he supposes, that in the same State of Nature, Men are by all means obliged ‡ *to seek Peace*, and ** *to enter into Compacts* to remedy the fore-mentioned Mischiefs. Now if Men are obliged by the original reason and nature of things to *seek terms of Peace*, and to *get out of*

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the pretended *natural State of War*, as soon as they can; how come they not to be obliged originally by the same reason and nature of things, to live from the beginning in *universal Benevolence*, and avoid entering into the *State of War at all*? He must needs confess they would be obliged to do so, did not *Self-preservation* necessitate them every man to War upon others; But this cannot be true of the *first Aggressor*; whom yet Mr *Hobbes*, in the place now cited, vindicates from being guilty of any Injustice: And therefore herein he unavoidably contradicts himself.

* Ex his sequitur, Injuriam nemini fieri posse, &c.

Thus again; in most instances of Morality, he supposes *Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust* to have no Foundation in the Nature of Things, but to depend entirely on positive Laws;

that † *the Rules or Distinctions of Good and Evil, Honest and Dishonest, are mere civil Constitutions; and whatever the Chief Magistrate Commands, is to be accounted Good; whatever he forbids, Evil*: that || *'tis the Law of the Land only, which makes Robbery to be Robbery; or Adultery, to be Adultery*: that † *the Commandments, to Honour our Parents, to do no Murder, not to commit Adultery; and all the other Laws of God and*

† *Regulas boni & mali, justi & injusti, honesti & inhonesti, esse leges civiles; ideoque quod legislator præceperit, id pro bono; quod vetuerit, id pro malo habendum esse. De cive, c. 12. § 1.*

Quod Actio justa vel injusta sit, a jure imperantis provenit. Reges legitimi quæ imperant, justa faciunt imperando; quæ vetant, vetando faciunt injusta. *De cive, c. 12. § 1.* [In which Section 'tis worth observing, how he ridiculously interprets those Words of Solomon, (*Dabis servo tuo cor docile, ut possit Discernere inter bonum & malum*), to signify, not his Understanding or Discerning, but his Decreeing what shall be good, and what evil.]

|| Si tamen Lex civilis jubeat invadere aliquid, non est illud *Furtum, Adulterium, &c. De cive, c. 14. § 10.*

† Sequitur ergo, legibus illis, *non Occides, non Mæchabere, non Furabere, Parentes honorabis; nihil aliud præcepisse Christum, quam ut cives & subditi suis Principibus & summis Imperatoribus in quæstionibus omnibus circa meum, tuum, suum, alienum, absolute obedirent. De cive, c. 17. § 10.*

* Si quærat an obediendum civitati sit, si imperetur Deum colere sub *Imagine*, coram iis quid id fieri honorificum esse putant, certè faciendum est. *De cive*, cap. 15. § 18.

† Universaliter & in omnibus obedire obligamur. *De cive*, c. 14. § 10.

Doctrina alia, quæ Obedientiæ civili repugnat, est, quicquid faciat civis quicumque contra conscientiam suam, peccatum esse. *Leviath.* c. 29.

Opinio eorum qui docent, peccare subditos, quoties mandata Principum suorum, quæ sibi Injusta videntur esse, exsequuntur; & erronea est, & inter eas numeranda, quæ obedientiæ civili adversantur. *De Cive*, c. 12. § 2.

|| Concludendum est, Legem Naturæ semper & ubique obligare in *Foro interno*, sive conscientia; non semper in *Foro externo*; sed tum solummodo, cum secure id fieri possit. *De Cive*, c. 3.

† Quæ si tanta potentia est stultorum sententiis atq; iussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non fanciunt, ut quæ mala perniciosaq; sunt, habeantur pro bonis ac salutariibus? *Cicero de Legib.* lib. 1.

* *De Cive*, * the Civil Authority is to judge of all Opinions and c. 6 § 11. Doctrines whatsoever; to † determine Questions Philosophical, Mathematical; and, because indeed the

Nature; are no further obligatory, than the Civil Power shall think fit to make them so: nay, that * where the Supreme Authority commands men to worship God by an Image or Idol, in Heathen Countries, (for in this instance he cautiously excepts Christian ones,) 'tis lawful and their Duty to do it: and (agreeably, as a natural Consequence to all This,) that † 'tis mens positive Duty to obey the Commands of the Civil Power in all things, even in things clearly and directly against their Conscience; (that is, that 'tis their positive Duty to do That, which at the same time they know plainly 'tis their Duty not to do:) || Keeping up indeed always in their own Minds, an inward desire to observe the Laws of Nature and Conscience; but not being bound to observe them in their outward Actions, except when 'tis safe so to do: (He might as well have said, that Humane Laws and Constitutions have † Power to make Light be Darknes, and Darknes Light; to make Sweet be Bitter, and Bitter Sweet: And indeed, as one Absurdity will naturally lead a Man into another, he does say something very like it; namely that

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signification of Words is arbitrary, even * *Arith-* * *Ibid. c.*
metical ones also; as, whether a man shall presume 18. § 4.
 to affirm that Two and Three make Five or not :) And
 yet at the same time, Some particular things, which
 it would either have been too flagrantly scanda-
 lous for him to have made depending upon hu-
 mane Laws; as that † God is to
 be Loved, Honoured and Adored;
 that ‖ a man ought not to Murder
 his Parents; And the like : Or
 else, which were of necessity to
 be supposed for the Foundation
 of his own Scheme; as that †
Compacts ought to be faithfully per-
*formed, and Obedience ** to be duly*
paid to Civil Powers : The Obliga-
 tion of *These Things* he is for-
 ced to deduce intirely from the
 internal Reason and Fitness of the
 Things themselves; †† antecedent
 to, independent upon, and unalte-
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 ter, he is guilty of the grossest
 Absurdity and Inconsistency that
 can be. For if those greatest and
 strongest of all our Obligations;
 to Love and Honour God, for in-
 stance, or, to perform *Compacts*
faithfully; depend not at all on
 any Humane Constitution, but
 must of Necessity (to avoid ma-
 king Obligations reciprocally depend on each o-
 ther in a Circle;) be confessed to arise originally
 from, and be founded in, the eternal Reason and
 unalterable Nature and Relations of Things them-
 selves; And the nature and force of these Obliga-
 tions be sufficiently clear and evident; so that
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† Neq; enim an honorificè
 de Deo sentiendum sit, neq; an
 sit amandus, timendus, colen-
 dus, dubitari potest. Sunt enim
 hæc Religionum per omnes
 gentes communia. *De Homine,*
cap. 14.

‖ Si is qui summum habet
 imperium, seipsum, imperantem
 dico, interficere alicui imperet;
 non tenetur. Neque Parentem,
 &c. cum filius mori quam vi-
 vere infamis atque exorsus malic.
 Et alii casus sunt, cum mandata
 factu inhonesta sunt, &c. *De*
Cive, c. 6. § 13.

† Lex naturalis est *Pactis*
standum esse, five Fidem ob-
 servandam esse. *De Cive, c. 3.*
 § 1.

** Lex naturalis omnes leges
 civiles jubet observari. *Ibid.*
c. 14. § 10.

†† Legem Civilem, quæ
 non fit lata in contumeliam
 Dei (*cujus respectu ipsæ Civita-*
tes non sunt sui juris, nec dicun-
tur leges ferre, &c.) *De Cive,*
c. 14. § 10

Pacti violatio, &c. See de
Cive, c. 3. § 3.

* See *de Cive*, c. 14. § 10.

† Est Similitudo quædam inter id, quod in vita communi vocatur *Injuria*, & id, quod in Scholis solet appellari *Absurdum*. Quemadmodum enim is, qui argumentis cogitur ad negationem assertionis quam prius asseruerat, dicitur redigi ad *Absurdum*: eodem modo is, qui præ animi impotentia facit vel omittit id quod se non facturum vel non omitturum pacto suo ante promiserat, *Injuriam* facit: neque minus in contradictionem incidit, quam qui in Scholis reducitur ad *Absurdum*. — Est itaque *Injuria*, *Absurditas* quædam in conversatione; sicut *Absurditas*, *Injuria* quædam est in disputatione. *De Cive*, c. 3. § 3.

he who * *Dishonours God*, or wilfully breaks his Faith, is (according to Mr, *Hobbes's* own Reasoning) guilty of as great an Absurdity in *Practice*, and of as plainly contradicting the right reason of his own Mind, as he who in a *Dispute* is reduced to a necessity of asserting something inconsistent with it self; And the original Obligation to these Duties, can from hence only be distinctly deduced: Then, for the same reason, all the Other Duties likewise of natural Religion; such as *universal Benevolence*, *Justice*, *Equity*, and the like; (which I have before proved to receive in like manner their *Power of obliging* from the eternal Reason and Re-

lations of Things;) must needs be obligatory antecedent to any consideration of *positive compact*, and unalterably and independently on all *Human Constitutions* whatsoever: And consequently Mr *Hobbes's* whole Scheme, (both of a State of Nature at first, wherein there was no such thing as Right or Wrong, Just or Unjust, at all; and of these things depending afterwards, by virtue of Compact, wholly and absolutely on the positive and arbitrary determination of the Civil Power;) falls this way entirely to the Ground, by his having been forced to suppose *some particular things* obligatory, originally, and in their own nature. On the contrary: If the Rules of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, have *none of them* any obligatory force in the State of Nature, antecedent to positive Compact; Then, for the same Reason, neither will they be of any force after the Compact

Compact, so as to afford men any certain and
 Security; (Excepting only what may arise
 from the *Compulsion of Laws*, and *Fear of Punish-*
ment; which therefore, it may well be supposed,
 all that Mr *Hobbes* really means at the bottom.)
 If there be no Obligation of *Just and Right*
 precedent to the *Compact*; then *Whence* arises the
 obligation of the *Compact* it self, on which he
 supposes all other Obligations to be founded? If,
 before any Compact was made, it was no Injustice
 for a Man to take away the Life of his Neighbour,
 for his own Preservation, but merely to satisf-
 an * arbitrary humour or plea-
 sure, and without any reason or
 provocation at all; How comes
 it to be an Injustice, after he has
 made a Compact, to break and
 neglect it? Or *What* is it that
 makes breaking one's Word, to be
 a greater and more unnatural
 Crime, than killing a Man merely
 for no other reason, but because no positive Com-
 pact has been made to the contrary? So that
 in this way also, Mr. *Hobbes's*
 whole Scheme is intirely de-
 stroyed.

4. That State, which Mr *Hobbes*
 calls the *State of Nature*, is not in
 any sense a Natural State; but
 a State of the greatest, most un-
 natural, and most intolerable Cor-
 ruption, that can be imagined.
 For Reason, which is the proper
 Nature of Man, can never (as
 has been before shown) lead men

* Ex his sequitur, injuriam
 nemini fieri posse, nisi ei quo-
 cum initur pactum. *De Cive*,
 c. 3. § 4. [Which whole Section
 highly deserves to be read and
 well considered, as containing the
 Secret of Mr *Hobbes's* whole
 Scheme]

† Itaque patet quod, si Hob-
 biana raticionatio esset valida,
 omnis simul *Legum Civilium*
 obligatio collaberetur; nec ali-
 ter fieri potest quin earum vis
 labefacteretur ab omnibus prin-
 cipiis, quæ *Legum* natura-
 lium vim tollunt aut minu-
 unt; quoniam his fundatur
 & regiminis civilis auctoritas ac
 securitas, & legum a civitatibus
 latarum vigor. *Cumberland. de*
Leg. Nat. pag. 303.

Etiam extra regimen civile,
 a malis omnigenis simul confi-
 geratis tutior erit, qui actibus externis *Leges Naturæ* constantissime obser-
 vat; quam qui, juxta doctrinam *Hobbianam*, vi aut insidiis alios omnes co-
 modo præoccupare, securitatem sibi quæfiverit. *Id. p. 304.*

to

to any thing else than *universal Love and Benevolence*: And *Wars, Hatred, and Violence*, can never arise but from extreme *Corruption*. A Man may sometimes, 'tis true, in his own Defence be necessitated, in compliance with the Laws of Nature and Reason, to make War upon his Fellows: But the first Aggressours, who upon Mr *Hobbes's*

* *Voluntas lædendi*, omnibus inest in statu Naturæ *De Cive*, c. 1. § 4.

† In statu naturali, unicuique licebat facere quæcunque & in quoscunque *libebat*. *ibid.* § 10,

superiour to in Strength, without any regard to Equity or Proportion; these can never, by any

|| Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri, hominibus violandis; quid cum eo differas, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? *Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.*

** Τάδε γ' δίκαια εὐδ' εἶναι το-
παράπαν φύσει. — γινώσκοντα
τέχνη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' ὃ δὴ
τῇ φύσει. — Φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ
δικαιότατον, ὃ, τι τις ἀνὴρ βίαι-
ζέει. ©. ὅταν ἀσέβειαί τε ἔ-
σοις ὅσην λῶσιν ἀνθρώπων νέων
δημοσίᾳ πόλεσσι τε καὶ ἰδίῳ οἴκοις.
Plato de Leg. lib. 10.

†† *Homines Libertatis & Dominii per naturam amantes.* *Leviath. c. 17.*

Nemini dubium esse debet, quin avidius ferrentur homines natura sua, si metus abesset; ad *Dominationem* quàm ad *Societatem*. *De Cive, c. 1. § 2.*

Principles, (that all Men * have a natural *Will* to hurt each other, and that every one in the State of Nature has a † *Right* to do whatever he has a *Will* to :) The first Aggressours, I say, who upon these Principles assault and violently spoil as many as they are colour whatsoever, be excused from having || *utterly devest'd themselves of Humane Nature*, and having ** introduced into the World, contrary to all the Laws of Nature and Reason, the greatest Calamities and most unnatural Confusion, that Mankind by the highest Abuse of their natural Powers and Faculties, are capable of falling under. Mr *Hobbes* pretends indeed, that one of the first and most natural Principles of humane Life, is †† a Desire necessarily arising in every man's Mind, of having Power and Dominion over Others; and that this naturally impels men to use Force and Violence to obtain it. But neither is it true, that Men, following the dictates of Reason

Reason and uncorrupted Nature, desire disproportionate Power and Dominion over others; neither, if it was natural to desire such Power, would it at all follow, that it was agreeable to nature to use violent and hurtful means to obtain it. For since the only natural and good reason to desire Power and Dominion (more than what is necessary for every man's Self-preservation) is, that the Possessor of such Power may have a larger compass and greater Abilities and Opportunities of doing good, (as is evident from God's exercise of perfectly *Absolute Power*;) 'tis plain that no man, obeying the uncorrupted Dictates of Nature and Reason, can desire to increase his Power by such destructive and pernicious Methods, the prevention of which is *the only good reason* that makes the Power it self truly desirable. All Violence therefore and War are plainly the Effects, not of natural Desires, but of unnatural and extreme Corruption. And this Mr *Hobbes* himself shewingly proves against himself, by those very Arguments, whereby he indeavours to prove that War and Contention is more *natural* to *Men*, than to *Bees* or *Ants*. For his Arguments on this Head, are all drawn from Mens using themselves (as the Animals he is speaking of, cannot do,) to * *Strive about Honours and Dignities, 'till the Contention grows up into Hatred, Seditions and Wars*; to † *separate each one his private Interest from the publick, and value himself high above others, upon getting and ingrossing to himself more than his Proportion of the things of Life*; to ‖ *find fault with each others management, and, through Self-con-*

* Homines inter se de Honoribus & Dignitatibus perpetuo contendunt; sed Animalia illa [Apes & Formicæ] non item. Itaque inter Homines Invidia, Odium, Bellum. &c. *Leviath. c. 17.*

† Inter Animalia illa, Bonum publicum & privatum idem est. — Homini autem in bonis propriis nihil tam jucundum est, quam quod alienis sunt majora. *Ibid.*

‖ Animantia quæ rationem ceit,

non habent, nullum defectum vident, vel videre se putant, in administratione suarum rerum publicarum. Sed in multitudine Hominum, plurimi sunt qui præ cæteris sapere existimantes, conantur res novare; Et diversi novatores innovant diversis modis; id quod est distractio & bellum civile. *De Cive, c. 5. § 5.*

† Animantia illa verborum arte illa carent, qua homines alii aliis videri faciunt Bonum Malum, & Malum Bonum; Magnum Parvum, & Parvum Magnum. *Leviath. c. 17.*

* Animalia bruta, quamdiu bene sibi est, cæteris non invident: Homo autem tum maxime molestus est, quando otio opibusque maximè abundat. *Ibid.*

|| Consensio creaturarum illarum brutarum, naturalis est; hominum pactitia tantum, id est, artificiosa. *De Cive, c. 5. § 5.*

5. Lastly: The chief and principal Argument which is one of the main Foundations of Mr

†† Regni Divini naturalis Jus derivatur ab eo, quod *Divinæ Potentiæ resistere impossibile est.* *Leviath. c. 31.*

In regno naturali, regnandi & puniendi eos qui leges suas violant, jus Deo est a sola potentia irresistibili. *De Cive, c. 15. § 5.*

Iis quorum Potentiæ resisti non potest, & per consequens Deo omnipotenti, jus Dominandi ab ipsa potentia derivatur. *Ibid.*

** Nam quoniam Deus jus ad omnia habet; & jus Dei nihil aliud est quam ipsa Dei

ceit, being in continual Innovation and distractions; to † impose upon another, by Lyes, Falsifying, and Deceit, calling good evil, and evil good; to * grow envious at the prosperity of others, or proud and domineering when themselves are in ease and plenty; and to || keep up tolerable Peace and Agreement among themselves, merely by artificial Compacts, and the compulsion of Laws. All which things, are far from being truly the Natural Effects and result of mens reason and other Faculties; that on the contrary they are evidently some of the grossest Abuses and most unnatural Corruptions thereof, that any one who was arguing on the opposite side of the question, could easily have chosen to have instanced in.

Hobbes's and his Followers System; namely, that †† God's irresistible Power is the only foundation of his Dominion, and the only measure of his Right over his Creatures and consequently, ** that every Other Being has just so much Right, as it has natural Power; that is, that 'tis naturally Right for every thing to do whatever it has Power to do: This Argument, I say, is of all his others the most notoriously false and absurd. As may sufficiently ap-

pear

ear, (besides what has been * already said, of God's Other Perfections being † as much the measure of his *Right*, as his Power;) from this single Consideration, Suppose the *Devil*, (for when men run into extreme impious assertions, they must be answered with suitable Suppositions;) Suppose, I say, such a Being as we conceive the *Devil* to be; of extreme malice, cruelty, and iniquity; was indued with supreme absolute Power, and made use of it only to render the World as miserable as was possible, in the most cruel, arbitrary, and unequal manner that can be imagined: Would it not follow undeniably, upon Mr *Hobbes's* Scheme; since *Dominion* is founded in Power, and Power is the measure of *Right*, and consequently *Absolute Power* gives *Absolute Right*; that such a Government as this, would not only be as much of Necessity indeed to be submitted to, but also that it would be as *Just* and *Right*,

and || *with as little reason to be complained of*, as is the present Government of the World in the Hands of the *Ever-blessed and infinitely Good God*, whose Love and Goodness and tender Mercy appears every where over all his Works.

Here Mr *Hobbes*, as an *unanswerable* Argument in defence of his Assertion, urges; that ** the only Reason, why Men are bound to obey *God*, is plainly nothing but *Weakness* or *Want of Power*; because, if they themselves were All-powerful, 'tis manifest they could not be under any Obligation to obey; and consequently *Power* would give them an undoubted *Right* to do what

potentia; hinc sequitur, unamquamque rem naturalem tantum juris ex natura habere, quantum potentiae habet. *Spinoz. de Monarch. cap. 2.* [See also *Tractat. Theolog. politic. cap. 16.*]

* pag. 219.

† See *Cumberland. de Leg. Naturæ*, locis supra citatis.

|| See *Hobbes de Civive*, c. 3. § 4.

** Quod si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab Omnipotentia sua, manifestum est Obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem. [To explain which, he adds in his *Note* ;) Si cui durum hoc videbitur, illum rogo ut tacita cogitatione consideret velut, si essent duo Omnipotentes, uter utri obedire ob-

they

ligaretur. Confitebitur, credo, neutrum neutri obligari. Hoc si verum est, verum quoque est quod posui, *homines ideo Deo subiectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt.* De Cive, c. 15. § 7.

Will and Command of Another in things *Positive*. But from their Obligation to the Practice of *Moral* Virtues, of Justice, Righteousness, Equity, Holiness, Purity, Goodness, Beneficence, Faithfulness and Truth, from which Mr *Hobbes* fallaciously in this Argument, and most impiously in

† Ut enim omittam vim & naturam Deorum; ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos & benignos fuisse. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.*

his whole Scheme, indeavours to discharge them; from this they could not be discharged by any addition of Power whatsoever. Because the obligation to these things, is not, as the obligation to obey in things of arbitrary and positive Constitution, founded only in the Weakness, Subjection, and Dependency of the *Persons* obliged; but also and chiefly in the eternal and unchangeable Nature and Reason of the *Things* themselves. For, these things are the Law of *God himself*; not only to his *Creatures*, but also to *Himself*, as being the Rule of all his own Actions in the Government of the World.

I have been the longer upon this Head, because *Moral Virtue* is the Foundation and the Sum, the Essence and the Life of all true Religion: For the Security whereof, all positive Institution was principally design'd: For the Restoration whereof, all revealed Religion was ultimately intended: And inconsistent wherewith, or in opposition to which, all Doctrines whatsoever, supported by what pretence of Reason or Authority soever, are as certainly and necessarily false, as *God* is true.

II. Though

II. *Though these eternal moral Obligations are indeed of themselves incumbent on all rational Beings, even antecedent to the consideration of their being the positive Will and Command of God; yet that which most strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and Indispensably inforces them upon us, is this; that both from the Perfections of God, and the Nature of Things, and from several other collateral Considerations, it appears, that as God is himself necessarily just and Good in the exercise of his infinite Power in the Government of the whole World, so he cannot but likewise positively Require that all his rational Creatures should in their Proportion be so too, in the exercise of each of their Powers in their several and respective Spheres. That is: As these eternal moral Obligations are really in perpetual force, merely from their own Nature, and the abstract reason of Things; so also they are moreover the express and unalterable Will, Command, and Law of God to his Creatures, which he cannot but expect should, in obedience to his Supreme Authority, as well as in compliance with the natural reason of Things, be regularly and constantly observed through the whole Creation.*

This Proposition is very evident, and has little need of being particularly proved.

For 1st. The same Reasons which prove to us that God must of Necessity be himself infinitely Holy, and Just, and Good; manifestly prove, that it must also be his Will, that all his Creatures should be so likewise, according to the Proportions and Capacities of their several Natures. That there are eternal and necessary Differences of Things, Agreements and Disagreements, Proportions and Disproportions, Fittests and Unfittests of Things, absolutely in their own Nature; has been before largely demonstrated. That, with re-

That moral Duties are the positive Will and Command of God, proved from the consideration of the Divine Attributes.

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gard to these fix'd and certain proportions and necessities of Things, the Will of God, which can neither be influenced by any external Power, nor imposed upon by any error or deceit, constantly and necessarily determines itself to choose always what in the whole is Best and Fittest to be done, according to the unalterable Rules of Justice, Equity, Goodness and Truth; has likewise been already proved. *That* the same considerations *Ought* also regularly to determine the Wills of all Subordinate rational Beings, to act in constant conformity to the same eternal Rules; has in like manner been shown before. It remains therefore only to prove, that these very same moral Rules, which are thus *of themselves* really obligatory, as being the necessary result of the unalterable reason and nature of Things; are moreover the positive *Will and Command of God* to all rational Creatures: And consequently, that the wilful transgression or neglect of them, is as truly an insolent contempt of the Authority of God, as 'tis an absurd confounding of the natural reasons and proportions of Things. Now this also plainly follows from what has been already laid down. For, the same *absolute Perfection* of the Divine Nature, which (as has been before shown) makes us certain that God must *Himself* be of Necessity infinitely Holy, Just and Good; makes it equally certain, that he cannot possibly approve Iniquity in *Others*. And the same *Beauty, the same Excellency, the same Weight and Importance* of the Rules of everlasting Righteousness, with regard to which God is always pleased to make those Rules the Measure of all his *Own* Actions; prove it impossible but he must likewise will and desire, that all rational Creatures should proportionably make them the Measure of *Theirs*. Even among *Men*, there is no earthly

Father

Father, but in those things which he esteems his own Excellencies, desires and expects to be imitated by his Children. How much more is it necessary that *God*, who is infinitely far from being subject to such Passions and Variableness as frail Men are; and who has an infinitely tenderer and heartier Concern for the Happiness of his Creatures, than mortal Men can have for the welfare of their Posterity; must desire to be imitated by his Creatures in those Perfections, which are the Foundation of his own unchangeable Happiness? In the exercise of his Supreme *Power*, we cannot imitate him; In the extent of his unerring *Knowledge*, we cannot attain to any Similitude with him. We cannot at all *Thunder with a Voice like Him*; Job xl. 9. nor are we able to search out and comprehend the least part of the depth of his unfathomable *Wisdom*. But his *Holiness* and *Goodness*, his *Justice*, *Righteousness* and *Truth*; these things we can understand; in these things we can imitate him; nay, we cannot approve our selves to him as obedient Children, if we do not imitate him therein. If God be himself essentially of infinite *Holiness* and *Purity*; (as, from the Light of Nature, 'tis of all things most manifest that he is;) it follows, that 'tis impossible but he must likewise be of *pure Eyes, than to behold* with approbation any manner of *Impurity* in his Creatures: And consequently it must needs be his Will, that they should All according to the measure of their frail and finite Nature) be *Holy as he is Holy*. If God is himself Being of infinite *Justice*, *Righteousness* and *Truth*; must needs be his Will, that all rational Creatures, whom he has created after his own Image, whom he has communicated some resemblance of his Divine Perfections, and whom he has endued with excellent Powers and Faculties to enable them to distinguish between Good and Evil;

should imitate him in the exercise of those glorious Attributes, by conforming all their Actions to the eternal and unalterable Law of Righteousness. If God is himself a Being of infinite Goodness; making the Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good, and sending Rain on the Just and on the Unjust; having never left himself wholly without Wickedness, but always doing Good, given men Rain from Heaven and fruitful Seasons, and filling their Hearts with Food and Gladness: It cannot but be his Will, that all reasonable Creatures should, by mutual Love and Benevolence, permit and assist each other to enjoy in particular the several Effects and Blessings of the Divine universal Goodness. Lastly, if God is himself a Being of infinite Mercy and Compassion; as 'tis plain he bears long with men before he punishes them for their Wickedness, and often freely forgives them his *ten thousand Talents*: It must need be his Will, that they should forgive one another their *hundred Pence*; being merciful one to another, as *he is merciful* to them all; and having Compassion each on his Fellow-Servants, as God has pity on Them. Thus from the Attributes of God, natural Reason leads Men to the Knowledge of his Will: All the same Reasons and Arguments, which discover to men the natural Fitnesses or Unfitnesses of Things, and the necessary Perfections or Attributes of God; proving equally at

* Ita principem Legem illam & ultimam, mentem esse omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei. Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.

Quæ vis non modo senior est quam ætas populorum & civitatum, sed æqualis illius cœlum atq; terras tuentis & regentis Dei. Neq; enim esse Mens Divina sine ratione potest, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rebus prævisq; sancientis habere. Ibid.

the same time, that * That which is truly the *Law of Nature*, or the *Reason of Things*, is in like manner the *Will of God*. And from hence the Soberest and most Intelligent Persons among the Heathens in all Ages, very rightly and wisely concluded, that the best and certainest part of Natural Religion, which was of the

greatest

greatest importance, and where-
in was the least danger of their
being mistaken ; was * to *imitate*
the moral Attributes of God, by
a Life of Holiness, Righteous-
ness and Charity : Whereas in the
External part of their Worship,
there was nothing but Uncertainty
and Doubtfulness : It being abso-
lutely impossible, without express
Revelation, to discover what,
in that particular, they might be
sure would be truly acceptable
to God.

This Method of deducing the
Will of God, from his *Attributes* ;
of all others the best and clearest,
the certainest and most universal, that the Light of
Nature affords. Yet there are also (as I said) some
other collateral Considerations, which help to prove
and confirm the same thing ; namely, that all mo-
ral Obligations, arising from the Nature and Rea-
son of Things, are likewise the positive Will and
Command of God. As

2. This appears in some measure from the con-
sideration of God's *Creation*. For God, by *Crea-*
ting things, manifests it to be his Will, that Things
should be what they Are. And as Providence won-
derfully preserves things in their present State ;
and all necessary Agents, by constantly and regu-
larly obeying the Laws of their Nature, necessari-
ly employ all their Natural Powers in promoting
the same end ; so 'tis evident it cannot but
be the *Will of God*, that all ra-

tional Creatures, whom he has
endued with those singular Pow-
ers and Faculties, of Understand-
ing, Liberty and Free-Choice,

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* Vis Deos propitiare ?
Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit,
qui imitatus est. Senec. epist.
96.

Καὶ γὰρ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ
δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποδιδέσκειν
ἡμῶν οἱ θεοί, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν
ψυχὴν, ἃν τις ὀσείῃ καὶ δίκαιῃ ᾖ
τυγχάνῃ. Πολλὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον, ὅ-
μαι, ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας
πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας. *Plato in*
Alcibiade 2.

Collitur autem, non taurorum
opimis corporibus contrucidatis,
nec auro argentove suspenso,
nec in thesauros stipe infusa ;
sed pia ἔσ' recta voluntate. *Se-*
nec. epist. 116.

*And from
the conside-
ration of
the Nature
of God's
Creation.*

† Mens humana non potest
non judicare, esse longè credi-
bilis, quod eadem constantis-
sima voluntas, à qua hominibus
datum est esse, pariter mallet

whereby

ipſos porro eſſe & valere, hoc eſt, conſervari & felicitate frui, quam illo deturbari de ſtatu, in quo ipſos collocavit——

Sic ſcilicet e *voluntate creandi*, cognoscitur *voluntas conſervandi* tuendiq; homines. Ex hac autem innotescit *obligatio*, qua tenemur ad inſerviendum eidem voluntati notæ. *Cumberl. de Log. Nat. pag. 227.*

whereby they are exalted in Dignity above the reſt of the World; ſhould likewiſe imploy thoſe their extraordinary Faculties in preſerving the *Order and Harmony* of the Creation, and not in introducing *Diſorder and Confuſion* therein. The Nature indeed and Relations, the Proportions and Diſproportions, the Fitneſſes and

Unfitneſſes of Things, are eternal and in themſelves abſolutely unalterable; But this is only upon Suppoſition that the Things Exiſt, and that they Exiſt in ſuch manner as they at preſent do. Now that Things Exiſt in ſuch manner as they do, or that they Exiſt at all, depends entirely on the Arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of God. At the ſame time therefore, and by the ſame means, that God manifeſts it to be his Will that things ſhould Exiſt, and that they ſhould Exiſt in ſuch Manner as they do; (as by *Creating* them he at firſt did, and by *Preſerving* them he ſtill continually does, declare it to be his Will they ſhould;) he at the ſame time evidently declares, that all ſuch moral Obligations, as are the *reſult of the neceſſary Proportions and Relations of Things*, are likewiſe His *poſitive Will and Command*. And conſequently, whoever acts contrary to the forementioned *Reaſons and Proportion of Things*; by *diſhonouring God*, by *introducing unjuſt and unequal Dealings among Equals*, by *deſtroying his own Being*, or by any way *corrupting, abuſing, and miſapplying the Faculties where-with God has endued him*; (as has been above more largely explained:) is unavoidably guilty of Tranſgreſſing at the ſame time the *poſitive Will and Command of God*, which in this manner alſo is ſufficiently diſcovered and made known to him.

3. The same thing may likewise further appear from the following Consideration. What-

And from the Tendency of the practice of Morality to the Good and Happiness of the whole World.

ever tends directly and certainly to promote the Good and Happiness of the Whole, and (as far as is consistent with that chief End) to promote also the Good and Welfare of every particular part of the Creation; must needs be

agreeable to the *Will of God*;

who, being infinitely Self-suffi-

cient to his own Happiness, could

have no other Motive to create

things at all, but only that he

might communicate to them his

Goodness and Happiness; and

who consequently cannot but ex-

pect and require, that all his

Creatures should, according to

their several Powers and Facul-

ties, endeavour to promote the

same end. Now that the exact

Observance of all those moral

Obligations, which have before

been proved to arise necessarily

from the Nature and Relations

of Things; (that is to say, Li-

ving agreeably to the unaltera-

ble Rules of Justice, Righteous-

ness, Equity and Truth;) is the

certainest and directest means to

promote the Welfare and Happiness, as well of

Every Man in particular, both in Body and Mind,

as of All Men in general considered with respect

to Society; is so very manifest, that even the

greatest Enemies of all Religion, who suppose it

to be nothing more than a worldly or State-poli-

cy, do yet by that very supposition confess thus

* Dubitari non potest, quin Deus, qui ita naturalem rerum omnium ordinem constituit, ut talia sint actionum humanarum consequentia erga ipsos auctores, fecitq; ut ordinaria hæc consequentia ab ipsis præsciri possint, aut summa cum probabilitate expectari; voluerit hæc ab iis considerari, antequam ad agendum se accingerent; atque eos his provisis velut argumentis in Legum sanctione contentis determinari. *Cum-berl. de Leg. Nat. pag. 228.*

Rektor, seu Causa prima rationalis, cujus voluntate res ita disponuntur, ut hominibus satis evidenter indicetur, Actus quosdam illorum esse media necessaria ad finem ipsis necessarium: *Vult homines ad hos Actus obligari, vel hos Actus Imperat. Id. pag. 285.*

much concerning it. And indeed This, 'tis not possible for any one to deny. For the practice of

* *Pari fane ratione (ac in Arithmetice operationibus) Doctrinæ Moralis veritas fundatur in immutabili coherētia inter Felicitatem summam quam Hominum vires assequi valent, & Actus Benevolentiae universalis. Id. pag. 23.*

moral Virtues does * as plainly and undeniably tend to the *Natural Good* of the World ; as any *Physical Effect*, or *Mathematical Truth*, is naturally consequent to the Principles on which it depends, and from which it is regularly derived. And without such Practice in some degree, the World can

never be happy in any tolerable measure : As is sufficiently evident from Mr *Hobbes's* own description of the extreme miserable condition that Men would be in, through the Total Defect of the Practice of all *moral Virtue*, if they were to live in That State which He stiles (falsely and contrary to all reason, as has been before fully proved,) *the State of Nature* ; but which really is a State of the grossest Abuse and most unnatural corruption and misapplication of Men's natural Faculties, that can be imagined. For since God has plainly so constituted the nature of Man, that they stand continually in need of each other's Help and Assistance, and can never live comfortably without Society and mutual Friendship ; and are endued with the Faculties of Reason and Speech, and with other natural Powers, evidently fitted to enable them to assist each other in all matters of Life, and mutually to promote universal Love and Happiness ; 'tis manifestly agreeable to nature, and to the *Will of God* who gave them these Faculties, that they should employ them wholly to this regular and good End. And consequently, 'tis on the contrary evident likewise, that all Abuse and Misapplication of these Faculties, to hurt and destroy, to cheat and defraud, to oppress, insult, and domineer over each other ; is directly contrary

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tions ;
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III.
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tures, a

contrary both to the dictates of Nature and to the *Will of God*; Who, necessarily doing always what is Best and Fittest and most for the benefit of the whole Creation, 'tis manifest cannot Will the corruption and destruction of any of his Creatures; any otherwise than as his Preserving their natural Faculties, (which in themselves are good and excellent, but cannot but be capable of being abused and misapplied,) necessarily implies a consequential Permission of such Corruption.

And This now, is the great Aggravation of the Sin and Folly of all Immorality; that it is an obstinate setting up the *Self-Will* of frail, finite, and fallible Creatures; as in Opposition to the eternal *Reason* of Things, the unprejudiced *Judgment* of their own Minds, and the general *Good and Welfare* both of Themselves and their Fellow-creatures; so also in Opposition to the *Will* of the Supreme *Author and Creator* of all Things, who gave them their Beings and all the Powers and Faculties they are endued with: In opposition to the *Will* of the All-wise *Preserver and Governour* of the Universe, on whose gracious Protection they depend every moment for the preservation and continuance of their Beings: And in Opposition to the *Will* of their greatest *Benefactor*, to whose Bounty they wholly owe whatever they enjoy at present, and all the Hopes of what they expect hereafter. This is the highest of all Aggravations; The utmost *Unreasonableness*, joyned with obstinate *Disobedience*, and with the greatest *Ingratitude*.

III. *Though the fore-mentioned eternal Moral Obligations, are incumbent indeed on all rational Creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular Reward*
or

or Punishment ; yet they must certainly and necessarily be attended with Rewards and Punishments. Because the same Reasons, which prove God himself to be necessarily Just and Good ; and the Rules of Justice, Equity, and Goodness, to be his unalterable Will, Law, and Command, to all created Beings ; prove also that he cannot but be pleased with and approve such Creatures as imitate and obey him by observing those Rules, and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto ; and consequently that he cannot but some way or other, make a suitable Difference in his dealing with them ; and manifest his Supreme Power and absolute Authority, in finally supporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the honour of these his Divine Laws ; as becomes the Just and Righteous Governour and Disposer of all Things.

This Proposition also is in a manner Self-evident.

That the Practice of (as has been before shown) of infinite Goodness, Justice, and Holiness : And if the same Reasons which prove the Necessity of these Attributes in God himself, prove moreover (as has likewise been shown already,) that the same Moral Obligations must needs be his positive Will, Law, and Command, to all rational Creatures ; It follows also necessarily, by the very same Argument, that He cannot but be Pleased with and Approve such Creatures, as imitate and obey him by observing those Rules ; and be Displeased with such, as act contrary thereto. And if so ; then in the Nature of the thing itself 'tis evident, that having absolute Power and uncontrollable Authority, as being Supreme Governour and Disposer of all Things, He cannot but Signify, by some means or other, his Approbation of the one, and his Displeasure against the other. And this can no way be done to any effectual purpose,

For 1st, If God is himself necessarily a Being (as has been before shown) of infinite Goodness, Justice, and Holiness : And if the same Reasons which prove the Necessity of these Attributes in God himself, prove moreover (as has likewise been shown already,) that the same Moral Obligations must needs be his positive Will, Law, and Command, to all rational Creatures ; It follows also necessarily, by the very same Argument, that He cannot but be Pleased with and Approve such Creatures, as imitate and obey him by observing those Rules ; and be Displeased with such, as act contrary thereto. And if so ; then in the Nature of the thing itself 'tis evident, that having absolute Power and uncontrollable Authority, as being Supreme Governour and Disposer of all Things, He cannot but Signify, by some means or other, his Approbation of the one, and his Displeasure against the other. And this can no way be done to any effectual purpose,

purpose, but by the Annexing of respective *Rewards and Punishments*. Wherefore if Virtue goes finally *unrewarded*, and Wickedness *unpunished*; then God never *Signifies* his Approbation of the one, nor his Displeasure against the other; and if so, then there remains no sufficient proof, that he is really at all *Pleased* or *Displeased* with either; And the consequence of That, will be, that there is no reason to think the one to be his *Will and Command*, or that the other is *forbidden* by him: Which being once supposed, there will no longer remain any certain evidence of his own *Moral Attributes*: Contrary to what has been already demonstrated.

2. The Certainty of *Rewards and Punishments* in general, may also somewhat otherwise be deduced from their being necessary to support the *Honour of God* and of his *Laws and Government*; in the following manner. 'Tis evident we are obliged in the highest Ties of Duty and Gratitude, to pay all possible *Honour* to God, from whom we receive our Being, and all our Powers and Faculties, and whatever else we enjoy. Now 'tis plain likewise, that we have no other way to *Honour God*, (whose Happiness is capable of no Addition from any thing that any of his Creatures are capable of doing,) than by *Honouring*, that is, by Obeying, his *Laws*. The *Honour* therefore that is thus done to his *Laws*, God is pleased to accept as done *immediately to himself*. And though we were indeed absolutely obliged in Duty to honour him in this manner, notwithstanding that there had been no Reward to be expected thereupon; yet 'tis necessary in the Government of the World, and well-becoming an infinitely wise and good Governour, that *those who Honour him* He should Honour; that is, should distinguish them with suitable marks of his Favour. On the contrary: Though nothing that weak and

And from the necessity there is, that there should be some Vindication of the Honour of God's Laws and Government.

1 Sam. ii.
30.

finite

finite Creatures are able to do, can in the least diminish from the absolute Glory and Happiness of God; yet, as to Us, the dishonouring, that is, the disobeying his Laws, is a dishonouring of Himself: that is, 'tis, as much as in Us lies, a despising his supreme Authority, and bringing his Government into Contempt. Now the same reason that there is, why Honour should be paid to the Laws of God at all; the same reason there is, that That Honour should be vindicated, after it has been diminished and infringed by Sin. For no Law-giver who has Authority to require Obedience to his Laws, can or ought to see his Laws despised and dishonoured, without taking some measures to vindicate the Honour of them, for the support and dignity of his own Authority and Government. And the only way, by which the Honour of a Law, or of its Author, can be vindicated after it has been infringed by wilful Sin, is either by the *Repentance and Reformation* of the Transgressor, or by his *Punishment and Destruction*. So that God is necessarily obliged, in vindication of the Honour of his Laws and Government, to Punish those who presumptuously and impenitently disobey his Commandments. Wherefore if there be no distinction made by suitable *Rewards and Punishments*, between those who obey the Laws of God, and those who obey them not; then God suffers the Authority of his Laws to be finally trampled upon and despised, without ever making any Vindication of it. Which being impossible; it will follow that these things are not really the Laws of God, and that he has no such regard to them as we imagine. And the consequence of this, must needs be the denial of his *Moral Attributes*; Contrary, as before, to what has been already proved. And consequent-

ly the Certainty of Rewards and Punishments in general, is necessarily established.

IV. Though, in order to establish this suitable Difference between the Fruits or Effects of Virtue and Vice, so reasonable in itself, and so absolutely necessary for the Vindication of the Honour of God; the Nature of Things, and the Constitution and Order of God's Creation, was originally such, that the observance of the eternal Rules of Justice, Equity, and Goodness, does indeed of itself tend by direct and natural consequence to make all Creatures happy; and the contrary Practice, to make them miserable: Yet since, through some great and general Corruption and Depravation, (whencesoever That may have arisen,) the condition of Men in this present State is such, that the natural Order of things in this World is in great manifestly perverted, and Virtue and Goodness are visibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due Effects in establishing Mens Happiness proportionable to their Behaviour and Practice; Therefore 'tis absolutely impossible, that the whole View and Intention, the original and the final Design, of God's creating such rational Beings as Men are, and placing them on this Globe of Earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (to speak more properly) the only Inhabitants, for whose sake alone this part at least of the Creation is manifestly fitted up and accommodated; 'Tis absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole of God's Design in all this, should be nothing more, than to keep up eternally a Succession of such short-lived Generations of Men, as we at present are; and those in such a corrupt, confused and disorderly State of Things, as we see the World is now in; without any due observation of the eternal Rules of Good and Evil; without any clear and remarkable Effect, of the great and most necessary Difference of Things; and without any final Vindication of the Honour

Honour and Laws of God, in the proportionable Reward of the best, or Punishment of the worst of Men. And consequently 'tis certain and necessary, (even as certain as the moral Attributes of God before demonstrated,) that instead of continuing an eternal Succession of new Generations in the present Form and State of Things, there must at some time or other be such a Revolution and Renovation of Things, such a Future State of existence of the same Persons, as that by an exact distribution of Rewards and Punishments therein, all the present disorders and inequalities may be set right; and that the whole Scheme of Providence, which to Us who judge of it by only one small portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and confused; may appear at its consummation, to be a design worthy of infinite Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness.

That, according to the original Constitution of things, Virtue and Vice are attended with Natural Rewards and Punishments.

I. In order to establish a just and suitable Difference between the respective Fruits or Effects of Virtue and Vice; the Nature of Things, and the Constitution and Order of God's Creation, was originally such, that the Observance of the eternal Rules of Piety, Justice, Equity, Goodness, and Temperance, does of itself plainly tend by direct and natural Consequence, to make all Creatures happy; and the contrary Practice, to make them miserable. This is evident in general; Because the practice of universal Virtue, is (in imitation of the Divine Goodness) the practice of That which is *Best* in the *whole*; And That which tends to the benefit of the *whole*, must of necessary consequence, originally and in its own Nature, tend also to the benefit of every individual Part of the Creation. More particularly: A frequent and habitual Contemplating the infinitely excellent Perfections of the All-mighty Creator, and All-wise Governor of the World, and our most bountiful Benefactor; so as to excite in our Minds a suitable Adoration, Love, and Imitation of those Perfection-

ons:

etions : A regular employing all our Powers and Faculties, in such designs and to such purposes only, as they were originally fitted and intended for by Nature : And a *due subjecting* all our Appetites and Passions to the Government of sober and modest Reason : are evidently the directest means to obtain such *settled Peace and solid Satisfaction of Mind*, as is the first Foundation, and the Principal and most necessary Ingredient of all true Happiness. The *temperate and moderate enjoyment* of all the good things of this present World, and of the pleasures of Life, according to the measures of right Reason and simple Nature ; is plainly and confessedly the certainest and most direct Method, to preserve the *Health and Strength of the Body*. And the practice of universal *Justice, Equity, and Benevolence* ; is manifestly (as has been before observed) as direct and adæquate a means to promote the *general Welfare and Happiness of Men in Society*, as any Physical Motion, or Geometrical Operation, is to produce its natural Effect. So that if All men were truly Virtuous, and practised these Rules in such manner, that the Miseries and Calamities arising usually from the numberless Follies and Vices of Men, were prevented ; undoubtedly this great Truth would evidence itself visibly in Fact, and appear experimentally in the happy State and Condition of the World. On the contrary : *Neglect of God*, and *Insensibleness* of our Relation and Duty towards him ; *Abuse and unnatural misapplication, of the Powers and Faculties* of our Minds ; *Inordinate Appetites*, and *unbridled and furious Passions* ; necessarily fill the *Mind* with *Confusion, Trouble, and Vexation*. And *Intemperance*, naturally brings *Weakness, Pains, and Sickneses* into the *Body*. And mutual *Injustice and Iniquity* ; *Fraud, Violence, and Oppression* ; *Wars, and Desolations* ; *Murders, Rapine,*

pine, and all kinds of Cruelty; are sufficiently plain causes of the *Miseries and Calamities of Men in Society*. So that the original Constitution, Order, and *Tendency* of Things, is evidently enough fitted and designed, to establish *naturally* a just and suitable Difference in general between Virtue and Vice, by their respective Fruits or Effects.

But that
now in this
present
World, the
natural
Order of
things is so
perverted,
that Vice
often flour-
ishes in
great prof-
perity, and
Virtue
falls under
the greatest
calamities
of Life.

2. But though originally the Constitution and Order of God's Creation was indeed such, that Virtue and Vice are by the regular *Tendency* of Things, followed with natural Rewards and Punishments: Yet in Event, through some great and general Corruption and Depravation, (whencesoever That may have arisen, of which more hereafter;) the condition of Men in the present State is plainly such, that this natural Order of things in the World is manifestly perverted: Virtue and Goodness are visibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due Effect, in establishing Mens Happiness proportionable to their Behaviour and Practice; and Wickedness and Vice very frequently escape the Punishment, which the general nature and disposition of Things tends to annex unto it. Wicked Men, by Stupidity, Inconsiderateness, and sensual Pleasure, often make shift to silence the reproaches of Conscience; and feel very little of that confusion and remorse of Mind, which ought naturally to be consequent upon their vitious Practices. By accidental Strength and Robustness of Constitution, they frequently escape the natural ill consequences of Intemperance and Debauchery; and enjoy the same proportion of Health and Vigour, as those who live up to the Rules of strict and unblameable Sobriety. And Injustice and Iniquity, Fraud, Violence, and Cruelty, though they are always attended indeed with sufficiently calamitous conse-

quences

Consequences in the general; yet the most of those ill
 Consequences fall not always upon such persons in
 particular, as have the greatest share in the guilt
 of the Crimes, but very commonly on those that
 have the least. On the contrary; Virtue and Pie-
 ty, Temperance and Sobriety, Faithfulness, Ho-
 nesty and Charity; though they have indeed both
 in themselves the true Springs of Happiness, and
 also the greatest Probabilities of outward Causes
 to concur in promoting their temporal Prosperi-
 ty; though they cannot indeed be prevented from
 affording a Man the highest Peace and Satisfac-
 tion of Spirit, and many other Advantages both of
 Body and Mind in respect of his own particular
 Person: Yet in respect of those Advantages which
 the mutual Practice of social Virtues ought to pro-
 duce in common, 'tis in experience found true,
 that the Vices of a great part of Mankind do so
 far prevail against Nature and Reason, as fre-
 quently to oppress the Virtue of the Best; and
 not only hinder them from enjoying those publick
 Benefits, which would naturally and regularly be
 the Consequences of their Virtue; but oft-times
 bring upon them the greatest temporal Calamities,
 even for the sake of that very Virtue. For 'tis
 but too well known, that Good Men are very of-
 ten afflicted and impoverished, and made a prey
 to the Covetousness and Ambition of the Wick-
 ed; and sometimes most cruelly and maliciously
 persecuted, even upon account of their Goodness
 in self. In all which Affairs, the Providence of
 God seems not very evidently to interpose for the
 Protection of the Righteous. And not only so;
 but even in Judgments also, which seem more im-
 mediately to be inflicted by the Hand of Heaven,
 frequently suffers the Righteous to be involved
 in the same Calamities with the Wicked, as they
 S
 are

are mixed together in Business and the Affairs of the World.

That there-
fore there
must needs
be a Future
State of
Rewards
and Pu-
nishments.

3. Which things being so; (*viz.* that there is plainly in Event no sufficient distinction made between Virtue and Vice; no proportionable and certain Reward annexed to the one, nor Punishment to the other, in this *present* World :) And yet it being no less undeniably certain in the general, as has been before shown, that *if* there be a God, (and That God be himself a Being of infinite Justice and Goodness; and it be his Will, that all rational Creatures should imitate his mo-

ral Perfections; and he * cannot but see and take notice how every Creature behaves it self; and cannot but be *accordingly* pleased with such as obey his Will and imitate his Nature, and be displeased with such as act contrary thereto;) It being certain, I say, that *if* these things be so, God must needs, in vindication of the Honour of his Laws and Government, *signify at some time or other* this his Approbation or Displeasure, by making finally a suitable Difference between those who obey him, and those who

obey him not: It follows unavoidably, *either* that all these Notions which we frame concerning God are *false*; and that there is no Providence, and God sees not, or at least has no regard to what is done by his Creatures, and consequently the ground of all his own moral Attributes is taken away, and even his Being it self; *or else* that there must necessarily be a *Future State of Rewards and Punishments after this Life*, wherein all the present difficulties of Providence shall be cleared up

* 'Εἰ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνετον τὰς
θεῖας, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος θεοφιλεὶς ἂν
εἴη, ὁ δὲ ἀδίκος θεομισῶν —
τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ, ὅσα γε ὑπὸ θεῶν
γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεται ὡς οἴ-
οντε, ἄριστα. — Οὕτως ἄρα
ὑποληπτίον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός,
εἰάν τ' ἐν πνίκα γίγνεται, εἰάν τ' ἐν
νόσοις, ἢ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούν-
των κακῶν, ὡς τέττα ταῦτα εἰς
ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ
ἀποθανόντι. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε
θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμειλῖται, ὅς ἂν προ-
θυμιῶν ἐδέχθῃ δίκαιος γίγναι,
ἐπιτιθεμένων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνα-
τὸν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοειδῶς θεῶ.
Plato de Republ. lib. 10.

by an exact and impartial Administration of Justice. But now, that these Notions are *True*; that there is a God, and a Providence, and that God is himself a Being indued with all moral Perfections, and expects and commands that all his rational Creatures should govern all their Actions by the same Rules; has been particularly and distinctly proved already. 'Tis therefore directly Demonstrated, that there must be a *Future State* of Rewards and Punishments. *Let not thine heart envy Sinners, but be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long; For surely there is a Reward, and thine Expectation shall not be cut off*, Prov. xxiii. 17 & 18.

4. This Argument is indeed a common one; but 'tis nevertheless strongly conclusive and unanswerable. So that, whoever denies a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, must of necessity, by a chain of unavoidable Consequences, be forced to recur to downright Atheism. The only middle Opinion that can be invented, is That Assertion of the *Stoicks*, that Virtue is *Self-sufficient* to its own Happiness, and a full Reward to itself in all Cases, even under the greatest Sufferings that can befall a man for its sake. Men who were not *Certain* of a Future State, (though Most of them did indeed believe it highly probable,) and yet would not give up the Cause of Virtue; had no other way left to defend it, than by asserting that it was in all Cases and under all Circumstances absolutely *Self-sufficient* to its own Happiness: Whereas on the contrary, because it is manifestly *not Self-sufficient*, and yet undoubtedly the Cause of Virtue is not to be given up; therefore they ought from thence to have concluded the *Certainty* of a Future State. That Virtue is truly *worthy* to be chosen, even merely for its own sake,

Of the Stoical Opinion concerning the Self-sufficiency of Virtue to its own Happiness.

without any respect to any recompense or reward; must indeed necessarily be acknowledged. But it does not from hence follow, that He who Dies for the sake of Virtue, is really any more *Happy*, than he that dies for any fond Opinion or any unreasonable Humour or Obstinacy whatsoever; if he has no other Happiness than the bare Satisfaction arising from the Sense of his Resoluteness in persisting to preserve his Virtue, and in adhering immoveably to what he judges to be right; and there be no Future State, wherein he may reap any Benefit of that his resolute perseverance. On the contrary, it will only follow, that God has made Virtue necessarily amiable, and such as Men's Judgment and Conscience can never but choose; and yet that he has not annexed to it any sufficient encouragement, to support Men effectually in that Choice. Brave indeed and admirable were the Things which some of the Philosophers have said upon this Subject; and which some very few extraordinary Men (of which *Regulus* is a remarkable Instance) seem to have made good in their Practice, even beyond the common Abilities of humane Nature: But 'tis very plain (as I before intimated) that the general Practice of Virtue in the World, can never be supported upon this Foot; It being indeed neither possible nor truly reasonable, that Men by adhering to Vir-

* Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως μακαρίης ὑπολάβω τοὺς μηδὲν ἀπολαύσαντας τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀγαθόν, δι' αὐτὴν ὅ ταύτην δοκῶν μένεις. *Dionys. Haricarn.*

tue should part with their Lives, if * thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all possibility of receiving any Advantage from that adherence. Virtue, 'tis true, in its proper Seat, and with all its full Effects and Consequences unhindered, must be confessed to be the *chief Good*; as being truly the Enjoyment, as well as the Imitation

on of God. But, as the * Practice of it is circumstantiated in this present World, and in the present State of things; 'tis plain it is not itself the chief Good, but only the *means* to it; as Running in a Race, is not in itself the Prize, but the way to obtain it.

Sumus pervenire, adeptos esse credamus.

Augustin de Civitate Dei, lib. 19.

* 4.

Non enim virtus ipsa est *Summum Bonum*, sed effectrix & mater est summi boni; quoniam perveniri ad illud sine virtute non potest. *Lactant. lib. 3.*

5. 'Tis therefore absolutely impossible, that the whole View and Intention, the original and the final Design of God's creating such rational Beings as Men are; endued with such noble Faculties, and so necessarily conscious of the eternal and unchangeable Differences of Good and Evil: 'Tis absolutely impossible (I say) that the whole Design of an infinitely Wise and Just and Good God, in all this, should be nothing more than to keep up eternally a Succession of new Generations of Men; and those in such a corrupt, confused, and disorderly State of Things as we see the present World is in; without any due and regular Observation, of the eternal Rules of Good and Evil; without any clear and remarkable Effect, of the great and most necessary Differences of things; without any sufficient Discrimination of Virtue and Vice, by their proper and respective Fruits; and without any final Vindication of the Honour and Laws of God, in the proportionable Reward of the Best, or Punishment of the Worst of Men. And consequently 'tis certain and necessary, (even as certain as the moral Attributes of God before demonstrated,) that in-

From whence the Certainty of a Future State is again concluded.

stead of the continuing an eternal Succession of new Generations in the present Form and State of Things, there must at some time or other be such a Revolution and Renovation of Things, such a *Future State* of existence of the same Persons, as that by an exact distribution of Rewards and Punishments therein, all the present Disorders and Inequalities may be set right; and that the whole Scheme of Providence, which to Us who judge of it by only one small Portion of it, seems now so inexplicable and much confused; may appear at its Consummation, to be a design worthy of infinite Wisdom, Justice and Goodness. Without

* Ita fit, ut si ab illa rerum Summa, quam superius comprehendoimus, aberraveris; omnis ratio intereat, & ad nihilum omnia revertantur. *Lactant. lib. 7.*

this, All * comes to Nothing. If this Scheme be once broken; there is no Justice, no Goodness, no Order, no Reason, nor any thing upon which any Argument in moral Matters can be founded, left in the World. Nay, even though we should set aside all consideration of the *Moral* Attributes of God, and consider only his *Natural* Perfections, his infinite Knowledge and Wisdom, as Framer and Builder of the World; it would even in That View only, appear infinitely improbable, that God should have created such Beings as Men are, and indued them with such excellent Faculties, and placed them on this Globe of Earth, as the only Inhabitants for whose sake this part at least of the Creation is manifestly fitted up and accommodated; and all this

† Non enim temerè, nec fortuito sati & creati sumus; sed profecto fuit quædam vis, quæ generi consuleret humano; nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod cum exantlavisset omnes labores, tum incideret in mortis

without any further Design, than † only for the maintaining a perpetual Succession of such short-lived Generations of Mortals, as we at present are; to live in the utmost confusion and disorder for a very few Years, and then Pe-

rish

with eternally into Nothing. What * can be imagined more vain and empty? what more absurd? what more void of all Marks of Wisdom, than the Fabric of the World, and the Creation of Mankind, upon this Supposition? But then, take in also the Consideration of the *Moral* Attributes of God; and it amounts (as I have said) to a conclusion, that there must be a *Future*

malum sempiternum. Cic. *Tusc.*
Quæst. lib. 1.

* Si sine causa gignimur; si in hominibus procreandis providentia nulla versatur; si casu nobismetipsis ac voluptatis nostræ gratia nascimur; si nihil post mortem sumus: quid potest esse tam *supervacuum*, tam *inane*, tam *vanum*, quam humana res est, quam mundus ipse? *Lactant. lib. 7.*

6. It may here at first sight seem to be a very strange thing, that through the whole System of Nature in the *material*, in the *inanimate*, in the *irrational* part of the Creation, every single thing should have in itself so many and so obvious, so evident and undeniable marks, of the infinitely accurate Skill and Wisdom of their Almighty Creator; that from the brightest Star in the Firmament of Heaven, to the meanest Pebble upon the Face of the Earth, there is no one piece of Matter which does not afford such instances of admirable Artifice and exact Proportion and Con-
 vivance, as exceeds all the Wit of Man, (I do not say to imitate, but even) ever to be able fully to search out and comprehend: And yet, that in the management of the *rational and moral World*, for the sake of which all the rest was created, and is preserved only to be subservient to it; there should not in many Ages be plain Evidences enough, either of the Wisdom, or of the Justice and Goodness of God, or of so much as the interposition of his divine Providence at all; to convince Mankind clearly and generally of the World's being under his immediate Care, Inspection and Government. This, I say, may indeed

at first sight seem very wonderful. But if we consider the matter more closely and attentively, it will appear not to be so strange and astonishing, as we are apt to imagine. For as, in a great *Machine*, contrived by the skill of a consummate Artificer, fitted up and adjusted with all conceivable Accuracy for some very difficult and deep-projected Design, and polished and fine-wrought in every part of it with admirable niceness and dexterity; any Man who saw and examined one or two Wheels thereof could not fail to observe in those single parts of it, the admirable Art and exact Skill of the Workman; and yet the Excellency of the End or Use for which the whole was contrived, he would not at all be able, even though he was himself a skilful Artificer, to discover and comprehend, without seeing the Whole fitted up and put together: So though in every part of the *natural* World, considered even single and unconnected, the Wisdom of the great Creator sufficiently appears; yet his Wisdom and Justice and Goodness in the Disposition and Government of the *moral* World, which necessarily depends on the Connexion and Issue of the whole Scheme, cannot perhaps be distinctly and fully comprehended by any Finite and Created Beings, much less by frail and weak and short-liv'd Mortals, before the Period and Accomplishment of certain great Revolutions. But 'tis exceedingly reasonable to believe, that as the Great Discoveries which by the Diligence and Sagacity of later Ages have been made in Astronomy and *Natural* Philosophy, have opened surprizing Scenes of the Power and Wisdom of the Creator, beyond what Men could possibly have conceived or imagined in Former Times: so at the unfolding of the whole Scheme of Providence in the Conclusion of this present State, Men will be surprized

surprized with the amazing Manifestations of Justice and Goodness, which will then appear to have run through the whole Series of God's Government of the *Moral* World.

This is the chief and greatest Argument, on which the *natural* Proof of a *Future State of Rewards and Punishments*, must principally be founded. Yet there are also several other collateral Evidences, which jointly conspire to render the same Thing extremely credible to mere natural Reason. As

1st, There is very great Reason, even from the bare *Nature* of the Thing it self, to believe the *Soul* to be *Immortal*: Separate from all moral Arguments drawn from the Attributes of God; and without any Consideration of the general System of the World, or of the Universal Order and Constitution, Connexion and Dependencies of Things. The Immortality of the Soul, has been commonly believed in * all Ages and in all Places, by the *unlearned* part of all civilized People, and by the almost general consent of all the most *barbarous* Nations under Heaven;

from a *Tradition* so ancient and so universal, as cannot be conceived to owe its original either to Chance or to vain Imagination, or to any other Cause than to the Author of Nature Himself. And the most *learned and thinking* part of Mankind, at all Times and in all Countries, where the Study of Philosophy has been in any measure cultivated, have almost generally agreed, that 'tis capable of a just Proof from the abstract consideration of the *Nature and Operations* of the Soul itself. That none of the known Qualities of *Matter* can in any possible Variation, Division, or Composition, produce *Sense* and *Thought* and *Reason*;

Of the Immortality of the Soul; and the natural Proofs we have of it.

* Et primum quidem omni Antiquitate, &c. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.*

* *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. See also a Letter to Mr Dodwell, with the several Answers and Replies.*

son; is abundantly evident; as has been demonstrated in the former * Discourse. That Matter consists of innumerable, divisible, separable, and for the most part actually disjoyned Parts; is acknowledged by all Philosophers. That, since the Powers and Faculties of the Soul are the most remote and distant from all the known Properties of Matter, that can be imagined; 'tis at least a putting great Violence upon our Reason, to imagine them superadded by Omnipotence to one and the same Substance; cannot easily be denied. That 'tis highly unreasonable and absurd, to suppose the Soul made up of innumerable Consciousnesses, as Matter is necessarily made up of innumerable Parts; and on the contrary, that 'tis highly reasonable to believe the seat of Thought to be a simple Substance, such as cannot naturally be divided and crumbled into Pieces, as all Matter is manifestly subject to be; must of necessity be confessed. Consequently the Soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the dissolution of the Body. And therefore it will naturally be Immortal. All this seems to follow, at least with the highest degree of probability, from the single consideration of the Soul's being endued with Sense, Thought,

or Consciousness. I cannot imagine, saith † Cyrus, (in that Speech which Xenophon relates he made to his Children a little before his Death) that the Soul, while it is in this Mortal Body, lives; and that when it is separated from it, then it should die. I cannot persuade my self, that the Soul, being separated from this Body which is devoid of Sense, should thereupon

become it self likewise devoid of Sense: On the contrary, it seems to me more reasonable to believe, that

† Οὐ τοι ἔγωγε, ὦ παῖδες, εἰδὲ τὸτο πάποτε ἐπέοδον, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἕως ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ, ζῇ· ὅταν δὲ τέττε ἀπαλλαγῇ, τέθνηκεν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅπως ἄφρων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴν τῷ ἀφρονὶ σώματι διχὰ γένηται, εἰδὲ τὸτο πείσμαι. Ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀκραιῖ ἐκαστὸς ὁ νῦς ἐκκρίδῃ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἶκος αὐτὸν εἶναι.
Cyrus apud Xen.

When the Mind is separated from the Body, it should
 then become most of all sensible and intelligent : Thus
 He. But then further ; if we take also into the
 Consideration all the higher and nobler Faculties,
 Capacities and Improvements of the Soul ; the Ar-
 gument will still become much stronger. I am
 persuaded, saith * Cicero, when I
 consider with what Swiftneſs of
 Thought the Soul is indued, with
 what a wonderful Memory of Things
 paſt, and fore-caſt of Things to
 come ; how many Arts, how many
 Sciences, how many wonderful In-
 ventions it has found out ; that That
 Nature, which is Poſſeſſour of ſuch
 Faculties, cannot be Mortal. A-
 gain ; The Memory, ſaith † he,
 which the Soul has of Things that
 have been, and its Foreſight of
 Things that will be, and its large
 Comprehenſion of things that at pre-
 ſent are, are plainly divine Powers :
 Nor can the Wit of Man ever in-
 vent any way, by which theſe Fa-
 culties could poſſibly come to be in Men, but by imme-
 diate Communication from God. Again ; Though
 we ſee not, ſaith ‖ he, the Soul of
 Man, as indeed neither are we
 able to ſee God : Yet, as from the
 Works of God we are certain of his
 being ; ſo from the Faculties of the
 Soul, its Memory, its Invention,
 its Swiftneſs of Thought, its noble
 Exerciſe of all Virtue, we cannot
 but be convinced of its divine origi-
 nal and nature. And, ſpeaking
 of the Strength and Beauty of that Argument,
 which, from the wonderful Faculties and Capa-
 cities

* Quid multa ? Sic mihi
 perſuaſi, ſic ſentio ; quum tanta
 celeritas animorum ſit, tanta
 memoria præteritorum, futuro-
 rum providentia, tot artes, tan-
 tæ ſcientiæ, tot inventa ; non
 poſſe eam naturam, quæ res
 eas contineat, eſſe mortalem.
Cic. de ſenectute.

† Quod & præterita teneat,
 & futura provideat, & com-
 plecti poſſit præſentia ; hæc di-
 vina ſunt. Nec invenietur un-
 quam, unde ad hominem veni-
 re poſſint, niſi a Deo. *Idem.*
Tuſc. Quæſt. lib. 1.

‖ Mentem hominis, quamvis
 eam non videas, ut Deum non
 vides ; tamen, ut Deum agnos-
 cis ex operibus ejus, ſic ex
 memoria rerum & inventione
 & celeritate Motus, omnique
 pulchritudine virtutis, vim di-
 vinam Mentis agnoſcito. *Id.*
ibid.

cities of the Soul, concludes it to be of an Immaterial and Immortal Nature ; *Tho' all the vulgar*

* Licet concurrant plebeii omnes philosophi, (sic enim ii qui à Platone & Socrate & ab illa familia dissident, appellandi videntur :) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, sed ne hoc quidem ipsum quam subtiliter conclusum sit intelligent. *Id. ibid.*

and little Philosophers in the World faith * he, (*for so I cannot but call all such, as dissent from Plato and Socrates and those superiour Geni- us's*) *should put their Heads together ; they will not only never, while they live, be able to explain any thing so neatly and elegantly, but even This Argument itself, they will never have understanding*

enough fully to perceive and comprehend, how near and beautiful and strong it is. The chief prejudice against the belief of the Soul's existing thus and living after the Death of the Body, and the Summ of all the Objections brought against this Doctrine by the *Epicurean* Philosophers of old, who denied the Immortality of the Soul ; and by certain Atheistical Persons of late, who differ very little from them in their manner of reasoning ; is This

That they † cannot apprehend how the Soul can have any *Sense of Perception*, without the Body wherein evidently are all the *Organs of Sense*. But neither † can they any better apprehend or explain how the Soul in the Body (that is, the Body itself, according to their Opinion,) is capable of *Sense or Perception*, by means of the *Organs of Sense*. And besides This Argument, that the Soul

† ——— Si immortalis natura animæ est,

Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro ;

Quinq; (ut opinor) eam faciundum est sensibus auctam :

—— At neq; seorsum oculi, &c. *Lucret. lib. 3.*

Quod autem corpus animæ per se ? quæ materia ? ubi cogitatio illi ? quomodo visus ? auditus ? aut qui tangit ? qui usus ejus ? aut quod sine his bonum ? *Plin. lib. 7.*

Neq; aliud est quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur æternitas, nisi quod nequeunt qualis sit animus vacans corpore intelligere, & cogitatione comprehendere. *Cic. Tusc. Quest. lib. 1.*

¶ Quasi vero intelligant qualis sit in ipso corpore. ——— Mini quidem naturam animi intuenti, multo difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multoq; obscurior qualis animus in corpore sit, quam qualis cum exierit. *Id. ibid.*

can have no Perception, when all the ways of Perception that we have at present Ideas of, are removed; is exactly the very same Argument, and no other, than what a Man born blind might make use of with the very same force, to prove that none of Us can possibly have in our present Bodies any Perception of Light or Colours; as I have explained more particularly in the * former Discourse.

* *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,* pag. 79.

This consideration, of the Soul's appearing in all Reason to be *naturally immortal*, afforded great Pleasure and Satisfaction to the wisest and soberest Men in the Heathen World; was a great Support under Calamities and Sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by being virtuous; filled them with great hopes and comfortable expectations of what was to come hereafter; and was a mighty encouragement to the practice of all moral Virtue, and particularly to take pains in subduing the Body and keeping it in subjection to the Reason of the Mind. *First*, it afforded great Pleasure and Satisfaction to the wisest and soberest Men in the Heathen World, from the bare contemplation of the Thing it self. *No body, saith † Cicero, shall ever drive Me from the Hope of Immortality: And, ‖ If this Opinion concerning the Immortality of the Soul, should at last prove an Errour; yet 'tis a very delightful Errour; And I will never suffer my self to be undeceived in so long as I*

The natural credibility of the Soul's being Immortal, of great Use to the wiser Heathens.

† Sed Me nemo de immortalitate depellet. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.*

‖ Quod si in hoc erro, quod animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro; nec mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo. *Idem de senectute.*

Secondly, it was a great Support to them under Calamities and Sufferings, especially under such as men brought upon themselves by being Virtuous:

These

* His & talibus adductus *Socrates*, nec patronum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit; & supremo vitæ die, de hoc ipso multa disseruit; & paucis ante diebus, cum facile posset educi e custodia, noluit. — Ita enim censebat, itaque disseruit, duas esse vias, duplicesque cursus animorum, e corpore excellentium, &c. *Id. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.*

See also the Passage of *Sophocles*, cited above, 214.

that when the Souls of Men depart out of their Bodies, they go two different ways; the Virtuous to a place of Happiness, the Wicked and the Sensual to a place of Misery. Thirdly, it filled them with great Hopes, and comfortable Expectations of what was to

† O præclarum diem, quum in illud animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, & quum ex hac turba & colluvione discedam! *Idem de Senect.*

|| Χρὴ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεταχειρῆν καλὸν ᾧ τὸ ἄθλον, ἢ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη. *Plato in Phædone.*

stages of Virtue

** Καὶ μὴ τὰ γε μέγιστα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα

These and the like Contemplations, faith * *Cicero*, had such an Effect upon *Socrates*, that when he was tried for his Life, he neither desired any Advocate to plead his Cause, nor made any Supplication to the Judges for Mercy; and on the very last day of his Life, made many excellent Discourses upon this Subject; and a few days before, when he had an opportunity offered him to have escaped out of Prison, he would not lay hold of it. For he believed, and thus he taught

that when the Souls of Men depart out of their Bodies, they go two different ways; the Virtuous to a place of Happiness, the Wicked and the Sensual to a place of Misery. Thirdly, it filled them with great Hopes, and comfortable Expectations of what was to come hereafter: O happy day, faith † the good old Man in *Cicero*, when I shall go to that blessed Assembly of Spirits, and depart out of this wicked and miserably confused World! Lastly, It was a mighty encouragement to the practice

of all moral Virtue, and particularly to take pains in subduing the Body and keeping it in subjection

to the reason of the Mind: We ought to spare no Pains, faith || *Plato*, to obtain the Habit of Virtue and Wisdom in this Life; for the Prize is noble, and the Hope is very great. Again; having reckoned up the temporal Advantages in the present World, he adds

** But we have not yet mentioned the greatest and chiefest Reward

which are proposed to *Virtue*; For what can be truly great, in so small proportion of *Time*? the whole age of the longest *Liver* in this our present *World*, being inconsiderable and nothing in comparison of *Eternity*. And again; These things, with * he, are nothing, either in Number or Greatness, in comparison with those Rewards of *Virtue*, and Punishments of *Vice*, which attend Men after *Death*. And, to mention no more places; They, saith † he, who in the Games hope to obtain a *Victory* in such poor Matters as *Wrestling*, *Running*, and the like; think not much to prepare themselves for the Contest by great *Temperance* and *Abstinence*: And shall our Scholars in the Study of *Virtue*, not have courage and resolution enough, to persevere with *Patience*, for a far nobler *Prize*? Words very like those of *St Paul*, 1 Cor. ix. 24. Know ye not that they which run in a *Race*, run all; And every man that striveth for the *Mastery*, is temperate in all things? Now they do it to obtain a corruptible *Crown*, what we an incorruptible.

2. Another Argument which may be used in The Argument for a proof of a *Future State*, so far as to amount to a *Future* very great probability; is That necessary *Desire* of *State*, *Immortality*, which seems to be naturally implanted in all Men, with an unavoidable Concern for from Mens natural desire of *Immortality*. that is to come hereafter. If there be no Existence after this *Life*; it will seem that the irrational creatures, who always enjoy the present *Good* without any *Care* or *Sollicitude* for what may happen afterwards, are better provided for by *Nature*, than Men, whose Reason and Foresight and all other

ἅλλα ἐδελγηθήμεθα. ——— Τ.
δ' ἂν ἔν γε ὀλίγω χρόνῳ μέ-
γα γένοιτο; πᾶς γ' ἕως γε ὁ
ἐν παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτη χρόνος
πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος. πῦ τις ἂν εἴη.
Plato de Republ. lib. 10.

* Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἑδὲν ἐστὶ πλή-
θους ἑδὲ μεγάλαι πρὸς ἐκείναις ἃ τι-
λεντήσαντα ἐκώτερον περιμένει. I-
dem. ibid.

† Οἱ μὲν ἄρα νίκης ἕνεκα πά-
λης ὁρῶμεν καὶ τοιαύτων, ἐτόλ-
μησαν ἀπέχεσθαι. ——— Οἱ δ'
ἡμέτεροι πᾶσι δυνάμει κατ-
τερεῖν, πολὺ καλλίον ἕνεκα νίκης.
Plato de Legib. lib. 8.

other those very Faculties, by which they are made more excellent than Beasts, serve them, upon this Supposition, scarcely for any other purpose, than to render them *uneasie* and *uncertain*, and *fearful* and *sollicitous* about things which are not. And 'tis not at all probable, that God should have given Men *Appetites*, which were *never to be satisfied*; *Desires*, which had *no Objects* to answer them; and unavoidable *Apprehensions*, of what was *never really to come to pass*.

Another,
drawn
from Mens
Conscience
or Judgment
of
their own
Actions.
Rom. ii.
14, 15.

3. Another Argument, which may be brought to prove a *Future State*, is That *Conscience* which all Men have of their own Actions, or That inward *Judgment* which they necessarily pass upon them in their own Minds: Whereby they *have not any Law, are a Law unto themselves*, their *Conscience bearing Witness*, and their *Thoughts accusing or else excusing one another*. There is no Man who at any time does good and brave and generous things, but the Reason of his own Mind applauds him for so doing; And no Man at any time does things base and vile, dishonourable and wicked, but at the same time he condemns himself in what he does. The one is necessarily accompanied with good Hope, and Expectation of Reward: The other, with continual Torment and Fear of Punishment. And hence, as before, 'tis not probable, that God should have so framed and constituted the Mind of Man, as necessarily to pass upon itself a *Judgment* which shall *never be verified*, and stand perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a *Sentence* which shall *never be confirmed*.

Another,
drawn
from Man's
being by nature
an accountable
Creature.

4. Lastly; Another Argument, which may be drawn from right Reason in proof of a *Future State* is this; that Man is plainly in his Nature an *accountable Creature*, and capable of being *Judged*. Those Creatures indeed, whose Actions are all de-

termined

determined by something without themselves, or by
 what we call mere instinct; as they are not capa-
 ble of having a Rule given them, so 'tis evident
 that neither can they be accountable for their Acti-
 ons. But *Man*, who has intirely within himself
 a free Principle or Power of determining his own
 Actions upon *moral* Motives, and has a Rule gi-
 ven him to act by, which is Right Reason; can
 be, nay, cannot but be, *accountable* for all his
 Actions, how far they have been agreeable or
 disagreeable to that Rule. Every Man, because
 of the natural Liberty of his Will, *can* and *ought*
 to govern all his Actions by some certain Rule,
 and give a Reason for every thing he does. E-
 very moral Action he performs, being Free and
 without any compulsion or natural necessity, pro-
 ceeds either from some *Good Motive*, or some *Evil*
 one; is either *conformable to right Reason*, or *con-*
trary to it; is worthy either of *Praise* or *Dispraise*,
 and capable either of *Excuse* or *Aggravation*. Con-
 sequently 'tis highly reasonable to be supposed,
 that since there is a Superior Being, from whom
 we received all our Faculties and Powers; and
 since in the *right Use* or in the *Abuse* of those Fa-
 culties, in the governing them by the Rule of
 Right Reason, or in the neglecting that Rule, con-
 sists all the moral Difference of our Actions;
 there will at some time or other be an *Examination*
 or *Inquiry* made, into the grounds and motives
 and circumstances of our several Actions, how a-
 greeable or disagreeable they have been to the
 Rule that was given us; and a suitable *Judg-*
ment be passed upon them. Upon these consid-
 erations, the Wifest of the Antient Heathens be-
 lieved and taught, that the Actions of every par-
 ticular Person should all be strictly tried and ex-
 amined after his Death, and he have accordingly
 a just and impartial Sentence passed upon him.

T

Which

Which Doctrine though the Poets indeed wrap up in Fables and obscure Riddles, yet the wisest of the Philosophers had a better Notion of it, and more agreeable to Reason. From this Judg-

* Ταύτης τῆς δίκης ἔτε σὺ μήποτε, ἔτε εἰ ἄλλῃ ἀτυχὴς γενόμενός ἐπέσῃται περιγενέσθαι θεῶν. — Οὐ γὰρ ἀμελεῖται ποτ' ἴσῃ αὐτῆς οὐχ οὕτω σμικρὸς ὢν, δυσὴν κατὰ τὸ τῆς γῆς βαθεῖαν οὐδ' ὑψηλὸς γενόμενός, εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσῃ τίσεις ἢ αὐτῶν τὴν προσηκῆσαν τιμωρίαν, εἴ τ' εὐβάδῃ μέναν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ἀποβύθῃ, εἴδε καὶ τούτων εἰς ἀγέμετον ἔτι ἀγκομίσθῃς τόπον.

Plato de Legib. lib. 10.

ment, faith * Plato, let no Man hope to be able to escape : For though you could descend into the very Depths of the Earth, or flie on high to the extremities of the Heavens ; yet should you never escape the just Judgment of the Gods, either before or after Death. An expression very agreeable to that of the Psalmist ; Psal. cxxxix. 8, 9.

These, I say, are very good and strong Arguments for the great probability of a Future State : But That drawn, as above, from the consideration of the Moral Attributes of God, seems to amount even to a Demonstration.

V. Though the necessity and indispensableness of the great and moral Obligations of Natural Religion, and also the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments, be thus in general deducible, even demonstrably, by a Chain of clear and undeniable reasoning : Yet (in the present State of the World by what means soever it came originally to be so corrupted ; the particular Circumstances whereof, could not Now be certainly known but by Revelation ;) such is the Carelessness, Inconsiderateness, and Want of Attention of the greater part of Mankind ; so many the Prejudices and false Notions taken up by early Education ; so strong and violent the unreasonable Lusts, Appetites, and Desires of Sense ; and so great the Blindness, introduced by superstitious Opinions, vitious Customs, and debauched Practices, through the World ; that very Few are able, in rea-

ity and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves: But Men have great need of particular Teaching, and much Instruction; to convince them of the Truth, and Certainty, and Importance of these things; to give them a due Sense, and clear and just Apprehensions concerning them; and to bring them effectually to the Practice of the plainest and most necessary Duties.

1. There is naturally in the greater part of Mankind, such a prodigious *Carelessness*, *Inconsiderateness* and *Want of Attention*; as not only hinders them from making use of their Reason, in such manner as to discover these things clearly and effectually for themselves; but is the cause of the grossest and most stupid Ignorance imaginable. Some seem to have little or hardly any Notion of God at all; and More take little or no care to frame just and worthy Apprehensions concerning him, concerning the Divine Attributes and Perfections of his Nature; and still many More are entirely negligent and heedless, to consider and discover what may be his Will. Few make a due use of their Natural Faculties, to distinguish rightly the essential and unchangeable Difference between Good and Evil; Fewer yet, so attend to the natural Notices which God has given them, as by their own Understanding to collect, that What is Good is the express Will and Command of God, and what is Evil is Forbidden by him; And still Fewer consider with themselves the Weight and Importance of these Things, the natural Rewards or Punishments that are frequently annexed in this Life to the Practice of Virtue or Vice, and the much greater and certainer Difference that shall be made between them in a Life to come. Hence it is, that (as Travellers assure us) even some whole Nations seem to have very little Notion of God, or at least very poor and unworthy Apprehensions

Men hindered from discovering and understanding religious Truths, by Carelessness and Want of Attention.

concerning him; and a very small Sense of the Obligations of Morality; and very mean and obscure Expectations of a Future State. Not that God has any where *left himself* wholly *without Witness*; or that the Difference of Good and Evil, is to any rational Being undiscernible; or that Men at any Time or in any Nation, could ever be firmly and generally persuaded in their own Minds, that they perished absolutely at Death: But through *Supine Negligence and Want of Attention*, they let

* Multis signis natura declarat quid velit: — obfurdescimus tamen nescio quo modo nec audimus. Cic. de Amicit.

their Reason (as it were) sleep, and * are deaf to the Dictates of common Understanding; and, like Brute Beasts, minding only the things that are before their Eyes, never consider any thing

that is abstract from Sense, or beyond their present private Temporal Interest. And it were well, if, even in civilized Nations, this was not, very nearly, the case of too many Men, when left entirely to themselves, and void of particular Instruction.

And by early prejudices and false Notions.

2. The greater part of Mankind are not only *Unattentive*, and barely *Ignorant*; but commonly they have also, through a careless and Evil Education, taken up *early Prejudices*, and many *vain and foolish Notions*; which pervert their natural Understanding, and hinder them from using their Reason in *moral Matters* to any effectual purpose. This cannot be better described, than in the

† Si tales nos natura genuisset, ut eam ipsam intueri & perspicere, eaque optimâ duce cursum vitæ conficere possemus; haud esset sanè quod quisquam rationem & doctrinam requireret. Nunc vero, &c. Cic. Tuscul. Quest. lib. 3.

Words of Cicero: *If we had come into the World, saith † he, in such Circumstances, as that we could clearly and distinctly have discerned Nature herself, and have been able in the course of our Lives to follow her true and uncorrupted Directions; this alone might have*

been sufficient, and there would have been little need of Teaching and Instruction. But Now Nature has given us only some small Sparks of right Reason, which we so quickly extinguish with corrupt Opinions and evil Practices, that the true Light of Nature no where appears. As soon as we are brought into the World, immediately we dwell in the midst of all Wickedness, and are surrounded with a number of most perverse and foolish Opinions; so that we seem to suck in Error even with our Nurse's Milk. Afterwards, when we return to our Parents, and are committed to Tutors; then we are further stocked with such Variety of Errors, that Truth becomes perfectly overwhelmed with Falsehood; and the most natural Sentiments of our Minds, are entirely stifled with confirmed Follies. But when after all this, we enter upon Business in the World, and make the Multitude, conspiring every where in Wickedness, our great Guide and Example; then our very Nature itself is wholly transformed, as it were, into corrupt Opinions. A livelier Description of the present corrupt estate of Humane Nature, is not easily to be met with.

3. In the generality of Men, the *Appetites* and *Desires of Sense* are so violent and importunate; the *Business* and the *Pleasures* of the World, take up so much of their time; and their *Passions* are so very strong and unreasonable; that of Themselves, they are very backward and unapt to employ their Reason, and fix their *Attention* upon moral Matters; and still more backward to ap-

Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionibusque depravatis sic relinguimus, ut nusquam Naturæ lumen appareat.

— Simul atque editi in Lucem & suscepti fumus, in omni continuo pravitare, & in summa opinionum perversitate versamur; ut pene cum lacte nutricis, errorem suxisse videamur. Cum vero parentibus redditi, deinde magistris traditi fumus, tum ita variis imbuimur, erroribus, ut vanitati veritas, & opinioni confirmatæ natura ipsa cedat. — Cum vero accedit eodem, quasi maximus quidem magister, populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo; tum plane insicimur opinionum pravitare, a naturaque ipsa deiscimus. *Ibid.*

ply themselves to the *Præctice* of them. The

* Ἐτι δὲ ἐν νηπίε πᾶσιν ἡμῶν συντίθεται [ἡδονή] διὸ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀπιδράσκειν τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ἐγκεχυρομένον τῷ βίῳ. *Aristot. Ethic. lib. 2. c. 2.*

Thoughts from Sensual Objects, and fasten them upon things remote from Sense. And if perhaps they do attend a little, and begin to see the reasonableness of governing themselves by a higher Principle, than

† Vitia de mercede sollicitant: Avaritia pecuniam promittit: Luxuria multas ac varias voluptates: Ambitio purpuram & plausum; & ex hoc potentiam, & quicquid potentia ponit. *Senec. Epist. 59.*

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἱσθμῷ, ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐν ἡμῶν εἶναι νεῦρα ἢ μὲντοι τῶς ἐνέσται, σπῶσι τε ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀνέλκυσιν, συντίθειν ἐσται ἐπ' ἐναντίας πράξεις. *Plato de Legib. lib. 1.*

|| — Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

† Ἐδοξε δὲ, καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα, οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπὰ εἶναι τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρη γίνεσθαι χρηστὸς ἄνθρωπος, παγχάλεπον. *Plato in Epinomide.*

** Φρήσιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαιῶν, εὐτυχίᾳ ὄντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἡμᾶς πνεύμενο. *Id de Legib. lib. 1.*

Love of Pleasure, is (as *Aristotle* elegantly * expresses it) so nourished up with us from our very *Childhood*, and so incorporated (as it were) into the whole course of our Lives; that 'tis very difficult for Men to withdraw their Thoughts from Sensual Objects, and fasten them upon things remote from Sense. And if perhaps they do attend a little, and begin to see the reasonableness of governing themselves by a higher Principle, than mere Sense and Appetite; yet with such † *Variety of Temptations* are they perpetually incompassed, and continually sollicitated; and the Strength of *Passions and Appetites*, makes so great Opposition to the Motions of Reason; that commonly they yield and submit to practise those things, which at the same time the Reason of their own Mind || condemns; and what they allow not, *That they Do*. Which Observation is so true of too great a part of Mankind, that *Plato* upon this Ground declares † *All Arts and Sciences to have in his Opinion less of difficulty in them, than that of making Men Good*; Infomuch that, it ** is well, saith he, if Men can come to attain a right Sense, and just and true Notions of Things, even by that time they arrive at old Age.

4. But that which above all other things, most depraves Mens natural Understanding, and hinders them from discerning and judging rightly of Moral Truths, is this ; That as stupid and careless Ignorance leads them into fond and superstitious Opinions, and the Appetites of Sense overcome and tempt them into Practices contrary to their Conscience and Judgment ; so on the reverse, the multitude of *superstitious Opinions, vicious Habits, and debauched Practices*, which prevail in all Ages through the greater part of the World, do reciprocally increase Mens gross Ignorance, Carelessness and Stupidity. False and unworthy Notions of God, or Superstitious Apprehensions concerning him, which Men carelessly and inconsiderately happen to take up at first ; do (as it were) blind the Eyes of their Reason for the future, and hinder them from discerning what of itself originally was easy enough to be discovered. *That which may be known of God, has been manifest enough unto Men in all Ages ; for God hath shewed it unto them : For the invisible things of Him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ; even his eternal Power and Godhead : So that they who are ignorant of him, cannot but be without excuse. But notwithstanding all the Heathen World had so certain means of knowing God ; yet generally they glorified him not as God ; neither were thankful, but became vain in their Imaginations, and their foolish Heart was darkned ; And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into Images of the meanest and most contemptible Creatures ; and worshipped and served the Creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. The natural Consequence of which absurd Idolatry, and also the just Judgment of God upon them for it, was, That they were given up to a reprobate*

And above all, by vicious Habits and Practices.

Rom. i.
19, &c.

Mind, to Uncleanneſs and to all vile Affections to ſuch a degree, that not only their Common Practices, but even their moſt Sacred Rites and Religious Performances, became themſelves the extreameſt Abominations. And when Men's *Morals* are thus corrupted, and they run with greedineſs into all exceſs of Riot and Debauchery; then, *on the other hand*, by the ſame natural Conſequence, and by the ſame juſt Judgment of God, both their *Vicious Cuſtoms* and *Actions*, as well as Superſtitious Opinions, reciprocally increaſe the *Blindneſs of their Hearts*, darken the Judgment of their *Underſtandings*, ſtupify and ſear their Con-

Eph. iv.
18, 19.

* *Justos natura eſſe factos; —tantam autem eſſe corruptelam malæ conſuetudinis, ut ab ea tanquam igniculi extinguantur a natura dati; exorianturq; & confirmantur vitia contraria.*
Cic. de Legib. lib. 1.

ſciences ſo as to become paſt feeling, and by degrees * extinguiſh wholly that *Light of Nature* in their own Minds, which was given them originally to enable them to diſcern between *Good* and *Evil*.

Wherefore
Men have
great need
to be
taught and
inſtructed
in matters
of Religion.

By theſe means it comes to paſs, that though the great *Obligations* and the principal *Motives* of Morality, are indeed certainly diſcoverable and demonſtrable by right Reason; and all conſiderate Men, when thoſe Motives and Obligations are fairly propoſed to them, muſt of neceſſity (as has been fully proved in the foregoing Heads) yield their Aſſent to them as certain and undeniable Truths; yet under the diſadvantages now mentioned, (as 'tis the caſe of moſt Men to fall under ſome or other of them,) very Few are of *Themſelves* able, in reality and effect, to diſcover thoſe Truths clearly and plainly for themſelves: But moſt men have great need of particular *Teaching* and much *Inſtruction*, not without ſome weight of *Authority*, as well as Reason and Perſwaſion;

1st, To raise and stir up their *Attention*; to move them to shake off their habitual Carelessness, Stupidity and Inconsiderateness; to persuade them to make use of their natural Reason and Understanding, and to apply their Minds to apprehend and study the Truth and Certainty of these things. For, as Men, notwithstanding all the rational Faculties they are by nature indued with, may yet through mere Neglect and Incogitancy be grossly and totally ignorant of the plainest and most obvious Mathematical Truths: so Men may also, for want of Consideration, be very ignorant of some of the plainest Moral Obligations, which, as soon as distinctly proposed to them, they cannot possibly avoid giving their Assent unto.

2. To give them a due *Sense*, and right and just *Apprehensions* concerning these things; to convince them of the great *Concern* and vast *Importance* of them; to correct the false Notions, vain Prejudices, and foolish Opinions, which deprave their Judgment; and to remove that Levity and Heedlessness of Spirit, which makes Men frequently to be in their practice very little influenced by what in abstract Opinion they may seem firmly to believe. For there are many Men, who will think themselves highly injured, if any one should make any doubt of their Believing the indispensable Obligations of Morality, and the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments; who yet in their Lives and Actions, seem to have upon their Minds but a very small Sense of the Weight and infinite Importance of these great Truths.

3. To *Inculcate* these things frequently upon Them, and press them effectually to the practice of the plainest and most necessary Duties; to persuade them to moderate those Passions, to sub-
due

due those Lusts, to conquer those Appetites, to despise those Pleasures of Sense, and (which is the greatest Difficulty of all) to reform and correct those vicious Customs and evil Habits, which tempt and hurry them too often into the Commission of such things, as they are convinced at the same time in the Reason of their own Minds, ought not to be practised. For 'tis very possible Men may both clearly understand their Duty, and also be fully convinced of the reasonableness of practising it.

Rom. vii. 23. and yet at the same time, find a *Law in their Members warring and prevailing against the Law of their Mind, and bringing them into Captivity to the Law*

* Quidam ad magnificas voces excitantur, & transeunt in affectum dicentium, alacres vultu & animo. Rapiunt illos instigatque rerum pulchritudo. — Juvat protinus quæ audias, tacere. Afficiuntur illi, & sunt quales jubentur, si illa animo forma permaneat, si non impetum insignem protinus populus honesti dissuasor excipiat. Pauci illam quam conceperant mentem, domum perferre potuerunt. *Senec. epist. 109.*

of Sin and Death. Men * may be pleased with the Beauty and Excellency of Virtue, and have some faint Inclinations and even Resolutions to practise it; and yet at the return of their Temptations, constantly fall back into their accustomed Vices; if the great Motives of their Duty be not very frequently and very strongly inculcated upon them, as to make very deep and lasting impressions upon their Minds, and they have not some greater

and higher Assistance afforded them, than the bare Conviction of their own speculative Reason.

For these Reasons (I say) 'tis very fit, that notwithstanding the natural Demonstrableness both of the Obligations and Motives of Morality, yet considering the manifest corruptness of the present Estate which humane Nature is in, the generality of Men should not by any means be left wholly to the workings of their own Minds, to the use of their natural Faculties, and to the bare conviction

of their own Reason ; but should be particularly *Taught and Instructed* in their Duty, should have the Motives of it frequently and strongly pressed and inculcated upon them with great Weight and Authority, and should have many extraordinary Assistances afforded them ; to keep them effectually in the Practice of the great and plainest Duties of Religion.

And hence we may, by the way, justly observe *The great Use and Necessity of an Order of Preachers.* the exceeding great Use and Necessity there is, of establishing an *Order* or Succession of Men, whose peculiar Office and continual Employment it may be to Teach and Instruct People in their Duty, to exhort and exhort them perpetually to the Practice of it, and to give them all possible Assistances for that purpose. To which excellent Institution ; the right and worthy Notion of God and his Divine Perfections, the just Sense and Understanding of the great Duties of Religion, and the universal Belief and due Apprehension of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments ; which the generality of the meaner and more ignorant sort of People among us, are now possess of ; is manifestly and undeniably almost wholly owing. As I shall have Occasion hereafter more particularly to observe.

VI. *Though in almost every Age there have indeed been in the Heathen World some wise and brave and good Men, who have made it their business to study and practise the Duties of natural Religion Themselves, and to teach and exhort Others to do the like ; who were therefore to have been raised up by Providence, as Instruments to reprove in some measure and put some check to the extream superstition and wickedness of the Nations wherein they lived : Yet none of these have*

have ever been able to reform the World, with any considerable great and universal Success; Because they have been but very Few, that have in earnest set themselves about this excellent Work; And they that have indeed sincerely done it, have themselves been intirely ignorant of some Doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary for the bringing about that great end; And those things which they have been certain of, and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and explain clearly enough; And those that they have been able both to prove and explain by sufficiently clear Reasoning, they have not yet had Authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon Men's Minds with so strong an Impression, as to influence and govern the general practice of the World.

1. There have indeed in almost every Age been in the Heathen World, some Wise and Brave and Good Men, who have made it their Business to study and practise the Duties of natural Religion Themselves, and to teach and exhort Others to do the like. An eminent Instance whereof, in the Eastern Nations, the Scripture itself affords in the History of Job; concerning whom it does not certainly appear, that he knew any positive revealed Institution of Religion, or that, before his Sufferings, any immediate Revelation was made to him, as there was to Abraham and the rest of the Patriarchs. Among the Greeks, Socrates seems to be an extraordinary Example of this kind. Concerning whom Plato tells us, in his

Apology, that * he did nothing else, but go continually about persuading both old and young not to be so much solicitous to gratify the Appetites of the Body, or to heap up Wealth,

* Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων
ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν
καὶ νεώτερος καὶ πρεσβύτερος, μὴτε
σολιάων ἐπιμελείσθαι, μὴτε χρη-
μάτων πρότερον, μὴτε ἄλλας τινὸς
ἐστὶ σφροδῆσαι, ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως

to raise themselves to Honour, or gain any outward Advantage whatsoever; as to improve the Mind, by the continual Exercise of all Virtue and Goodness: Teaching them, that a Man's

true Value did not arise from his Riches, or from any outward Circumstances of Life; but that True Riches, and every real Good, whether publick or private, proceeded wholly from Virtue. After him, *Plato* and *Aristotle* and Others followed his Example, in teaching Morality. And among the Romans, *Cicero*; and in later times, *Epiſtetus* and *Antoninus*, and several Others, gave the World admirable Systems of Ethicks, and noble moral Instructions and Exhortations, of excellent Use and Benefit to the Generations wherein they lived, and deservedly of great value and esteem even unto this Day.

2. So that, I think, it may very justly be supposed, that these Men were raised up and designed by Providence, (the abundant Goodness of God having never left itself wholly without Witness, notwithstanding the greatest corruptions and provocations of Mankind,) as Instruments to reprove in some measure, and put some kind of check to the extreme Superstition and Wickedness of the Nations wherein they lived; or at least to bear Witness against, and condemn it. Concerning *Job*, the case is evident and confessed. And for the same reason, some of the Antientest

Writers of the Church have not scrupled to * call even *Socrates* so, and some others of the Best of the *Heathen* Moralists, by the Name of *Christians*; and to as-

ως ἀρίστη ἔσται λέγων, ὅτι ἐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἡ ἀρετὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰλλα ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα, καὶ ἰδὲ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. *Plato in Apol. Socrat.*

* Καὶ οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιάσαντες, χριστιανοὶ εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοι ἐνομι-
θήσαν· οἷον ἐν Ἑλλήσι μὲν Σωκρά-
της καὶ Ἡράκλειτος, καὶ οἱ ὅμοιοι
αὐτοῖς ἐν βαρβάροις δ' Ἀεραάμης
ἔσθ' *Justin, Apolog. 2.*

firm,

* Τάχα δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰδοῦναι ἢ φιλοσοφία τότε, πρὶν ἢ τὸν κύριον καλέσαι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαιδαγωγῆσαι καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τὰς Ἑβραίους εἰς χριστὸν προπαρασκευάζει τῶν καὶ φιλοσοφία, προοδοποιούσα τὸ ὑπὸ χριστοῦ τελειώμενον. *Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1.*

† Ὁ θεὸς καὶ αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ὅσα καλῶς λέλεκται, ἐφανερώσει. *Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.*

firm, that, * as the Law was as if it were a Schoolmaster to bring the Jews unto Christ, so true natural Philosophy was to the Gentiles a Preparative to receive the Gospel. This perhaps was carrying the matter somewhat to far: But to be sure, thus much we may safely assert, that † whatever any of these Men were at any time enabled to deliver Wisely and Profitably and Agreeably to Divine

Truth, was as a Light shining in a dark Place, derived to them by a Ray of that infinite overflowing Goodness, which does good to all even both Just and Unjust; from God the sole Fountain of Truth and Wisdom: And This, for some Advantage and Benefit to the rest of the World, even in its blindest and most corrupt Estate.

But yet none of these Men were ever able to reform the World with any considerable Success.

Rom. i. 21, & 28.

3. But then, notwithstanding the most that can be made of this Supposition, 'tis certain the Effort of all the teaching and instruction even of the best of the Philosophers in the Heathen World was in comparison very small and inconsiderable. They never were able to reform the World with any great and universal Success, nor to keep together any considerable number of Men in the knowledge and practice of true Virtue. With respect to the Worship of God, Idolatry prevailed universally in all Nations; and, notwithstanding Men did indeed know God, so as to be without excuse, yet they did not like to retain him in their Knowledge, but became vain in their Imagination and their foolish Heart was darkened, and they changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into Images of the vilest Creatures; And no Philosophers ever turned any great number of Men from this abominable

Idolatry, to the acknowledgment and Worship of the only true God. In respect of Mens Dealings one with another; Honour, and Interest, and Friendship, and Laws, and the Necessity of Society, did indeed cause *Justice* to be practised in many Heathen Nations to a great degree; But very Few Men among them were Just and Equitable upon right and true Principles, a due Sense of Virtue, and a constant Fear and Love of God. With respect to Themselves, *Intemperance* and *Luxury* and unnatural *Uncleanness* was commonly practised, even in the most civilized Countries; and This not so much in Opposition to the Doctrine of the Philosophers, as by the consent indeed and encouragement of too great a part of them. I shall not enlarge upon this ungrateful and melancholy Subject: There are Accounts enough extant, of the universal corruption and debauchery of the Heathen World. St Paul's Description of it, in the whole first Chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, is alone sufficient; and *

The Complaints of their own Writers, abundantly confirm it. The Disciples of the best Moralists, or at least the Practisers of their Doctrine, were, in their own Life-time, † *very few*; as too plainly appears from the evil Treatment, which that great Manocrates met withal at Athens. And at their Deaths, their Doctrine in great measure died with them; not having any sufficient Evidence or Authority to support it. And their Followers quickly fell back into the common Idolatry, Superstition, Uncleanness

* Egregium sanctumque virum si cerno, bimbembri

Hoc monstrum puero, vel miranti sub aratro

Piscibus inventis, & fœtæ comparo mulæ.

Juvenal. Sat. 13.

See also the places cited a little below.

† Sint licet perhonesti;— sed audire deposcimus quot sint aut fuerint numero.— Unus, Duo, Tres.—

At genus humanum non ex bonis pauculis, sed ex cæteris omnibus æstimari convenit. Arnob. advers. Gentes, lib. 2.

Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effice— and

natus; paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam. Da libidinosum, &c. — *Nunquid hæc Philosophorum aut unquam præstitit, aut præstare, si velit, potest? Lactant. lib. 3.*

Παρα μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλήτιν εἰς τις Φαίδων καὶ ἐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερον, &c. *Origen, advers. Cels. lib. 1.*

to give over all

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present Life in Peace, and at last Die with Tranquillity and good Hope. And indeed, for many Reasons, it was altogether impossible, that the Teaching of the Philosophers should ever be able to reform Mankind, and recover them out of their very degenerate and corrupt Estate, with any considerably great and universal Success.

Because they have been but very few, that have in earnest set themselves about that excellent Work.

1. In the first place, Because the Number of those, who have in earnest set themselves about this excellent Work, have been exceeding few. Philosophers indeed, that called themselves so there were enough in every place, and in every Age. But those who truly made it their business to improve their Reason to the height; to free themselves from the Superstition, which over-

and Debauchery. Of which, the Character the Roman Writers give of those that called themselves the Disciples of Socrates, is a particular and remarkable instance. These considerations (so very early did they appear to be true,) affected in such a manner that great admirer of Socrates, Plato; that he sometimes seems to give over all Hopes of working any Reformation in Men by Philosophy, and says, that * a good Man, when he considers these Things, would even choose to sit quiet, and sleep for himself; like a Man that in a violent Hurricane, creeps under a Wall for his Defence; and seeing the whole World round about him filled with all manner of Wickedness, be content of, preserving his single Self from Iniquity and every evil Work, he can pass away the

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† Inclusos [Philosophos] in Angulis, facienda precipere, quæ ne ipsi quidem faciunt qui loquuntur; & quoniam se a veris artibus removerunt, apparet eos exercendæ linguæ causa, vel advocandi gratia, artem ipsam Philosophiæ reperisse. *Laſant, lib. 3.*

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was not so much intended and fitted for the Reformation of Men's Manners, as to be an *Exercise of Wit and Subtilty*, and an *Instrument of Vain-Glory*. Excepting perhaps Socrates and Plato, and some others of that Rank; this

* Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον πρᾶξις ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ καταφύγοντες οἰοῦνται φιλοσοφεῖν, καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς σπουδαίῳ ὁμοίον τι ποιῶντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούσι μὲν ἐπιμελῆς, ποιοῦσι δ' εὐδὲν τὴν προσασομένην, ὥσπερ ἔν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι εὖ ἔχουσι τὸ σῶμα, οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν, οὕτων φιλοσοφούντες. *Aristot. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 3.*

† Inclusos [Philosophos] in Angulis, faciendæ præcipere, quæ ne ipsi quidem faciunt qui loquuntur; & quoniam se a veris actibus removerunt, apparet eos exercendæ linguæ causa, vel advocandi gratia, artem ipsam Philosophiæ reperisse. *Lactant. lib. 3.*

U

Account

Account is too plainly true of the greatest part of the Philosophers. The Argument is too unpleasant, to instance in particulars. Whoever pleases, may in *Diogenes Laertius* and other Writers, find Accounts enough, of the lewdness and unnatural Vices of most of the Philosophers. 'Tis a shame for Us, so much as to speak of those Things, which were done of them, not only in secret, but even in the most publick manner. I shall here only add the Judgment of *Cicero*; a Man as able to pass a right Judgment in this Matter, as ever lived.

* Sed hæc eadem num censes apud eos ipsos valere, nisi admodum paucos, a quibus inventa, disputata, conscripta sunt? Quotus enim quisque Philosophorum invenitur, qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat; qui disciplinam suam non ostentationem scientiæ, sed legem vitæ putet; qui obtemperet ipse sibi, & decretis suis pareat? Videre licet multos, libidinum servos, &c. *Cic. Tusculan. Question. lib. 2.*

Do you think, says * he, that these Things, [meaning the Precepts of Morality] had any influence upon those Men, (excepting only a very few of them,) who taught, and wrote, and disputed about them? No; Who is there of all the Philosophers, whose Mind and Life and Manners were conformable to right Reason? who ever made his Philosophy to be his Law and Rule of his Life, and not a mere Boast and Show of his Wit and Parts? who observed his own Instructions, and lived in obedience to his own Precepts? Or

the contrary; many of them were Slaves to their Lusts, many to Pride, many to Covetousness, &c.

And those few of the Philosophers, who did indeed sincerely endeavour to reform Mankind, were yet themselves

2. Those few extraordinary Men of the Philosophers, who did indeed in good measure sincerely Obey the Laws of natural Religion Themselves and make it their chief Business to instruct and exhort Others to do the same; were yet Themselves intirely ignorant of some Doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about this great End, of the Reformation and Recovery of Mankind.

In general : Having no knowledge of the whole *entirely ignorant of some Doctrines absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great* Scheme, Order, and State of things, the Method of God's governing the World, his Design in Creating Mankind, the original Dignity of Humane Nature, the Ground and Circumstances of Mens present corrupt Condition, the Manner of the Divine Interposition necessary to their recovery, and the Glorious End to which God intended finally to conduct them : Having no knowledge (I say) of all This ; their whole Attempt to discover the Truth of Things, and to instruct Others therein, was * like wandering in the wide Sea, without knowing whither they were to go, or which way they were to take, or having any Guide to conduct them. And accordingly † the Wisest of them were never backward to confess their own ignorance and great blindness : *That* Truth || was hid from them, as it were in an unfathomable Depth : *That* † they were much in the Dark, and very dull and stupid, not only as to the profounder things of Wisdom, but as to such things also, which seemed very capable of being in great part discovered : Nay, *That* even ** those things, which in themselves were of all others the most Manifest, (that is, which, whenever Made known, would appear most obvious and evident,) their natural Understanding was of itself as unqualified to find out and apprehend, as the Eyes of Bats to behold the Light of the Sun : *That* the very first and

* Errant ergo velut in Mari magno, nec quo ferantur intelligunt ; quia nec viam cernunt, nec ducem sequuntur. *Lactant. lib. 6.*

† Ex cæteris Philosophis, nonne optimus & gravissimus quisque confitetur, multa se ignorare ; & multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda ? *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 3.*

|| 'Εν βυθῷ ἀλγύδεια.

† Tui ergo te, Cicero, libri arguunt, quam nihil a philosophia disci possit ad vitam. Hæc tua verba sunt : *Mibi autem non modo ad sapientiam cæci videmur ; sed ad ea ipsa, quæ aliqua ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes & obtusi.* *Lactant. lib. 3.*

** Ὡςπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μετ' ἡμέραν, ἔτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανεράτατα πάντων. *Aristot. Metaph. lib. 2. c. 1.*

* Τὸν μὲν ἔν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέ-
ρα τῶδε τὴ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον,
καὶ εὐρόντα λέγειν εἰς πάντας ἀδύ-
νατον. *Plato in Timæo*,

Profecto eos ipsos, qui se
aliquid certi habere arbitrantur,
addubitare coget doctissimorum
hominum de *maxima re tanta*
diffensio. *Cic. de Natura De-*
or. lib. 1.

† Utinam tam facilè vera
invenire possem, quam falsa
convincere. *Id. ibid.*

|| Ἐπεὶ ἐνθάδε μετ' ἑμοῦ.
Καὶ μοι δόσεατός
γέ τις τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσ-
τοι. ἔστιν ἔν σκοτεινός καὶ δυσ-
διερευνήτος. *Plato de Republ.*
lib. 4.

† See *Plu-*
tò in Apo-
logia So-
cratis.

Particu-
larly they
were very
ignorant in
what man-
ner God
might be
acceptably
worshipped

duly sensible of his own Ignorance, and † be-
lieved that it was merely for that very Rea-
son, that the Oracle pronounced him the wisest of
Men.

More particularly : The Manner, in which God
might be acceptably worshipped, these Men were
entirely and unavoidably ignorant of. That God
ought to be worshipped ; is, in the general, as evi-
dent and plain from the Light of Nature, as any
thing can be : But in what particular Manner, and
with what kind of Service he will be worshipped
cannot be certainly discovered by bare Reason.
Obedience to the Obligations of Nature, and Imi-
tation of the Moral Attributes of God ; the wis-
est Philosophers easily knew, was undoubtedly
the most acceptable Service to God. But some ex-
ternal Adoration seemed also to be necessary ;

how this was to be performed, they could not with any certainty discover. Accordingly even the very best of them complied therefore generally with the outward Religion of their Country, and advised Others to do the same; and notwithstanding all their wise Discourses, they fell lamentably into the practice of the most foolish Idolatry. * *Plato*, after having delivered very noble and almost divine Truths concerning the Nature and Attributes of the Supreme God, † weakly advises Men to worship likewise Inferiour Gods, Dæmons, and Spirits; and dared not to condemn the worshipping even of Statues also and Images, dedicated according to the Laws of their Country; as if || the Honour they paid to lifeless Idols, could procure the Favour and Goodwill of Superiour Intelligences. And so † he corrupted and spoiled the best Philosophy in the World, by adding Idolatry to that Worship, which he had wisely and bravely before proved to be due to the Creatour of all Things. After him, *Cicero*, the greatest and best Philosopher, at *Rome* or perhaps any other Nation ever produced, allowed

they could not

* *Laëtantius* observes that *Socrates* himself, at the Conclusion of one of the bravest Discourses that ever was made by any Philosopher, superstitiously ordered a Sacrifice to be offered for him to *Æsculapius*. But herein *Laëtantius* was certainly mistaken: For *Socrates* undoubtedly spake this in mockery of *Æsculapius*; looking upon Death as his truest Deliverance.

Ἐπεὶ, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθίγγετο Ὡκρίτων, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀλεκτρυόνα ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δότε, καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. *Plato in Phædone.*

Illud vero nonne summæ vanitatis; quod ante mortem familiares suos rogavit, ut *Æsculapio* gallum, quem voverat, pro se sacrarent. *Laëtant. lib. 3.*

† Πρῶτον μὲν, Φαμὲν, τιμᾶς τὰς μετ' Ὀλυμπίης τε καὶ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἔχοντας θεῖς, τοῖς χθονίοις ἂν τις θεοῖς ἄρτια καὶ δευτέρα καὶ ἀριστέρα νέμων, ὀρθότατα τῇ εὐσεβείας σκοπεῖν τυγχάνει.

Μετὰ θεῖς ἡ τέσσαρς, καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅγ' ἐμφορῶν ὀργιάζοιτ' ἔν.

Ἐπακολουθεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἱδρύματα ἰδία πατρῶν θεῶν κατὰ νόμον ὀργιάζοντα. *Plato de Legib. lib. 4.*

|| Τὰς μὲν γὰρ θεῶν ὁρῶντες σαφῶς, τιμᾶμεν· τῇ δὲ εἰκόνας ἀγάλματα ἱδρυσάμενοι, ὅς ἡμῖν ἀγάλλεσσι, καίπερ ἀψύχους ὄντας, ἐκείνους ἡγούμεθα, τὰς ἐμψύχους θεοὺς πολλὴν ἀπὸ ταυτ' εὐνοίαν καὶ χάριν ἔχειν. *Plato de Legib. lib. 11.*

† Τὰ Πλάτωνα οὐκ ἀπιθάνως μὲν εἰρημύνα, οὐ μὴν καὶ διδόντα τῷ φιλοσοφῶν ἀξίως καὶ αὐτῷ ἀ-

* Men

νατραφῆναι ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν ποιη-
τὴν ἑὴ ὅλαν εὐσεβείᾳ, ἢ ἡ ἐχρῆν
μὴ νοθεύειν, μὴδὲ μιᾶναι τῇ εἰδω-
λολατρείᾳ. *Orig. advers. Cels.*
lib. 6.

* A Patribus acceptos Deos
placet coli. *Cic. de Legib.*
lib. 2.

† Item illud ex institutis
Pontificum & Aruspicum non
mutandum est, quibus hostiis
immolandum cuique Deo. *Id.*
ibid.

‖ Nec sequor Magos Persa-
rum, quibus auctoribus *Xerxes*
inflammâsse templa Græciæ di-
citur, quod parietibus include-
rent deos, quorum hic mundus
omnis templum esset & do-
mus. Melius Græci atque
nostri, qui, ut augerent pieta-
tem in Deos, easdem illos,
quas nos, urbes incolere volue-
runt. *Id. ibid.*

‡ Video te, Cicero, terrena
& manufacta venerari. Vana
esse intelligis, & tamen eadem
facis, quæ faciunt ipsi, quos
ipse stultissimos confiteris.

— Si libenter errant etiam
ii, qui errare se sentiunt, quan-
to magis vulgus indoctum?
Lactant. lib. 2.

have had no Superiour in the Heathen World;

** Σπένδειν δὲ καὶ θύειν, καὶ
ἀπαρχεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰ πατρία
ἐκαστῷ προσήκει. *Epiet. cap.*
38.

And in
what Me-
thod God
would be
reconciled

But still more particularly: That which of all
other things, these best and wisest of the Philoso-
phers were most absolutely and unavoidably ig-
norant of; and yet which, of all other things,

* Men to continue the Idola-
try of their Ancestors; advised
them † to conform themselves
to the superstitious Religion of
their Country, in offering such
Sacrifices to different Gods, as
were by Law established; and
‖ disapproves and finds fault
with the *Persian* Magi, for
burning the Temples of the
Grecian Gods, and asserting
that the whole Universe was
God's Temple. In all which,
he fondly contradicts himself,
by ‡ inexcusably complying with
the Practices of those Men,
whom in many of his Writings
he largely and excellently proves
to be extremely Foolish upon
account of those very Practices.
And to mention no more, (for
indeed those of a lower Rank,
the *Minuter* Philosophers, as *Tul-*
ly calls them, are not worth the
mentioning;) That admirable
Moralist *Epietetus*, who, for a
true Sense of Virtue, seems to
even He also ** advises Men to
offer Libations and Sacrifices to
the Gods, every one according
to the Religion and Custom of
his Country.

was of the greatest Importance for *Sinful Men* to ^{to return-} know; was *The Method*, by which such as have er-^{ing Sin-}red from the right way, and have offended God, may^{ners.} yet again restore themselves to the Favour of God, and to the Hopes of Happiness. From the consideration of the Goodness and Mercifulness of God, the Philosophers did indeed *very reasonably hope*, that God would show himself placable to Sinners, and might be some way reconciled: But when we come to inquire more particularly, *what Propitiation* he will accept, and in *what Manner* this reconciliation must be made; here Nature stops, and expects with impatience the aid of some particular Revelation. That God will receive returning Sinners, and accept of Repentance instead of perfect Obedience, *They cannot certainly know*, to whom he has not declared that he *will* do so. For though this be the most *probable* and *only* means of reconciliation, that Nature suggests; yet whether this will be alone sufficient; or whether God will not require something further, for the Vindication of his Justice, and of the Honour and Dignity of his Laws and Government, and for the expressing more effectually his Indignation against Sin, before he will restore Men to the Privileges they have forfeited; they cannot be satisfactorily assured. For it cannot positively be proved from any of God's Attributes, that he is *absolutely* obliged to pardon all Creatures all their Sins at all times, barely and immediately upon their Repenting. There arises therefore from Nature no *Sufficient* Comfort to Sinners, but anxious and endless Sollicitude about the Means of appeasing the Deity. Hence those divers ways of Sacrificing, and numberless Superstitions, which over-spread the Face of the Heathen World, but were so little satisfactory to the wiser part of Mankind, even in those times of darkness; that the more consi-

* See *Plato's Alcibiades 2. through-out.*

And other Doctrines absolutely necessary in order to reform Mankind, the best Philosophers were very doubtful and uncertain about.

† *Præterea nihil apud eos certi est, nihil quod à scientia veniat; — & nemo paret, quia nemo vult ad incertum laborare. Lactant. lib. 3.*

dering Philosophers could not forbear frequently declaring, that * they thought those Rites could avail little or nothing towards appeasing the Wrath of a provoked God, or making their Prayers acceptable in his Sight; but that something still seemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what.

3. Some other Doctrines absolutely necessary likewise to the bringing about this great End of the Reformation of Mankind; though there was indeed so much proof and evidence of the Truth of them to be drawn from Reason, as that the best Philosophers could not by any means be entirely ignorant of them; yet so much doubtfulness, uncertainty, and unsteadiness, was there in the Thoughts and Assertions of these Philosophers

concerning them, as could not but † very much diminish their proper Effect and Influence upon the Hearts and Lives of Men. In instance in the *Immortality of the Soul, the Certainty of a Future State, and the Rewards and Punishments*

to be distributed in a Life to come. The Arguments, which may be drawn from Reason and from the Nature of things, for the Proof of these great Truths; seem really (as I have before shown) to come very little short of strict Demonstration: And accordingly the wisest Philosophers (as has likewise been shown before) did indeed sometimes seem to have reasoned themselves into a firm Belief of them, and to have been fully convinced of their Certainty and Reality; even so far as to apply them to excellent purposes and uses of Life. But then on the other hand, a Man cannot without some pity and concern of Mind observe, how strangely at other times the weight of the same Arguments seem to have slipped

(as it were) out of their Minds ; and with what wonderful *Diffidence, Wavering* and *Unsteadiness*, they discourse about the same Things. I do not here think it of any very great moment, that there were indeed some whole Sects of Philosophers, who absolutely denied the *Immortality of the Soul*, and peremptorily rejected all kind of Expectation of a *Life to come* : (Though, to be sure, this could not but in some measure shock the *common People*, and make them entertain some Suspicion about the strength of the Arguments used on the other side of the Question by wiser Men : Yet, I say,) it cannot be thought of any very great Moment, that some whole Sects of Philosophers did indeed absolutely deny the *Immortality of the Soul* ; Because these Men were weak Reasoners in other matters also, and plainly low and contemptible Philosophers, in comparison of those greater Genius's we are now speaking of. But that which I now observe, and which may cannot be observed without some pity and concern of Mind, is this ; that even those Great Philosophers themselves, the very Best and Wisest, and most considerate of them that ever lived ; notwithstanding the undeniable strength of the Arguments, which sometimes convinced them of the Certainty of a *Future State* ; did yet at other times express themselves with so much Vacillancy and unsteadiness concerning it, as, without doubt, could not but extremely hinder the proper Effect and Influence, which that most important Consideration ought to have upon the Hearts and Lives of Men. *I am*

said * *Socrates* a little before his Death, *about to leave this World ; and ye are still to continue in Doubt : Which of us have the better Portion allotted to us, God only knows :*

* Έμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανυμένῳ, ὑμῶν βιωσομένοις ὁπότεροι ὃ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμείνον πρόγνῳμα, ἀδελφὸν παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ Θεῷ.
Plato in Apolog. Socra.

* Seeming

* Quod præter Deos negat scire quenquam, scit ipse, utrum melius sit; nam dixit antè. Sed suum illud, nihil ut affirmet, tenet ad extremum. Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.

† Νῦν ὃ ἐν ἵεσι ὅτι παρ' ἀνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεια ἀγαθούς, καὶ τοῦτο σὺν μὲρ ἂν πάνυ διαγυρισκίμην. Plato in Phæd.

Yet I would not be too peremptory and confident concerning it. But || if Death be really as it were a Transmigration from hence unto another place; And the Things, which are told us, be indeed true; that those who are dead to Us, do all Live there: Then, &c.

|| 'Εἰ δὲ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι ἐστὶν ὁ θάνατος εἰσὶν δὲ εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεί ἐῖσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, &c. Plato in Apo'og. Socrat.

the same Subject: I will endeavour, faith he

† Ea, quæ vis, ut potero, explicabo; nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut sint & fixa quæ dixerō; sed ut homunculus unus è multis; probabilia conjectura sequens. Ultra enim quod progrediar, quam ut verisimilia videam, non habeo. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 1.

** Harum sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit; quæ verisimillima, magna Quæstio est. Id. ibid.

all those excellent Arguments before-mentioned in proof of the Immortality of the Soul; Yet

†† Etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere. Movemur enim sæ-

* Seeming to express some Doubtfulness, whether he should have any Existence after Death, or not. And again, at the End of his most admirable Discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul; I would have you to know, said † he to his Friends who came to pay him their last Visit, that I have great Hopes I am now going into the Company of Good Men.

ly as it were a Transmigration from hence unto another place; And the Things, which are told us, be indeed true; that those who are dead to Us, do all Live there: Then, &c. So likewise Cicero, speaking of

the same Subject: I will endeavour, faith he † to explain what you desire; yet I would not have you depend upon what I shall say, as certain and infallible; But I may guess, as other Men do, at what shall seem me probable: And further than that I cannot pretend to go. Again Which of those two Opinions

faith ** he, [that the Soul is mortal, or that it is immortal,] be True, God only knows; Which of them is most Probable, is a very Great Question. And again in the same Discourse, having brought

all those excellent Arguments before-mentioned in proof of the Immortality of the Soul; Yet ought not, faith †† he, to be overconfident of it: For it often happens

that we are strongly affected at first, with an acute Argument; and a little while after, stagger in our Judgment and alter our Opinion, even in clearer Matters than these; For these Things must be confessed to have some obscurity in them. And again: I know not how, saith * he, when I read the Arguments in proof of the Soul's Immortality, methinks I am fully convinced; and yet after I have laid aside the Book, and come to think and consider of the Matter alone by my self, presently I find myself fallen again insensibly into my old Doubts. From which it appears, that notwithstanding all the weighty Arguments and acute Conclusions, and brave sayings of the best Philosophers; yet Life and Immortality were † not fully and satisfactorily brought to Light by mere natural Reason; but Men still plainly stood in need of some further and more compleat Discovery.

pe aliquo acutè concluso: labamur mutamisque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas. *Id. ibid.*

* Nescio quomodo, dum lego, assentior; cum posui librum, & mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabatur. *Id. ibid.*

† Credebam facilè opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam [*animæ immortalitatem*] promittentium magis quam probantium. Senec. epist. 102.

Adeo omnis illa tunc sapientia Socratis, de industria venerat consultæ æquanimittatis, non de fiducia expertæ veritatis. *Tertullian de Anima.*

4. Those Things which the Philosophers were indeed the most fully certain of, and did in good measure understand; such as the Obligations of Virtue, and the Will of God in matters of Morality; they were never able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, to Persons of all Capacities, in order to their complete conviction and reformation. First, because most of their Discourses upon these subjects, have been rather speculative and learned, and subtle Disputes; than practical and universally

And those things which they were indeed certain of, yet they were not able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough.

sally useful Instructions. They proved, by strict and nice Argumentation, that the *Practice of Virtue* is *wise and reasonable* and *fit to be chosen*; rather than that 'tis of *plain, necessary, and indispensable Obligation*; And were able to deduce the *Will of God*, only by such abstract and subtle Reasonings, as the generality of Men had by no means either Abilities or Opportunities to understand or be duly affected by. Their very Profession and manner of Life,

* *Profecto omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberri- mos fontes virtutis & scientiæ contineat, tamen collata cum horum [qui rempublicam gubernant] actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantum Oblectationem quandam Otii.* Cic. de Repub. fragm.

† *Est, inquit Cicero, philosophia paucis contenta judici- bus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens.* ——— *Maximum itaque argumentum est, philosophiam neque ipsam esse sapientiam; quod mysticium ejus, barba tantum celebratur & pallio.* *Laëtant. lib. 3.*

|| *Ὀλίγους μὲν ἄνησεν ἡ περι- καλὴς καὶ ἐπιτετηδευμένη Πλάτωνος λέξις, πλείονας δὲ ἡ τῶν εὐτε- λέστερον ἄλλα καὶ πραγματικῶς καὶ ἐσυχασμένων τῶν πολλῶν διδάξ- αντων καὶ γραψάντων ἐσιγῆν ἰδίῳ, ὅτι μὲν Πλάτωνας ἐν χειρὶ τῶν δο- καυτῶν εἶναι φιλολόγων μόνων.* *Orig. advers. Cels. lib. 6.*

Ἀγροικότερον εἶπὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, τῷ θάλλοντι τὸν χιτῶνά σου λα- λῶν, ἄφες καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον, βιωφε- λέστερον κίνηκε τὸν λόγον καὶ παρέστηκεν ἕως εἰπὼν, ἡ ὥς ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ Πλάτων, ἔ μὴδ' ἐκείνῳ

led them to make their Philoso- phy rather * an Entertainment of leisure time, a Trial of Wit and Parts, an Exercise of Eloquence, and of the Art and Skill of good Speaking; than an Endeavour to reform the Manners of Men, by showing them their plain and ne- cessary Duty. And accordingly the Study of it, was, as *Cicero* himself observes, unavoidably con- fined to a Few, and by no means fitted for the bulk and common sort of Mankind: who, as they cannot judge of the true strength of nice and abstract Arguments, so they will always be suspicious of some Fallacy in them. None but Men of Parts and Learning of Study and liberal Education have been able to profit by the subtle Doctrine of *Plato*, or by the sublime disputations of other Philosophers; whereas the Doc- trine of Morality, which is the Rule of Life and Manners, ought to be plain, easy and familiar, and suited fully to the Capacities of

all Men.
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all Men. Secondly, Another Reason why the Philosophers were never able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough, even those things of which they were the most Certain, to Persons of all Capacities, in order to their compleat conviction and reformation; was because they never were able to frame to themselves any complete, regular, and consistent System or Scheme of things; but the Truths which they taught, were * single and scattered, accidental as it were, and hit upon by chance, rather than by any Knowledge of the whole true State of Things; and consequently less universally convictive. Nothing could be more Certain, (as they all well knew,) than that Virtue was unquestionably to be chosen, and the Practice of it to be recommended necessarily above all things; And yet they could never clearly and satisfactorily make out, upon what Principles originally, and for what End ultimately, this Choice was to be made; and upon what Grounds it was universally to be supported. Hence they perpetually † disagreed, opposed, and contradicted one another in all their Disputations to such a degree, that St. Justin somewhere out of Varro reckons up no less than 280 Opinions concerning that one Question, What was the Chief Good or Final Happiness of Man. The Effect of all which Differences could not, without doubt, but be a mighty hindrance to that Conviction and general Influence, which That great Truth, in the Certainty whereof they

ιδιᾶται δύναται, ἀλλὰ μόνις οἱ τὰ ἐγκύκλια πρὸς τῆς σεμνῆς Ἑλληνῶν φιλοσοφίας μεμαθηκότεις. Id. lib. 7.

* Οὐκ ὅτι ἀπότριά ἐστι τὰ Πλάτωνος διδάγματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ· ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ πάντα ὁμοία, ὥσπερ εἶδεν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. — ἕκαστος γὰρ τίς, ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικοῦ θεῖς λόγος τὸ συγγενὲς ὅρῳ, καλῶς ἐφθέγγετο. Οἱ ὅ τὰναντία αὐτοῖς ἐν κυριωτέροις εἰρηκότες, οὐκ ἐπισήμην τὴν ἀπεπτον ἢ γινῶσιν τὴν ἀνέλεγκτον φαίνονται ἐχθρύναι. Justin. Apolog. 1.

† Nec, quid defendere debeant, scientes; nec quid refutare. Incursantque passim sine delectu omnia quæ asserunt, quicunque dissentiunt. Lactant. lib. 7.

they All clearly agreed, (namely, that the Practice of *Virtue* was necessary and indispenfable,) ought to have had upon the Minds and Lives of Men. This whole Matter, is excellently fet forth by Lac-

* Totam igitur veritatem, & omne divinæ religionis arcanum Philosophi attigerunt. Sed aliis refellentibus, defendere id, quod invenerant, nequiverunt; quia singulis ratio non quadravit; nec ea, quæ vera fenerant, in summam redigere potuerunt. *Lactant. lib. 7.*

whole and Entire Scheme, the several Truths dispersed among them All; therefore they are not able to maintain and defend what they had discovered. And again; having set down a brief summary of the whole Doctrine and Design of true Religion, from the Original to the Consummation of all Things

† Quam summam, quia Philosophi non comprehenderunt; nec veritatem comprehendere potuerunt; quamvis ea ferè, quibus summa ipsa constat, & viderint & explicaverint. Sed diversi ac diversè illa omnia protulerunt, non annectentes nec causas rerum, nec consequentias, nec rationes; ut summam illam, quæ continet universa, & compingerent & complerent. *Lactant. lib. 7.*

Quod si extitisset aliquis qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum, ac redigeret in corpus; is profecto non dissentiret à nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verùm autem non nisi

*tantius: The Philosophers, saith * he, take them All together, did indeed discover all the particular Doctrines of true Religion; But because each one indeavoured to confuse what the others asserted; and no One's single Scheme was in all its parts consistent, and agreeable to Reason and Truth; and none of them were able to collect into One*

This Entire Scheme, says † he, because the Philosophers were ignorant of, therefore they were not able to comprehend the Truth; notwithstanding that they saw and discovered singly, almost all the Particulars of which the whole Scheme consisted. But this was done by different Men and at different Times and in different Manners; (with various Mixtures of different Errours, in which every one discovered of Truth singly;) and without finding the Connexion of the Causes, and Consequences and Reasons of Things; from the mutual Dependencies of which the Compleatness and Perfection of the whole Scheme arises. Where

had there been any Man, who could
 have collected and put together in
 Order all the several Truths, which
 were taught singly and scatteredly by Philosophers of
 all the different Sects, and have made up out of them
 One Entire consistent Scheme; truly he would not
 have differed much from Us Christians: But This,
 it was not possible for any man to do, without having
 the true System of Things first Revealed to him.

And those
 things
 which they
 were able
 to prove
 and ex-
 plain clear-
 ly and
 distinctly
 enough, yet
 they had
 not suffi-
 cient Autho-
 rity to in-
 force in
 Practice.

5. Lastly; Even those Things; which the Phi-
 losophers were not only Themselves certain of,
 but which they have also been able to prove and
 explain to Others, with sufficient clearness and
 plainness; such as are the most obvious and necessary
 Duties of Life; they have not yet had Authority
 enough to inforce and inculcate upon Men's Minds
 with so strong an Impression, as to influence and
 govern the general Practice of the World. The
 Truths which they proved by speculative Reason,

wanted still some more sensible
 Authority to back them, and
 make them of more Force and
 Efficacy in Practice; And the
 Precepts which they laid down,
 however evidently reasonable and
 fit to be obeyed, seemed still to
 want Weight, and to be but the
 Precepts of Men. Hence || none
 of the Philosophers, even of
 those who taught the clearest and
 certainest Truths, and offered the
 best and wisest Instructions, and
 enforced them with the strongest
 Motives that could be; were yet
 ever able to work any remarka-
 ble Change, in the Minds and
 Lives of any considerable Part

* Platonis documenta, quam-
 vis ad rem multum conferant,
 tamen parum habent Firmita-
 tis ad probandam & implem-
 dam veritatem. Lactant. lib.

7.

† Quid ergo? nihilne illi
 [Philosophi] simile præcipi-
 unt? Imo permulta, & ad ve-
 rum frequenter accedunt. Sed
 nihil ponderis habent illa præ-
 cepta, quia sunt humana; &
 auctoritate majori, id est, di-
 vina illa carent. Nemo igitur
 credit; quia tam se hominem
 putat esse qui audit, quam est
 ille qui audit, quam est ille
 qui præcipit. Lactant. lib. 3.

|| Εἰπομεν δ' ἂν ἀληθεύειν τοὺς
 δυνηθέντας διαδίδειν τοὺς ἀκροα-
 τὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἔτι βιούντας
 ὡς τέτων οὕτως ἔχόντων. Διατί-

of

δίνεται Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ χριστιανοὶ περὶ
τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτῶν καλεσμένου μέλλον-
τος αἰῶνος. — δεικνύτω οὖν
καὶ Κέλσος ἢ ὁ βυζαντινός, τίνες
διετίθησαν περὶ αἰωνίων καλῶν,
ὑπὸ τῶν τελειῶν καὶ μυσαγωγῶν.
Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 8.

Παρά μιν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν εἰς τις
Φαίδων, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερος,
καὶ εἰς Πολέμων, μεταβαλόντες
ἀπὸ ἀσώτου καὶ μοχθηροτάτου βίης
ἐφιλοσόφησαν· παρά ᾧ τῷ Ἰησοῦ,
ὃ μόνον τότε οἱ δάδκα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
καὶ πολλαπλασίως οἷτινες γινόμενοι
σωφρόνων χορός. *Idem. lib. 3.*

Da mihi virum qui sit ira-
cundus, &c. Numquis hæc
Philosophorum, &c. *Lactant.*
lib. 3. See this Passage cited
above, pag. 287, 288

* Σωκράτης μιν ᾧ εἰς ἐπι-
σεύδη ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ δόγματος
ἀποτήσκειν. Χριστὸς δὲ τὰ καὶ ἀπὸ
Σωκράτους ἀπὸ μέρους γνωσκόντι καὶ
φιλόσοφοι καὶ φιλόλογοι μόνον
ἐπέδωκαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντελῶς
ιδιᾶται καὶ δόξης καὶ φόβου καὶ θα-
νάτου καταφρονήσαντες. *Justin.*
Apoloq. 1.

Philosophy and bare Reason to reform Mankind effectually, without the Assistance of some high Principle. For, though the bare natural Possibility of the thing,

† Nam si, consensu omnium Philosophorum, sapientiam nemo assequitur; in summis malis omnes sumus, quibus vos optimè consultum à Diis immortalibus dicitis. Nam ut nihil interest utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit valere; sic non intelligo quid

of Mankind; as the Preaching of Christ and his Apostles undeniably did. Nor does it appear in History that * any Number of Socrates's or Plato's Followers were convinced of the Excellency of true Virtue, or the Certainty of its final Reward, in such a manner as to be willing to lay down their Lives for its sake; and innumerable of the Disciples of Christ, are known to have done so. In Speculation indeed, it may perhaps seem possible, that notwithstanding it must be confessed Philosophy cannot discover any complete and satisfactory Remedy for past Miscarriages, yet the Precepts and Motives offered by the best Philosophers, might at least be sufficient to amend and reform Men's Manners for the future. But in Experience and Practice hath on the contrary appeared to be altogether impossible, for Philosophy to reform Mankind effectually, without the Assistance of some high Principle. For, though the bare natural Possibility of the thing, cannot indeed easily be denied yet in this Case (as Cicero excellently expresses † it,) in like manner as in Physick it matters nothing whether a Disease be such as that no Man does, or no Man can recover from it; so neither does it make any difference, whether Philosophy no Man is, or no Man can be made wise and good.

that, without some greater Help and Assistance, Mankind is plainly left in a very bad State. Indeed

interfit, utrum nemo sit sapiens, an nemo esse possit. Cic. de Natura Deor. lib. 3.

in the original uncorrupted State of Humane Nature, before the Mind of Man was depraved with prejudicate Opinions, corrupt Affections, and vicious Inclinations, Customs, and Habits; right Reason may justly be supposed to have been a sufficient Guide, and a principle powerful enough to preserve Men in the constant Practice of their Duty. But in the present Circumstances and Condition of Mankind, the wisest and most sensible of the Philosophers themselves have not been backward to complain, that they found the *Understandings* of Men dark and cloudy, their *Wills* so byassed and inclined to Evil, their *Passions* so outrageous and rebelling against Reason; that they lookt upon the Rules and Laws of right Reason, as very hardly practicable, and which they had very little Hopes of ever being able to perswade the World to submit to. In a word; they confessed that Humane Nature was strangely corrupted; and they acknowledged this corruption to be a Disease whereof they knew not the true Cause, and could not find out a sufficient remedy. So that the great Duties of Religion, were laid down by them as Matters of Speculation and Dispute, rather than as the Rules of Action; and not so much urged upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, as proposed to the Admiration of those, who thought them hardly possible to be effectually practised by the generality of Men. To remedy all these Disorders, and conquer all these Corruptions; there was plainly wanting some extraordinary and supernatural Assistance; which was above the reach of bare Reason and Philosophy to procure, and yet without which the Philosophers themselves were sensible there * should never be any truly Great

* Nemo unquam vir magnus, sine Divino Afflatu fuit. Cicero.

VII. *For these Reasons there was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of their universally degenerate Estate, into a State suitable to the original Excellency of their Nature. Which Divine Revelation, both the Necessities of Men, and their natural Notions of God, gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for: As appears from the acknowledgments which the best and wisest of the Heathen Philosophers themselves have made, of their Sense of the necessity and want of such a Revelation; and from their Expressions of the Hopes they had entertained, that God would some time or other vouchsafe it unto them.*

A Divine Revelation absolutely necessary for the recovery of Mankind.

I. There was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of their universal corruption and degeneracy; And without such a Revelation, it was not possible that the World should ever be effectually reformed. For *If* (as has been before particularly shown) the gross and stupid Ignorance, the innumerable Prejudices and vain Opinions, the strong Passions and Appetites of Sense, and the many vicious Customs and Habits, which the generality of Mankind continually labour under; make it undeniably too difficult Work, for Men of all Capacities to discover even One for himself, by the bare Light of Nature all the particular Branches of their Duty; but Most men, in the present State of Things, have manifestly need of much Teaching, and particular Instruction: *If* those who were best able to discover the Truth and instruct others therein, namely the Wisest and Best of the Philosophers, were Themselves unavoidably altogether ignorant of some Doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great End, the Reformation of Mankind: *If* those Truths, which they were then

selv

elves very certain of, they were not yet able to prove and explain clearly enough, to vulgar Understandings: If even those things which they proved sufficiently, and explained with all clearness they had not yet Authority enough to enforce and inculcate upon Men's Minds with so strong an Impression, as to influence and govern the general Practice of the World; nor pretended to afford Men any supernatural Assistance, which yet was very necessary to so great a Work: And after all, in the discovery of such matters as were the great Motives of Religion, Men are apt to be more easily worked upon, and more strongly affected, by good Testimony, than by the strictest abstract Arguments; So that, upon the whole, it is plain the Philosophers were never by any means well qualified to reform Mankind with any considerable Success: Then there was evidently wanting some *particular Revelation*, which might supply all these Defects. There was plainly a Necessity of some *particular Revelation*, to discover in *what Manner*, and with *what* Kind of *external Service*, God might acceptably be *worshipped*. There was a Necessity of some *particular Revelation*, to discover *what Expiation* God would accept for Sin; by which the Authority, Honour, and Dignity of his Laws might be effectually indicated. There was a necessity of some *particular Revelation*, to give Men full assurance of the Truth of those great *Motives of Religion*, the *Rewards and Punishments of a future State*; which, notwithstanding the strongest Arguments of Reason, men

* Νομοδότης ὅστις νῦν κέκτηται, ἔποτε μὴ τολμήσῃ καινοτομῶν ἐπὶ θεοσεύειαν, ἥτις μὴ σαφὲς ἔχει τι, τρέψαι πόλιν ἑαυτῆ. — μηδὲν τοπαράπαν εἰδώς, ὥσπερ εἶδ' ὃν δυνατὸν εἶδέναι τῇ θνητῇ φύσει τῶν τοιούτων πύρι. *Plato in Epinomide.*

Τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα [θεῶν θεομαπίας] ἐπ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμῖς, οἰκίζοντες τε πόλιν ἐδὲν ἄλλω πεισομεθα ἔαν νῦν ἔχομεν, οὐδ' ἐχρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ Θεῷ. *Plato de Republ. 4.*

† Τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ὃ ἔνε, διαγρίξοχ ταῦτα ἕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἀμφισβητήντων, Θεὸς ἐστὶ. *Plato de Legib. lib. 1.*

could not yet forbear doubting of. In fine, there was a Necessity of some *particular Divine Revelation*,

* Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μέρει φαμέν
φύσει κυριώτατον, καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς
εἶον τε μάλιχα καὶ ἀριστα μαθεῖν,
εἰ διδάσκει τις· ἀλλ' ἐθ' ἂν διδά-
ξειεν, εἰ μὴ Θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο. *Plato*
in *Epinomide*.

without the Assistance of such a Revelation, 'tis manifest it was not possible that the World could ever be effectually reformed. Ye may e'en give

† Εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον καθεύ-
δοντες διατελεῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα
ἄλλον ὑμῖν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ,
κηδόμενοι ὑμῶν. *Plato* in *Apo-*
log. Socratis.

|| Εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἶδέναι, ὅ, τι περ
ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν
τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, Θε-
οῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι. *Plato* de
Republ. lib. 6.

That it

was agree-
able to the
dictates of
Nature
and right
Reason, to
expect or
hope for
such a di-
vine Re-
velation.

2. Since therefore there was plainly and confessedly wanting a *Divine Revelation*, to relieve the Necessities of Men in their Natural State; And since no Man can presume to say, that 'tis inconsistent with any of the Attributes of God, or unbecoming the Wisdom of the Creator of all things to supply that Want; to reveal to his Creature more fully the way to Happiness; to make more particular discoveries of his Will to them; to shew before them in a clearer Light, the Rewards and Punishments of a future State; to explain in what manner he will be pleased to be worshipped; and to declare what Satisfaction he will accept for Sin; and upon what Conditions he will receive returning Sinners; Nay since, on the contrary, it seems more suitable to our natural Notions of the Good

ness and Mercy of God, to suppose that he should do all this, than not: It follows undeniably, that it was most reasonable, and agreeable to the dictates of Nature, to *expect* or *hope* for such a divine Revelation. The generality of the Heathen World, who were far more equal and less prejudiced Judges in this matter, than modern Deists; were so fully persuaded, that the great Rules for the Conduct of Humane Life, must receive their Authority from Heaven; that their chief Law-givers thought it not a sufficient recommendation of their Laws, that they were agreeable to the Light of Nature; unless they pretended also, that they received them from God. But I have no need in this Argument, to make use of the Examples of Idolatrous Law-givers. The Philosophers themselves, the Best and Wisest, and the least Superstitious of them, that ever lived; were not ashamed to confess openly, their Sense of the Want of a Divine Revelation; and to declare their Judgment, that it was most natural and truly agreeable to right and sound Reason, to *hope* for something of that Nature. There is, besides the several places before cited, a most excellent Passage in *Plato* to this purpose; one of the most remarkable Passages indeed in his whole Works; though not quoted by any that I have met with; which therefore I think highly worthy to be transcribed at large, as a just and unanswerable Re-
 sponse to all those who deny that there is any Want or Need of a Revelation.

*seems best to me, saith * Socra-
 to one of his Disciples, that
 we expect quietly; nay'tis absolute-
 necessary, that we wait with
 patience, till such time as we can
 learn certainly, how we ought to
 have our selves both towards God*

* ΣΩΚ: Εἰ μὲν μὲν ἔν δοκεῖ
 κράτιστον εἶναι, ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν. —
 ἀναγκαῖον ἔν ἐστὶ περιμένειν, ἕως
 ἂν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς Θεὸς
 καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι. ΑΛΚ.
 Πότε ἔν παρέσαι ὁ χρόνος ἕτερος,
 ὃ Σώκρατες; καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύ-
 σων; ἡδιστα ᾧ ἂν μοι δοκῇ
 ἰδῆναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστὶ.

ΣΩΚ: Οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομίδει φησὶ τὴν Ἀθηναῖον Ὀμηρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλὺν, ὅφρ' εὖ γινώσκῃς ἐμὴν Θεὸν ἢ δὲ καὶ ἀνδρά, ἔτα καὶ σοῦ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον ἀφελόντα τὴν ἀχλὺν, ἢ νῦν παρούσα τυγχάνει, τοτὶς καὶ ἡδὴ προσφέρειν δὲ ἂν μέλλεις γινώσκειν ἢ μὲν κακὸν ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκῆς δυνηθῆναι.

ΑΛΚ: Ἀφαιρεῖται, εἴτε βούλεται, τὴν ἀχλὺν, εἴτε ἄλλο τί· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηδὲν ἂν φεύγειν τῶν ὑπὸ ἐμῇ προσαδομένων, ὅς τις ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνδρῶν, εἴγε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι. ΣΩΚ: Ἀλλὰ μὴν κακῶς θαυμάσῃς ὅσῃ περὶ σε προθυμίαν ἔχει.

ΑΛΚ: Εἰς τότε τινοὺν καὶ τὴν δυσίαν ἀναβάλλει κατίστον εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. ΣΩΚ: Καὶ ὁρῶς γε σοὶ δοκεῖ ἀσφαλές· γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ παρακινῶν· οὐκ ὁποῦτον κίνδυνον.

ΑΛΚ: Τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ καὶ σεφάνος καὶ τῶν πάντων τοιοῦτων τότε δάσσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνη τὴν ἡμῶν ἐλθέσαν ἰδῶν ἔξει δ' ἢ ὅσον μακρῶν, τέτων δελόντων. *Plato in Alcibiade 2.*

[If it be supposed that Socrates in this passage means *Himself*, (which is very difficult;) yet it nevertheless very lively represents the great Sense which the most confederate Heathens had, of their Want of some Extraordinary Instruction.]

crifices, till the time that this Person appears. You judge very well, answers Socrates; it will be much safer so to do, than to run so great a hazard of offering Sacrifices, which you know not whether they are acceptable to God or no. Well then, replies the Disciple, we will Then make our Offerings to the Gods, when That Day comes; And I hope, God will

and towards Men. When will that time come, replies the Disciple; and who is it that will teach us this? For methinks I earnestly desire to see and know Who the Person is, that will do it. It is one, answers, Socrates, who has now a Concern for you. But in like manner as Homer relates, that Minerva took away the Mist from before Diomede's Eyes, that he might be able to distinguish one Person from another; so 'tis necessary that the Mist which is now before your Mind, be first taken away, that afterwards you may learn to distinguish rightly between Good and Evil; for, as yet, you are not able to do it. Let the Person you mentioned, replies the Disciple, take away this Mist, or whatever else it be, as soon as he pleases. For I am willing to do any thing he shall direct, whosoever the Person be, so that I may but become a good Man. Nay, answers Socrates, That Person has a wonderful readiness and willingness to do all this for you. It will be best then, replies the Disciple, to forbear offering any more

ing, it may not be far off. And in another place, the same Author having given a large Account of that most excellent Discourse, which Socrates made a little before his Death, concerning the great Doctrines of Religion, the Immortality of the Soul, and the Certainty of a Life to come; he introduces one of his Disciples replying in the following manner: *I am, faith*

he *, *of the same Opinion with you, O Socrates, concerning these things;*

that, to discover the certain Truth of them, in this present Life, is either absolutely impossible for us, or at least exceeding difficult. Yet not

to enquire with our utmost diligence into what can be said about them,

or to give over our Inquiry before we have carried our search as far

as possible, is the sign of a mean and low Spirit. On the contrary,

we ought therefore by all means to do one of these two things; either,

by hearkening to Instruction, and by our own diligent Study, to find out

the Truth; or, if that be absolutely impossible, then to fix our Foot upon

that which to humane Reason, after the utmost search, appears best

and most probable; and, trusting to

That, venture upon that bottom to direct the course of our Lives accord-

ingly. Unless a Man could have still some more sure and certain Conduct to carry him through this Life;

such as a Divine Discovery of the Truth would be.

I shall mention but one Instance more, and that is of Porphyry; who, though he lived after our

Saviour's time, and had a most inveterate hatred to the Christian Revelation in particular, yet

* Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σόκρατες, περὶ τῶν ταύτων ἵστας ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ· τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῇ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδυνατῶν εἶναι, ἢ παγκάλῃ περὶ τὸ μῦθος αὐτὰ [λογ: τα] λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ ἔχει παρ- τι τρόπον ἐλέγχειν, καὶ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπέπαυ- τις, πάνυ μάλ' ἂν εἶναι ἀνδρὸς. [Note that Ficinus in his translation of this passage, as if the word ἔχει was to be repeated διὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ with προαφίστασθαι, writes absurdly *non desistere*, instead of *desistere*.] Δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γε τι τῶτων ἀφ- πράξασθαι ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει, ἢ εὐρεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον τὸν γούν βέλτιστον τῶν Ἀνδραπνίων λό- γων λαβόντα καὶ δυσλεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὀχρούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα ἀπληῦσαι τὸν βίον· εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφα- λέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον, ἐπὶ βεβαι- οτέρεσσι ὁχημασιν, ἢ Λόγῳ Θεῷ τινος. ἀπορροῦθῃσι. Plato in Phædron.

* Quum autem dicit Porphyrius, in primo de Regressu Animæ libro, nondum receptum in unam quandam sectam quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam; procul dubio confitetur, esse aliquam; sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam. Ita ei non sufficebat quicquid de anima liberanda studiosissime didicerat, sibi-que, vel potius aliis, nosse ac tenere videbatur. Sentiebat enim adhuc fuisse deesse aliquam præstantissimam auctoritatem, quam de re tanta sequi oporteret. *Augustin. De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. c. 32.*

The unreasonableness of Modern Deists, in denying the Want and Use of a Revelation

3. This Sense of the Antient and Wiser Philosophers, is much departed from by Modern Deists, who contend that there was no Want, no Need of a Revelation; that Philosophy and right Reason was of itself sufficiently able, to instruct and preserve Men in the Practice of their Duty; and that nothing was to be expected from Revelation. But besides what has been already intimated concerning the extreme Barbarity of the present Heathen World, and what the Philosophers both Greeks and Latins have confessed concerning the State of the more civilized Nations wherein they lived; I think we may safely appeal even to our Adversaries themselves, *whether* the Testimony of *Christ*, (without considering at present what Truth and Evidence it has,) concerning the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Punishments of a Future State, have not had (notwithstanding all the Corruptions of Christians

† Οὐκ ὀλίγους, Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους, σοφούς καὶ ἀνοήτους, μέχρι θανάτου ἀγωνίζεσθαι ὑπὲρ Χριστιανισμοῦ, ἵν' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐξομώσωνται ὅπερ ἑδείξεν ὑπὲρ ἄλλης δόξματος ἰσχυρταί ποιῶν. *Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 1.*

* confesses in general, that he was sensible there was wanting some *universal Method of delivering Mens Souls*, which no Sect of Philosophy had yet found out.

visibly in Experience and Effect a † greater and more powerful Influence upon the Lives and Actions of Men, than the Reasonings of all the Philosophers that ever were in the World: *Whether* credible Testimony, and the Belief

and Authority of Revelation, be not in itself as it were a Light held to the Consciences of stupid and careless Men; and the most natural and proper Means that can be imagined, to awaken and arouse up many of those, who would be little affected with all the strict Arguments and abstract Reasonings in the World. And, to bring this matter to a short Issue; *whether* in Christian Countries, at least where Christianity is professed in any tolerable degree of Purity,) the generality even * of the meaner and most vulgar and ignorant People have not Truer and Worthier Notions of God, more just and right Apprehensions concerning his Attributes and Perfections, a deeper Sense of the Difference of Good and Evil, a greater regard to moral Obligations and to the plain and most necessary Duties of Life, and a more firm and universal Expectation of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; than in any Heathen Country, any considerable Number of Men were ever found to have had.

It may here perhaps be pretended by Modern Deists, that the great Ignorance and undeniable corruptness of the whole Heathen World, has always been owing, not to any absolute Insufficiency of the Light of Nature itself, but merely to the fault of the several particular Persons, in not sufficiently improving that Light; and that Deists, now, in places where Learning and right Reason are cultivated, are well able to discover and explain all the Obligations and Motives of Morality,

* Ὡςτε μηκέτι κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν βραχεῖς τινας καὶ ἀκριβοῦς ληπτὰς, ὁρᾶς περὶ Θεοῦ φέρειν ὁδοῦς· ἀλλὰ μυρία πλήθη βαρβαρῶν. *Euseb. Demonstrat. Evangel. lib. 3. c. 3.*

Αἱ δὲ Θεοῦ Χριστοῦ μαθητευθεῖσαι ἐκκλησίαι, συνέξεταζόμεναι ταῖς ἂν παροικεῦσι δήμεναι ἐκκλησίαις· ὡς φωστῆρες εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ. Τίς ἦρ' ὅτι ἂν ὁμολογήσῃ, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἔλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ συγκρίσῃ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐλάττω, πολλὰ κρείττω τυγχάνει τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; [Note, this passage is both corruptly printed, πολλῶν instead of πολλὰ; and also the Sense of it hurt by an imperfect Translation. *Orig. adver. Cels. lib 3. Edit. Cant. p. 128.*]

The great Necessity and Use of Divine Revelation.

* See an
excellent
Passage of
Cicero to
this pur-
pose cited
above, pag.
304, 305.

lity, without believing any thing of Revelation. But this, even though it were true, (as, in the Sense they intend, it by no means is; because, as has been before shown, there are several very necessary Truths not possible to be discovered with any certainty by the bare Light of Nature; But supposing it, I say, to be true, that all the Obligations and Motives of Morality *could possibly* be discovered and explained clearly, by the mere Light of Nature alone; yet even This would not at all prove, that there is no need of Revelation. For, whatever the bare *Natural Possibility* was; it is certain in *Fact*, the *Wiseſt Philoſophers of Old*, * never were able to do it to any effectual purpose; but always willingly acknowledged that they ſought wanted ſome higher Aſſiſtance. And as to the great Pretences of *Modern Deists*; 'tis to be obſerved, that the clearneſs of moral Reasonings was much improved, and the Regard to a future State very much increaſed, even in Heathen Writers after the coming of *Chriſt*. And almoſt all the Things that are ſaid wiſely and truly by modern Deists, are plainly borrowed from That Revelation, which they reſuſe to imbrace; and without which, they could never have been able to have ſaid the ſame things. Now, indeed, when our whole Duty, with its true motives, is clearly revealed to us; its Precepts appear plainly agreeable to Reason; and Conſcience readily approves what is Good, as it condemns what is Evil: Nay, after our Duty is thus made known to us, 'tis eaſy not only to ſee its agreement *with* Reason, but alſo to begin and deduce its Obligation *from* Reason. But had we been utterly deſtitute of all revealed Light, then, to have diſcovered our Duty in all points, with the true motives of it, merely by the help of natural Reason; would have been a work

Nice

Nicety, Pains and Labour ; like groping for an unknown way, in the obscure Twilight. What ground have any Modern Deists to imagine, that if they themselves had lived without the Light of the Gospel, they should have been wiser than *Socrates* and *Plato* and *Cicero* ? How are they certain, they should have made such a right use of their Reason, as to have discovered the Truth *exactly*, without being any way led aside by Prejudice or Neglect ? If their Lot had been among the *Vulgar* ; how are they sure they should have been so happy, or so considerate, as not to have been involved in that Idolatry and Superstition, which overspread the whole World ? If they had joyned themselves to the *Philosophers*, which Sect would they have chosen to have followed ? And what Book would they have resolved upon, to be the adæquate Rule of their Lives and Conversations ? Or, if they should have set up for *Themselves*, how are they certain they should have been skilful and unprejudiced enough, to have deduced the several Branches of their Duty, and applied them to the several Cases of Life, by Argumentation and dint of Reason ? 'Tis *one thing* to see that those Rules of Life, which are beforehand plainly and particularly laid before us, are perfectly agreeable to Reason ; and *another thing* to find out those Rules merely by the Light of Reason, without their having first been any otherwise made known. We see that even many of those, who profess to govern their Lives by the *plain written Rule* of an *instituted and revealed Religion*, are yet most miserably ignorant of their Duty ; And how can any Man be sure he should have made so good Improvement of his Reason, as to have *understood* it *perfectly* in all its parts, without any such help ? We see that many of those, who profess to believe firmly *that great and everlasting*

everlasting Happiness, which Christ has promised to Obedience ; and *that great and eternal* Misery, which Christ has threatned to Disobedience ; are yet hurried away by their Lusts and Passions to transgress the Conditions of that Covenant, to which these Promises and these Threatnings are annexed. And how can any Man be sure he should be able to overcome those great Temptations, if these mighty Motives were *less distinctly known*, or *less powerfully enforced* ? But suppose he could, and that by strength of Reason he could demonstrate to himself these things with all *clearness and distinctness* ; yet could *All* Men do so ? Affuredly all Men are not *equally capable* of being *Philosophers*, though all Men are *equally obliged* to be *Religious*. At least thus much is certain, that the Rewards and Punishments of another World, the great Motives of Religion, cannot be so *powerfully enforced*, to the influencing the Lives and Practice of all sorts of Men, by one who shall undertake to demonstrate the reality of them by abstract Reason and Arguments ; as by one who showing sufficient Credentials of his having been himself in that other State shall assure them of the Truth and certainty of these things. But after all, the Question does not really lie here. The Truth, at the bottom, is plainly This. All the great Things that Modern Deists affect to say of *right Reason*, as to its sufficiency in discovering the Obligations and Motives of *Morality* ; is only a Pretence, to be made use of, when they are opposing *Christianity*. At other times, and in reality, they have no hearty regard for *Morality*, nor for the natural Evidences of the Certainty of a Future State. They are willing enough to believe, that Men perish absolutely at Death ; And so they have no concern to support effectually the Cause of Virtue, nor care to make

any consistent Scheme of Things; but unavoidably recur, in Truth, to downright *Atheism*. At least, in the Manners of most of them, 'tis so plain and apparent, that absolute Libertinism is the thing they really aim at; And however their Creed may pretend to be the Creed of Deists, yet almost always their Practice is the Practice of every Atheists.

4. To return therefore to the Argument. *Yet God was not absolutely obliged, to afford Men the Help of such a Revelation* From what has been said upon this Head, it appears plainly, that 'tis agreeable to the natural Hopes and Expectations of Men, that is, of right Reason duly improved; to suppose God making some particular Revelation of his Will to Mankind, which may supply the undeniable Defects of the Light of Nature. And at the same time, 'tis evident that such a thing is by no means unworthy of the Divine Wisdom, or inconsistent with any of the Attributes of God; but rather, the contrary most suitable to them. Consequently, considering the manifold Wants and Necessities of Men, and the abundant Goodness and Mercy of God; there is great Ground from right Reason and the Light of Nature, to believe, that God would not always leave Men wholly destitute of so needful an Assistance, but would at some time or other actually afford it them. Yet it does not from hence at all follow, (as some have imagined,) that God is *Obliged* to make such a Revelation. For then it must needs have been given to all Ages, and to all Nations; and might have been claimed and demanded as of Justice, rather than wished for and desired as of Mercy and condescending Goodness. But the forementioned Considerations are such as might afford Men reasonable ground to *Hope for* some Favour of this kind, to be conferred at such Time, and in such manner, and upon such Persons, as should seem best

best to supreme infinite Wisdom: At least, they might well dispose and prepare Men before-hand, whenever any Doctrine should come accompanied with just and good Evidence of its being such a Revelation, to believe and embrace it with all readiness.

*Want of
Universa-
lity, no suf-
ficient Ob-
jection a-
gainst the
Truth of a
Revelation
* Oracles
of Reason,
pag. 197,
&c.*

It has been made use of, by * a modern Author, as his principal and strongest Argument against the reasonableness of believing any Revelation at all; that 'tis confessed there has been no Revelation *universally* owned and embraced as such, either in all Ages, or by all nations in any Age. He pretends to acknowledge, that if the Doctrine of Christianity was *universally* entertained, he would not doubt of its being truly a Revelation of the Will of God to Mankind. But since, in Fact, there is no instituted Religion *universally* received as a Divine Revelation; and there are several Nations to whom the Christian Doctrine in particular was never so much as preached, nor ever came to their knowledge at all; he concludes, that, what is not universal and equally made known to *Men*, cannot be needful for *Any*; and consequently, that there never was any real Want of a Revelation at all, nor any ground to think any further Assistance necessary to enable Men to answer all the Ends of their Creation than the bare Light of Nature. This is the Summ and Strength of this Author's Reasoning; and herein all the Deniers of Revelation agree with him. Not (not to take notice here, that 'tis by no means impossible, but all Men may be capable of receiving some Benefit from a Revelation, which a great part of them may have never heard of). If these Mens Reasoning was true, it would follow by the same Argument, that neither was *Natural Religion* necessary to enable Men to answer the ends of their Creation. For, though all

Truths of Natural Religion, are indeed certainly discoverable by the due use of right Reason alone; yet 'tis evident *All Men* are not indued with the same Faculties and Capacities, nor have they All equally afforded to them the same means of making that discovery: As these Gentlemen themselves upon some occasions are willing enough to own, when they are describing the barbarous ignorance of some poor Indian Nations. And consequently, the knowledge of Natural Religion being, in Fact, by no means universal; it will follow that there is no great Necessity even That; but that Men may do very well without it, in performing the Functions of the Animal Life, and directing themselves wholly by the Inclinations of Sense. And thus these Gentlemen must at last be forced to let go all moral Obligations, and so recur unavoidably to absolute Atheism. The Truth is: As God was not obliged, to make all his Creatures equal; to make Men, Angels; or to endue All Men, with the same Faculties and Capacities as Any; So neither is he bound to make All Men capable of the *same Degree* or the *same Kind* of Happiness, or to afford All Men the *very same means and opportunities* of obtaining it. There is ground enough, from the consideration of the manifest corruption of Humane Nature, to be so far sensible of the Want of a Divine Revelation, as that right Reason and the Light of Nature itself will lead a wise and considerate Man to think it very probable, that the infinitely merciful and good God may actually condescend to afford Men some such supernatural assistance: And consequently such a Person will be very willing, ready, and prepared to enter into a Doctrine which shall at any time come attended with just and good Evidence of its being truly a Revelation of the Will of God. But it does

does not at all from hence follow, either that God is absolutely bound to make such a Revelation; or that, if he makes it, it must equally be made to All Men; or that, since in Fact it is not made to All, therefore there is no reason to believe that there is any Need or any Probability of its being made to Any.

VIII. *There is no other Religion now in the World, but the Christian, that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of Reason, to be esteemed such a Divine Revelation: And therefore, if Christianity be not true, there is no Revelation of the Will of God at all made to Mankind.*

This Proposition will easily be granted by all *Modern Unbelievers*; and therefore I need not be particular in the Proof of it.

*Of the
Mahometan Reli-
gion.*

The *Mahometan* Religion, was founded by a vicious Person, proposes ridiculous and trifling Doctrines to be believed, was propagated merely by violence and force of Arms, was confirmed by no publick and uncontestable Miracles, promises vain and sensual Rewards to its Professors, and is every way incompaffed with numberless such Absurdities and Inconsistencies, (as those who have given us Accounts of the Life of *Mahomet* and the Nature of his Religion, have abundantly made out; and is sufficiently evident even from the *Alcoran* itself;) that there is no great Danger of *Its* imposing upon rational and considerate Men.

*Of the
Jewish
Religion.*

The *Jewish* Religion, was founded wholly upon the Expectation of a Messiah to come. And the Time of his appearance was limited by such plain and determinate Prophecies, that what difficulties soever there may be in computing the very nice and exact Time of their Completion; what different Periods soever may be fixed, from

whence

whence to begin several Computations ; yet the time of their being fulfilled, is now, in all possible ways of computing, so very far elapsed, that if the *Christian* Doctrine be false, there is no Supposition left, upon which the *Jewish* Religion can, with any Colour of Reason, be believed to be true.

It being evident therefore, that either the Christian Revelation is true, or else (how great Want soever there may be of it) there is no such thing as Revelation at all : It remains that I proceed to consider what *positive and direct Evidence* there is, to prove the actual Truth of this Divine Revelation.

IX. *The Christian Religion, considered in its primitive Simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures, has all the Marks and Proofs of being actually and truly a Divine Revelation ; that any Divine Revelation, supposing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or desired to have.*

The necessary Marks and Proofs of a Religion coming from God, are these. *First*, That the Duties it enjoins, be all such as are agreeable to our natural Notions of God ; and perfective of the Nature, and conducive to the Happiness and Well-being of Men. And that the *Doctrines* it teaches, be all such ; as, though not indeed discoverable by the bare Light of Nature, yet, when discovered by Revelation, may be consistent with, and agreeable to, sound and unprejudiced Reason. For otherwise, no Evidence whatever, can be of so great force to prove that any Doctrine is True ; as its being either Contradictory in itself, or wicked in its Tendency, to prove that it must necessarily be False. *Secondly*, For the same Reason, the *Motives* likewise, which it is recommended to Mens Belief and

*The Marks
of a Religion
coming
from God.*

Practice ; and all the peculiar *Circumstances*, with which it is attended ; must be such as are suitable to the excellent Wisdom of God, and fitted to amend the Manners, and perfect the Minds of Men. *Lastly*, It must moreover be *positively and directly proved* to come from God, by such certain *Signs and Matters of Fact*, as may be undeniable Evidences of its Author's having actually a Divine Commission. For otherwise, as no Evidence can prove a Doctrine to come from God, if it be either Impossible or Wicked in itself ; so on the other hand, neither can any degree of Goodness or Excellency in the Doctrine itself, make it demonstrably certain, but only highly probable, to have come from God ; unless it has moreover some positive and direct Evidence of its being actually Revealed.

The entire Proof therefore of this Proposition must be made by an Induction of Particulars, as follows.

X. First, *The Practical Duties which the Christian Religion enjoyns*, are all such, as are most agreeable to our natural Notions of God, and most perfective of the Nature, and conducive to the Happiness and Well-being of Men. That is ; Christianity even in this single respect, as containing alone and one consistent System all the wise and good Precepts (and those improved, augmented, and exalted to the highest degree of Perfection,) that ever were taught singly and scatteredly, and many times but very corruptly by the several Schools of the Philosophers ; and this without any mixture of the fond, absurd, and superstitious Practices of any of these Philosophers ; ought to be embraced and practised by all rational and conscientious Deists, who will act consistently, and steddily pursue the consequences of their own Principles ; as at least the best Scheme and Sect of Philosophy, that ever

was set up in the World; and highly probable, even though it had no external Evidence, to be of Divine Original.

This Proposition is so very evident, that the greatest Adversaries of the Christian Institution have never been able to deny it any otherwise, than by confounding the Inventions of Men, the superstitious Practices of particular Persons, or the corrupt Additions of certain particular Churches or Societies of Christians, with the pure and simple Precepts of the Gospel of Christ. In all those Instances of Duty, which pure and uncorrupt Christianity enjoins, the Proposition is manifest and altogether undeniable. The Duties of *Love, Fear, and Adoration*, which the Christian Religion obliges us to render unto God, are so plainly incumbent upon us from the consideration of the excellent Attributes of the Divine Nature, and our relation to him as our Creator and Preserver; that no Man who considers, can think himself free from the Obligations which our Religion lays upon him to practise these Duties; without denying the very Being of God, and acting contrary to the Reason and all the natural Notions of his own Mind. It is placing the true and acceptable Worship of God, not so much in any positive and ritual Observances, as in approaching him with pure Hearts and undefiled Bodies, with unfeigned Repentance for all past Miscarriages, and sincere Resolutions of constant Obedience for the future; in praying to him for whatever we want, and returning him our most hearty Thanks for whatever good Things we receive; with such Dependence and Humility, such Submission, Trust, and Reliance, as are the proper Affections of dutiful Children; all this is plainly most agreeable to our Natural Notions and Apprehensions of God. And that the Prayers

The Proposition proved in the several Instances of Duty.

of sinful and depraved Creatures, sincerely repenting, should be offered up to God, and become prevalent with him, through and by the Intercession of a *Mediator*; is very consonant to right and unprejudiced Reason: As I shall have occasion to show more particularly hereafter, when I come to consider the Articles of our *Belief*. Again; The Duties of *Justice, Equity, Charity* and *Truth*, which the Christian Religion obliges us to exercise towards *Men*, are so apparently reasonable in themselves, and so directly conducive to the Happiness of Mankind; that their unalterable Obligations is not only in great measure deducible from the bare Light of Nature and right Reason; but even Those Men also, who have broken through all the Bonds of natural Religion itself, and the original Obligations of Virtue, have yet thought it necessary for the preservation of Society and the well-being of Mankind, that the Observation of these Duties to some degree, should be enforced by the Penalties of humane Laws. And the additional Improvements, which our Saviour has made to these Duties, by commanding his Disciples to be as it were Lights in the World, and Example of good Works to all Men; to be so far from injuring others, that on the contrary they should not indulge themselves in any degree of Anger or Passion; to seek reconciliation immediately upon any Difference or Offence that may arise; to bear injuries patiently, rather than return evil for evil; to be always willing to forgive one another Their Trespases, as they all expect forgiveness at the Hands of God; to be kind and charitable to all Men; to assist readily, and be willing to do all good Offices, not only to their Friends, but even to their bitterest Enemies also; in a word, to raise their Virtue and Goodness far above the

Matt. v.
16, &c.

common

common Practice of Men, extending their Charity universally in imitation of the Goodness of God himself, who maketh the Sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth Rain on the just and on the unjust : These Precepts, I say, are such, as no unprejudiced Philosopher would have been unwilling to confess were the utmost Improvements of Morality, and to the highest degree Perfective of humane Nature. In like manner ; The Duties of *Sobriety, Temperance, Patience and Contentment*, which our Religion enjoins us to practise in *Our Lives*, are so undeniably agreeable to the inward constitution of humane Nature, and so perfective of it, that the principal Design of all true Philosophy has ever been to recommend and set off these duties to the best Advantage ; Though, as the Philosophers themselves have always confessed, no philosophy was ever able to govern Mens practice effectually in these respects. But the additional Precepts, and the new Weight and Authority, which our Saviour has added to his Instructions of this kind ; teaching his Disciples to govern their every Thoughts, Desires and Inclinations ; to conquer and get above all the Desires of this present World, and to set their Affections principally on that which is to come ; These are the things, which, when the Christian Religion was in its primitive and purest State, worked Men up actually to such a Pitch of cheerful and generous Obedience to the Laws of God, and taught them to obtain such a compleat Victory over the World, and over all the Desires and Appetites of Sense ; the best Philosophers have acknowledged, their Instructions were never able to do. Lastly, even these *positive and external Observances*, (the *Two Sacraments*,) which are instituted in the Christian Religion, as means and assistances to keep Men steadfast in the practice of those *great and moral*

Matt. v.

28.

Matt. vi.

19, 24, &c.

Duties which are the *weightier Matters of the Law*; even those positive Institutions (I say) are so free from all appearance of Superstition and Vanity, and so wisely fitted to the end for which they were designed, that no Adversaries of Christianity have ever been able to object any thing at all against the things themselves, but only against certain Corruptions and Superstitions, which some who call themselves Christians, have, directly in opposition to the true Design of Christianity, introduced and annexed to them. For, what reasonable Man can pretend to say, that 'tis any way unreasonable or Superstitious, for every Member of the Society to be solemnly admitted into his Profession, by a plain and significant Rite, intitling him to all the Privileges, and charging him with all the Obligations, which belong to the Members of that Society as such? which is the Design of *One* of the *Sacraments*: Or, that 'tis unreasonable and Superstitious, for Men frequently to commemorate with all Thankfulness the Love of their greatest Benefactor, and humbly and solemnly to renew their Obligations and Promises of Obedience to him? which is the Design of the *Other*.

This, a great Evidence of a Religion coming from God.

Let now any impartial Person judge, whether this be not a wise and excellent Institution of *practical* Religion; highly conducive to the Happiness of Mankind; and worthy to be established by a Revelation from God, when Men had confessedly corrupted themselves to such a degree that not only the Light of Nature and right Reason was altogether insufficient to restore true Piety, but even That Light itself

* — ut Naturæ Lumen nusquam appareat. Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 3. See this Passage cited before at large, pag. 277.

(as Cicero * expressly acknowledges) no where appeared. Let any impartial Person judge, whether a Religion that tends thus manifestly

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manifestly to the recovery of the rational part of God's Creation, to restore Men to the Imitation and Likeness of God, and to the Dignity and highest Improvement of their Nature; has not within itself an intrinsick and very powerful Evidence of its being truly Divine. Let any one read the *fifth, sixth and seventh Chapters of St Matthew's Gospel*, and judge if they do not, as it were, *set before his Eyes* such a lovely Image and Representation of true Virtue, as *Plato* *

could not but charm Men with the highest degree of love and admiration imaginable. In a Word; let any Man of an honest and sincere Mind consider,

whether That practical Doctrine has not even *in itself* the greatest marks of a Divine Original; wherein whatsoever things are *true*, whatsoever things are *honest*, whatsoever things are *just*, whatsoever things are *pure*, whatsoever things are *lovely*, whatsoever things are *of good report*, if there be any *Virtue*, if there be any thing *praiseworthy*; all these, and these only, are the things that are earnestly recommended to Mens practice. What wise Precept was ever delivered by any Philosopher of any Sect, which is not more plainly laid down by our Saviour and his Apostles? And not only so; but enforced moreover with greater Efficacy and Strength? founded upon nobler and more consistent Principles? urged with greater Weight and Authority? and pressed with more powerful and affecting Arguments? Nay, neither is This all the difference, even in respect merely of the Excellency of the Doctrine itself. For the Philosophers taught indeed many excellent moral Truths; but some upon one occasion and upon one Set of Principles, some upon another; and every one of them were mistaken in

* *Formam ipsam, & tanquam Faciem honesti; quæ si Oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret Sui. Cic. de Offic. lib. 1.*

Phil. iv. 8.

some Instances of Duty, and mingled particular Superstitions and false Notions, with their good Instructions, and built their *Doctrine* upon no sure Foundation of consistent Principles; And All of them (as has been before shown) were very imperfect and deficient, and far from being able to make up an entire and compleat Scheme of the

whole Duty of Man in all Cases.

But now; * *to put together all the wise and good Precepts that ever were delivered by any wise Men of any Sect and in any Age; to improve and exalt every one of them, to the highest possible degree of excellency and perfection; to separate and lay aside all the superstitious Opinions and Practices, that had been mixed by all or any of the different Sects of Philosophers, or Teachers of Religion in any Nation, with their respective moral Instructions; and to supply all those Doctrines, wherein both moral Philosophy and the additional Institutions of all Religions in the*

* Οὐκ ὅτι ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἐστὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος διδάγματα τῷ Χριστοῦ· ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι πάντῃ ὁμοία· ὥσπερ ἔδὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. — ἕκαστος γάρ τις, ἀπὸ μέρους τοῦ σπερματικοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου τὸ συγγενὲς ὁρῶν, καλῶς ἐφθέγγετο. — ὅσα ἔν παρὰ πᾶσι καλῶς, εἴρηται, ἡμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστὶ. *Justin Apolog. 1.*

Quod si extitisset aliquis, qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per Sectasque diffusam, colligeret in unum ac redigeret in corpus; is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. Sed hoc nemo facere, nisi veri peritus ac sciens, potest. Verum autem non nisi ejus scire est, qui sit doctus a Deo. *Lactant. lib. 7.*

World, had in the whole been hitherto altogether deficient; and all this, in one plain, entire, and regular System upon the Foundation of certain and consistent Principles; This is, the peculiar Character of the Christian Institution; and all this, cannot with any colour of Reason, be imagined to have ever been done by any Man, but one sent immediately from God. Upon this consideration alone, all sincere Deists (if any such there be) who really are what they pretend to be, who believe the Being and Attributes of God, and are firmly convinced of the Obligations of

Virtue

Virtue and natural Religion, and the certainty of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments ; must needs by their own Principles be strongly inclined to embrace the Christian Religion ; to believe, at least to *hope* confidently, that a Doctrine so plainly fitted to recover Men out of their universally corrupt Estate, and restore them to the Knowledge and Favour of God, is truly Divine ; and to entertain it with all cheerfulness, as what in itself has those manifold Marks of Goodness and Perfection, which are themselves sufficient, though not indeed to prove it demonstrably, yet to satisfy a good Man, that it cannot be any thing else than a Revelation from God, even * though it had wanted all those outward Proofs, and divine and miraculous Testimonies, which shall hereafter be mentioned in their proper place.

* Sed si vel casu id efficeret, certissime philosopharetur ; & quamvis non posset divinis testimoniis illa defendere, tamen seipsam veritas illustraret suo lumine. *Lactant. lib. 7.*

XI. Secondly, *The Motives by which the Christian Religion inforces the Practice of the Duties it enjoins, are such as are most suitable to the excellent Wisdom of God ; and most answerable to the natural Expectations of Men.*

I. The *Acceptableness of true Repentance*, in the Sight of God ; and the certain *Assurance of Pardon* upon such Repentance ; which the Christian Religion affords us : is a most powerful and necessary *Motive* to frail and sinful Creatures, to encourage and support them effectually in the practice of their Duty. 'Tis indeed in general evidently most agreeable to right Reason, and to Mens natural Notions of God, to believe him mercable and merciful and willing to forgive. But at the same time it cannot be proved by Arguments from Reason, that God is *absolutely obliged* to forgive ; and 'tis confessedly evident,

Of the acceptableness of true Repentance, a Motive to Obedience.

dent, that it becomes the Supreme Governour of the Universe, to vindicate the Honour and Authority of his Laws and Government, to give some Evidences of his Hatred and Indignation against Sin, and sometimes by instances of Severity to prevent Sinners from abusing his Mercy and Patience; no less than that 'tis agreeable to his infinite Wisdom and Goodness, to suffer his Anger to be by some means appeased: No Motive in this Case can be imagined more expedient and powerful, to incourage Sinners to return to the practice of their Duty, and to perswade them to continue therein immoveably for the future; nothing can be imagined more seasonable and satisfactory to the Mind of Man, and more agreeable to the excellent Wisdom of God, and worthy of the supreme and infinitely merciful Governour of all Things; than such a positive Declaration of the *Acceptableness of sincere Repentance*, and such an authentick Assurance of *Pardon and Forgiveness* thereupon, as under the Christian Dispensation the Divine Goodness and Mercy has found means to afford unto us, in such manner, as is at the same time abundantly consistent with the Honour and Dignity of the Laws of God, and with his irreconcilable Hatred against all Unrighteousness and Sin.

Of the divine Assistance, as another Motive to Obedience.

2. *That divine and supernatural Assistance*, which under the Christian Dispensation, they who sincerely endeavour to obey the Will of God, have incouragement to hope for, upon all necessary occasions; is another powerful *Motive*, to support Men effectually in the Practice of their Duty. The wisest of the Philosophers, were so far sensible of the great Corruption and Depravity of Humane Nature in its present State; they were sensible that such was the Carelessness, Stupidity and Want of Attention, of the greater part of Mankind

Mankind ; so many the early Prejudices and false Notions taken in by evil Education ; so strong and violent the unreasonable Lusts, Appetites, and Desires of Sense ; and so great the Blindness, introduced by superstitious Opinions, vitious Customs, and debauched Practices through the World ; that (as has been before shown,) they themselves openly confessed, they had very little hope of ever being able to reform Mankind with any considerably great and universal Success, by the bare force of Philosophy and right Reason ; but that, to produce so great a change, and enable Men effectually to conquer all their corrupt Affections, there was need of some supernatural and divine Assistance, or the immediate Interposition of God himself. Now This *divine assistance* is vouchsafed to Men under the Christian Dispensation in such a manner, as (from what has been already said concerning the Judgment of the Wisest of the Antient Philosophers in this matter) appears to be undeniably agreeable to the natural Expectations of right Reason, and suitable to the best and worthiest Notions, that Men have ever by the Light of Nature been able to frame to themselves, concerning the Attributes and Perfections of God. *If ye, says our Saviour, being Evil, know how to give Good Gifts unto your Children ; how much more shall your heavenly Father give the holy Spirit to them that ask him ?* The Effect of this divine Assistance, evidenced itself in a very visible and remarkable manner in the primitive Times, by * the sudden wonderful and total Reformation of far greater Numbers of wicked Men, than ever were brought to Repentance by the Teaching and Exhortations of all the Philosophers in the World. and even at this Day, notwithstanding

Luke xi.

13.

* Da mihi virum, qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effrænatus ; paucissimis Dei verbis tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam. Da libidinosum, &c. *Lactant. lib. 3.*

Παρά μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν οὐ τις, &c. Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 1. See this Passage cited above, pag. 304.

standing

standing all the Corruption introduced among Christians, I think it can hardly be denied by any Unbelievers of Revelation, but that there are among us many more Persons of all conditions, who worship God in sincerity and simplicity of Heart, and live in the constant practice of all Righteousness, Holiness, and true Virtue; than ever were found in any of the most civilized Nations, and most improved by Philosophy in the heathen World.

Of the clear Discovery of future Rewards and Punishments, as another Motive to Obedience.

3. The Rewards and Punishments which the Christian Religion proposes, to Obedience or Disobedience; are a *Motive*, perfectly agreeable to Mens natural Hopes and Fears, and worthy of God to make known by positive and express Revelation. For since 'tis confessedly suitable to the divine Wisdom, to make variety of Creatures, endued with very different Powers and Faculties, and capable of very different kinds and degrees of Improvement; and since all rational Creatures, by reason of that natural Liberty of Will which is essentially necessary to their being such, cannot but be capable of exalting and improving their Nature by the practice of Virtue and the Imitation of God, and on the contrary of depraving and debasing their Nature by the practice of Vice and Alienation of themselves from God; It follows undeniably, (as has been before shown by a more particular deduction,) that 'tis highly agreeable to the Light of Nature and to right Reason to suppose, that God, the Supreme Governour and Disposer of all things, will finally make a just and suitable distinction between his Creatures, by the distribution of proportionable Rewards and Punishments. Nevertheless, both the Truth itself of these final Rewards and Punishments, was so far called in question, and ren-

dred

ered doubtful and uncertain, by the Disputations even of the Wisest Philosophers that ever lived ; and those who did in general believe the Truth and Certainty of them, had yet so very blind and obscure Notions of what Nature and Kind they were to be ; having their Imaginations strangely prejudiced with poetical Fictions, and fabulous Stories ; that the setting this matter clear and right, and the supplying this single defect in the Light of Nature, was a thing highly worthy of Divine Revelation : It being plainly a very different thing, and of very different Force as to the influencing Mens Actions, for Men to be able to argue themselves into a *reasonable Expectation* of future Rewards and Punishments ; and to be *certainly assured* of the reality of them by express Testimony of Divine Revelation. And accordingly by Divine Revelation in the Gospel, this defect of the Light of Nature *Is* now actually supplied in such a manner ; Life and Immortality are so brought to Light ; and the Wrath of God so revealed from Heaven against all Ungodliness and Unrighteousness of Men ; that this very thing, the clear and distinct and consistent Account which the Gospel gives us of these final Rewards and Punishments, (which, though indeed in themselves so absolutely necessary, that without them no tolerable Vindication could be made of the Attributes of God, yet neither by the Light of Nature, nor by any positive Institution of Religion, excepting only the Christian, were they ever so *clearly* and *plainly* represented to Mankind, as to have their full and proper effect upon the Hearts and Lives of Men ;) This very Thing (I say,) the clear, distinct, and consistent Account, which the Gospel gives us of these final Rewards and Punishments, is itself no contemptible Argument of the Truth and Divine

vine Authority of the Christian Revelation. By the certain Knowledge of these Rewards and Punishments it is, that the practice of Virtue is now established upon a sure Foundation. Men have now abundantly sufficient encouragement, to support them in their Choice of Virtue, and in their constant adherence to it, in all Cases and under all Circumstances that can be supposed. There is now sufficient Weight on the side of Virtue to enable Men to conquer all the Temptations of the Devil, the Flesh, and the World; and to despise the severest Threatnings, even Death itself. *This is the Victory that overcometh the World, even our Faith.* The only Difficulty in this matter, arising from the Duration of the final Punishment of the Wicked, shall be considered when I come to discourse of the Articles of our Belief.

XII. Thirdly, *The peculiar Manner and Circumstances, with which the Christian Religion joins the Duties, and urges the Motives before-mentioned; are exactly consonant to the Dictates of sound Reason, or the unprejudiced Light of Nature; and most wisely perfective of it.*

The Proposition proved by particular instances.

For, what can be more agreeable to the Light of Nature, and more evidently perfective of it, than to have those Duties which Nature hints at only in general, explained fully and largely, and urged in particular, and inculcated upon the meanest Capacities with great Weight and Authority, and exemplified in the Lives of holy Persons proposed as Patterns for our Imitation? What can be more perfective of the Light of Nature, than to have those great Motives of Religion, the Rewards and Punishments of a Future State, which Nature only obscurely points at, described to us most plainly, affectionately, and lively? What can be more perfective of the Light of Nature, than

to have the *means of atoning for Sin*, which Nature discovers *only the want of*, plainly declared and exhibited to us? What can be more perfective of the Light of Nature, than such a discovery of the heinousness of Sin and the necessity of Holiness, as the Death of Christ and the Purity of the Gospel does make unto us? In fine, What can more effectually perfect the Religion of Nature, than the gathering together the Worshippers of the True God, into One Body? the causing them to enter into solemn Obligations, to live suitably to their Holy Profession? the giving them gracious Assurances that true Repentance shall be accepted for what is past, and sincere renewed Obedience for the future? the uniting them by a few positive Rites in one Religion as well as Civil Communion, for mutual Assistance and improvement? and the establishing a certain Order or perpetual Succession of Men, whose constant Business it may be, to explain the great Duties of Religion to persons of meaner Capacities; to urge and enforce the Practice of them; to set before Men the reasons of their Duty, and the Necessity of it; to show them clearly and impartially the danger of neglecting it, and the great advantage of performing it sincerely; in a word, to instruct the Ignorant, and admonish the Wicked; to reduce those that err, to comfort the doubting, to reprove the obstinate; and to be Instruments of conveying to Men all proper Assurances, to enable them to perform their whole Duty Effectually?

If these things be the Ordinances of One, who come to contradict the dictates of right Reason, and not to perfect the Law of Nature, but to destroy it; then let all wise Men for ever forsake the Assemblies of Christians, and profess themselves again Disciples of the Philosophers. But if these things be perfectly agreeable to Nature and right Reason, and tend exceedingly to the supply-

supplying the Deficiencies thereof ; then let none, under pretence of maintaining *Natural Religion*, revile and blaspheme the *Christian* ; least they be found Liars unto God.

An Answer to the Objection drawn from the Divisions among Christians.

The many *Contentions* indeed, about *Opinions* of great Uncertainty and little Importance, which to the very great Scandal of Christianity, have in several Ages of the Church, been with unreasonable Zeal kept up, instead of promoting the universal Interest of true practical Religion and Virtue ; have, it must be confessed, given some *Occasion* to the Enemies of our most holy Religion to blaspheme and revile both It, and the Teachers of it. But though such things as these, have indeed afforded them too plausible an *Occasion*, yet they have not given them any just *Reason*, so to do. For the acknowledged corruption of a Doctrine or Institution in any particular *part* or respect, is by no means a weighty or real *Objection* against the Truth of the *whole*. And there has always been extant a sufficient Rule, to enable sincere Persons, in the midst of the greatest disputes and contentions, to distinguish the *Doctrine which is of God*, from the *Opinions of Men*. The Doctrine of Christ having been plainly and fully delivered in our Saviour's own Discourses and in the Writings of his immediate Followers the Apostles ; who cannot with any Reason be imagined either to have misrepresented it, or to have represented it imperfectly. But besides : think it can hardly be denied even by our Adversaries themselves, but that in all Times and Places, wherein Christianity has been professed to any tolerable degree of Purity ; whatever contentions and disputes may have arisen about particular, and perhaps *unnecessary* Doctrines ; yet the great, the most necessary, and *fundamental* Doctrines of Religion ; concerning God, and Providence

vidence ; concerning the gracious Method, of God's Reconciliation with penitent Sinners ; concerning the necessity of true Piety, Righteousness, and Sobriety ; concerning a Judgment to come, and the final Reward of the Righteous, and the Punishment of wicked Men, in such a manner as will effectually vindicate both the Justice and Goodness, the Wisdom and Honour of God ; these things (I say) have, notwithstanding all Differences concerning smaller Matters, been nevertheless at the same time universally and constantly taught, pressed and inculcated upon Persons of all Capacities, by the earnest and continual Preaching of all the Ministers of the Gospel ; with an effect infinitely more considerable and visible, both in Extent and Duration, than by the Teaching of any Heathen Philosophers that ever lived. Which shows undeniably the Excellency at least, if not the Divine Authority of the Christian Institution, in this particular respect.

XIII. Fourthly : *All the [Credenda, or] Doctrines, which the true, simple, and uncorrupted Christian Religion teaches ; (that is, not only those main Doctrines which it requires to be believed as fundamental and of necessity to eternal Salvation, but even all the Doctrines which it teaches as Matters of course ;) are, though indeed many of them not discoverable by bare Reason unassisted with Revelation, when discovered by Revelation, apparently most agreeable to sound unprejudiced Reason ; have every one of them a natural Tendency, and a direct and powerful Influence, to reform Mens Minds, and correct their Manners ; and do together make up an infinitely more consistent and rational Scheme of Belief, than any that the wisest of the antient Philosophers ever contrived, or the cunningest of modern Unbelievers can invent.*

Of the One
Supreme
God.

1. *That there is One only living and true God; existing of himself, by the Necessity of his own Nature; absolutely Independent, Eternal, Omnipresent, Unchangeable, Incorruptible; without Body, Parts, or Passions; of infinite Power, Knowledge, and Wisdom; of perfect Liberty, and Freedom of Will; of infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other possible Perfections; so as to be absolutely Self sufficient to his own infinite and unalterable Happiness: This is, not only the first and principal Article of the Christian Faith, but also the first and most evident Truth that the Light of Nature itself teaches us, being clearly demonstrable, upon certain and undeniable Principles of right Reason.*

Of the
Only-be-
gotten Son
of God.

2. *That this Supreme Self-existent Cause and Father of all things, did before all Ages, in an incomprehensible manner, by his Almighty Power and Will, beget or produce a Divine Person; still*

* *Ὁς ἐκ ὅου, in contradiction to 'Αυτοῦ.*

*the Logos, the Word, or Wisdom, or Son, of God; * God, of God, in whom dwells the fulness*

Divine Perfections, (excepting absolute Supremacy, Independency, or Self-Origination;) being

Col. i. 15. *Image of the Invisible God; the Brightness of*
Heb. i. 3. *Father's Glory, and the express Image of his Person*
Ἀπαύλας
ματὸς δι-
κῆς αὐτοῦ.
Joh. i. 2. *having been in the beginning with God, partaker with*
xvii. 5. *him of his Glory before the World was; the Upholder*
Heb. i. 3. *of all things by the Word of his Power; and himself*
Rom. ix. 5. *over all (by Communication of his Father's*
& Joh. i. 1. *Glory and Dominion) God blessed for ever: This*
Doctrine (I say) though not indeed discovered by bare Reason, yet, when made known by Revelation, appears plainly very consistent with right Reason, and, ('tis manifest) contains nothing that implies any manner of Absurdity or Contradiction in it.

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Indeed if any Men, pretending to be *wise above* and beyond *what is written*, have at any time given such Explications of the *Manner* how the Son of God derived his Being from the Father, or have offered such Accounts of his *Nature and Attributes*, as can by any just and necessary consequence be reduced to imply or involve any Contradiction ;

which perhaps many of the Schoolmen have but too justly been accused of doing ;) such Explications are without all controversy False, and very injurious to Religion. But as this Doctrine is delivered in *Scripture* ; I think, there is nothing in it in any degree contrary to Right Reason ; as I have elsewhere intreated to show in a *particular Discourse*, to which I refer the Reader.

* It is not to be denied but that the Schoolmen, who are bounded in Wit and Leisure, though very few among them had either exact Skill in the Holy Scriptures, or in Ecclesiastical Antiquity, and the Writings of the antient Fathers of the Christian Church : I say, it cannot be denied but that these speculative and very acute Men, who wrought a great part of their Divinity out of their own Brains, as Spiders do Cobwebs out of their own Bowels, have started a thousand Subtilties a-

out this Mystery, such as no Christian is bound to trouble his Head withal ; much less is it necessary for him to understand those *Niceties*, which we may reasonably presume that they who talk of them did themselves never thoroughly understand ; and least of all, is it necessary to believe them. Archbishop Tillotson, *Sermon concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature*.

It were to be wished, that some *Religionists* did not here symbolize too much with the *Atheists*, in affecting to represent the *Mystery* of the Christian Trinity, as a thing directly contradictory to all humane Reason and Understanding. *Cudworth's System*, pag. 560.

Now the same that is said of the *Son*, may in *Of the Holy Spirit*. like manner, with little Variation, be, very agreeably to right Reason, understood concerning the *Original Procession* or *Manner of Derivation* of the *Holy Spirit* likewise from the *Father*.

3. That the Universe, the Heavens and the Earth, and all things that are therein, were Created and Made by God ; and this, through the *Operation* of his Son, That Divine Word, or *Of the Creation of the Universe*.

Wisdom of the Father ; by whom, the Scripture
 Heb. i. 2. *says that God made the Worlds ; that by him God*
 Eph. iii. 9. *created all things ; that by him were all things crea-*
 Col. i. 16. *ted, that are in Heaven, and that are in Earth, Vi-*
 sible and Invisible, whether they be Thrones or Domi-
 nions, or Principalities or Powers ; all things were
 created by him and for him, and he is before all things
 Joh. i. 3. *and by him all things consist ; that all things were*
made by him, and without him was not any thing
made that was made : All this likewise, is very
 agreeable to sound and unprejudiced Reason. For
 that neither the whole, nor any part of the World
 neither the Form, nor Motion, nor Matter of the
 World, could exist of itself, by any Necessity in
 its own Nature ; is abundantly demonstrable from
 undeniable Principles of Reason ; as has been
 shown in my former Discourse. Consequently
 both the whole World, and all the Variety of
 things that now exist therein, must of Necessity
 have received both their Being itself, and all
 their Form and Manner of being, from God the
 alone Supreme and Self-existent Cause ; and must
 needs depend upon his Good-pleasure every mo-
 ment, for the continuance and preservation of
 that Being. Accordingly, if we set aside the *Epi-*
cureans, (whose absurd Hypothesis has long since
 been given up even by all Atheists themselves ;
 and some very few others, who with no less Absur-
 dity (as I have also at large shown) contend
 that the World was in its present Form Self-ex-
 istent and Necessary ; All the Philosophers of
 Ages, (even * not excepting those who held the
 Eternity of the World,) have unanimously agreed
 in this great Truth, that the World evidently owes
 both its Being and Preservation to God, the Su-
 preme Cause and Author of all Things. And
 then, that God made the World by the Operation
 of his Son ; though this could not indeed be known

* See former Vo-
 lume, pag.
 30, &c.

known certainly without exprefs Revelation ; yet it by no means incredible, or contrary to right Reason. For, to the judgment of Reason, 'tis one and the fame thing, whether God made the World imediately by himself, or mediately by the Ministration of a Second Principle. And what Plato and his Followers have said concerning a second *Noûs* or Mind, whom they frequently stile *μινιστρος* the Minister or Workman *by whom* God framed all things ; proves undeniably thus much at least, that the Doctrines delivered in Scripture concerning this Matter, cannot be rejected as inconsistent and irreconcilable with right Reason.

4. That, about the Space of 6000 Years since, *Of the Formation of the Earth.* the Earth was without Form and Void, that is, a confused Chaos ; out of which God framed this beautiful and useful Fabrick we now inhabit, and Gen. i. 2. stocked it with the Seeds of all kinds of Plants, and formed upon it *Man*, and all the other Species of Animals it is now furnished with ; is also very agreeable to right Reason. For though the precise Time indeed, when all this was done, could not now have been known exactly, without Revelation ; yet even at this day, there are remaining many considerable and very strong rational Proofs, which make it exceedingly probable, (separate from the Authority of Revelation,) that this present Frame and Constitution of the Earth, cannot have been of a very much longer date. The universal Tradition delivered down from all the most ancient Nations. of the World, both learned and barbarous ; The constant and agreeing *Doctrine* of all ancient Philosophers and Poets, concerning the Earth's being formed within such a Period of Time, out of Water or a Chaos ; The manifold *absurdities and Contradictions* of those few Accounts, which pretend to a much greater Antiquity ; The

Number of Men, with which the Earth is at present inhabited ; The *late Original of Learning and all useful Arts and Sciences* ; The *Impossibility*, that universal Deluges, or other Accidents, should at certain long Periods have oft-times destroyed far the greatest part of Mankind, with the Memory of all former Actions and Inventions, and yet never have happened to destroy them All ; The changes that must necessarily fall out naturally in the Earth in vast length of Time, by the Sinking and Washing down of Mountains, the Consumption of Water by Plants, and innumerable other such like Accidents ; These (I say) and many more Arguments, drawn from Nature, Reason and Observation, make That Account of the Time of the Earth's Formation exceedingly probable in itself, which from the Revelation delivered in Scripture-History we believe to be certain.

*Of the
continual
Govern-
ment of
Providence*

5. That the same God who created all things by the Word of his Power, and upholds and preserves them by his continual Concourse, does also by his All-wise *Providence* perpetually govern and direct the issues and events of things ; takes care of this lower World, and of all, even the smallest things, that are therein ; disposes things in a regular Order and Succession in every Age, from the beginning of the World to its final Period and inquests, with a more particular and special regard, the moral Actions of Men : This, as is far more expressly, clearly, and constantly taught in Scripture, than in any of the Writings of the Philosophers ; so it is also highly agreeable to right and true Reason. For, that an Omnipresent and infinitely Wise Being, cannot but know every thing that is done in every part of the Universe, and with equal Ease take notice of the minutest things as of the greatest ; That

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infinitely powerful Being, must needs govern and direct every thing in such manner and to such ends, as he knows to be best and fittest in the whole; so far as is consistent with that Liberty of Will, which he has made essential to all rational creatures; And that an infinitely *Just and Good* Governour, cannot but take more particular and exact notice of the moral Actions of all his rational Creatures, and how far they are conformable or not conformable to the Rules he has set them; All this (I say) is most evidently agreeable to right Reason, and, as has been before shewn, deducible from it.

6. *That* God, after the Formation of the Earth, created Man at first *upright and innocent*, and placed him in a *happy and paradisiacal* State, where he enjoyed plenty and abundance of all things without labour or sorrow; And that *Sin* was the original Cause, that now on the contrary the very ground is *curst* and barren for our sake, and in Gen. iii. 17, 18, 19. *we eat of it all the Days of our Life*; that *thorns also and thistles are brought forth to us*, and *the sweat of our face we eat bread, till we return to the ground*; This likewise is very reasonable and credible in itself: As appears, not only from the abstract consideration of the nature of the thing; but also from the general Opinion that the ancient and nearest Heathens entertained, upon very obscure and uncertain Tradition, that the original State of Man was innocent and simple, and the Earth, whereon they dwelt, * *fruitful of itself, and abundant with all plenty*; and that God, for the Sin of Man, changed this Happy Constitution of things, and made Labour necessary for the support of our Lives.

κατάσκευσεν, ἠφάνισεν πάντα, καὶ διὰ πόνου τὸν βίον ἀπέδειξε. Calanus Indu and Strabon. lib. 15.

* Τὸ παλαιὸν πάντ' ἦν ἀλφει-
των καὶ ἀλεύρων πλήρη, κατὰ περ
καὶ νῦν κοινοῦς καὶ κρήναι δ' ἔρρεον,
αἱ μὲν ὕδατος, γάλακτος δ' αἰ-
λαι καὶ ὀρυζίας αἱ μὲν μέλιτος, αἱ
δ' οἶνου, τινὲς δ' ἐλαίου ὑπὸ πλησ-
μοῦς, δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τροφῆς,
εἰς ὅσον ἐξέπεσον. Ζεὺς ὁ μισήσας

Of the
Flood.

7. That in process of Time, after the first entrance of Sin into the World, Men by degrees corrupted themselves more and more ; 'till at

* 'Επει δὲ ἡ τῆ θεοῦ μὴ μοῖρα ἐξήτηλ' ἐγένετο ἐν αὐτοῖς, πολλὰ τῷ θνητῷ ἢ ποδάκης ἀνακατασκευασμένη, τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπινον ἦδ' ἐπεκράτει. ὅτε θεὸς ὁ Θεὸν Ζεὺς, αὐτὸς δυνάμει καθεσθῆναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐνοήσας γέν' ἐπιεικὲς ἐθλίας διατιθεμένων, διὰ αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βελήδεις, &c. *Plato in Critia five Atlantico.*

length God, for the * punishment of their Sin and Incurribleness, brought upon them a general Flood, which destroyed them all, except a few Persons, preserved for the restoration of humane Race ; is a Truth delivered down to us, not only by Authority of Scripture, but also by the concurrent Testimony of almost all

Heathen Philosophers and Poets : And the Histories of all Nations backwards, terminate in it : And, (which is the most remarkable thing of all, because it is a demonstrative and ocular Proof of the *Universality* of some such kind of Dissolution ;) the present visible Frame and Constitution of the Earth throughout ; the Disposition and Situation of the several Strata of different kind of Matter, whereof it is composed ; the numberless Shells of Fishes, Bones of other Animals, and parts of all kinds of Plants, which in every Country and in almost every place are at great variety of Depths found inclosed in Earth, in Clay, in Stones, and in all sorts of Matter ; are such *apparent* Demonstrations of the Earth's having been in *Some Former Times* and perhaps more than Once, (the *whole Surface* of it at least) in a state of Fluidity ; that whosoever has seen the Collections of this kind made by the very ingenious Dr Woodward and others, must in a manner abandon all Use both of his Senses and Reason, if he can in the least doubt of this Truth.

Of God's
revealing
himself to
the Patri-

8. That God, after the Flood, made particular Revelation of himself and of his Will to the Patriarchs ; is a thing very credible in itself, for

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the same reasons that I have before shown in general, that the Expectation of some Revelation from God, was a reasonable and probable Expectation. And that, after this, God should vouchsafe by Express Revelation to give a *Law* to the whole Nation of the *Jews*, consisting very much in Sacrifices, and in external Rites and ceremonious Observances ; cannot with any just reason be rejected as an incredible Fact ; if we consider, that such a kind of Institution was necessary in those Times and Circumstances, to preserve that Nation from the Idolatry and Worship of false Gods, wherewith the Countries around them were overspread ; that those Rites and Ceremonies were typical of, and preparative to, a higher and more excellent Dispensation ; that the Jews were continually told by their Prophets, that their observance of those Rites and Ceremonies was by no means so highly acceptable to God, nor so absolutely and indispensably insisted upon by him, as obedience to the Moral Law ; and that the whole matter of Fact relating to that Revelation, is delivered down to us in a History, on which the policy of a whole Nation was founded, at a time when no body could be ignorant of the truth of the principal Facts, and concerning which we can now have no more reason to doubt, than of any History of any antient matter of fact in the World. The most considerable and difficult difficulty, viz. Why this Favour was granted to that *single* Nation only, and not to all the rest of the World likewise ; is to be accounted for by the same Reasons, which prove (as has been before shown) that God was not obliged to make known the *Revelation of the Gospel*, to all Men like.

arches, and giving the Law to the Jews.

pag. 318.

9. That all the other particulars of *Scripture-History* contained in the *Old Testament*, are true Relations

Of the other particulars of Scripture-

History in
the Old
Testament.

* lib. 1.
c. 16. and
lib. 3. c.
16. where
see the Ci-
tations at
large.

* Δουκαλίονι Φασι περιφερὴν
ἐκ τῆς λάρνακος ἀφιεμένην δὴλω-
μα γενέσθαι, χειμῶν δὲ μὴ ἴσω
πάλιν εἰσδομένην, ἐνθαυτῇ ἀποπ-
τῶσαν. Plutarch: utrum Ter-
restria an Aquatica animantia
plus habeant solertiae.

† Οἱ δὲ [Μωσῶν] διαδεζόμενοι,
χρόνος μὲν τινὰς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
δέμνουν δικαιοπραγῶντες, καὶ θε-
οσεεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντες. Επειτ.
&c. lib. 16.

Relations of Matter of Fact ; (not to insist now on the many Arguments which prove in general the Antiquity , Genuineness , and Authority of the Books themselves ;) will to a rational Inquirer appear very credible from hence ; that very many of the particular Histories, and some even of the minuter Circumstances also of those Histories, are confirmed by concurrent Testimonies of profane and unquestionably unprejudiced Authors. Of which Grotius, in his excellent Book of * the Truth of the Christian Religion, has given us a large Collection. As particularly ; that the manner of the Formation of the Earth out of a Chaos, is mentioned by the Antientest Phœnician, Egyptian, Indian and Greek Historians ; the very Names of Adam and Eve, by Sanchuniathon and others ; the longævity of the Antidiluvians, by Berosus and Manethos, and others ; the Ark of Noah, by Berosus ; many particulars of the Flood, by Ovid and others ; the Family of Noah, and two of every kind of Animals entering into the Ark with him, mentioned by Lucian himself, as a Tradition of the Antient Græcians ; The Dove which Noah sent out of the Ark, by Abydenus and * Plutarch ; the building of Babel, by Abydenus ; the burning of Sodom, by Diodorus Siculus and Strabo and Tacitus and others ; several particulars of the History of Abraham and the rest of the Patriarchs, by Berosus and others ; many particulars of Moses's Life, by several antient Writers ; the eminent Piety of the most antient Jews, by † Strabo and Justin ; divers Actions of David and Solomon, in the Phœnician Annals ; some of the Actions of Elijah

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by *Menander*, and confessed by *Julian* himself; the History of *Jonah*, under the name of *Hercules*, by *Lycophron* and *Æneas Gazæus*; and the Histories of the following Times, by many more Authors. Besides that (as * learned Men have upon * See *Stillingfleet's* exceeding probable grounds supposed,) many of the most antient Scripture-histories are acknowledged and asserted in the Writings of the Poets, both Greeks and Latins; the true Histories being touched under *fictional* Names and *fabulous* Representations.

lingfleet's
Origin. sacræ. lib. 3. cap 5. And
Bocharti
Phaleg, &
Vossius de
Idololatria

10. That God, in the fulness of Time; that is, that time which his infinite Wisdom had fore-appointed, which all the Antient Prophecies had determined, and which many concurrent Circumstances in the state of the Jewish Religion, and in the disposition of the Roman Empire, had made a fit reason for the reception and propagation of a new Institution of Religion: that God (I say) at that Time, should send his Only-begotten Son, That Word or Wisdom of the Father, That Divine Person by whom (as has been before shown) he created the World, and by whom he made all former particular Manifestations of himself unto Men; that he should send him, to take upon him our humane nature, and therein to make a full and particular revelation of the Will of God to Mankind, (who by Sin had corrupted themselves and forfeited the favour of God, so that by the bare Light of Nature they could not discover any certain means by which they could be satisfactorily and absolutely secure of regaining that Favour;) To preach unto Men Repentance and Remission of Sin, and, by giving himself a Sacrifice and Expiation for Sin, to declare the Acceptableness of Repentance, and the Certainty of Pardon thereupon, in a Method evidently consistent with all necessary Vindication of the Honour and Authority of the Divine Laws,

Of God's
sending his
Son into
the World
for the Re-
demption of
Mankind.

Laws, and with God's irreconcilable Hatred against Sin; *To* be a Mediator and Intercessor, between God and Man; *To* procure the particular Assistance of God's Holy Spirit, which might be in Men a new and effectual Principle of a Heavenly and Divine Life; in a word, *To* be the Saviour and Judge of Mankind, and finally to bring them to Eternal Life: All this, when clearly and expressly revealed, and by good Testimony proved to be so revealed; is apparently agreeable and very credible to right and true Reason. As (because it is the main and fundamental Article of the Christian Faith,) I shall endeavour to make out more largely and distinctly, by showing in particular, that none of the several Objections, upon which *Speculative* Unbelievers reject this Doctrine, do at all prove any inconsistency in the belief of it, with sound and unprejudiced Reason.

That 'tis not unreasonable to suppose God making a Revelation of his Will to Men.

For, *First*; it cannot be thought unreasonable to be believed in the general, that God should make a *Revelation of his Will* to Mankind; since on the contrary, (as has been before proved at large,) it is very agreeable to the Moral Attributes of God, and to the Notions and Expectations of the Wisest and most rational Men that lived in the Heathen World.

That 'tis not unreasonable to believe, that God would appoint a Sacrifice or Expiation for Sin.

Secondly, It cannot be thought unreasonable to be believed, that in such a Revelation, wherein God freely proclaims Remission of Sin, and the Acceptableness of Repentance, he should nevertheless have appointed such a *Sacrifice* or *Expiation for Sin*, as might at the same time be a sufficient Testimony of his irreconcilable Hatred against it. For though, by the Light of Nature it was indeed exceeding probable and to be hoped for, that God would forgive Sin upon true Repentance; yet it could not be proved, that he

was absolutely obliged to do so, or that he *would* certainly do so. On the contrary, there was reason to suppose, that, in Vindication of the Honour and Dignity of his Laws, he would require some further Satisfaction and Expiation. And accordingly we find the Custom of *Sacrificing*, to have prevailed universally over the Heathen World in all Ages: Which, how unreasonable soever an expectation it was, to think that the Blood of Beasts could truly expiate Sin, yet thus much it plainly and undeniably shows, that it has been the common Apprehension of Mankind in all Ages, that God would not be appeased nor pardon Sin without some Punishment and Satisfaction; and yet at the same Time they had good Hopes, that, upon the Repentance of Sinners, God would accept some other Satisfaction instead of the Destruction of the Offenders. 'Tis therefore plainly agreeable to right Reason, to believe that God, in Vindication of the Honour of his Laws, and for a Testimony of his Hatred against Sin, should appoint some Sacrifice or Expiation for Sin, at the same Time that he forgives the Sinner upon his true Repentance.

Thirdly, It cannot be thought unreasonable to be believed, that a *Mediator* or *Intercessor* should be appointed between God and Man, through and by whom the Prayers of Sinners may be offered up so as to be acceptable in the Sight of God. 'Tis well known, the generality of the best Heathens thought it agreeable to Reason, to make use of Subordinate Intelligences, Dæmons or Heroes, by whom they put up their Prayers to the Superiour Gods; hoping that by the Mediation of those Intercessours, the unworthiness of their own persons, and the defects of these Prayers might be supplied; and they might obtain such merciful and gracious Answers to their Prayers, as they could

That 'tis not unreasonable to believe, that a Mediator should be appointed between God and Man.

could not presume to hope for upon their own Account. Wherein though those Pagans laboured indeed under very great Uncertainty, in doing a thing for which they had no sufficient Warrant, and in using Mediators whom they neither knew distinctly to have any Being, nor could they however have any good Security that such Mediation would be acceptable to the Supreme God; Yet at the same time this undeniably proves, that 'tis by no means inconsistent with right Reason, to believe that a Mediator may by Divine Authority be appointed between God and sinful Men, to be their Intercessor and Advocate with a justly offended God.

*Of the
Objection
drawn
from the
Dignity of
the Person
whom we
believe to
be our Me-
diator and
Redeemer.*

Fourthly, The greatest real Difficulty in this Matter, to the Judgment of right Reason, seems to arise from the consideration of the *Dignity of the Person*, whom we believe to have given himself a Sacrifice and Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind; viz. how 'tis possible, that the *Only-begotten Son of God* should be *Incarnate* and become *Man*; how 'tis conceivable that *God* should descend so far as to *send*, and the *Son of God* should descend willingly to *be sent*, and do such great things for his Creatures; and above all, how 'tis consistent with Reason, to suppose *God* condescending to do so much for such *frail* and *weak* Creatures as *Men*, who, in all appearance, seem to be but a very small, low, and inconsiderable part of the Creation. And here indeed it may readily be acknowledged, that humane Reason could never have discovered such a Method for this, for the reconciliation of Sinners to an offended God, without express Revelation. But this neither on the other Side, when once this Method is made known, is there any such Difficulty or Inconceivableness in it, as can reasonably make a wise and considerate Man call in question

truth of a well-attested Revelation, merely upon that account : Which indeed, any plain Absurdity or Contradiction in the Matter of a Doctrine pretended to be revealed, would, it must be confessed, unavoidably do. For, as to the *Possibility of the Incarnation of the Son of God* ; whatever Myseriousefulness there confessedly was in the *Manner* of it, yet, as to the thing itself, there is evidently no more unreasonableness in believing the possibility of it, than in believing the Union of Our Soul and Body, or any other certain Truth which we plainly see implies no Contradiction in the thing itself, at the same time that we are sensible we cannot discover the *manner* how it is affected. Again ; As to the incredibility of the *Doctrine*, that God should make so great a *Condescension* to his Creatures ; and that a Person of such Dignity as the Only-begotten Son of God, should vouchsafe to give himself a Sacrifice for the Sins of Men : He that duly considers, how 'tis no diminution to the Glory and Greatness of the Father of all things, to inspect, govern, and direct every thing by his All-wise Providence through the whole Creation ; to take care even of the meanest of his Creatures, so that not a Sparrow falls to the ground or a hair of our head perishes without his knowledge ; and to observe exactly every Particle even of inanimate Matter in the Universe : he (I say) who duly considers This, cannot with Reason think it any real Disparagement to the *Son* of God, (though it was indeed a most wonderful and amazing Instance of Humility and Condescension,) that he should concern himself so far for sinful Men, as to appear in Their Nature to reveal the Will of God more clearly to them, to give himself a Sacrifice and Expiation for their Sins, and to bring them to Repentance and Eternal Life. The greatest Enemies

mies and Deriders of Christianity, have asserted things *far more* incredible, to have been done upon *far less* Occasions : Witness what *Julian* the A-

* Ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν
Ἀσκληπίου ἐγέννησεν εἰς τὴν γῆν
ἀπὸ τῆς ἡλίας γούμφου ζωῆς ἐνέφη-
θεν· οὗτος ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποι-
ησάμενος πρόθεον, ἐνοειδῶς μὲν
περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη. *Ju-*
lian.

postate * thought fit to believe concerning *Æsculapius's* coming down from Heaven, and conversing upon Earth in a visible Form, only to teach Men the Art of healing Diseases. And

Modern Unbelievers, who seem

willing, in the contrary Extreme, to deny God's having *any* regard, or taking *any* care in any respect, for the Welfare and Happiness of his Creatures; are forced, if they will go about to give any account or explication of things, to invent much more incredible Hypotheses, dishonourable to God, and utterly inconsistent with his Divine Attributes. Indeed, if we will consider things impartially; so far is it from being truly any diminution of the Greatness and Glory of God, to send his *Son* into the World for the Redemption and Salvation of Mankind; that, on the contrary, 'tis a Means of bringing the very greatest Honour to the Laws and Government of God that can be imagined. For, What can be imagined more honourable, and worthy of the Supreme Lord and Governour of all things; than to shew forth his Mercy and Goodness, in forgiving the Sins of frail and fallible Creatures, and suffering himself to be reconciled to them upon their true Repentance; and yet at the same time to cause such an Expiation to be made for Sin, by the sufferings and Death of his own Son in Their Nature as might be an abundant Evidence of his irreconcilable Hatred against Sin, a just Vindication of the Authority and Dignity of his Laws, and a sufficient and effectual Warning to deter Men from Sin, to create in them the greatest Dread

and Detestation of it, and for ever to terrify them from venturing upon wilful Transgression and Disobedience? 'Tis true, no Man can take upon him certainly to say, but God by his absolute Sovereignty and Authority, might, if he had so pleased, have pardoned Sin upon Repentance, without any Sacrifice or Expiation at all. But This Method of doing it by the Death of Christ, is more wise and fit, and evidently more proper and effectual to discountenance and prevent Presumption, to discourage Men from repeating their Transgressions, to give them a deep Sense of the heinous Nature of Sin, and to convince them of the excellency and importance of the Laws of God, and the indispensable Necessity of paying Obedience to them; Forasmuch as it shows us, that at the same time that God was willing to save the Sinner, yet, least encouragement should be given to Sin by letting it go unpunished, he did not think it to forgive the Transgressions of Men without great Sufferings in Our Nature, and to put away the guilt of our Sins but upon such difficult Terms as the Death of his own Son. So that in this Dispenation, Justice and Mercy and Truth are met together, Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other. And by how much the greater the Dignity of the Person was, who gave himself thus a Sacrifice for the Sins of Men; of so much the greater Weight and Force is this Argument to deter Men from the future from Sin, and to convince them of the Necessity of Obedience. Wherefore so far is it from being true, that the consideration of the Dignity of the Person suffering, is a real Objection against the credibility of the Doctrine; that, on the contrary, That very Consideration contains the highest Vindication imaginable, of the Greatness and Honour and Authority of the Laws of God; and at the same Time, the greatest pos-

sible Instance or Expression of his Mercy and Compassion towards Men, agreeable to our natural Notions of his Divine Attributes. And then, as to the *last* part of this Difficulty, *viz.* how it can be consistent with Reason, to suppose God condescending to do so very great Things for such *mean* and *weak* Creatures, as *Men* are; who in all appearance, seem to be but a very *small*, *low* and *inconsiderable* part of the Creation; forasmuch as the whole Earth itself, is but a little Spot that bears no proportion at all to the Universe; and, in all probability of Reason, the large and numberless Orbs of Heaven cannot but be supposed to be filled with Beings more capable, than we, to show forth the Praise and Glory of their Almighty Creator, and more worthy to be the Objects of his Care and Love: To this part of the Difficulty, I say, the Answer is very easy: *That* the Mercy and Love of the infinitely good God, is extended equally over all his Works; *That*, let the Universe be supposed as large, and the rational Creatures with which it is furnished, as many and excellent as any one can imagine; yet Mankind is plainly the chief, indeed the only Inhabitant, for whose sake 'tis evident this our Globe of Earth was formed into a habitable World; and this our Earth is, as far as we have any means of judging, as considerable and worthy of the Divine Care, as most other parts of the System; and this our System, as considerable, as any other single System in the Universe; and finally, *that*, in like manner as the same Divine Providence, which presides over the whole Creation, does particularly govern and direct every thing in this our lower World, as well as in every other particular part of the Universe; so there is no real Difficulty to right Reason, in conceiving that the same Divine *Logos*, the *Word* or *Messenger* of the Father, who in various Dispensations, ac-

ordin

According to the particular Needs and Exigencies of Mankind, has made various Manifestations of God and Discoveries of the Divine Will, to Us here upon Earth; may also, for ought we know, have made to other Beings, in other parts of the Universe, according to their several Capacities or Wants, made different Manifestations of God and Discoveries of his Will, in ways of which we can know nothing, and in which we have no Concern: There being nothing in this, at all contrary to the Nature of God, or the Condition of things.

Fifthly and Lastly; If any one thinks it unreasonable to be believed, that God should send his Son into the World for the Redemption of Mankind; and yet that this appearance of the Son of God upon Earth, should not be till the *later Ages* of the World; and, after he has appeared, yet his appearance not be made known equally to all Nations: Such a one * must likewise for the same Reason affirm, that 'tis unreasonable to believe the Necessity and Obligations even of Natural Religion itself, because 'tis plain all Men are not furnished equally with the same Capacities and Opportunities of understanding those Obligations; And consequently no Deist can, consistently with his own Principles, make *This* Objection against the Truth of Christianity. He must likewise for the same Reason affirm, that God is obliged in all other respects also to make all his Creatures equal; to make Men, Angels; to endue All Men with the same Faculties and Capacities, As Any; at least, to make all Men capable of the very same *Kind*, and the same *Degree* of Happiness, and to afford to All of them, all the very same Means and Opportunities of obtaining it: In a word, he must assert, that infinite Wisdom cannot reasonably be supposed to have a Right of making variations of Creatures in very various Circumstances:

Of the Objection drawn from the Christian Revelation not being in fact Universal. See above, pag. 318.

Which is an Assertion palpably most absurd, in Experience false, and a very unjust diminution of God's Sovereignty in the World. But besides: Though the Redemption purchased by the Son of God, is not indeed actually made known unto All Men; yet as no Man ever denied, but that the Benefit of the Death of Christ extended backwards to those who lived *before* his Appearance in the World; so no Man can prove, but that the same Benefit may likewise extend itself forwards to those who never heard of his Appearance, though they lived *after* it.

Of the
other Particulars of
Scripture-
history
contained
in the New
Testament.

II. That the History of the Life of Christ, contained in the New Testament, is a true Relation of Matters of Fact, (not to insist here on the Testimony of his Disciples and Followers, which shall be considered hereafter in its proper place;) will to a rational Inquirer appear very credible from hence; that very many Particulars of that History, are confirmed by concurrent Testimonies of profane and unquestionably unprejudiced Authors. That, before the coming of our Saviour, there was a general Expectation spread over all the Eastern Nations, that out of *Judæa* should arise a Person, who should be Governour of the World

is expressly affirmed by the Roman Historians, * *Suetonius* and *Tacitus* †. That there lived in *Judæa*, at the time which the Gospel relates, such a Person as *Jesus of Nazareth*; is acknowledged by all Authors, both Jewish and Pagan, who have written since that Time. The *Star* that appeared at his Birth, and the Journey of the *Chaldæan* Wise Men, is mentioned by || *Chalcidius*

* *Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus & constans opinio, esse in fatis, ut Judæa profecti rerum potirentur. Sueton.*

† *Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis Sacerdotum libris contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judæa rerum potirentur. Tacit. lib. 21.*

|| See the Place cited by *Grotius*, de Veritate Christianæ Religionis, lib. 3. c. 14.

the Platonist. *Herod's* causing all the Children in *Bethlehem* under two Years old to be Slain, and a Reflexion made upon him on that occasion by the Emperour *Augustus*, is related by * *Macrobius*. Many of the *Miracles* that *Jesus* worked in his Life-time, are, as to matters of Fact; (particularly his healing the *Lame* and the *Blind*, and casting out *Devils*;) expressly owned by the most implacable Enemies of Christianity, by † *Celsus* and *Julian*, and the Authors of the *Jewish Talmud*. And how the Power of the Heathen Gods ceased after the coming of *Christ*, is acknowledged by ‖ *Porphry*, who attributes it ‖ *Ibid.* to their being Angry at the setting up of the Christian Religion, which he stiles impious and profane. Many Particulars of the collateral History, concerning *John Baptist*, and *Herod* and *Pilate*, (not to mention the famous Testimony concerning *Jesus* himself, because 'tis by Some suspected not to be genuine, notwithstanding it is found in all the antient Copies;) are largely recorded by *Josephus*. The Crucifixion of *Christ* under *Pontius Pilate*, is related by † *Tacitus*: And divers of the most remarkable Circumstances attending it, such as the *Earthquake* and miraculous *Darkness*, were recorded in the ** publick Roman Registers, commonly appealed to by the first Christian Writers as what could not be denied by the Adversaries themselves. Then, as

* Cum audisset [*Augustus*,] inter pueros quos in Syria *Herodes Rex Judæorum intra bimatum* jussit interfici, filium quoque ejus occisum; ait, *Melius est Herodis porcum esse quam filium*. *Macrobius*. lib. 2. cap. 4. [A Testimony so very remarkable and pertinent, that 'tis strange how *Grotius* could omit to mention it in the place now cited.]

† See the places cited by *Grotius*, de *Veritate Christ. Rel.* lib. 2. cap. 5.

‡ *Tiberio* imperitante, per procuratorem *Pontium Pilatum*, supplicio affectus erat. lib. 15.

** Eum mundi casum relatum in *Arcanis vestris* habetis. *Tertullian. Apol.*

to the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ ; these depend on the general Proofs of the credibility of his *Disciples* Testimony, and other *following Evidences* ; which will be considered hereafter in their proper place.

*Of the Day
of Judgment, and
Christ the
Judge.*

12. *That* God has appointed a *Day*, wherein he will judge the *World in Righteousness*, by *That Person* whom he has ordained, in order to reward every Man according to his Works ; is a Doctrine perfectly agreeable to right Reason, and to our Natural Notions of the Attributes of God : As may appear more particularly from what has been before said concerning the Necessity and Certainty of another Life after this ; and is evident from the Opinion of all the wiser Heathens concerning this Matter. Nor may it perhaps be altogether impertinent to observe here, that the Poets both Greek and Latin have unanimously agreed in this one particular Circumstance, that Men after Death should not have Judgment passed upon them immediately by God himself, but by *just Men* appointed for that purpose.

*Of the Resurrection
of the
Body.*

13. *That*, in order to this final Judgment, not only the Soul shall survive the Dissolution of the Body, but the *Body itself* also shall be *raised again* ; This Doctrine, though not indeed discoverable with any kind of certainty by the bare Light of Nature ; because the belief of the Soul's Immortality (for ought that appears to Reason alone) is sufficient to answer all the purposes of a Future State, as far as is discoverable merely by the Light of Nature ; Yet this Doctrine (I say *of the Resurrection of the Body*, when made known by Revelation, evidently contains nothing in the least contrary to right Reason. For, what reasonable Man can deny, but that 'tis plainly all together

together as easy for God to raise the Body again after Death, as to create and form it at first?

Some of the * Stoical Philosophers seem to have thought it not only possible, but even probable: And many of the Jews, who had no express Revelation concerning it, did yet believe it

* Δήλον ὡς ἔδεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἡμᾶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι, πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν εἰλυμένων χρόνῳ, εἰς ὃ νῦν ἐσμὲν ἀποκαταστήσασθαι ἡμᾶς. *Chrysippus, citat. a Lactant. lib. 7.*

upon an ancient Tradition; as appears from all their Writings, and particularly from the Translation of the last Verse of the Book of *Job*, which according to *the Seventy* runs thus; *So Job died, being old and full of Days; but †*

it is written that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises up. The only real difficulty in

† Γέγραπται ὅτι αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναστήσεται, μετ' ὧν ὁ Κύριος ἀνίστησι. *Job 42. ult.*

this Doctrine, seems to arise upon putting the Supposition of one Body's being turned into the Nourishment, and becoming part of the Substance of another; so as that the same parts may equally belong to two Bodies, to both of which it shall nevertheless be absolutely impossible that the same parts should be restored. But this Objection, as great and principal a Difficulty as it is, is really but a great *Trifle*. For there does not at all appear any absolute Necessity, that, to constitute the same Body, there must be an exact re-stitution of all and only the same Parts. And if there was any such Necessity; yet even still, without making that hard Supposition (which || *Grotius* and others have done) that God by a miraculous Providence always interposes to prevent the Parts of one humane Body from incorporating with and becoming the Nourishment of another; for I cannot see any sufficient Ground to deny, but that it may be possible in Nature, for barbarous *Cannibals*, if any such there be, to subsist for

|| De Veritate Rel. Chr. lib. 2. c. 10.

some time and live wholly one upon another, if deprived of all other Sustainance :) Without any such hard Suppositions as these (I say,) 'tis easy to imagine many ways, by which the Resurrection of the same Body, properly speaking, shall nevertheless be very possible; and the whole Foundation of this, and all other Difficulties of this kind, concerning the Parts and Forms and Magnitudes and Proportions of our future Bodies, be entirely taken away.

Of the Resurrection of the same Body.

As, *First*; No Man can say 'tis improbable, (and they who have been most and best versed in Microscopical Observations, think it more than probable,) that the *original Stamina*, which contain all and every one of the solid Parts and Vessels of the Body, not excepting even the minutest Nerves and Fibres, are themselves the *entire Body*; and that all the *extraneous Matter*, which, coming in by way of Nourishment, fills up and extends the minute and insensible Vessels, of which all the visible and sensible Vessels are composed, is not strictly and properly Part of the Body. Consequently, while all this *extraneous Matter*, which serves only to swell the Body to its just magnitude, is in *continual Flux*, the *original Stamina* may continue *unchanged*; and so no Confusion of Bodies will be possible in Nature. There may be made many very considerable Observations, concerning the *determinate Figure* into which every respective Body unfolds itself by Growth; concerning the Impossibility of the Body's extending itself by any Nourishment whatsoever, beyond *that certain Magnitude*, to which the original Vessels are capable of being unfolded; and concerning the *Impossibility of restoring* by any Nourishment any the smallest Vessel or solid part of the Body, that has at any time

happened

happened to be mutilated by any Accident; All which Observations, often and carefully made, will seem very much to favour some such Speculation as This.

Secondly: It may also be supposed otherwise, not without good probability,

that * in like manner as in every Grain of Corn there is contained a minute insensible feminal Principle, which is itself the entire future Blade and Ear, and in due season, when all the rest of the Grain is corrupted, evolves and unfolds itself visibly into that Form; so our present mortal and

* Ἡμεῖς μὲν ἐν ᾧ φαμέν τὸ διαφθαρεν σῶμα ἐπ' ἀνέρχεσθαι εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν, ὡς ἔδει τὸ διαφθαρέντα κόκκον ἔσπευ. λέγομεν γὰρ, ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῷ κόκκῳ τῆ σίτου ἐγγίγεται εἶδος οὕτω λόγῳ τις ἐγκύεται τῷ σώματι. ἀφ' οὗ μὴ φθειρομένου ἐγγίγεται τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ. *Origen. advers. Cels. lib. 5.*

corruptible Body may be but the *Exuviae*, as it were, of some hidden and at present insensible Principle, (possibly the present Seat of the Soul,) which at the Resurrection shall discover itself in its proper Form. This way also, there can be no confusion of Bodies, possibly in Nature. And 'tis not without some Weight, that the Antientest Writers of the Church have always made use of this very Similitude; that the Apostle St Paul himself, alleges the same Comparison; and that the Jewish Writers seem to have had some obscure glimpse of this Notion, when they talked of a certain *incorruptible* part of the Body; Though these latter indeed explained themselves very weakly and unphilosophically.

Many other ways perhaps may be imagined, by which the same thing may be explained intelligibly. But these Speculations are nice and subtle, and neither needful nor proper to be enlarged upon in this place. Only the bare mention of them, shows the manifold possibility of the Doctrine of the Resurrection; against the Objections of those who would have it seem contradictory.

14. Lastly;

Of the
eternal
Happiness
of the
Blessed,
and the
eternal
Punish-
ment of the
Damned.

14. Lastly ; That after the Resurrection and the general Judgment, wherein every Man shall be judged according to his Works ; they that have done well, shall go into *everlasting Happiness* ; and they that have done evil, into *everlasting Punishment* : is a Doctrine in itself very credible, and reasonable to be believed. Concerning the *everlasting Happiness* of the Righteous there is no dispute ; it being evident that God in his infinite Bounty may reward the sincere Obedience of his Creatures, as much beyond the Merit of their own weak and imperfect Works, as he himself pleases. But the *everlasting Punishment* threatened to the Wicked, has seemed to Many a great difficulty ; since 'tis certain from our Natural Notions of the Attributes of God, that no Man shall be punished beyond the just demerit of his Sins. Here therefore it is to be observed *first*, that no Man can say 'tis unreasonable, that they who by wilful and stubborn Disobedience to their Almighty Creatour and most merciful Benefactor, and by the habitual Practice of unrepented Wickedness, have, during the State of Trial, made themselves unfit for the enjoyment of the Happiness which God has prepared for them that love and obey him ; should be *eternally rejected* and *excluded* from it. Thus much, the wicked of Men are willing enough to believe : And that bare *Deprivation of Happiness* was all the Punishment they had reason to fear, they would be content to sit still in their Wickedness. But that it at all agreeable to Reason to believe, that such Punishment to be inflicted by the final Wrath of a provoked God upon his most obstinate and incorrigible Enemies, should be merely such a thing as is in its own Nature less dreadful and terrible, than even those Afflictions which by certain Experience we see in this present Life

someti

sometimes upon such Persons with whom God is not angry at all? Is it agreeable to reason to believe, that God, who (as is evident by experience) offers the very best of his own Servants, for the punishment of their Sins, or even only for the cryal of their Virtue, to fall sometimes under all the Calamities and Miseries, which 'tis possible for the cruellest and most powerful Tyrants to invent and execute; should punish his most obstinately rebellious and finally impenitent Creatures, with nothing more than the *Negation of Happiness*? There must therefore in the *next* place be some *sensible and positive Punishment*, besides the mere negative Loss of Happiness. And whoever seriously considers the dreadful Effects of God's Anger in this present world, in the Instance of the general *Deluge*, the overthrow of *Sodom and Gomorrha*, the amazing calamities which befel the whole *Jewish Nation* at the Destruction of *Jerusalem*, and other such like examples; in some of which Cases, the Judgments have fallen upon mixt multitudes of good men and bad together; (not to mention the calamities which sometimes befall even good Men themselves :) Whosoever, I say, seriously considers all this, cannot but frame to himself very terrible Apprehensions of the *Greatness* of that Punishment, which the despised Patience of God will finally inflict on the impenitently Wicked and Incurable, when they shall be separated from the good by themselves. And then, as to the Duration of this Punishment; no Man can presume, in our present State of Ignorance and Darkness, to be able truly to judge, barely by the strength of his own natural Reason, what in *this Respect* is not consistent with the Wisdom and Justice and Goodness of the supreme Governour of the world; since we neither know the *Place*, nor the *Kind*,

Kind, nor Manner, nor Circumstances, nor Degrees, nor All the Ends and Uses of the final Punishment of the Wicked. Only this one thing we are certain of, that the Justice of God will abundantly vindicate itself, and all Mouths shall be stopped before him, and be forced to acknowledge the exact Righteousness of all his Judgments, and to condemn their own Folly and Wickedness; forasmuch as the Degrees or Intensity of the Punishment which shall be inflicted on the Impenitent, shall be exactly proportionate to their Sins, as a Recompence of their Demerit, that no Man shall suffer more than he has deserved. This being once clearly established; the Difficulty about the Duration of the Punishment will not appear so insuperable to right Reason. For nothing can be more evident, than that God may justly banish the Wicked eternally from his Kingdom of Glory, and from that Happiness which is his Free and undeserved Gift to the Righteous: And the positive Punishment which shall be inflicted upon them in that State of Eternal Rejection, shall undoubtedly be such and proportionated to Men's Deserts, as the Righteous Judge will then make appear before Men and Angels, to be just and wise and necessary, and such only as becomes the infinitely Wise and Good Lord and Governour of the Universe to inflict. The Wiser of the Heathen Philosophers without the help of Revelation, have taught, as I did believe it agreeable to right Reason, that

Rev. xiv.
10. Shall
be torment-
ed with
Fire and
Brimstone,
in the pre-
sence of the
Holy An-
gels, and
in the pre-
sence of the
Lamb.

* Οἱ ὅτι ἀν' ὁδῶσιν ἀνάταρ ἐ-
χθιν ἅλα τὰ μεγάλα τῶν ἀμαρτη-
μάτων, τέτους ἢ προσήκουσα μοί-
ρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸ Τάρταρον, ὅθεν
ἐποτρὶ ἐκείνουσι. Plato in
Phaed.

* the Punishment of the incorrigible should be [αἰώνιος] without any determinate or known End. And We cannot tell how many Wise Designs God may see thereby. We know not

that, as God has now discovered
to Us in some measure the Fall
and Punishment of *evil Angels*,
to be a warning to Us; so he
may hereafter use the Example
of the Punishment of *Wicked and*

corrigible Men, to be a means of preserving o-
ther Beings in their Obedience. And many other
considerations there may possibly be, very ne-
cessary to enable us to judge rightly concerning
this Matter; which, in this present State, we
have no sufficient means of coming to the Know-
ledge of.

Thus all the *Credenda*, or *Doctrines*, which the
Christian Religion teaches; (that is, not only
those plain Doctrines which it requires to be be-
lieved as fundamental and of necessity to eter-
nal Salvation, but even *All* the Doctrines which it
teaches as Matters of Truth;) are in the *First*
place, though indeed many of them not discovera-
ble by bare Reason unassisted with Revelation,
when discovered by Reve-
lation, apparently most * agreea-
ble to sound and unprejudiced
Reason.

Ὡςπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νο-
μίσεις, ἔγω κὲ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων
ἐξηγηταὶ τεληταὶ τε κὲ μυσαγω-
γοί. *Cels. apud Origen. lib. 8.*

Οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι πάμπαν αἰωνίως
κακοῖς συνέζονται. *Id. ibid.*

* Τὰ τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν, ταῖς
κοιναῖς εἰσείαις ἀρχῇθεν συναγο-
ρευόμενα. *Origen. advers. Cels.
lib. 3.*

In the next place; Every one of these Doc- Every one
trines, has a natural Tendency, and a direct and of them
powerful Influence, to reform Mens Lives, and cor- has a direct
rect their Manners. This is the great End, and Tendency
the immediate Design, of all true Religion; and 'tis a and pow-
very great and fatal Mistake, to think that any erful In-
Doctrine or any Belief whatsoever, can be any fluence to
otherwise of any Benefit to Men, than as it is reform
directed to promote this main end. There was none Mens
of the Doctrines of our Saviour, (as an † excellent † Archbp.
state of our Church admirably expresses this Sharp's
matter) before the Sermon

Queen on
Christmas-
Day, 1704

matter) calculated for the gratification of Mens idle Curiosities, the busying and amusing them with airy and useless Speculations; Much less were they intended for an Exercise of our Credulity, or a Tryal how far we could bring our Reason to submit to our Faith: But, as on the one Hand they were plain and simple, and such as, by their agreeableness to the rational Faculties of Mankind, did highly recommend themselves to our Belief; so on the other Hand they had an immediate relation to Practice, and were the genuine Principles and Foundation upon which all humane and divine Virtues were naturally to be superstruëd. Particularly, What can be a more necessary and excellent Foundation of true Religion than That Doctrine which the Christian Religion clearly and distinctly teaches us, concerning the Nature and Attributes of the *One only true God* without any of that Ambiguity and Doubtfulness of those various and inconsistent Opinions and Conjectures, those uncertain and oft-times false Reasonings concerning the Nature of God, which notwithstanding the natural possibility of discovering very many of the Attributes of God by the Light of true Reason, did yet in Fact overspread the greatest part of the Heathen World with Polytheism or Atheism? What can be so certain a Preservative against Idolatry, and the Worship of false Gods; as the Doctrine, that *the Universe, the Heavens and the Earth, and all that contained therein, are the Creatures and Workmanship of the One true God, and have a continual dependence upon Him for the Preservation of their being?* What can be so sure a Ground of true Piety and Reliance upon God, as the clear Christian Doctrine concerning Providence, concerning God perpetually governing and directing the Issues of Events of all Things, and inspecting with a more especial regard the moral Actions of Men? what

Doctr

Doctrine was perplexed by the Philosophers with
 endless Disputes. What can be so just a Vindica-
 tion of the Goodness of God, and consequently
 necessary in order to our maintaining in our
 Minds worthy and honourable Notions concern-
 ing him; as the Doctrine, that *God created Man*
first Upright, and that *the Original of all Evil*
and Misery is Sin? the want of a clear Knowledge
 of which Truth, extremely perplexed the Hea-
 ven World, and made many recur to that most
 absurd Fiction of a Self-Existent *Evil Principle*.
 What can be a more proper Motive to Piety,
 than the Doctrine that *the Deluge* and other Re-
 markable Calamities which have befallen Man-
 kind, were sent upon them by God's immediate
 direction, as *Punishments* for their Wickedness?
 What can be a greater encouragement to the
 practice of Holiness, than the Doctrine, that *God*
at several times vouchsafed to make several par-
ticular Revelations of his Will to Men, to instruct
 and support them more effectually in that Prac-
 tice? But above all; What Doctrine could ever
 have been imagined so admirably fitted in all re-
 spects to promote all the Ends of true Religion,
 than that of the *Incarnation of the Son of God*? Which
 could Men have been filled with so deep
 sense of the Mercy and Love of God towards
 them, and have been instructed in all divine
 truths in a Method so well accommodated to
 their present Infirmities; as by *God's sending his*
only-begotten Son, to take upon him our Nature,
therein to make a general Revelation of the Will
of God to Mankind? How could the Honour and
 Majesty and Authority of the Laws of God have
 been so effectually vindicated, and at the same
 time so satisfactory an assurance of Pardon upon
 Repentance have been given unto Men; as
 this Method, of *the Son of God giving himself a*
Sacrifice

Sacrifice and Expiation for Sin? What could have been a more glorious Manifestation of the Mercy and Compassion of God, and at the same time a more powerful means to discountenance Men's Presumption, to discourage them from repeating their Transgressions, to give them a deep Sense of the heinous Nature of Sin, and of God's extreme Hatred and utter Irreconcilableness to it, and to convince them of the Excellency and Importance of the Laws of God and the indispensable Necessity of paying Obedience to them; that this Expedient of *saving Sinners by the Suffering and Death of the Son of God, and by establishing with them a new and gracious Covenant upon the Merit of that Satisfaction?* How could Men be better encouraged, to begin a religious Life; than by having such a *Mediator, Advocate, and Intercessor* for them with God, to obtain Pardon of all their Frailties; and by being assured of the *Assistance of the Spirit of God*, to enable them to conquer all their corrupt Affections, and to be in the an effectual Principle of a heavenly and divine Life? In fine; What stronger and more powerful Motives could possibly have been contrived to persuade Men to live virtuously, and to deter them from Vice; than the clear Discoveries made to us in the Gospel, of *God's having appointed a Day, wherein he will judge the World in Righteousness, every Man according to his Works; and that they who have done well, shall be adjudged to everlasting Happiness; and they that have done evil, to everlasting Punishment*: of which the Light of Nature affords Men but obscure Glimpses? And may we not hereupon the whole, appeal now even to our Adversaries themselves, whether in all and every one of the Doctrines there be not a more powerful, a more effectual Method laid down, for the reformation of humane Nature, and obliging the whole World

to forsake their Sins, and to lead holy and virtuous Lives ; than was ever taught before : nay, more than was possible to have been contrived by all the Wit of Mankind? This is the great and highest recommendation of the Christian Doctrine : This is what, to a well-disposed Mind, would well-nigh satisfactorily prove, even without the addition of any external Testimony, that the Revelation of Christianity could not possibly but come from God ; Seeing that, not only all its practical Precepts, but even all its *Articles of Belief* also, tend plainly to this one and the same End, to make Men universally amend and reform their Lives ; to recover and restore them to their original excellent State, from the Corruption and Misery which had been introduced by Sin ; and to establish upon Earth the Practice of everlasting Righteousness, and entire and hearty obedience to the Will of God : Which would have been the Religion of Men (had they continued Innocent) in Paradise, and now is the Religion of Angels, and for ever will be the Religion of Saints in Heaven. Vain Men may value themselves upon their speculative Knowledge, and to dissent in Right Opinions, and True and Orthodox Belief, separate from the Practice of Virtue and Righteousness ; But, as sure as the Gospel is true, no Relief whatsoever shall finally be of any Advantage to Men, any otherwise than only so far as it corrects their Practice, hinders them from being *Workers of Iniquity*, and makes them like unto

Luk. xiii.
7.

Lastly ; All the Doctrines of the Christian Religion, do *Together* make up an infinitely more *consistent and rational Scheme of Belief*, than any of the wisest of the Antient Philosophers ever did,

B b

And all of them Together, make up the most consistent

and rational Scheme
of Belief in
the World.

did, or the cunningest of Modern Unbelievers can invent or contrive. This is evident from a summary View of the forementioned Scheme of the Christian Doctrines; wherein every Article has a just dependence on the foregoing ones, and a close connexion with those that follow; and the whole account of the Order and Disposition of Things from the Original to the Consummation of all Things, is one intire, regular, compleat, consistent, and every way a most rational Scheme: Whereas the Wifest of the *Antient Philosophers*, that is, those of them who hit upon the greatest Number of single Truths, and taught the fewest

Absurdities; were yet * never able to make out any universal, entire, and coherent System of Doctrines, and Scheme of the *Whole State of Things*, with any manner of probability: And the cunningest of *Modern Deists*, (besides that they must needs, in

* *Diversi ac diversè omnia protulerunt, non annectentes nec causas rerum, nec consequentias, nec rationes; ut Summam illam, quæ continet universa, & compingerent & complement. Lactant. lib. 7.*

their own Way, believe some particular Thing stranger and in themselves more incredible than any of the forementioned Christian Doctrines, cannot in the whole, as has been before shown, frame to themselves any fixt and settled Principles, upon which to argue consistently; but must unavoidably either be perplexed with inextricable Absurdities, or confessedly recur to downright Atheism. There have indeed even among Christians themselves, been many Differences and Disputes about particular Doctrines: But, (excepting such as have intolerably corrupted the very fundamental Doctrines, and even the main Design itself of the whole Christian Dispensation; of which there are too many Instances in Writers of the Roman Church especially;) these Disputes among Ch

stians

tians, have not been, like those among the Philosophers, *de rerum summa*, concerning the whole Scheme and System of things, but only concerning particular Explications of particular Doctrines ;

Which kind of Disputes do not at all * affect the Certainty of the whole Religion itself, nor brought in reason to be any manner of hindrance to the † Effect which the plain and weighty and confessedly more important fundamental Doctrines ought to have upon the Hearts and Lives of Men.

* Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque dissensio. Et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos natura certos putamus ; illa, quæ aliis sic, aliis secus, nec iisdem semper uno modo videntur, ficta esse dicimus. Quod est longè aliter. Cic. *de Legib.* lib. 1.

† See above, pag. 335.

XIV. Fifthly ; *As this Revelation, to the Judgment of right and sober Reason, appears of itself highly credible and probable ; and abundantly recommends itself in its native Simplicity, merely by its own intrinsic goodness and excellency, to the practice of the most rational and considering Men, who are desirous in all their Actions to have satisfaction and comfort and good hope within themselves, from the conscience of what they do : So it is moreover positively and directly proved, to be actually and immediately sent to us from God ; by the many infallible signs and Miracles, which the Author of it worked publicly as the evidence of his divine Commission ; by the exact completion both of the Prophecies that went before concerning him, and of those that He himself delivered concerning things that were to happen after : and by the Testimony of his Followers ; which, in its Circumstances, was the most credible, certain, and convincing Evidence, that was ever given to any matter of Fact in the World.*

First, The Christian Revelation is positively and directly proved, to be actually and immediately sent to us from God, by the many infallible *Signs and Miracles*, which the Author of it worked publicly as the Evidence of his Divine Commission.

Of the Life and Character of our Saviour, as an Evidence of the Truth of the Christian Revelation.

Besides the great Excellency and Reasonableness of the Doctrine considered in itself, of

which I have already treated; 'Tis here of no small moment to observe, that the *Author* of it (separate from all external Proof of his Divine Commission) appeared in all his Behaviour, Words

and Actions, to be neither an *Impostor* nor an *Enthusiast*. His Life was Innocent and Spotless; spent entirely in serving the Ends of Holiness and Charity, in doing good to the Souls and Bodies of Men, in exhorting them to Repentance, and inviting them

to serve and glorify God. When his bitterest Enemies accused him, in order to take away his Life; they could not charge him with any appearance of Vice or Immorality. And so far was he from being guilty of what they *did* accuse him of, namely of Vain-glory and attempting to move Sedition; that once, when the admiring People would by force have taken him and made him their King, he chose even to work a Miracle to avoid that, which was the only thing that could be imagined to have been the Design of an *Impostor*. In like manner, whoever seriously considers the Answers he gave to all Questions whether moral or captious, his occasional Discourses to his Disciples, and more especially the Wishes

* Πεντήκοντα ἔτη αὐτῶν, εἰ ποτέ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτον πλάνον ἰσότηται, πρωτότης καὶ ἐπιεικειᾶς σωφροσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλος τοῖς ἀπαταμένοις γεγονώς αὐτίκα, &c. *Eusib. Demonstrat. Evangelic. lib. 3. c. 3.*

and Excellency of his Sermon upon the Mount, which is as it were the System and Summary of his Doctrine, manifestly surpassing all the moral Instructions of the most celebrated Philosophers that ever lived ; cannot, without the extremest Malice and Obstinacy in the World, charge him with *Enthusiasm*.

These Considerations cannot but add great Weight and Authority to his Doctrine, and make his own Testimony concerning himself exceedingly credible. But the *positive and direct* proof of his Divine Commission, are the *Miracles* which he worked for that purpose : His healing the Sick : His giving Sight to the Blind : His casting out Devils : His raising the Dead : The Wonders that attended his Crucifixion : His own Resurrection from the Dead : His Appearance afterwards to his Disciples : And his Ascension visibly into Heaven.

Of the Miracles of Christ, as the Evidence of his Divine Commission.

These, and the rest of his stupendous Miracles, were, *to the Disciples that saw them*, sensible Demonstrations of our Lord's Divine Commission. And *to those who have lived since that Age*, they are as certain Demonstrations of the same Truth, as the Testimony of those first Disciples, who were Eye-witnesses of them, is certain and true.

To the *Disciples that saw them*, these Miracles were sensible and compleat Demonstrations of our Lord's Divine Commission ; because they were, so great, and so many, and so publick, and so evident, that it was absolutely impossible they should be the effect of any *Art of Man*, of any *Chance* or *Falsity* : And the Doctrine they were brought to confirm, was of so good and holy a Tendency, that it is impossible he should be inabled to work them without the Power and Assistance of *Evil Spirits* : So

that, consequently, they must of necessity have been performed, either *immediately* or *mediately*, by God himself.

Of Mira-
cles in
general.

But here, because there have been many Questions raised, and some Perplexity introduced, by the Disputes and different Opinions of learned Men, concerning the *Power of Working Miracles*, and concerning the *Extent of the Evidence* which Miracles give to the Truth of any Doctrine; And because it hath been much controverted, whether true Miracles can be worked by any less Power, than the immediate Power of God; and whether, to compleat the Evidence of a Miracle, the Nature of the Doctrine pretended to be proved thereby, is requisite to be taken into the Consideration, or no: It may not perhaps be improper, upon this Occasion, to endeavour to set this whole Matter in its true Light, as briefly and clearly as I can.

That in re-
spect of the
Power of
God, all
things are
alike easy.

1st then: In respect of the *Power of God*, and in respect to the *Nature of the things themselves* absolutely speaking, all things that are possible at all that is, which imply not a direct contradiction, are *equally and alike easy* to be done. The Power of God, extends equally to great things, as to small and to many, as to few: And the one makes no more Difficulty at all, or Resistance to his Will than the other.

That there-
fore Mira-
cles ought
not to be
defined by
any abso-
lute diffi-
culty in the
nature of
the things
themselves
to be done.

'Tis not therefore a right Distinction, to define or distinguish a *Miracle* by any *absolute Difficulty* in the Nature of the thing itself to be done. As if the things we call *natural*, were absolute and in their own Nature easier to be effected, than those that we look upon as *miraculous*. On the contrary, 'tis evident and undeniable, that 'tis at least as great an Act of Power, to cause the S

or a Planet to move at all ; as to cause it to stand still at any Time. Yet this latter, we call a Miracle ; the former, not. And, to restore the dead to Life, which is an Instance of an extraordinary Miracle ; is in itself plainly altogether as easy, as to dispose matter at first into such order, as to form a humane Body in that which we commonly call a natural way. So that, absolutely speaking, in *This strict and philosophical Sense* ; either nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the Power of God ; or, if we regard our own Power and Understanding, then almost every thing, as well what we call natural, as what we call supernatural, is in *this Sense* really miraculous ; and 'tis only *usualness* or *unusualness* that makes the distinction.

2. What degrees of Power God may reasonably be supposed to have communicated to Created Beings, to subordinate Intelligences, to good or evil Angels ; is by no means possible for us to determine. Some Things absolutely impossible for Men to effect, 'tis evident may easily be within the natural Powers of Angels ; and some Things beyond the Power of inferior Angels, may as easily be supposed to be within the Natural Power of others that are superior to Them ; and so on. So that, (unless we knew the Limit of communicable and incommunicable Power) we can hardly affirm with any Certainty, that any particular Effect, how great or miraculous soever it may seem to us, is beyond the Power of all Created Beings in the Universe to have produced.

'Tis not therefore a right Distinction, to define a Miracle (as some very learned and very pious Men have done,) to be such an Effect, as could not have been produced by any less Power than

What degrees of Power, God may have communicated to Created Beings, is not possible for us to determine.

That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be the such an

*effect, as
could not
have been
produced
by any less
Power
than the
Divine
Omnipo-
tence.*

the Divine Omnipotence. There is no Instance of any Miracle in Scripture, which to an ordinary Spectator would necessarily imply the immediate operation of *original, absolute, and undervied* Power: And consequently such a Spectator could never be *certain*, that the miraculous Effect was beyond the Power of all created Beings in the Universe to produce. There is one Supposition indeed, upon which the Opinion of *all Miracles being necessarily the immediate Effects of the Divine Omnipotence*, may be defended; And that is, if God, together with the natural Powers wherewith he hath indued all subordinate Intelligent Beings, has likewise given a Law or Restraint, whereby they be hindred from ever interposing in this lower World, to produce any of those Effects which we call miraculous or supernatural: But then, how certain soever it is, that all Created Beings are under some particular Laws and Restraints; yet it can never be proved, that they are under such Restraints universally, perpetually, and without exception: And without this, a Spectator that sees a Miracle, can never be certain that it was not done by some Created Intelligence. Reducing the natural Power of Created Beings to as low a degree as any one can desire to suppose, will help nothing in this matter; For, supposing (which is very unreasonable to suppose) that the natural Powers of the highest Angels, were no greater than the natural Powers of Men; yet since thereby an Angel would be inabled to do all That invisibly which a Man can do visibly; he would even in this Supposition be naturally able to do numberless things, which we should esteem the greatest of Miracles.

3. All things that are *Done* in the World, are done either immediately by God himself, or by *created Intelligent Beings*: Matter being evidently not at all capable of any *Laws* or *Powers* whatever, any more than it is capable of Intelligence; excepting only this *One Negative Power*, that every part of it will, of itself, always and necessarily continue in that State, whether of *Rest* or *Motion*, wherein it at present is. So that all those things which we commonly say are the Effects of the *Natural Powers of Matter*, and *Laws of Motion*; of *Gravitation*, *Attraction*, or the like; are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the Effects of God's acting upon Matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created *Intelligent Beings*: (Which Observation, by the way, furnishes us, as has been before noted, with an excellent natural Demonstration of *Providence*.) Consequently there is no such thing, as what Men commonly call the *Course of Nature*, or the *Power of Nature*. The *Course of Nature*, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else but the *Will of God* producing certain Effects in a continued, regular, constant and uniform Manner: Which *Course or Manner of Acting*, being in every Moment perfectly *Arbitrary*, is as easy to be altered any time, as to be *preserved*. And if, (as seems most probable,) this continual Acting upon Matter be performed by the subserviency of created *Intelligences* appointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator; then 'tis as easy for any of Them, as much within their natural Power, (by the permission of God,) to *alter* the *Course of Nature* any time, or in any respect, as to *preserve* or *continue* it.

All things that are done in the World, are done either immediately by God himself, or by created Intelligent Beings; Matter being capable of no Laws or Powers. And consequently there is, properly speaking, no such thing as the Course or Power of Nature.
pag. 161.

That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to be That which is against the Course of Nature, or above the natural Powers of Created Agents.

'Tis not therefore a right Distinction, to define a *Miracle* to be That which is *against the Course of Nature*: meaning, by the *Course of Nature*, the *Power of Nature*, or the *Natural Powers of Created Agents*. For, in this Sense, 'tis no more *against the Course of Nature*, for an Angel to keep a Man from sinking in the Water, than for a Man to hold a Stone from falling in the Air, by overpowering the Law of Gravitation; And yet the one is a Miracle, the other not so. In like manner, 'tis no more above the natural Powers of a created Intelligence, to stop the Motion of the Sun or of a Planet, than to continue to carry it in its usual Course; And yet the former is a Miracle, the latter not so. But if by the *Course of Nature*, be meant only (as it truly signifies) a constant and uniform manner of God's acting either immediately or mediately in preserving and continuing the Order of the World; then, in this Sense, indeed a Miracle may be rightly defined to be an Effect produced contrary to the usual Course or Order of Nature, by the unusual Interposition of some Intelligent Being Superior to Men; As I shall have occasion presently to serve more particularly.

The unreasonableness of those who deny the Possibility of Miracles in general.

And from this Observation, we may easily cover the Vanity and Unreasonableness of that obstinate Prejudice, which Modern Deists have universally taken up, against the Belief of Miracles in general. They see, that things generally go on in a constant and regular Method; that the Frame and Order of the World, is preserved by things being disposed and managed in an uniform manner; that certain Causes produce certain Effects in a continued Succession, according to certain fixed Laws or Rules; And from hence they conclude, very weakly and unphilosophically

that there are in *Matter* certain necessary *Laws* and *Powers*, the Result of which is That which they call the *Course of Nature*; which they think impossible to be changed or altered, and consequently that there can be no such thing as *Miracles*. Whereas on the contrary, if they would consider things duly; they could not but see, that all and lifeless *Matter* is utterly incapable of obeying any *Laws*, or of being indued with any *Powers*; and that therefore That Order and Disposition of Things, which they vulgarly call the *Course of Nature*, cannot possibly be any thing else, but the *Arbitrary Will and Pleasure of God*, exerting itself and acting upon *Matter* continually, either immediately by itself, or mediately by some subordinate *Intelligent Agents*, according to certain *Rules* of uniformity and proportion, fixed indeed and constant, but which yet are made up merely by *Arbitrary Constitution*, not by any sort of *Necessity* in the things themselves; as has been abundantly proved in my former *Discourse*: And consequently it cannot be denied, that 'tis altogether as easy to alter the *Course of Nature*, as to preserve it; that is, that *Miracles*, excepting only that they are more unusual, are in themselves, and in the *Nature and Reason of things*, as credible in all respects, and as easy to be believed, as any of those we call natural effects.

4. Those Effects which are produced in the *Some Ef-*
 world *regularly and constantly*, which we call the *fects prove*
works of Nature; prove to us in general, the Be- *the constant*
 ing, the Power, and the other Attributes of God. *Providence*
 of God, and
 those Effects, which, upon any *rare and extra-* *Others*
ordinary Occasion, are produced in such manner, *prove the*
 'tis manifest they could neither have been *occasional*
 done *Interposi-*

tion either
of God
himself, or
of some
Intelligent
Being Su-
perior to
Man.

done by any *Power or Art of Man*, nor by what we call *Chance*, that is, by any Composition or result of those Laws which are God's *constant and uniform* Actings upon Matter; These undeniably prove to us the immediate and *occasional* Interposition either of God himself, or at least of some intelligent Agent Superior to Men, at That particular Time, and on That particular Account. For instance: The regular and continued Effects of the *Power of Gravitation*, and of the *Laws of Motion*; of the *Mechanick*, and of the *Animal Powers*; All these prove to us in general, the Being of the Power, the Presence, and the constant Operation, either immediate or mediate, of God in the World. But if, upon any particular Occasion, we should see a *Stone suspended in the Air*, or a *Man walking upon the Water*, without any visible support; a *chronical Disease cured by a word speaking*, or a *dead and corrupted Body restored to life in a moment*; We could not then doubt, but there was an *extraordinary* Interposition either of God himself, in order to signify his Pleasure upon that particular Occasion; or at least of some Intelligent Agent superior to Man, in order to bring about some particular Design.

Whether
such Inter-
position be
the imme-
diate Work
of God, or
of Some
Good or E-
vil Angel;
can hardly
be discove-
red merely
by the
Work it
self.

5. Whether such an Extraordinary Interposition of some Power Superior to Men, be the immediate Interposition of *God himself*, or of some good *Angel*, or of some *evil Angel*; can hardly be distinguished certainly, merely by the *Work or Miracle itself*: Because 'tis impossible for Us to know with any *certainty*, either that the natural Power of good Angels, or of evil ones, extend not beyond such or such a certain Limit; or that God always restrains them from exercising their natural Powers in producing such or such particular Effects.

'Tis not therefore a right Distinction, to suppose the Wonders which the Scripture attributes to evil Spirits, to be mere *Præstigiæ*, *Sleights*, or *De-lusions*. For if the Devil has any natural Power of doing any thing at all, even but so much as the meanest of Men; and be not restrained by God from exercising that natural Power; 'tis evident he will be able, by reason of his Invisibleness, to work *true and real Miracles*. Neither is it a right Distinction, to suppose the Miracles of Evil Spirits, not to be *real Effects* in the things where they appear, but *Impositions upon the Senses* of the Spectators: For, to impose in this manner upon the Senses of Men, (not by Sleights and Delusions; but by really so affecting the Organs of Sense, as to make things appear what they are not;) is to all Intents and Purposes as *true* a Miracle, and as *great* an one, as making real Changes in the things themselves.

That there is no reason to suppose all the Wonders worked by Evil Spirits to be mere De-lusions.

6. When therefore upon any particular Occasion; How we Instance, when at the Will of a Person who are to distinguish Miracles worked by God for the proof of any Doctrine, from the Frauds of Evil Spirits. touches some new Doctrine as coming from God, and in Testimony to the Truth of that Doctrine, there is plainly and manifestly an Interposition of the Superiour Power, producing such miraculous Effects as have been before mentioned: The only possible ways, by which a Spectator may certainly and infallibly distinguish, whether those Miracles be indeed the Works either immediately of God himself, or, (which is the very same thing,) of the good Angel employed by him; and consequently the Doctrine witnessed by the Miracles, be infallibly true and divinely attested: Or whether, the contrary, the Miracles be the Works of evil Spirits, and consequently the Doctrine a Fraud and Imposition upon Men: The only possible ways (I say) of distinguishing this matter certainly and

and infallibly, are these. *If the Doctrine attested by Miracles, be in itself impious, or manifestly tending to promote Vice ; then without all question the Miracles, how great soever they may appear to Us, are neither worked by God himself, nor by his Commission ; because our natural Knowledge of the Attributes of God, and of the necessary difference between Good and Evil, is greatly of more force to prove any such Doctrine to be false, than any Miracles in the World can be to prove it true.* As, for example ; suppose a Man pretending to be a Prophet, should work any Miracle, or give any Sign or Wonder whatsoever, in order to draw Men from the Worship of the True God, and tempt them to Idolatry, and to the Practice of such Vices as in all Heathen Nations have usually attended the Worship of False Gods ; nothing can be more infallibly certain, than that such Miracles ought at first sight to be rejected as Diabolical. *If the Doctrine attested by Miracles, be in itself indifferent, that is, such as cannot by the Light of Nature and right Reason alone, be certainly known whether it be true or false ; and at the same time, in opposition to it, and in proof of the direct contrary Doctrine, there be worked other Miracles, more and greater than the former, or at least attended with such Circumstances, as evidently show the Power by which these latter are worked, to be superior to the Power that worked the former ; then the Doctrine which is attested by the *Superiour Power* must necessarily be believed to be Divine. Thus was the Case of *Moses*, and the *Ægyptian Magicians*. The *Magicians* worked several Miracles, to prove that *Moses* was an Impostor, and not the Son of God ; *Moses*, to prove his Divine Commission, worked Miracles *more and greater* than theirs ; and else (which is the very same thing,) the Power*

Deut. xiii.
1, &c.

which *He* worked his Miracles, restrained the
 Power by which *They* worked theirs, from being
 able at that time to work all the same Miracles
 that he did : and so appeared evidently the *Super-*
our Power : Wherefore it was necessarily to be be-
 lieved, that *Moses's* Commission was truly from
 God. *If*, in the last place, the Doctrine attested
 by Miracles, be such as in its own Nature and
 consequences tends to promote the Honour and
 glory of God, and the practice of universal Righte-
 ousness amongst Men ; and yet nevertheless be not
 itself demonstrable, nor could without Revelati-
 on have been discovered to be actually true, (or
 even if it was but only indifferent in itself, and
 such as could not be proved to be any way contrary
 or inconsistent with these great Ends ;) and
 there be no pretence of more or greater Miracles
 on the opposite Side, to contradict it ; (Which
 is the Case of the *Doctrine and Miracles of Christ* :)
 then the Miracles are unquestionably Divine, and
 the Doctrine must without all Controversy be ac-
 knowledged as an immediate and infallible Reve-
 lation from God : Because, (besides that it cannot
 be supposed that Evil Spirits would overthrow their
 own Power and Kingdom ;) should God in such
 Cases as these, permit Evil Spirits to work Mira-
 cles to impose upon Men, the Errour would be ab-
 solutely invincible ; and That would in all respects
 be the very same thing, as if God worked the Mi-
 racles to deceive Men himself. No Man can
 doubt, but Evil Spirits, if they have any natural
 powers at all, have power to destroy Mens *Bodies*
 and *Lives*, and to bring upon Men innumerable o-
 ther Calamities ; which yet in Fact 'tis evident
 that he restrains them from doing, by having set
 them Laws and Bounds which they cannot pass.
 Now, for the very same Reason, 'tis infinitely cer-
 tain

Matt. xii.
 25.

tain that God restrains them likewise from imposing upon Men's *Minds* and *Understandings*, in all such Cases where Wise and Honest and Virtuous Men would have no possible way left, by which they could discover the Imposition.

The difference between those who teach, that the immediate Power of God is, or is not, necessarily requisite to the working of a Miracle; is not very great at bottom.

And here at last the difference between Those who believe that all Miracles necessarily require the immediate Power of God himself to effect them, and those who believe created Spirits able to work Miracles, is not very great. They who believe all Miracles to be effected only by the *immediate Power of God*, must do it upon this Ground, that they suppose God by a perpetual Law restrain all subordinate intelligent Agents from interposing at any time to alter the regular course of things in this lower World; (for, to say that created Spirits have not otherwise a *Natural Power*, when *unrestrained*, to do what we call Miracles; is saying that those invisible Agents have no Power naturally to do any thing at all.) And they who believe that *subordinate Beings have Power* to work Miracles, must yet of necessity suppose that God restrains them in all such Cases at least, where there would not be sufficient Marks left, by which the Frauds of evil Spirits could be clearly distinguished from the Testimony and Commission of God.

And now from these few clear and undeniable Propositions, it evidently follows;

The true Definition of a Miracle.

1st. That the true *Definition* of a *Miracle*, in the *Theological* Sense of the Word, is this; that it is a work effected in a manner *unusual*, or different from the common and regular Method of Providence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of some Intelligent Agent superior to Man, for the Proof or Evidence of some particular Doctrine, or in attestation to the Authority

ty of some particular Person. And if a Miracle worked, be not opposed by some plainly superior Power ; nor be brought to attest a Doctrine either *contradictory* in itself, or *vicious* in its consequences ; (a Doctrine of which kind, no Miracles the World can be sufficient to prove ;) then the doctrine so attested must necessarily be lookt upon Divine, and the Worker of the Miracle enterained as having infallibly a Commission from God.

2. From hence it appears, that the compleat *The demonstration* of our Saviour's being a Teacher *strength of the Evidence of our Saviour's Miracles.* from God, was, to the Disciples who *saw his Miracles*, plainly This: That the *Doctrine* he taught, being in itself possible, and in its consequences Tending to promote the Honour of God and true Righteousness among Men ; and the *Miracles* he worked, being such, that there neither is nor could be any pretence of more or greater Miracles to be set up in opposition to them ; it was infallibly certain that he had truly a Divine Commission, as it was certain that God would not himself impose upon Men a necessary and invincible error.

3. From hence it appears how little reason there is to object, as some have done, that we prove in a Circle the *Doctrine* by the *Miracles*, and the *Miracles* by the *Doctrine*. For the *Miracles*, in this way of reasoning, are not at all proved by the *Doctrine* ; But only the *Possibility* and the *good Tendency*, or at least the *Indifferency* of the *Doctrine*, necessary Condition or Circumstance, without which the *Doctrine* is not capable of being proved by any *Miracles*. 'Tis indeed the *Miracles* only, that prove the *Doctrine* ; and not the *Doctrine*, that proves the *Miracles* : But then in order to

Concerning the Objection, that we prove in a Circle the Miracles by the Doctrine, and the Doctrine by the Miracles.

this End, that the *Miracles* may prove the *Doctrine*, 'tis always necessarily to be first supposed, that the *Doctrine* be such as is in its nature capable of being proved by *Miracles*. The *Doctrine* must be in itself possible and capable to be proved, and then *Miracles* will prove it to be actually and certainly true. The *Doctrine* is not first known or supposed to be true, and then the *Miracles* proved by it; But the *Doctrine* must be first known to be such as is possible to be true, and then *Miracles* will prove that it actually is so. Some *Doctrines* are in their own nature necessarily and demonstrably true, such as are those which concern the obligation of plain moral Precepts; And these neither need nor can receive any stronger proof from *Miracles*, than what they have already (though not perhaps so clearly indeed to all Capacities,) from the Evidence of right Reason. Other *Doctrines* are in their own Nature necessarily false and impossible to be true; such as are all Absurdities and Contradictions, and all *Doctrines* that tend to promote Vice; And these can never receive any degree of proof, from all the *Miracles* in the World. Lastly, Other *Doctrines* are in their own Nature indifferent, or possible, or perhaps probable to be true; And these could not have been known to be positively true, but by the Evidence of *Miracles*, which prove them to be certain. I apply this to the *Doctrine* and *Miracles* of Christ. The moral part of our Saviour's *Doctrine* would have appeared infallibly true, whether he had or no worked any *Miracles* or no. The rest of his *Doctrine* was what evidently Tended to promote the Honour of God, and the practice of Righteousness amongst Men: Therefore That part also of his *Doctrine*, was possible and very probable to be true; But yet it could not from thence be known to be certainly true, nor ought to have been

ceived as a Revelation from God, unless it had been proved by undeniable *Miracles*. And the *Miracles* he worked, did indeed undeniably prove it to be the Doctrine of God. Nevertheless, had his Doctrine in any part of it been either absurd and contradictory in itself, or vicious in its Tendency and Consequences; no *Miracles* could then possibly have proved it to have been true. 'Tis evident therefore that the Nature of the Doctrine to be proved, must be taken into the Consideration, as a necessary Circumstance; and yet, that only the *Miracles* are properly the Proof of the *Doctrine*; and not the *Doctrine*, of the *Miracles*.

4. From hence it follows, that the pretended *Of the* *Miracles of Apollonius Tyaneus, Aristeas Procon-* pretended *Miracles of* *us, and some few others among the Heathens,* Apolloni- *us and* *others.* even supposing them to have been *true Miracles*, which yet there is no Reason at all to believe, because they are very poorly attested, and are in themselves very mean and trifling, as has been fully shown by *Eusebius* in his Book against *Hierocles*, and by many late Writers; but supposing them, (say, to have been *true Miracles*,) yet they will prove nothing at all to the disadvantage of Christianity; Because they were worked either without any pretence of confirming any new Doctrine at all; or else to prove absurd and foolish Things; or to establish Idolatry and the Worship of False Gods; and consequently they could not be done by the Divine Power and Authority, nor bear any kind of * comparison with the *Miracles of Christ*, which were worked to attest a Doctrine that tended in the highest degree to promote the Honour of God and the general Reformation of Mankind.

* Διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ βεβασιωμένης τῆς ἐπαγγελλομένης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐξετάσονται ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ τοῦ ἡθους καὶ τῆ ἐπακολουθεύοντων ταῖς δυνάμεσιν. ἢτοι εἰς βλάβην τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ εἰς ἡθῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν; *Origen advers. Cels. lib. 2.*

Μίσην τοίνυν σαυτὸν εἰσας τὸ
περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστείου γινωσκόντων, καὶ τῶν
περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἱστορούντων, ἰδεῖ εἰ-
μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀποσπέντου, καὶ τὸ ὠφε-
λουμένων εἰς ἡδὼν ἐπανόρθωσιν καὶ
εὐλαβείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θε-
ὸν, ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν· ὅτι πισυτέον μὲν
ὡς οὐκ ἀθεεὶ γινωσκόμενοι τοῖς περὶ
Ἰησοῦ ἱστορούντοισι, οὐχὶ ὅ τοῖς περὶ
τῆς Προκολλησίου Ἀριστείου. Τί μὲν
ἢ βουλομένη ἡ πρόνοια τὰ περὶ τὸ
Ἀριστεῖον παράδοξα ἐπραγματεύειτο,
καὶ τί ὠφελεῖσαι τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων
γένει βουλομένη, τὰ τηλικαῦτα
(ὡς οἱεῖ) ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅσα ἔχει
λέγειν. *Id. lib. 3.*

To return therefore to the Ar-
gument. The Miracles (I say)
which our Saviour worked, were
to the Disciples that saw them, sen-
sible Demonstrations of his di-
vine Commission. And to those
who have lived since that Age, they
are as certain Demonstrations of
the same Truth, as the Testimony
of those first Disciples who were
Eye-witnesses of them, is certain
and true: Which I shall have oc-
casion to consider presently.

Of the ful-
filling the
Prophecies,
as an Evi-
dence of
our Savi-
our's Di-
vine Com-
mission.
Of the
Prophecies
that went
before, con-
cerning the
Messiah.

Secondly, The Proof of the Divine Authority
the Christian Revelation, is confirmed and ascer-
tained, by the Exact Completion both of all those Prophe-
cies that went before concerning our Lord, and of those
that He Himself delivered concerning things that were
to happen after.

Concerning the Messiah it was foretold, (*Gen. xlix. 10.*) that he should come, before the Scepter
parted from Judah: And accordingly Christ appeared a little before the Time, when the Jewish
Government was totally destroyed by the Roman Government. It was foretold that he should come before the
destruction of the second Temple, (*Hagg. ii. 7.*) The Desire of all Nations shall come, and I will
fill this House with Glory, saith the Lord of Hosts; the Glory of this latter House shall be greater than of
the former: And accordingly Christ appeared, some time before the Destruction of the City and Temple.
It was foretold that he should come at the End of 490 Years, after the restoring of Jerusalem
which had been laid waste during the Captivity, (*Dan. ix. 24.*) and that he should be
cut off; and that, after That, the City and Sanctuary should be destroyed.

should be destroyed and made desolate: And accordingly, at what time soever the beginning of the four hundred and ninety Years can, according to any Interpretation of the Words, be fixt; the End of them will fall about the Time of Christ's appearing; and 'tis well known how entirely the City and Sanctuary were destroyed some Years after his being cut off. It was foretold that he should do many great and beneficial Miracles; that *the Eyes of the Blind* (Isai. xxxv. 5,) *should be opened, and the Ears of the Deaf unstopped; that the lame Man should leap as an Hart, and the Tongue of the Dumb sing:* And this was literally fulfilled in the Miracles of Christ; *The Blind received their Sight, (Matt. xi. 5) and the Lame walked; the Deaf heard, &c.* It was foretold that he should die a violent death, (Isai. liii. throughout,) and *That not for himself, (Dan. ix. 26,) but for our Transgressions, (Isai. liii. 6, & 12,) for the Iniquity of us all, and that he might bear the Sin of many:* All which, was exactly accomplished in the Sufferings of Christ. It was foretold, (Gen. xlix. 10.) that *to him should be the gathering of the People be,* and (Psal. ii. 8,) *that God would give him the Heathen for his Inheritance, and the utmost Parts of the Earth for his Possession:* Which was punctually fulfilled by the wonderful Success of the Gospel, and its universal spreading through the World. Lastly, Many miraculous Circumstances were foretold of the Messiah; that he should be of the *Tribe of Judah,* and of the *Seed of David;* that he should be born in the *town of Bethlehem,* (Mic. v. 2;) that he should *come upon an Ass* in humble Triumph into the City of *Jerusalem,* (Zech. ix. 9;) that he should be *sold for thirty Pieces of Silver,* (Zech. xi. 12;) that he should be *Scourged, Buffeted, and Spit upon,* (Isai. l. 6;) that *his Hands and Feet* should be

pierced, (Psal. xxii. 16;) that he should be numbered among Malefactors, (Isa. liii. 12;) that he should have *Gall and Vinegar* offered him to drink, (Psal. lxix. 21;) that they who saw him crucified, should *mock* at him, and at his *trusting in God* to deliver him, (Psal. xxii. 8;) that the Soldiers should *cast Lots for his Garments*, (Psal. xxii. 18;) that he should *make his Grave with the Rich*, (Isai. liii. 9;) and that he should rise again without *seeing Corruption*, (Psal. xvi. 10.) All which Circumstances were fulfilled to the greatest possible exactness, in the Person of *Christ*: Not to mention the numberless *typical Representations*, which had likewise evidently their complete Accomplishment in *Him*. And 'tis no less evident, that none of these Prophecies can possibly be applied to any other Person, that ever pretended to be the Messiah.

Of the
Prophecies
that Christ
himself
delivered
concerning
things that
were to
happen
after.

Further; The Prophecies or Predictions which *Christ* delivered Himself, concerning things that were to happen *after*; are no less strong Proofs of the Truth and Divine Authority of his Doctrine, than the Prophecies were, which went *before* concerning Him. He did very particularly and at several times foretell his own Death, and the Circumstances of it, (Matt. xvi. 21;) that the *chief Priests and Scribes* should condemn him to Death, and deliver him to the Gentiles, that is, to Pilate and the Roman Soldiers, to mock and scourge and crucify him, (Matt. xx. 18 & 19;) that he should be betrayed into their Hands, (Matt. xx. 18;) that *Judas Iscariot* was the Person who would betray him, (Matt. xxvi. 23;) that all his Disciples would forsake him and flee, (Matt. xxvi. 31;) that *Peter* particularly, would thrice deny him in one Night, (Mar. xiv. 30.) He foretold further, that he would rise again the third Day, (Mat. xvi. 21;) that after his Ascension, he would send down the

Holy

Holy Ghost upon his Apostles, (*Joh. xv. 26 ;*) which should enable them to work many Miracles, (*Mar. xvi. 17.*) He foretold also *the Destruction of Jerusalem* with such very particular Circumstances, in the whole *xxivth* Chapter of *St Matthew*, and the *xiiiith* of *St Mark*, and *xxist* of *St Luke* ; that no Man who reads * *Josephus's* History of that dreadful and unparalleled Calamity, can, without the greatest Obstinacy imaginable, doubt of our Saviour's divine Fore-knowledge. Lastly, He foretold likewise many particulars concerning the future Success of the Gospel, and what should happen to several of his Disciples : He foretold what Opposition and Persecution they should meet withal in their preaching, (*Matt. x. 17 ;*) He foretold what particular kind of Death *St Peter* should die, (*Joh. xxi. 18 ;*) and hinted, that *St John* should live till after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, (*Joh. xxi. 22 ;*) and foretold, that notwithstanding all Opposition and Persecutions, the Gospel should yet have such Success, as to spread itself over the World,

(*Matt. xvi. 18 ; xxiv. 14 ; xxviii. 19.*) All and every one of which particulars, were exactly accomplished, without failing in any respects.

Some of these things are of permanent and visible Effects, even unto this Day. Particularly the captivity and dispersion of the Jews, through all Nations, for more than 1600 Years ; and yet

* *Very remarkable also is the History recorded by a Heathen Writer, of what happened upon Julian's attempting to rebuild the Temple. Imperii sui memoriam magnitudine operum gestiens propagare, ambitiosum quondam apud Hierosolymam templum, quod post multa & interneeiva certamina obsidente Vespasiano posteaque Tito agrè est expugnatum, instaurare sumptibus cogitabat immodicis ; Negotiumque maturandum Alypio dederat Antiocheni, qui olim Britannias curaverat pro Præfectis. Cùm itaque rei idem instaret Alypius, juvaretque provinciæ rector ; metuendi globi flammæ prope fundamenta crebris assultibus erumpentes fecere locum exustis aliquoties operantibus inaccessum ; Hocque modo, elemento destinatus repellente, cessavit inceptum. Ammian. Marcellin. lib. 22. sub initio.*

their continuing a distinct People, in order to the fulfilling the Prophecies of Things still future : This (I say) is particularly a permanent Proof of the Truth of the Ancient Prophecies. But the greatest part of the Instances above-mentioned, were *sensible and ocular Demonstrations* of the Truth of our Lord's Doctrine, *only* to those Persons who lived at the Time when they happened : The *Credibility* of whose *Testimony* therefore, shall be considered *presently* in its proper Place.

*Objections
answered.*

But before I proceed to This ; it may not be improper in this place, to take notice of Some *Objections*, which have of late been revived and urged against this *whole notion* both of the *Prophecies themselves*, and of the *Application of them to Christ*. The Sum and Strength of which *Objections*, is briefly This :

That all the Promises supposed to be made to the Jews before Christ's time, of a *Messias* or *Deliverer* ; were understood and meant of some " *Temporal Deliverer* " only, who should restore to the Israelites a mere worldly Kingdom ; " *without the least Imagination of a Spiritual Deliverance,* " or of any *Such Saviour* as is preached in the New Testament.

That, consequently, " *All the Prophecies* " in the Old Testament, applied to *Christ* by the Apostles in the New ; are applied to him in a Sense merely " *typical, mystical, allegorical, or enigmatical ;* " in a Sense " *different from the obvious and literal Sense ;* " by " *new interpretations put upon them, not agreeable to the obvious and literal meaning of those Books* " from whence they are cited. That is to say ; That the Prophecies were all of them intended concerning *Other Persons*, and *Other Persons Only* ; and there-

fore

fore are falsely and groundlessly applied either to Christ in particular, or in general to the expectation of *Any such Messiah* as should introduce a *Spiritual and Eternal Kingdom*.

That there are several Passages, cited by the Apostles out of the Old Testament ; which are either not found there at all ; or else are very different in the Text itself, from the Citations alledged ; and consequently are by the Apostles either *misunderstood* or *misapplied*.

That even *Miracles* themselves, “ can never render a *Foundation* valid, which is in itself invalid ; can never make a *False inference* true ; can never make a *Prophecy* fulfilled, which is not fulfilled ; ” can never make those things to be spoken concerning Christ, which were not spoken concerning Christ. And consequently, that the *Miracles* said to have been worked by Christ, could not possibly have been really worked by him ; but must of necessity, together with the *Whole System* both of the Old and New Testament, have been wholly the effect of *Imagination and Enthusiasm*, if not of *Imposition*.

Now in order to inable every careful and sincere reader, to find a *Satisfactory Answer* to These and all other *Objections* of the like nature ; I would lay before him the following *Considerations*.

1. I suppose it to have been already proved in the foregoing part of this Discourse, that there is a *GOD* ; and that the Nature and Circumstances of Men, and the necessary Perfections of God, do demonstrate the *Obligations* and the *Modes* of *NATURAL RELIGION* ; that is, that God is a *MORAL* as well as *Natural* Governour of the World. Whoever denies *Either* of these assertions, is obliged to invalidate the Arguments alledged for proof of them in the Former part of This

This Book ; before he has any Right to intermix *Atheistical* Arguments and Objections, in the *present* Question. It being evidently ridiculous, in All who believe not that God is, and that he is a *Moral Judge* as well as *Natural Governour* ; to argue at all about a *Revelation* concerning *Religion*, or to make any Inquiry whether it be *from God* or no.

* See above,
Prop. VII.
§ 4. pag.
317.

2. *As God has in fact* made known even demonstrable Truths, * *Natural* and *Moral* Truths, not to All men equally ; but in *different degrees* and *proportions*, to such as have a *Disposition* and *Desire* to *inquire* after them : So 'tis agreeable to Reason and to the Analogy of God's Proceedings, to believe, that he *may possibly*, by *Revelation* and *Tradition*, have given some *further degrees of Light*, to Such as are sincerely desirous to know and obey him ; so that they who will *Do his Will*, may *Know* of the doctrine whether it be of God. As our *Natural Knowledge of Moral and Religious Truths* in fact is, so *Revelation* possibly *may further be*, as it were *a Light shining in a dark place*.

3. It appears in History, that the Great Truths and Obligations of *Natural Religion*, have from the Beginning been *Confirmed* by a perpetual *Tradition* in particular *Families*, who, though in the midst of *Idolatrous Nations*, yet *steadfastly adhered* to the *Worship of the God of Nature*, the *God of the universe*. And by the *Nation of the Jews* (notwithstanding all their *Corruptions in Practice*, yet in the *System and Constitution of their Religion*) has the same *Tradition* been continually preserved. Whereby they have been as it were *a City upon a Hill*, a *standing Testimony* against an *Idolatrous World*.

4. Among the Writings of all, even the most ancient and learned Nations, there are *None* but the Books of the *Jews*, which (agreeably to the above demonstrated Truths concerning the *God of Nature*

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Nature, and the Foundations of *Natural Religion*,) have, exclusive of *Chance* and of *Necessity*, ascribed either the Original of *the Universe* in general, (an *Universe* full of infinite *Variety* and *Choice*,) to the Will and Operation of an *Intelligent and Free Cause*; or given any tolerable Account in particular, of the Formation of *this our Earth* into its present *habitable State*.

5. But in *These Books*, there is, not only (in order to prevent *Idolatry*) a full Account (agreeable to the Principles of natural Reason,) how the Heavens and the Earth and all things therein contained are the *Creatures of GOD*; but moreover, an *uniform Series* of History, from the Infancy of mankind; consistent with *itself*, and with the State of the *Jewish and Christian Church at this day*, and with the *Possibilities* of the predicted series for the future; for several Thousands of years. Which consistency with the *Possibilities* of such predicted future Events, could not be by *Chance*, (as I shall show presently;) but is itself a great and standing *Miracle*.

6. In *These Books*, agreeably to the *Hopes and Expectations naturally founded on the Divine Perfections*, God did from the Beginning make, and has along continued to his Church or True Worshipers, a Promise that Truth and Virtue shall finally prevail, should prevail over the Spirit of Errour and Wickedness, of Delusion and Disobedience. That the Seed of the Woman should (1) bruise the Serpent's head. That among Her Posterity should arise Deliverance from the Delusion and Power of Sin, in which Satan (2) should be bruised under their feet. That in particular from the Seed of Abraham, and from the Family of Isaac, and from the Posterity of Jacob, and from the House of David, should be the Accomplishment of all God's Promises to his Church, and all the Blessings included in God's Co-

(1) Gen.

iii. 15.

(2) Rom.

xvi. 20.

- (1) If. xi. length, the Earth (1) should be full of the Knowledge
 9. of the Lord, as the Waters cover the Sea: that (2) the
 (2) Rev. Kingdoms of this world should become the Kingdoms of
 xi. 15. the Lord: That, in the (3) last days, unto the Moun-
 Dan. vii. tain of the Lord's house, the Seat of his True Wor-
 27. ship, should all Nations flow. That God would
 (3) If. ii. (4) create New Heavens, and a New Earth, (5)
 2. wherein dwelleth righteousness: Wherein (6) the Peo-
 (4) If. lxxv. ple should be All righteous, and inherit the Land for
 17. ever; should be All (7) Holy, even every one that
 (5) 2 Pet. is (8) written among the Living. That God would
 iii. 13. (9) set up a Kingdom, which should never be destroy-
 (6) If. lx. ed, but stand for ever: And that (10) the Saints of
 21. lxxv. 25. the most High should take the Kingdom, and possess the
 xi. 9. i. Kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever.
 26. (7) If. iv.
 3. (8) or,
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 כחיים
 So Dan.
 xii. 1.
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 the Book.
 (9) Dan.
 ii. 44.
 (10) Dan.
 vii. 18, 22,
 27. If. lx.
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7. All the Great Promises therefore, which God
 has ever made to his CHURCH, to his PEO-
 PLE, to the FAMILIES or NATIONS
 of his True Worshipers; are evidently to be all
 along so understood, as that Wicked and Unworthy
 Persons, of whatever Family or Nation or Profess-
 ion of religion they be, shall be excluded from the
 Benefit of Those Promises, shall be cut off from
 God's People; And Worthby persons of All Nati-
 ons, from the East and from the West and from the
 North and from the South, shall be accepted in
 Their stead. That is to say: In like manner as the
 Promise was made originally, not to All the children
 of Abraham, but to Isaac only; and not to Benjamin
 the Sons of Isaac, but to Jacob only: And, among
 the Posterity of Jacob, All were not Israel
 which were Of Israel; but, in Elshab's days, seven
 thousand only were the True Israel; and, in the
 time of Isaiab, though the number of the children
 of Israel was as the Sand of the Sea, yet a rem-
 nant only was to be saved; And in Hosea God says

If. x. 22.
 Rom. ix.
 27.

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I will call *Them my people, which were not my people, and Her beloved, which was not beloved*: So ^{Hof. ii. 23.} ^{Rom. ix.} ^{25.} It is all along evidently to be understood, that the children of the Promise in the literal sense according to the *Flesh*, the *Visible Church*, or *Professed Worshipers of the True God*, are but the *Type* or *Representative* of the *Real invisible Church of God*, the (1) true children of *Abraham* in the *spiritual* ^{(1) Rom.} ^{ii. 28. iii.} ^{7 and 9.} ^{iv. 12.} and *religious sense*, the (2) *Saints of the most High*, ^{(2) Dan.} ^{vii. 18.} who shall possess the *Kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever*, even (3) *every one that is Written among the Living*. ^{(3) If. iv.} ^{3.}

8. It being evident that God cannot be the God of the dead, but of the *Living*: And that All Promises, made to *Such Worshipers of the True God* as at any time forsook *All that they had* and even *Life itself* for the sake of *That Worship*, could be nothing but mere *Mockery*, if there was *No Life to come*, and God had no Power to *restore* them from the dead: This (I say) being *Self-evident*, it follows necessarily, that when the time comes that *The Promised Kingdom* shall take place, the *dead* must be *raised*; and the *Saints*, which have died in the intermediate time, must live again, and (4) *stand in their Lot at the end of the days*. When God styles himself ^{(4) Dan.} ^{xii. 13.} ^{(5) Exod.} ^{iii. 6, 16.} ^{(6) Gen.} ^{xv. 1.} ^{(7) Gen.} ^{xvii. 7.} ^{(8) Gen.} ^{xvii. 8, 13.} ^{15, 17.} ^{(9) Gen.} ^{xxvi. 3.} ^{(10) Gen.} ^{xxviii. 13.} ^{(11) Deut.} ^{i. 8.} ^{(12) Acts} ^{vii. 5.} ^{(13) Heb.} ^{xi. 9.} THE God of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; and said to *Abraham*, (6) *I am THY exceeding great Reward*, and (7) *I will—be a God unto THEE*, and to thy seed after thee; and, (8) *I will give thee and unto THEE, and to thy seed after thee*; and repeated the very same Promises to (9) *Isaac* and to (10) *Jacob* personally, as well as to (11) their Posterity after them; and yet (12) gave *Abraham* none Inheritance in the Land, tho' he promised that he would give it to HIM and to his Seed after him; but *Abraham* himself (13) sojourned only in the land of *Providence*, as in a strange country, dwelling in *tabernacles* with

- with Isaac and Jacob, the Heirs with him of the same Promise ; who all (1) confessed that they were Strangers and Pilgrims on the Earth ; and Jacob particularly complained, that (2) the days of the Years of his Pilgrimage had been Few and Evil ; And, in blessing Isaac and Ishmael, God promised to (3) make Ishmael fruitful, and to multiply him exceedingly, so that he should beget twelve Princes, and God would make him a great Nation, and (4) multiply his Seed exceedingly, that it should not be numbred for multitude : and yet in the very same sentence, expressly by way of opposition, and of high and eminent distinction, declares that, notwithstanding all this, yet (5) his COVENANT, his EVERLASTING Covenant, he would establish with Isaac : When all This (I say) is considered, the Inference of the Apostles to the Hebrews cannot but appear unanswerably just, that these Patriarchs (6) looked for a City somewhere more than Temporal, even a City which hath Foundations, whose Builder and Maker is God ; and that (7) they who said Such things, declared plainly that they sought a Country, a better country, that is, a heavenly ; and that for This reason God was not ashamed to be called THEIR God, because he had prepared for them a City. And if this Inference were necessarily True concerning the Patriarchs, who confessed that they were Strangers and Pilgrims on the Earth ; much more, concerning those who (9) were tortured, not accepting deliverance, must it needs be true, that the only possible reason of this their Choice, was, that they might obtain a better Resurrection.

Other Notices in the Old Testament, that the Worshipers of the True God in every Age of the World, should at the End have their Lot in the Kingdom promised to the Saints of the most Holy

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are, the (1) Translation of *Elijah*, (2) *that he should not see death*; and the (3) taking up of *Elijah* into Heaven. Allusions to it at least, if perhaps not direct Assertions, are the Words of (4) *Job*: (5) *I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the Earth: And though after my Skin, worms destroy this Body, yet in my Flesh shall I see God.* And those of *Isaiah*: (6) *Thy dead men shall live: together with my dead Body shall they arise: Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the Earth shall cast out the Dead.* And, (7) *Your bones shall flourish like an herb.* And that Passage

Hosea: (8) *I will ransom them from the Power of the grave; I will redeem them from Death. O Death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction.* And That in *Ezekiel*: (9) *Behold, the Bones came together, Bone to his Bone; and the Sinews and the Flesh came up upon them, and the Skin covered them above; and the Breath came into them, and they lived, and stood upon their feet: Behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of your Graves, and bring you into the land of Israel.* Again: The words of *Isaiah*; (10) *The righteous perisheth, and — is taken away from the evil come; He shall enter into P E A C E:* What more natural signification have they, than that which the book of *Wisdom* expresses, *ch. iii. 1, 3. The Souls of the righteous are in the hand of God; — They are in Peace?* And What, but the Future State, can the

(1) Gen. v. 24. (2) Heb. xi. 5. *Wisd.* iv. 10. *Ecclef.* xlv. 16. xlix. 14. (3) 2 Kings ii. 11. *Ecclus.* xlviii. 9. 1 Macc. ii. 58. (4) *Job* xix. 25. (5) The introduction to these words is very solemn: *Oh, that my Words were now — graven with an iron pen, and Lead, in the rock for ever.* And how they were antiently understood, appears from that Addition to the End of the book of *Job* in the LXX, γράψαι δὲ, αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναστήσας, μετ' ὧν ὁ κύριος ἀνίστησιν. So *Job* died, being old, and full of Days. "But 'tis written that he shall rise again, with those whom the Lord raises up."

(6) *If.* xxvi. 19. (7) *If.* lxvi. 14.

(8) *Hof.* xiii. 14. (9) *Ezek.* xxxvii. 7, 8, 10, 12.

(10) *If.* lvii. 1, 2.

(1) If.
lxv. 17.
lxvi. 22,
23, 24.

the (1) Conclusion of *Isaiab's* Prophecy reasonably be referred to? *Behold, I create new Heavens and a new Earth: — As the new Heavens and the new Earth which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord; so shall your seed and your name remain. And — all flesh shall come to worship before me, saith the Lord. And they shall go forth and look upon the Carcases of the men that have transgressed against me: For their Worm shall not die, neither shall their Fire be quenched, and they shall be an abhorring unto all*

(2) Ezek. *Flesh.* In like manner; *Whom* does God speak of xlv. 15, by Ezekiel, when he says, (2) *The Sons of* (3) *Za-*
16. (3) *dock, that kept the charge of my Sanctuary, WHEN*
צִדְקִיָּהוּ *The Sons of the children of Israel went astray from me; [which*
Righteous- (4) *went not astray, when the children of Israel*
ness. (4) *went astray,] — they shall enter into my Sanctua-*
(4) Ezek. *ry? And to what do the following words of the*
xlviii. 11.

(5) Ezek. xlvii. 9, 12. compared with Rev. xxii. 1, 2. *He shewed me a pure River of water of Life: — And of either side of the River, was there the Tree of Life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her Fruit every Month, and the Leaves of the Tree were for the Healing of the Nations.*

same Prophet most naturally refer? (5) *Every thing shall live, whither the River cometh: — And by the River, upon the Bank thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all Trees for Meat; whose Leaf shall not fade, neither shall the Fruit thereof be consumed:*

It shall bring forth new fruit according to his Months, because their waters they issued out of the Sanctuary; And the Fruit thereof shall be for Meat, and the Leaf thereof for Medicine.

(6) Dan.
vii. 9, 10.

Still more strong, is that *Allusion* in Daniel: (6) *I beheld till the Thrones were cast down, [till the Thrones were placed,] and the Antient of days did sit: — A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him: Thousand thousands ministred unto him, and ten Thousand times ten thousand stood before him. The Judgment was set, and the Books were opened.*

(7) Dan.
xii. 2, 3,
13.

But the following words of the same Prophet, are direct and express; (7) *Many of them that sleep in*

the dust of the Earth shall awake, some to everlasting Life, [every one (1) that shall be found written in (1) ver. 1. the Book,] and some to shame and Everlasting Contempt. And they that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the Stars for ever and ever.—

But go thou thy way, till the end be: For thou shalt rest, and shalt stand in thy Lot at the end of the days. Can any one, who considers these Texts, with any Truth or Reason affirm, that All the Promises supposed to be made to the Jews before Christ's time, were meant of some "Temporal" Deliverance only, without the least Imagination of a Spiritual Deliverance?"

9. There are in the Old Testament many Intimations, and some direct Prædictions, that all the Great Promises of God, made to his True Worshipers, shall receive their final Accomplishment by means of a Particular Person, anointed of God for That purpose; who, after the reduction of all Adversaries, shall set up the Everlasting Kingdom. The Seed of Abraham, in which All the Nations of the Earth were to be Blessed; (and in like manner the Seed of the Woman, which was to bruise the Serpent's Head;) might originally with equal propriety, and in as reasonable and natural a sense of the words, be understood to signify (what St Paul afterward (2) asserts it did signify,) in the singular sense, a Particular Person; as, in the plural sense, a Number of persons. The (3) Messiah which was to come, and to whom the Gathering of the people was to be; (the Promise laid up in store, τὰ ἀποκείμενα αὐτῷ, as the LXX render it;) by its opposition in the Text to the Terms Preceptre and Lawgiver, most naturally signifies a

(2) Gal. iii. 16. He saith not, And to Seeds, as of Many; but as of One, And to thy Seed; That is to say: In the Promise to Abraham, the Scripture uses the ambiguous word, Seed, not in the Plural sense, but in the Singular sense.

(3) Gen. xlix. 10.

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- Single person who was to reign ; and, by the gradation in the words of the Text, Somewhat of Superior Dignity to that of a Sceptre and a Lawgiver.
- (1) Num. xxiv. 17, 19. The words of Balaam : (1) *I shall see him, but not now ; I shall behold him, but not nigh : There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel : — out of Jacob shall come he that shall have Dominion :* are words so put in his Mouth, as most properly and obviously to describe a much Greater Person than perhaps He thought of, a much Greater Person than one who should smite the Corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth. Again :
- (2) Deut. xviii. 15. That the words of Moses ; (2) *The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, like unto Me, unto Him shall ye hearken ;* were not meant barely of Joshua, or of “ a Succession of Prophets,” but of One who should have as eminent a legislative Authority as Moses ; may reasonably be gathered from the occasion of their being spoken, not merely by Moses, upon a general Reliance and Trust that God would provide him a Successor ; but by God himself, upon the people’s
- (3) Deut. xviii. 16, 17, 18, 19. (3) *desiring in Horeb, — saying, Let me not bear again the Voice of the Lord my God, neither let me see this great Fire any more, that I die not : Then the Lord said, They have well spoken : — I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto Thee, and will put my words in his Mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I command him : And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require of him. And that the words were Antiently, long before the Application of them by the writers of the New Testament, thus understood, and concerning Joshua or a Succession of Prophets ; appears from those additional words, at the conclusion of the Book of Deuteronomy : (4) *Joshua**
- (4) Deut. xxxiv. 9, 10.

Son of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdom ; for Moses had laid his hands upon him——But there arose not a Prophet since in Israel, like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face. The Prædiction of Isaiah, is still clearer : (1) Unto Us a Child is born, unto Us a Son is given, and the Government shall be upon his shoulders ; and his Name shall be

called (2) Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace : Of the increase of his Government and Peace there shall be no end, upon the Throne of David and upon his Kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even FOR EVER : The zeal of the Lord of Hosts will perform this. Again :

(3) There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse,——He shall not judge after the sight of his Eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his Ears : But with righteousness shall he judge the Poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the Earth ; and he shall smite the Earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the Breath of his Lips shall he slay the Wicked.——The Wolf also shall dwell with the Lamb, &c.——They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my Holy Mountain ; For the Earth shall be full of the Knowledge of the Lord, as the Waters cover the Sea. And (4) I will uphold my Servant,——mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth : I have put my Spirit upon him :——A bruised reed shall he not break :——He shall bring forth judgment unto Truth :——till he have set judgment in the Earth, and the Isles shall wait for his word. The Prophet Jeremiah no less plainly : (5) I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the Earth :——And This is his Name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD

(2) פֶּלֶא יוֹעֵז אֵל גִּבּוֹר
אֲבִיעֵזֶר, Wonderful, Counsellor,
[LXX, Μεγάλῃς βουλῇς ἀγγε-
λῶν as Mal. iii. 1, ὁ ἀγγελῶν
τῆς διαθήκης.] the Mighty, the
Potent one, the Father of the Age
to come. [Vulg. Pater futuri
seculi. Compare Heb. ii. 5.]

(4) If. xlii.
1, 3, 4.
Matt. xii.
17.

(5) Jer.
xxiii. 5, 6.
xxxiii. 15.
16.

OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. And Ezekiel :

(1) Ezek. (1) *I will set up one Shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, even my Servant David; —*

^{xxiv. 23,} *And I will make with them a Covenant of Peace,*
^{25, xxxvii.} *&c. — One King shall be King to them All; —*

^{22, 23, 24,} *neither shall they defile themselves any more with their*
^{25.} *Idols; — and they all shall have One Shepherd;*
They shall also walk in my judgments, — and my
servant David shall be their Prince FOR EVER.

(2) Hagg. ii. 6, 7. Heb.
 xii. 26.

(3) *The Shiloh, unto whom shall the Gathering of the People be, Gen. xlix. 10.*

(4) Zech. ix. 9, 10. Matt.
 xxi. 5.

having Salvation; lowly, and riding upon an Ass, and upon a Colt the Foal of an Ass: — He shall speak Peace unto the Heathen; and his Dominion shall be from Sea even to Sea, and from the River even to the ends of the Earth. And by Malachi :

(5) Mal. (5) *The LORD whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his Temple; even the Messenger of the Covenant.*

(6) Dan. vii. 13, 14.

(7) With reference to *This* it is, that Christ in the Gospel perpetually styles himself *THE Son of Man*; and once, *The Son of Man which is in* [which in the Prophecy is described as coming in the Clouds of] *Heaven, Joh. iii. 13.* And tells his Disciples that *they shall see the Son of Man coming in the Clouds of Heaven, Matt. xxiv. 30* And the High-Priest, that *Hereafter ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of Power, and coming in the Clouds of Heaven, Matt. xxvi. 64.*

By Haggai is the same prædicted:

(2) *Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake the Heavens and the Earth, — And the (3) Desire of all Nations shall come. And by Zechary: (4) Behold, thy King cometh unto thee: He is just, and*

But most expressly of all by Daniel: (6) *I saw in the night-visions, and behold, one like (7) The Son of Man, came with the Clouds of Heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him: And there was given him Dominion, and Glory, and a Kingdom; that all People, Nations, and Languages should serve him: His dominion is an Everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away; and his Kingdom, which shall not be destroyed. And the Anointing of the Holy One*

this Prophet calls (1) *the Sealing up of the Vision* (1) Dan. ix. 24. and *Prophecy*, and *the finishing of Transgression*, and *the making an end of Sins*, and *the making reconciliation for iniquity*, and *the bringing in Everlasting Righteousness*. (Do all these things denote nothing but "Temporal" Deliverance, "without the least imagination of a Spiritual Deliverance?") And in the words next following, he is styled by name, *Messiah*. (2) *Know therefore*, [וְחָדַע Know Also] and (2) Dan. ix. 25. *understand, that from the going forth of the Commandment to restore and to build Jerusalem, unto the Messiah the Prince, shall be* (3) *Seven Weeks*.

(3) Seven
Septena-
ries (or

weeks) of Years, (as the word is used, *Gen. xxix. 27.*) That is to say, *forty nine Years*; the number of Years appointed until the *Jubilee*, *Levit. xxv. 8, 9, 10.* Concerning the *Other Numbers of Daniel* in this place, I shall have occasion to speak presently.

10. Concerning this *Messiah*, in the setting up of whose Kingdom All the Promises of God terminate, 'tis clearly prædicted in the Old Testament, that he should arise particularly from the Tribe of *Judah*, from the Family of *David*, and in the Town of *Bethlehem*.

The first of these particulars is expressed in those emphatical words of *Jacob*: (4) *Judah, thou art he* (4) *Gen. xlix. 8, 10.* *whom thy Brethren shall praise,—thy Fathers children shall bow down before thee:—The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a Lawgiver from between his Feet, until Shiloh come, [LXX, ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ ἀποκείμενον αὐτοῦ, till the accomplishment of the Promises which God has laid up in store for him,] and unto him shall the gathering of the people be. To which the Writer of the *Chronicles* seems to refer, when he says: (5) *The Genealogy is not to be reckoned after the Birth-right: For Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the chief Ruler,* (5) *1 Chr. v. 1, 2.* *וְדָוִד מִמֶּנּוּ and from Him was it prophesied, the**

(1) Ps. lx. *Ruler should arise,] And the Psalmist ; (1) Ju-*
 7. cviii. 8. *dah is my Law-giver.*

The second is expressed in That Promise to Da-
 (2) 2 Sam. vii. 16. *vid ; (2) Thine House, and thy Kingdom shall be esta-*
blished for ever before thee, [LXX, ἐν αἰῶνι μου, before
Me :] Thy Throne shall be established for ever. Which
 words might indeed, of themselves, be understood
 concerning a Succession of Kings in the House of Da-
 vid. But that God had a further and a greater
 Meaning in them, he very clearly explains by the
 following Prophets. By *Isaiah* : (3) *There shall*
 (3) If xi. 1, &c. *come forth a rod out of the Stem of Jesse, and a Branch*
 Compare *shall grow out of his roots ; And then follows, through*
 Rev. iii. 7. *the whole chapter, a glorious description of an ever-*
 v. 5. xxii. 16. *lasting Kingdom of Righteousness, over both Jews*
 (4) Jer. xxiii. 5. *and Gentiles. By Jeremiah : (4) I will raise unto*
David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and
prosper, and shall execute Judgment and Justice in the
Earth : — And this is his Name, whereby he shall
be called, THE LORD OUR RIGH-
 (5) Ezek. xxxvii. 23, 24, 25, 26. *TEOUSNESS. By Ezekiel : (5) They shall be my*
people, and I will be their God : And David my ser-
vant shall be King over them ; and they all shall have
One Shepherd : — and my servant David shall be
their Prince FOR EVER : Moreover I will make
a Covenant of peace with them, it shall be an Ever-
 (6) Hos. iii. 4. *lasting Covenant. And by Hosea : (6) The children*
of Israel shall abide Many Days without a King and
without a Prince, and without a Sacrifice : —
Afterward shall the children of Israel return, and
seek the Lord their God, and David their King ; and
shall fear the Lord and his Goodness, in the LAT-
TER days.

The third particular, is expressed in those words
 of *Micah* : (7) *But thou, Bethlehem Euphrata,*
 (7) Micah v. 2. *though thou be little among the thousands of Judah,*
 Mat. i. 6. *yet out of thee shall He come forth unto me, that is*

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to be Ruler in Israel : *Whose Goings forth have been from of old, from Everlasting.* After the Passages now cited out of the foregoing Prophets, what can be more *jejunz*, than to understand these words of *Micah* concerning *Zorobabel*, only as having been of an *Antient Family*?

II. In the Books of the Old Testament 'tis expressly predicted, that the Kingdom of the Messiah should extend, not over the *Jews* only, but also over the *Gentiles*. The (1) Promise made to *Abraham* and so often repeated to *Him*, and to *Isaac* and to *Jacob*, that in *Their Seed* should *All the Nations of the Earth* be blessed; is thus opened and explained by the Prophets. (2) *There shall be a root of Jesse, which shall stand for an Ensign of the people; To it shall the Gentiles seek, and his Rest shall be glorious.* (3) *Behold my Servant — in whom my Soul delighteth; — he shall bring forth Judgment to the Gentiles: — I will — give thee for a Covenant of the people, for a Light of the Gentiles.* (4) *It is a light thing, that thou shouldst be my Servant to raise up the Tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a Light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my Salvation unto the End of the Earth.* (5) *Also the Sons of the Stranger, that join themselves to the Lord, — even Them will I bring to my Holy Mountain, and — mine House shall be called an House of Prayer for All people. The Lord God, which gathereth the Out-casts of Israel, saith; Yet will I gather Others to him, besides those that are gathered unto him.* (6) *The Strangers that sojourn among you, — shall have an Inheritance with you among the Tribes of Israel.* (7) *From the Rising of the Sun even unto the going down of the same, my Name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in Every place, Incense shall be offered unto my Name, and a pure Offering; For my*

(1) Gen. xii. 3.

xviii. 18.

xxii. 18.

xxvi. 4.

xxviii. 14.

(2) Is. xi.

10.

(3) Is. xlii.

1, 6.

Matt. xii.

18.

(4) Is. xlix.

6.

(5) Is. lvi.

6, 7, 8.

Joh. x. 16.

(6) Ezek.

xlvi. 22.

(7) Mal.

i. 11.

Name shall be great among the Heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts.

12. Concerning the *Same Messiah*, of whom so great things are spoken, and whose Kingdom is to be an Everlasting Kingdom; 'tis still *expressly* predicted by the Prophets, that he should *Suffer* and be *Cut off*. Concerning the very *same* person, who, (with respect to his *coming to Reign*, and to introduce the everlasting *Jubilee* or (1) *Rest* to the people of God,) is styled (2) *Messiah the Prince*; Concerning the very *same* person, I say, 'tis in the very *same* sentence *expressly* prædicted that he should (3) *be Cut off, but not for himself*, [*וְלֹא־בְחַיָּתוֹ* and the *People should not Then be His*; unto Him should not Then (4) *the Gathering of the people be*.] For which *Reason*, and also *because* the words can with no tolerable Sense be applied to any *Other* person, and *because* moreover the *Connexion* of the *Whole* Prophecy leads to the *same* interpretation; the *lii*d chapter of *Isaiah* likewise, is most justly understood to be spoken of the *Messiah*: (5) *There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse*:—— (6) *With righteousness shall He judge the Poor*:—— (7) *Behold My Servant,—— mine Elect in whom my Soul delighteth; —— he shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his Voice to be heard in the street: A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax shall he not quench; he shall bring forth judgment unto Truth.*—— (8) *Behold, My Servant shall deal prudently*; —— (9) *Surely He hath born our Grievs*; —— *he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities*: —— *he is brought as a Lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his Mouth: He was taken from prison and from judgment, and Who shall declare his generation?* —— *for the transgression of my people was he stricken*; *And he made his Grave with the*
- (1) Heb. iv. 9. *σαββατισμός*.
 (2) Dan. ix. 25.
 (3) Dan. ix. 26.
 (4) Gen. xlix. 10.
 (5) Isa. xl. 1.
 (6) Isa. xi. 4.
 (7) Isa. xlii. 1, 2, 3.
 (8) Is. lii. 13.
 (9) Is. liii. 4, &c.

Wicked,

Wicked, and with the Rich in his Death : — When thou shalt make his Soul an offering for Sin ; — My righteous Servant shall justify Many, for he shall bear their iniquities : — He was numbred with the Transgressors, and he bare the Sin of Many, and made Intercession for the Transgressors.

13. All Prophecies of Blessings to the Worshipers of the True God, expressed either as being to happen in the *Latter Days*, or in words which imply a *Lasting Duration* ; are in reason to be understood, as having reference to the Times of the promised Kingdom of the *Messiah* ; of whom 'tis expressly said, that he shall (1) *bring in Everlasting* (1) Dan. ix. 24. Righteousness, and that (2) *his Dominion is an Everlasting Dominion which shall not pass away, and his Kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.* (2) Dan. vii. 14. Some Prophecies of this kind, are *direct* and *express*. Others, beginning with Promises of *particular intermediate* blessings, and proceeding with *general* expressions more great and lofty, than can *naturally* be applied to the *Temporal Blessing* immediately spoken of ; are most reasonably understood to have a *perpetual View* and *Regard* to That *Great and General Event*, in which all God's Promises to his true Worshipers do enter and terminate ; and of which, *All intermediate Blessings* promised by God, are justly looked upon as *Beginnings, Types, Pledges, or Earnests*.

14. For since from the *express* Prophecies before cited of the *Messiah's everlasting Kingdom of Righteousness*, it appears that God had in fact a *View* to That, as the *Great and General End* of all the Dispensations of Providence towards his true Worshipers from the Beginning ; and (3) *no Prophecy* (3) 2 Pet. i. 20. *the Scripture is of any Private interpretation*, (that is, the Meaning of Prophecies is not what perhaps the Prophet himself might imagine in his private judgment of the State of things then present,) because
the

the Prophecy in old time came not by the WILL of Man, but Holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost: there may therefore very possibly and very reasonably be supposed to be many Prophecies, which, though they may have a prior and immediate reference to some nearer Event, yet by the Spirit of God, (whom Those Prophecies which are Express, shew to have had a further View,) may have been directed to be uttered in such words, as may even more properly and more justly be applied to the Great Event which Providence had in view, than to the intermediate Event which God designed as only a Pledge or Earnest of the Other. For

(1) Dan. vii. 9, 10. *instance: Suppose these words of Daniel; (1) I beheld till the thrones were cast down, [till the Thrones were placed,] and the Antient of Days did sit:—*

A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him: thousand Thousands ministred unto him, and ten thousand times ten Thousand stood before him; the Judgment was set, and the Books were opened: Suppose

(2) ver. 11. *(I say) these words were spoken concerning the (2) slaying of a wild Beast, or the destruction of a Temporal Empire; yet what reasonable man, who had*

ever elsewhere met with any Notices of a Judgment to come, could doubt but the Destruction there spoken of, was therefore expressed in Those words, that might be understood to be the introduction to the General Judgment? The exact and very particular description of a Resurrection, in the xxxviii of Ezekiel, supposing it to be indeed spoken of a Temporal Restoration of the Jews, yet Who can doubt but it was so worded with Design, to allude to a real Resurrection of the Dead? The words of Micah; (3) Micah

v. 2. *Thou, Bethlehem, though thou be little among thousands of Judah, yet out of Thee shall He come forth unto me, that is to be Ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of Old, from Everlasting*

(3) Micah
v. 2.

Matt. ii. 6.

ing : supposing it possible they could be spoken of
 Zorobabel, yet, if afterwards there should arise out
 of Bethlehem One in whom were found all the Other
 prophetick characters of the promised *Messiah*, Who
 could doubt but the words were intended either
 solely or at least chiefly of the *Latter* ? The words of
Jeremy ; (1) *Babylon hath been a golden Cup ;* — (1) *Jer. i.*
the Nations have drunken of her wine, therefore the 7. vi. 5.
Nations are mad : Flee out of the midst of Babylon,
be not cut off in her iniquity : — My People, go ye
out of the midst of her, and deliver ye every Man his
soul from the fierce anger of the Lord : Who, that
considers the Nature and character of the Babylon
in Jeremias's time, and compares it with the Na-
ture and character of the Babylon described by St
John, can doubt but the Spirit which influenced
Jeremy, foresaw and intended to allude to That Baby-
lon, which had (2) a golden cup in her hand, full of (2) *Rev.*
dominations, (3) and the Inhabiters of the Earth xvii. 4.
have been made drunk with the wine of her fornica- (3) *ver. 2.*
tion, (4) and the Kings of the Earth have committed (4) *ch.*
fornication with her : — Come out of her, my xviii. 3, 4.
People, that ye be not partakers of her Sins, and that
ye receive not of her Plagues ? For the words of Je-
ry are more strictly applicable to this latter Baby-
lon, than to That in his own time. Again : The
words of Isaiab ; (5) Behold, a Virgin shall conceive (5) *Is.*
and bear a Son, and shall call his Name Immanuel, vii. 14.
that is to say, God with us : Supposing Isaiab him- *Matt. i.*
self could possibly at That time understand them con- 23.
cerning a Son of his own, concerning a Son to be
born of a young woman afterwards, who at the time
then present was a Virgin ; and that his being styled
Immanuel, meant nothing more, than that, before
this Child was grown up, Judah should be delive-
red from the then threatned incursions of Israel and
Assyria ; (all which, notwithstanding the seeming con-
nexion

nexion of the words in the place they stand, is very difficult to suppose;) yet if afterwards any person, comparing the *Solemn Introduction* wherewith the words are brought in, (*Hear ye now, O house of David; Is it a small thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also? therefore the Lord himself shall give you a Sign; Behold, a Virgin shall conceive, &c.*) If any one, I say, comparing this *Solemn Introduction* with the Promises repeated to the House of David in Other passages of the Prophets, that there should be born unto them a Son who should

- (1) If. ix. (1) *sit upon the Throne of David and upon his Kingdom for ever, and of the increase of whose government and peace there should be no end*; and considering moreover the character of this promised Son, that he should (2) *finish transgression, and make an end of Sins, and make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in everlasting Righteousness*: If a person considering and comparing these things, should in his own days find a Son really born of a Virgin, attested to by numerous Miracles, and by God's Command named Jesus (which is Synonymous to Immanuel, a Potent Saviour or God with us) because he (3) *should save his People from their Sins*, that is, should (4) *make reconciliation for iniquity, and bring in everlasting Righteousness*: Could such a person possibly entertain the least doubt, whether God who sent Isaiah to repeat the forecited words to the house of David, did not intend thereby to describe, if not wholly and solely, at least chiefly and ultimately, this Latter Saviour? In like manner: Suppose those great Promises to David, (5) *concerning the establishment of the Throne of his Son for ever*, were by David and the Prophet himself that delivered them, understood (τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐννοεῖται, as St Peter speaks,) concerning Solomon and a Succession of Kings in his Family; yet when following Prophecies clearly and expressly declare

(1) If. ix.
7.
Ezek.
xxxvii. 25.

(2) Dan.
ix. 24.

(3) Matt.
i. 21.

(4) Dan.
ix. 24.

(5) 2 Sam.
vii. 13,
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clared, that out of the *root of Jesse* should arise a *Messiah* who should *reign for ever*; no reasonable man can doubt, but that the *former and less clear Prophecy* was likewise *intended of God*, and therefore *rightly applied by the Apostles of Christ*, to the same purpose. To give but One Instance more: suppose the words, (1) *Thou wilt not leave my Soul in* (1) Ps. Hell, *neither wilt thou suffer thy Holy One to see cor-* xvi. 10. *ruption*; were by *David* spoken concerning *Himself*, which however can by no way be proved; yet who, that (2) knew *David himself* to be a *Prophet*; (2) Acts and that had compared the Other Prophecies, con- ii. 30. cerning the (3) *Branch out of the roots of Jesse*, the (3) Is. xi. (4) *One Shepherd* of Israel, even God's (5) *Servant* 1, &c. (4) Ezek. David who should be *their Prince for ever*, and yet xxxvii. 24. was to be (6) *Cut off* before he should *reign for* (5) ver. 25. *ever*; and that had himself seen (as *St Peter* did) 25. and actually conversed with *Christ risen from the dead*; (6) Dan. ix. 26. Who (I say) in these Circumstances could possibly Is. liii. tot. doubt, but that (7) *the Spirit of the Lord which* (7) 2 Sam. *came by David*, intended the forementioned words xxiii. 2. should be understood of, and applied to *Christ*? and the like may be said concerning some Other prophecies, which are vulgarly supposed to be applied typically to *Christ*.

15. 'Tis not agreeable to Reason, or to the Analogy of Scripture, to suppose that the Jews before our Saviour's time, could have a *Clear and distinct Understanding* of the *Full Meaning* even of the *Express Prophecies*, much less of those which were more *obscure* and *indirect*; when Both were intended to be only * as it were a *Light shining in a dark Place*. But thus much is evident, that the *Jews* both before and in our Saviour's time, had from these Prophecies † a *general expectation* of a *Messiah*, and that

* See above, pag. 394; and Prop. VII. § 4. pag. 318.

† Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus & constans opinio, esse this

in fatis, ut *Judæa* profecti rerum potirentur. *Sueton.*

Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis Sacerdotum libris contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret *Oriens*, profectique *Judæa* rerum potirentur. *Tacit.*

(1) Luke xxiv. 21.

(2) Acts i. 6.

at This Time restore again the Kingdom to Israel; I say, it does not at all appear that they expected *MERELY* a “Temporal” Kingdom; but their Errour was in expecting a *Present* Kingdom; and therefore our Lord’s Answer to them, is not concerning the *Nature* but the *Time* of the Kingdom. And the modern Jews at this Day, who to be sure have entertained no *Prejudicate* Notions from the *New Testament Writers* interpretation or application of Prophecies; have (I think) still an universal expectation, that the *Messiah* shall be their Prince in the *future State* as well as in the *present*.

(3) Joh.
x. 25.

(4) Joh.
v. 36.

16. When *Jesus Christ*, by (3) the Works which he did in his Father’s name, and (4) which his Father gave him to finish, had Proved himself to be sent of God; (which Truth the Apostles likewise confirmed by Their Testimony, by their Works, and by laying down their Lives, not for their Opinions, which possibly Erroneous and Enthusiastick Persons may sometimes sincerely do, but in Attestation to Facts of their own Knowledge;) and it appeared moreover, that there was wanting in Him no Circumstance, no *sine quâ non*, no Character, appropriated by any of the Antient Prophets to the promised *Messiah*; He had then a clear Right to apply to himself All the Prophecies, which either directly spoke of the *Messiah*, or which, through

this *Messiah* was to be, not merely a “Temporal” Deliverer, but אביעזר, *Pater futuri Seculi*, the Head of the future state, as well as of the present. Nor does it at all appear that our Lord’s Disciples, when they (1) thought he would have redeemed Israel, or when they (2) asked if he would

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any intermediate Events, pointed at him, and were applicable to him.

17. The Application of this latter sort of Prophecies to Christ, is not *Allegorical*. 'Tis not an *allegorical* Application, much less an *allegorical* Argument or Reasoning. But they are applied to Him, as being *really and intentionally*, in the View of Providence, the *End* and *complete Accomplishment* of that, whereof the *intermediate Blessing* was a *Pledge* or *Beginning*.

18. The Application of this latter sort of Prophecies to Christ, was never by *reasonable Men* urged as being *itself* a *Proof* that *Jesus* was the true *Messiah*. Nay, the Application of the most *direct* and *express* Prophecies whatsoever, (unless when the *Characters* be so *particular* as not to be at *all* compatible to different persons, or the *Marks of Time* be very *finite* and *exact*,) has not of *itself* the nature of a *direct* or *positive Proof*; but can *only* be a *sine quâ* non, an Application of certain *Marks* or *Characters*, *without which* no person could be the promised *Messiah*. Many men were of the *Seed of Abraham*, and of the *Tribe of Judah*, and of the *Family of David*, and born in *Bethlehem of Judæa*, and suffered, and were *cut off*; And yet neither *Any* nor *All* of these *Characters*, could *prove* any man to be the promised *Messiah*; But the *Want* of *any one* of them, could *prove* that any man was *not* He. The *Proof* *Jesus* being the *Christ*, were (1) the *Works* which (1) Joh. 10. 36. the *Father* gave him to *finish*. The Application of *direct* and *express* Prophecies to him, is nothing but such a *Congruity of Marks* or *Characters*, as removes all *Objections* by which an *Adversary* would endeavour to *prove* that it was *not* He. Ought not *Christ* to have suffered these things, and to enter into his (2) Luke xxiv. 26. *grave*? is not *Proving* from his *Sufferings*, that *Jesus* was the *Christ*; but removing the *Objection*, by which

which Some were apt to infer from his *Sufferings*, that he *could not possibly be* the Christ. The Application of *indirect* Prophecies to him, is only a giving of further Light, from the analogy and conformity of the Old Testament to the New, by way of *Illustration* and *Confirmation*, to such as have been before convinced by the *direct* Proofs. The Proof therefore of the Truth of Christianity, does not *stand upon* the Application of Prophecies: But the *Works* by which Christ proved himself to be *sent of God*, gave him a *Right* to apply to himself the Prophecies concerning the *Messiah*; And the *Marks* or *Characters* of the *promised Messiah*, given by the Prophets, were so many *Tests* by which his Claim was to be tried. "*Miracles*" indeed "*can never* "*render a Foundation valid, which is in itself inva-* "*lid; can never make a False Inference, true; can* "*never make a Prophecy fulfilled, which is not fulfil-* "*led; can never mark out a Messiah, or Jesus for the* "*Messias, if Both are not marked out in the Old Tes-* "*tament:*" But *Miracles* can give a man a just and *undeniable Claim* to be received as the *promised Messiah*, if the prophetick Characters of the *Messiah* be applicable to him. And *This* it is, by which *Jesus* was proved to be *The Christ*.

19. From what has been said concerning the Application of *indirect* Prophecies, 'tis easy to observe the Nature and Use of *Types* and *Figures* and *Allegorical* manners of speaking: That *They* were *much less* intended to be ever alledged for *Proofs* of the *Truth* of a *Doctrine*; and yet, in their *proper* Place, may afford very great Light and Assistance towards the *right understanding* of it. An instance or two, will make this manifest obvious. There is a very remarkable Passage in the Epistle to the *Galatians*, where the Apostle himself styles the thing he is speaking of

an (1) *Allegory*; that is, he draws an Argument (1) Gal. iv. 24. *a simili*. The *Allegory* or *Similitude* he makes use of, is not alledged by him as a “*Proof*” of the *Truth* of the *Doctrine* he is asserting; but as a *Proof* of the *Falseness* and *Groundlessness* of a particular *Objection* urged by the Unbelieving Jews against it. The *Doctrine* the Apostle asserts (both in the Epistle to the Romans, and in *This* to the Galatians,) is; that *Christians* of the *Gentiles*, who imitate the *Faith* and *Obedience* of *Abraham*, (being *circumcised with the Circumcision*—of *Christ*, Col. ii. 11.) are equally capable of being admitted to the Benefit of God’s Promises to *his People*, as the *Jews* of the *literal Circumcision*, who were *lineally* descended from that Patriarch. In opposition to this, the Jews alledged, that since *to the Israelites* confessedly (2) pertained (2) Rom. ix. 4. *the Adoption, and the Glory, and the Covenants, and the Giving of the Law, and the Service of God, and the Promises*; since *Theirs* confessedly were the *Fathers* or *Patriarchs*, to whom all the Promises of God were originally made; it could not possibly be true, or consistent with the Promises of God made to their Fathers, that these *Israelites* who had been all along the *peculiar people* or *Church* of God, should last be rejected for not receiving the Gospel; and that Believers from among the *Gentiles* of all Nations, should be received in Their stead. Now Reply to this Objection, the Apostle argues with the greatest *Justness* and *Strength*, from the *Analogy* of a like case acknowledged by *Themselves*, in which the *Reason of the thing* was the same; even from the *Analogy* of God’s Method and Manner proceeding, in the giving of *Those very Original Promises to the Patriarchs*, upon which *This* prejudice of the Jews was founded. (3) Tell me, (3) Gal. iv. 21, &c. *ye that desire to be under the Law, do ye not* *for the Law?* That is; Will ye not attend to the

Analogy of God's Method of proceeding, in Those Very Promises on which ye depend? For it is written, that Abraham had Two Sons, the one by a Bond-maid, the other by a Free Woman: But he who was of the Bond-woman, was born after the Flesh; but he of the free woman, was by Promise: Which things are an Allegory, &c. That is to say: Even originally, the Promise was not made to All the children of Abraham, but to Isaac only: Which was, from the Beginning, a very plain declaration, that God did not principally intend his Promise, to take place

(1) Rom.
ix. 8.

in (1) Abraham's Descendents according to the Flesh; but in those who, by a Faith or Fidelity like His, were in a truer and higher sense the Children and Followers of that Great Father of the Faithful. In like manner, and for the same reason, the Promise

(2) Rom.
ix. 10.

was not made (2) to Both the Sons of Isaac, but to Jacob only: And, among the Posterity of Jacob,

(3) Rom.
ix. 6.

All (3) were not Israel, which were Of Israel. What

(4) Gal.
iv. 21.

ye (4) yourselves therefore, saith St Paul, who are so desirous to be under the Mosaick Law, cannot but acknowledge to have been originally and always true;

(5) ver.
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the same is true (5) Now. What was true concerning the two Sons of Abraham, and likewise concerning the two Sons of Isaac, who were the Patriarchs with whom God's Covenant was originally made; is, by continuance of the same Analogy, true concerning the Covenant established with the Families, and with the Nation of the Jews, descended from those Patriarchs; 'tis true concerning the Church of God, through all successive Ages:

(6) Gal.
iv. 25.

'tis true concerning the (6) Jerusalem which Now is, and concerning That which is to come. As

(7) ver.
22.

(7) Abraham had Two Sons, the one by a bond-maid the other by a free woman: And as (8) the Son of

(8) ver.
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the Bond-maid, though, according to the Flesh, not less truly his Natural Descendent than the Other

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yet was not to be *Co-Heir* with *Him* who, by the *Promise* of God, was appointed to inherit : So, says the Apostle, the (1) *Jerusalem which Now is, and* (1) ver. *is in bondage with her children ; the visible earthly* 25, 26. *Church*, which received the external ceremonial Law from *Mount Sina* ; is not, by that outward general denomination, intitled to the *eternal* favour of God : But *the Jerusalem which is above, which is the Mother of us all, of All* who by true Faith and sincere Obedience are pleasing to God ; This heavenly *Jerusalem*, this *spiritual invisible Church or City of the Living God* it is, to which all the Promises of God, made in All Ages to his *Church*, are, in reality, originally and finally appropriated.

From this remarkable Instance, 'tis well worth observing by the way, that when the Apostles are supposed to argue with the Jews *ad Hominem*, the Meaning is, that Arguments alledged by the Apostles to *the Jews in particular*, differ from Arguments brought to the *Gentiles*, in This ; not that they were at any time Arguments drawn from things acknowledged by the *Jews*, and in themselves otherwise *inconclusive* ; but that they were drawn, justly and strongly, from things well known among the *Jews*, though what the *Gentiles* were *Strangers* to.

The correspondencies of *Types* and *Antitypes*, though they are not themselves proper *Proofs* of the Truth of a doctrine, yet they may be very reasonable *Confirmations* of the *Foreknowledge* of God ; of the *uniform View of Providence* under different *Dispensations* ; of the *Analogy, Harmony, and Agreement* between the *Old Testament* and the *New*. The words in the Law, concerning one particular kind of death ; (2) *He that is hanged, is* (2) Deut. *accursed of God* ; can hardly be conceived to have *xxi. 23.* been put in upon any other account, than with a

- View and Foresight* to the application made of it by
- (1) Gal. iii. (1) *St Paul*. The *Analogies* between the (2) *Paschal Lamb*, and the *Lamb of God slain from the Foundation of the World*; between the *Egyptian Bondage*, and the *Tyranny of Sin*; between the (3) *Baptism of the Israelites in the Sea and in the Cloud*, and the *Baptism of Christians*; between the (4) *Passage through the Wilderness*, and through the *Present World*; between (5) *Jesus [Joshua] bringing the People into the promised Land*, and *Jesus Christ being the Captain of Salvation to Believers*; between the Sabbath of (6) *Rest promised to the people of God in the earthly Canaan*, and the *Eternal Rest promised in the Heavenly Canaan*; between the (7) *Liberty granted from the time of the Death of the High Priest*, to him that had fled into a *City of Refuge*, and the *Redemption purchased by the Death of Christ*; between the (8) *High Priest entering into the Holy place every year with Blood of Others*, and *Christ's (9) once entering with his own blood into heaven itself, to appear in the presence of God for us*: These (I say) and innumerable other *Analogies*, between the (10) *Shadows of things to come*, the (11) *Shadows of good things to come*, the (12) *Shadows of heavenly things*, the (13) *Figures for the time then present*, the (14) *patterns of things in the heavens*; and (15) *The Heavenly Things Themselves*; cannot, without the force of strong *Prejudice*, be conceived to have happened by *Mere Chance*, without *Any Foresight or Design*. There are no such *Analogies*, much less such *Series of Analogies*, found in the *Books of mere entbusiastick Writers*, much less of *entbusiastick Writers living in such remote Ages from each other*. 'Tis much more credible, and reasonable to suppose, (what *St Paul* affirms,) that (16) *these things were our examples*; and that, in the uniform course of *God's Government of the world*, (17) *all these things happened unto Them of old for ensamples*,

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ensamples, and they are written for Our admonition, upon whom the Ends of the World are come. And hence arises that *Aptness* of Similitude, in the application of several *Legal* Performances to the *Morality* of the Gospel; that it can very hardly be supposed, not to have been originally intended. As

(1) Know ye not that a little Leaven leaveneth the whole Lump? Purge out therefore the Old Leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. (1) 1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 8.

For even Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us. Therefore let us keep the Feast, not with old Leaven, neither with the Leaven of Malice and Wickedness, but with the unleavened Bread of Sincerity and Truth. Again;

(2) WE are THE Circumcision, which worship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the Flesh. And; (2) Phil. iii. 3.

(3) You being dead in your Sins and in the Uncircumcision of your flesh, hath God quickened together with Christ; (3) Col. ii. 13, 11.

In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the Body of the Sins of the flesh, by [the Christian, the Spiritual circumcision,] the circumcision of Christ. And;

(4) Do ye not know, that they which—wait at the Altar, are partakers with the Altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel. — Say I these things as a Man? or saith not the Law the same also? For it is written in the Law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the Ox that treadeth out the Corn. (4) 1 Cor. ix. 13, 14, 8, 9, 10. 1 Tim. v. 18.

Doth God take care for Oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes?

Some Applications of Texts out of the Old Testament, are mere *Allusions*. That is; Nothing more is intended to be affirmed, than that the words spoken in the Old Testament are as Truly and as Justly applicable to the present occasion, as they were to That upon which they were originally spoken. Of this kind, I think, is that of

- (1) Matt. iii. 17. Jer. xxxi. 15. *St Matthew: (1) Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremiah the Prophet, saying; In Rama was there a Voice heard, lamentation and weeping and great Mourning; Rachel weeping for her Children, and would not be comforted, because they are not.*
- (2) 2 Cor. viii. 13, 14, 15. *Thus likewise St Paul: (2) I mean not that other Men be eased, and you burdened: But by an Equality; As it is written He that had gathered much, had nothing over; and he that had gathered little, had no lack.*
- (3) If. vi. 9. *Again: What (3) Isaiah says of the Jews, (supposing he did not speak there prophetically, though the Solemnity of the Introduction makes it much more reasonable to believe he did: But, supposing he spake of the Jews in his own time,) Go and tell this People, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not: make the heart of this People fat, and make their Ears heavy, and shut their Eyes; least they see with their Eyes, and hear with their Ears, and understand with their Heart, and convert and be healed: was (4) fulfilled, was verified, was equally true, equally applicable to the Jews, in our Saviour's days. Of the same kind seems to be (5) St Matthew's explication of that Passage in (6) Isaiah; Surely he hath born our Grievs, and carried our Sorrows. The sense of the words in the prophecy, is, what St Peter expresses; (7) Who his own self bare our Sins in his own body on the Tree; And the Apostle to the Hebrews, (8) Christ was once offered, to bear the Sins of Many. Yet St Matthew says; (9) He healed all that were Sick, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the Prophet, saying; Himself took our infirmities, and bare our Sicknesses. His Meaning is: Christ healed Diseases in such a manner, that even in That sense also, the words of Isaiah were literally verified. To give but One Instance more. (10) All these things, (saith the Evangelist) spake Jesus unto the multitude in Parables,—*

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that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in Parables, I will utter things which have been kept secret from the Foundation of the World: That is, the words (1) of the Psalmist were as properly, as truly, and as justly applicable to the things which our Lord spoke, as to the occasion upon which they were originally spoken by the Psalmist. (1) Ps. lxxviii. 2.

To such as are accustomed only to Modern Languages, and understand not the nature of the Hebrew and Syriack speech, it may seem very surprising, that in the (2) Two last mentioned Passages, the Citations are introduced with These words, *That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, saying, &c.* But All who understand those Languages, well know, that the Phrase answering to these expressions, *ὅσα πλῆρουσῃ*, *that it might be fulfilled*; mean nothing more than, *Hereby was verified*, or, *So that hereby was verified*, or the like. And they who understand not the Languages, may yet easily apprehend this, by considering the nature and force of some Other expressions of the like kind. As: (3) *They prophecy a lie in my Name, THAT I might drive you out.* (4) *Behold, I send unto you Prophets, — THAT upon You may come All the righteous Blood.* With (5) Many other Passages of the same nature: Where the words, “*THAT*” such a thing may be,” do not at all signify the Intention, “*To the End that it May be;*” but merely the Event, “*So that it Will be.*” In the case of the most Direct and Express Prophecies of all; the words, “*This was done, THAT it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet,*” never do, never possibly can signify literally, that the thing was done *For that End*, that the Prophecy might be fulfilled; because, *on the reverse*, the reason why any thing is predicted, always is, because the thing was (before That prædiction) appointed to be (2) Matt. viii. 17. xiii. 35.
(3) Jer. xxvii. 15.
(4) Matt. xxiii. 34.
(5) Exod. xi. 9. xvii. 3. Numb. xxxii. 14. Ps. li. 4. Jer. vii. 18. Matt. x. 34, 35.

done. Much more therefore, in the case of indirect Prophecies ; the words, *This was done, THAT it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet* ; necessarily and evidently mean This only, that the thing was *so* done, as that *thereby* or *therein* Was verified what the Prophet had spoken.

20. It cannot therefore, with any sort of reason or justice, be inferred from *such citations* out of the Old Testament as I have now mentioned, that the Apostles either *misunderstood* or *enthusiastically misapplied* the Writings of the Prophets. Nor can Any just Argument be drawn against the Authority of the Books of the Old and New Testament, from such Topicks as These ; *that* the Copies of the Law, in the times of the idolatrous Kings of Judah and Israel, were well nigh lost ; *that* some Texts cited out of the Old Testament by the Writers of the New, are not Now found in the Old Testament at all ; *that* other texts are read differently in the Old Testament itself, from the Citations of the same Texts recorded in the New ; and the like. Which things have indeed given occasion to *Weak and Ridiculous Writers*, to invent certain *senseless Rules or Regulations* ; according to which, men may at any time *rightly* make what *Wrong* Quotations they please. But in truth, the things themselves I am here speaking of, are nothing but what must of necessity happen in a long Succession of Ages.

(1) 2 Chr.
xxxiv. 14.

When (1) *Hilkiab the Priest* (in the days of *Josiah*,) found in the house of the Lord, a Book of the Law of the Lord, given by *Moses* ; 'tis very probable indeed, from the Circumstances of the History, that Copies of the Law were then very scarce ; and that This found by *Hilkiab*, was, to his Surprise, an *authentick* or *original* Copy. But that the Whole should have been at that time a *Forgery* of *Hilkiab*, is evidently impossible ; be-

cause

cause the very *Being* and *Polity* of the Nation, as well as their *Religion*, was founded upon the Acknowledgment of the *Law* of *Moses*; how much soever idolatrous Kings might at certain times have corrupted that Religion, and caused the Study of the *Law* to have been neglected. And in the very same book, wherein the account is given of *this particular Fact*, of *Hilkiab's* finding a Copy [an *authentic Copy*] of the *Law*; 'tis expressly and at large recorded how, in a *foregoing* Reign, the King (1) sent to his Princes—to teach in the Cities of *Judah*; and with them he sent *Levites* and *Priests*;—^{(1) 2 Chr. xvii. 7, 8,} and they taught in *Judah*, and had the *Book of the Law of the Lord* with them, and went about throughout all the Cities of *Judah*, and taught the people.

That, in length of time, some whole Books should have been *lost*; is nothing wonderful. There are several Books expressly cited in the Old Testament, of which we have now nothing remaining. That in the Books which remain, there should sometimes, for want of

(2) *Infallibility* in Transcribers, happen *Omissions*, *Transpositions*, and various *Readings*; is still less to be wondered at. Nothing, but perpetual *Miracle*, could prevent

They who have Skill to compare, in the *Original*, certain Passages in the Books of *Chronicles*, with the correspondent places in the Books of *Kings*; or the 18th Psalm, with 2 Sam. c. xxii. which is a Transcript of the same Psalm;

the 14th Psalm with the 53d, which are also one and the same Psalm transcribed; and much more, they who can compare the *Septuagint Translation* with the *Original*; will be able to find *Instances* of these

(2) In some few places, there is reasonable Ground for a worse Suspicion. As, for Instance, *Psal. xxii. 16*. Where the *Sense* most evidently shows it ought to be read, and the LXX Version shows it anti-*ently was read*, כָּאֵר or כֵּר, “they Pierced my Hands and my Feet”; the Jewish Masters, in all their *correct* Hebrew Editions, have written it, כָּאֵר “as a Lion my hands and my Feet.” Which has no tolerable sense at all.

these things, and very often also to see plainly *how* and *whence* they happened : (All which, far from diminishing the Authority of the Books, are *strong Arguments* of their *Antiquity*, and *against* their having been *forged* by *Esdra*s, or *any other hand*.) What Wonder then is it, that among the numerous Texts cited in the New Testament out of the Old *one* or *two* should *Now* not be found in our present Copies of the Old Testament ; and that *some others* should be read *differently* in the Old Testament, from the Citations of the same Texts recorded in the New ? Or how does this at all affect the *Authority* of *Either* ; when much the *greatest Part* of the Texts cited, *agree perfectly* either in *Words* or at least in *Sense* ; and the *Whole Series, Harmony, Analogy, Connexion, and Uniformity* of *Both*, compared with the *System of Natural and Moral Truths*, and with the *History of the World* and the *State of Nations* through a long *Succession of Ages* from the *days of Moses* to *this present time* ; shows that the Books are not the result of *random* and *enthusiastick Imaginations*, but of long *Fore-sight* and *Design* ? For, the *Spirit of Enthusiasm* is *very hardly consistent* with *itself* through the Writings of *one single person*. How then is it *possible*, that for *3000 years* together, and pretending too (*through all That Time*) to an *uniform Series of Predictions*, it should *HAPPEN* never to have fallen into *Such a Tract* of expected *Events*, as the *Nature and Truth of Things* and the *Situation of the Kingdoms of the World*, should have rendered absolutely *IMPOSSIBLE* ; and altogether *INCAPABLE* of any farther, much less of any *final completion* ?

21. I shall conclude This Head, with pointing at some *particular extraordinary Prophecies*, which deserve to be carefully considered and compared with the Events, whether they could *possibly* have proceeded

proceed

proceeded from *Chance* or from *Enthusiasm*. Some of them are of such a nature, as that they can only be judged of by persons learned in *History*; and these I shall but just mention. Others are obvious to the consideration of the *whole World*; and with these I shall finish what I think proper at this time to offer upon this Subject.

Concerning *Babylon*, "it was

(1) particularly foretold, that it

(2) should be shut up, and be-

sieged by the Medes, Elamites,

and Armenians: That the River

dried up: That the City should be taken in the

time (4) of a Feast, while her—mighty

men were drunken; Which accordingly came to

pass" when "Belshazzar and all his thousand

Princes, who were drunk with him at the feast,"

were (5) "slain by Cyrus's Soldiers.—Also it

was particularly foretold, "that God would make

the Country of Babylon (6) a Possession for the

Bittern, and Pools of Water; Which was accord-

ingly fulfilled by the overflowing and drowning of

it, on the breaking down of the great Dam in

order to take the City." Could the correspon-

dence of These Events with the Predictions, be

the result of *Chance*? But suppose These Predictions

were forged After the Event: Can the following

also have been written After the Event? or,

with any reason, be ascribed to *Chance*? (7) The

Wild Beasts of the desert—shall dwell There,

and the Owls shall dwell therein: And it shall be NO

MORE inhabited for EVER, neither shall it be

rebuilded in from generation to generation: As God over-

threw Sodom and Gomorrah, &c. (8) They shall

take of thee a Stone for a corner,—but thou

shalt be desolate For EVER, saith the Lord:—

Babylon shall become Heaps, a dwelling place for Dra-

gons, an astonishment and an hissing without an Inha-

bitant:

(1) Prideaux Connexion
Part I, Book II. pag. 67. Edit.
fol.

(1) Is. xiii. 17. xxi. 2.

(3) Jer. l. 38. li. 36.

(4) Jer. li. 39. 57.

(5) Cyropædia, lib.

(6) Is. xiv. 23.

(7) Jer. l. 39.

(8) Jer. li. 26. xxxvii.

64.

- bitant: — It shall sink, and shall not rise from the
 (1) If. i. Evil that I will bring upon her. (1) Babylon, the
 19, 20, 21. Glory of Kingdoms, — shall be as when God over-
 threw Sodom and Gomorrah: It shall NEVER be
 inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation
 to generation: Neither shall the Arabian pitch Tent
 there, neither shall the Shepherds make their Fold
 there: But wild Beasts of the Desert shall lie there
 and their Houses shall be full of doleful Creatures, and
 Owls shall dwell there.

- Concerning Egypt, Was the following Prediction
 on forged after the Event? or can it, with any rea-
 son, be ascribed to Chance? (2) Egypt — shall
 (2) Ezek. be a BASE Kingdom: It shall be the BASES
 xxix. 14, of Kingdoms, neither shall it exalt itself AN-
 15. MORE above the Nations: For I will diminish
 them, that they shall NO MORE RULE over
 the Nations.

- Concerning Tyre, the Prediction is no less re-
 markable: (3) I will make thee like the Top of
 (3) Ezek. Rock; Thou shalt be a place to spread Nets upon
 xxvi. 14, Thou shalt be built NO MORE; — Thou shalt
 21. be NO MORE; (4) The Merchants among the
 (4) Ezek. people shall hiss at thee, thou shalt be a Terrour, and
 xxvii. 36. NEVER shalt be any more. (5) All they that
 (5) Ezek. know thee among the people, shall be Astonished
 xxviii. 19. thee.

- The Description of the Extent of the dominion
 That People, who were to possess Judæa in the
 latter days; Was it forged after the Event? or
 can it reasonably be ascribed to Chance? (6) He
 (6) Dan. shall come — with Horse-men and with many Slaves
 xi. 40, 41, and — shall overflow and pass over: He shall en-
 42, 43. also into the Glorious Land, [and (7) shall plant
 (7) ver. Tabernacles of his Palace between the Seas in the Glo-
 45. rious Holy Mountain;] And many Countries shall
 be overthrown: But These shall escape out of his hand
 even Edom and Moab, and the chief of the children

Ammon. He shall stretch forth his hand also upon the Countries, and the land of Egypt shall not escape. But he shall have power over the Treasures of Gold and of Silver, and over all the precious things of Egypt; and the Libyans and Ethiopians [נְשִׁים] shall be at his Steps.

When Daniel, in the (1) Vision of Nebuchadnezzar's Image, foretold (2) Four Great Successive Monarchies: Was This written after the Event? or can the conformity of his description with the things themselves, reasonably be ascribed to mere Chance?

(1) The Fame of which, was so early spread; that Ezekiel, who was contemporary with Daniel, plainly alludes to it, when he says of the Prince of Tyre, chap. xxviii. 3. *Thou art wiser than Daniel; there is no Secret, that they can hide from thee.*

(2) Dan. ii. 38-44.

(3) Dan. ix. 24.

(4) Weeks, or Septenaries, of Years. Compare Gen. xxix. 27. Num. xiv. 34. Ezek. iv. 6.

When the Angel says to Daniel: (3) Seventy Weeks (4) are determined upon thy people, and upon thy Holy City, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of Sins, and to make reconciliation

for iniquity, &c. Was this Written after the Event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to Chance,

that from (5) the Seventh year of Artaxerxes the King, (when Ezra went up from Babylon — un- Jerusalem with a Commission to restore the Government of the Jews,) to the Death of Christ; from ann. Nabonass. 290, to ann. Nabonass. 460,] should be precisely 490] 70 weeks of years? (5) Ezra vii. 6, 7, 8.

When the Angel tells Daniel, that (6) Threescore (6) Dan. ix. 25. and two Weeks the street [of Jerusalem] shall

be rebuilt again, and the Wall, even in troublous times וּבְיָמֵי טְרוּבָה, but This in Troublous times, not those * that should be under

Sheshbazzar the Prince, when he should come to reign:] Was This written after the Event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to Chance,

* This and the following Observation was extracted out of a MS communicated by Sir Isaac Newton; and was published in his life-time in the that

foregoing Editions of this Discourse, with his *express* consent.

(1) Τοῖς Ἱεροσολύμοις, ἀνακοδομηθῆναι τὸ τεῖχος, ὁμοῦ καὶ αἰκοῦ τῆς Εἰρήνης Βασιλείας ἔτει, μὴν ἑνῶτον· τέλει δὲ τῶν τευχῶν λαβόντων, &c. *Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 11. cap. 5.* Compare *Nehem. v. 14.*

(2) Dan. ix. 27.

with Many for One Week: Was This written after the Event? Or can it reasonably be ascribed to Chance, that from the Death of Christ, (*anno Dom. 33,*) to the Command given first to St Peter to preach to Cornelius and the Gentiles, (*anno Dom. 40,*) should be exactly Seven [One week of] years?

(3) Dan. ix. 27.

When he still adds: (3) *And in the midst of the Week* [שבוע השבוע, *And in Half a Week*] *he shall cause the Sacrifice and the Oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of Abominations he shall make it desolate*: Was This written after the Event? Or can it with any reason be ascribed to Chance, that from Vespasian's marching into Judæa in the Spring *Anno Dom. 67,* to the taking of Jerusalem by Titus in the Autumn *Anno Dom. 70,* should be [Half a Septenary of Years,] *Three Years and a Half*?

(4) Dan. vii. 25.

When the same Daniel foretels a Tyrannical Power, which should wear out the Saints of the Most High, and they should be given into his hand until (4) *a Time and Times and the Dividing of Time*

(5) Dan. xii. 7.

(6) *Three Years and a Half, or 1260 Days,* is, according to the Analogy of all the forementioned Numbers, *1260 Years.*

(7) Dan. viii. 26.

that from the (1) *Twenty Eighth of Artaxerxes,* when the Walls were finished, to the Birth of Christ, [from *ann. Nabonass. 311,* to *ann. Nabonass. 745*] should be precisely 434 [62 weeks of] years?

When Daniel further says: (2) *And he shall confirm* [or *Nevertheless he shall confirm*] *the Covenant*

and (5) again, for (6) *a Time and a Half*: (Which can no way be applied to the Short Persecution of Antiochus, because these Prophecies are expressly declared to be (7) *for many Days* concerning

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concerning (1) *what shall befall thy people in the Last days, for yet the Vision is for Many Days*; concerning (2) *the Time of the End*; (3) *what shall be in the Last End of the indignation*; concerning those who (4) *shall fall by the sword and by flame, by captivity and by Spoil, Many Days*; (5) *to try them, even to the Time of the End, because it is yet for a time appointed*; concerning (6) *a Time of Trouble, such as never was since there was a Nation*; the time (7) *when God shall have Accomplished to scatter the Power of the Holy people*; (8) *the time of the End, till which the words are closed up and sealed*; (9) *to which the Prophet is commanded to shut up his words, and seal the Book, for many shall run to and fro, and Knowledge shall be increased*; even (10) *the End, till which Daniel was to rest, and then stand in his Lot at the End of the Days.*) When Daniel, I say, foretells such a Tyrannical Power, to continue such a determined period of Time; And in John prophecies, that the (11) *Gentiles should tread the Holy City under foot, Forty and Two Months*; which is exactly the same period of time, with that of Daniel: And again, that (12) *Two Witnesses, clothed in Sackcloth, should prophesy a thousand two Hundred and threescore days*; which is again exactly the very same Period of time: And again, that the (13) *Woman which fled into the Wilderness from Persecution, should continue there a thousand two Hundred and threescore days*: And again, that she should (14) *fly into the Wilderness, for a Time, and Times, and Half a Time*; which is still the very same period: And again, that a *Wild Beast, a Tyrannical Power, was given to make War with the Saints, and to overcome them, was (16) to * continue forty and two Months, (still the very same period of time,) and have (17) Power over All Kingdoms*.

(1) Dan.

x. 14.

(2) ch.

viii. 17.

(3) ch.

viii. 19.

(4) ch.

xi. 33.

(5) ch.

xi. 35.

(6) ch.

xii. 1.

(7) ch.

xii. 7.

(8) ch.

xii. 9.

(9) ch.

xii. 4.

(10) ch.

xii. 13.

(11) Rev.

xi. 2.

(12) Rev.

xi. 3.

(13) Rev.

xii. 6.

(14) Rev.

xii. 14.

(15) ch.

xiii. 7.

(16) ch. xiii. 5.

(17) ch. xiii. 7, 8.

* There has prevailed among Learned men a very Im-
dreds,

portant Errour, as if the 1260 Days (or Years) here spoken of, took their Beginning from the Rise of the Tyranny here described. Whereas, on the contrary, the words of *Daniel* are exprefs, that, not from the Time of his Rise, but after his having made War with the Saints, and from the time of their being given into his hand, should be a Time, and Times, and the Dividing of Time, chap. vii. 24, 25. And *St John* no less exprefsly says, that the time, not of the Two Witnesses Prophefying, (for in Part of That time they had Great Power,) but of their Prophefying in Sackcloth, should be a thousand two hundred and threescore days, Rev. xi. 3. And the persecuted Woman, after her Flight, was to be actually in the Wilderness, (and in her Place there, of Riches and Honour,) a thousand two hundred and threescore days, chap. xii. 6. Wherefore also the forty and two months, (the very same period,) during which time Power was given unto the Wild Beast to Continue, (in the original it is, ποιῆσαι, to do what he pleased, Rev. xiii. 5.) evidently ought not to be reckoned from his Rise, or from the time when the ten Kings (chap. xvii. 12.) received Power With Him; but from the time of his having totally overcome the Saints, and of his being Worshipped by All that dwell upon the Earth, ch. xiii. 7, 8.

dreds, and Tongues, and Nations, so that All that dwell upon the Earth should worship him: Is it credible or possible, that ignorant and Enthusiastical Writers should, by mere Chance, hit upon such Coincidencies of [occult] Numbers? especially since *St John* could not possibly take the Numbers from *Daniel*, if he understood *Daniel* to mean nothing more than the Short Persecution of *Antiochus*. And if he did understand *Daniel* to mean a much Longer and Greater and more Remote Tyranny, which *John* himself prophefied of as in His time still future; then the Wonder is still infinitely Greater, that in Those early Times, when there was not the least Footstep in the World of any such Power as *St John* distinctly describes, (but which Now is very conspicuous, as I shall presently observe more particularly;) it should ever enter the Heart of man to conceive so much as the Possibility of such a Power, sitting, not upon the Pavilion of Heathen Persecutors, but exprefsly (2 Thess. ii. 4.) in the Temple and upon the Seat of God himself.

But These Prophecies, which either relate to Particular Places, or depend upon the computation of Particular Periods of Time, are (as I said) of such a nature, that they cannot be judged of,

but by persons *skilled in History*. There are some Others more *General*, running through the *Whole Scripture*, and obvious to the consideration of the *Whole World*.

For Instance : It was foretold by *Moses*, that when the Jews forsook the True God, they should be (1) *removed into all the Kingdoms of the Earth* ; (1) Deut. xxviii. 25. should be (2) *scattered among the Heathen*, (3) *among the Nations*, (4) *among all people from the one end of the Earth even unto the other* ; should There (2) Levit. xxvi. 33. be (5) *left Few in number among the Heathen*, and (3) Deut. iv. 27. (6) *pine away in their iniquity in their Enemies lands* ; (4) Deut. xxviii. 64. and should (7) *become an astonishment, a proverb, and a By-word, among all Nations* ; and that (8) *among these Nations they should find no Ease, neither should the Sole of their Foot have Rest ; but the Lord should give them a Trembling Heart, and failing of Eyes, and sorrow of Mind ; and (9) send a Faintness into their Hearts, with Lands of their Enemies ; so that the sound of Shaven Leaf should chase them.* (5) Deut. iv. 27. (6) Levit. xxvi. 39. (7) Deut. xxviii. 37. (8) Deut. xxviii. 65. (9) Levit. xxvi. 36. Had any thing like This, in *Moses's* time, ever happened to Any Nation ? Or was there in Nature any Probability that any such thing *should ever happen* to any People ? that, when they were conquered by their Enemies, and led into captivity, they should neither continue in the place of their captivity, nor be swallowed up and lost among their Conquerors, but be scattered among all the Nations of the World, and hated by all Nations for many Ages, and yet *continue* a People ? Or could Any description of the Jews, written at this day, possibly be a more exact and lively Picture of the State they have *Now* been in for many Ages ; than this prophetick description given by *Moses*, more than 2000 Years ago ?

The very same thing is in like manner continually predicted through all the following Prophets ;

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that

- (1) Jer. ix. that God would (1) scatter them among the Heathen; 16. Ezek. that he would (2) cause them to be removed into all iv. 13. Kingdoms of the Earth; that he would (3) scatter (2) Jer. them into all the Winds, and (4) disperse them through xv. 4. the Countries of the Heathen: that he would (5) sift xxiv. 9. them among all Nations, like as Corn is sifted in a xxix. 18. Sieve; that (6) in all the Kingdoms of the Earth, xxxiv. 17. whither they should be driven, they should be a Re- (3) Ezek. proach and a Proverb, a Taunt and a Curse, and an v. 10, 12. Astonishment, and an Hissing: and that they should (4) Ezek. abide MANY DAYS without a King, and xx. 23. without a Prince, and without a Sacrifice, and with- xxii. 15. out an Image, and without an ephod, and without te- (5) Amos raphim. And here concerning the Prædictions of (6) Jer. Ezekiel, 'tis remarkable in particular, that they be- xxiv. 9. ing spoken (8) in the very time of the Babylonian xxix. 18. Captivity, 'tis therefore evident from the Time of (7) Hof. his Prophesying, as well as from the Nature and iii. 4. Description of the thing itself, that he must needs be (8) See understood of that Latter (9) "captivity into all Ezek. i. i. Places," which was to happen after the "Fulfil- iii. 11. ling the Time of that Age" wherein God was first xi. 24. to "bring them again" (out of the Babylonian Cap- (9) Tobit. tivity) "into the Land where they should build a xiv. 5. Temple," but not like to that which afterward (after their Final Return) should "be built for ever with a Glorious Building." The forecited Prophecies (I say) must of necessity be understood of that Wide and Long Dispersion, which in the New Testament also is expressly mentioned by (10) Our Saviour, and by (11) St Paul.
- (10) Luke 'Tis also, further, both largely and distinctly pro- xxi. 24. dicted, as well by Moses himself, as by All the fol- (11) Rom. lowing Prophets; that, notwithstanding this un- xi. 25. ampled Dispersion of God's People, (12) yet, for (12) Levit. that, when they be in the Land of their Enemies, xxvi. 44. will not destroy them utterly; but (13) when (13) Deut. xxx. 1, 2, 3, 4.

shall call to mind among all the Nations, whither God has driven them, and shall return unto the Lord, he will turn their Captivity, and gather them from all the Nations,—from the utmost parts of Heaven,—

(1) even in the *LATTER* Days : That (2) though (1) Deut. iv. 30. he makes a full end of all other Nations, yet will he not make a full end of Them ; but (3) a Remnant of them shall be preserved, and return out of all Countries (2) Jer. xxx. 11. whither God has driven them : That he (4) will sift (3) Isa. x. 21, 22. the House of Israel among all Nations, like as Corn is sifted in a Sieve ; yet shall not the least Grain fall upon Jer. xxiii. 3. Ezek. vi. 8, 9. the Earth : That (5) the Lord shall set his hand against the second time, to recover the Remnant of his (4) Amos ix. 9. People,—and shall set up an Ensign for the Nations, and shall assemble the Out-casts of Israel, and gather (5) Isa. xi. 11—16. together the dispersed of Judah, from the Four Corners of the Earth : For (6) I will

bring thy Seed from the East, saith the Lord, and gather thee from the West ; I will say to the North, Give up ; and to the South, Keep not back ; Bring my Sons from far, and my Daughters from the Ends of the Earth : (7) Behold, I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my Standard to the People ; and they shall bring my Sons in their Arms, and thy Daughters shall be carried upon their Shoulders : (8) For a small moment have I forsaken thee, but with Great Mercy will I gather thee : In a little Wrath I hid my face from thee, for a Moment ; but with Everlasting Kindness will I have mercy on thee. And that these Prophecies might not be applied to the Return from the 70 Years Captivity in Babylon, (which moreover was not a Dispersion into All Nations,) they are expressly referred to the *LATTER* Days, not only by (9) Moses, but by (10) Hosea, who lived long after, (For the children of Israel shall abide *MANR DAYS* without a King, and with-

(6) Isa. xliii. 5, 6. Jer xvi. 15. xxiii. 7, 8. xxxi. 8—12. xxxii. 37, &c. Ezek. xi. 15, 16, 17. xx. 41. xxviii. 25. xxxiv. 12, 13. xxxvi. 24. xxxvii. 21. xxxix. 27, 28, 29.

(7) Is. xlix. 22. lx. 8, 9, 10. lxi. 20.

(8) Isa. liv. 7 ; and the whole chapter.

(9) Deut. iv. 30. (10) Hos. iii. 4, 5.

out a Prince, and without a Sacrifice; AFTER-
WARD they shall return, and seek the Lord their
God, and David their King, and shall fear the Lord
and his Goodness in the **LATTER DAYS**;) And
(1) Ezek. by Ezekiel, who lived in the Captivity itself; (1) Af-
xxxviii. 8. ter **MANY DAYS** [speaking of Those who should
xii. 14, 16. oppose the Return of the Israelites,] thou shalt be vi-
sited; in the **LATTER YEARS** thou shalt come into
the Land; — upon the People that are gathered out
of the Nations; — In that Day, when my People of
Israel dwelleth safely, — thou shalt come up against
them, — it shall be in the **LATTER DAYS**.
These Prædictions therefore necessarily belong to
That Age, when (2) the Times of the Gentiles shall be
fulfilled, and (3) the Fulness of the Gentiles be come
in. And that, through all the Changes which have
happened in the Kingdoms of the Earth, from the
Days of Moses to the present Time, which is more
than 3000 Years; nothing should have happened,
to prevent the **POSSIBILITY** of the Accom-
plishment of these Prophecies; but, on the contrary,
the State of the Jewish and Christian Nations at
this Day, should be such as renders them easily
capable, not only of a figurative, but even of a li-
teral completion in every Particular, if the Will of
God be so; this (I say) is a *Miracle*, which
hath nothing parallel to it in the Phænomena of
Nature.

Another Instance, no less extraordinary, is as
follows. Daniel foretells (4) a Kingdom upon the
(4) Dan. Earth, which shall be divers from All Kingdoms
vii. 23. (5) divers from all that were before it, (6) exceeding
(5) ver. 7. dreadful, (7) and shall devour the Whole Earth: That
(6) ver. 19. among the Powers into which this Kingdom shall
(7) ver. 23. be divided, there shall arise One Power (8) dis-
(8) ver. 24. from the rest, who (9) shall subdue unto himself
(9) ver. 8, 20. **THREE** of the First Powers, and he shall have
(10) ver. (10) a Mouth speaking very great Things, and a Lo-

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more Stout than his Fellows. He shall (1) make War (1) ver. with the Saints, and prevail against them. (2) And he shall speak great words against the most High, and shall wear out the Saints of the most High, and think to change Times and Laws; and they shall be given into his hand, for a long season; even till (3) the Judgment shall sit, and—the Kingdom under the whole Heaven shall be given to the people of the Saints of the most High. (4) He shall exalt himself and magnify himself above every God, and shall speak marvellous things against the God of Gods;—Neither shall he regard (5) the God of his Fathers, nor (6) the Desire of Women, nor regard any God; for he shall magnify himself above all. And in his estate, shall he honour (7) the God of Forces; and (8) a God whom his Fathers knew not, shall be honour.—Thus shall he do in the most strong Holds with a Strange God, whom he shall acknowledge and increase with glory; and he shall cause them to rule over many, and shall divide the Land for Gain. Suppose now all this to be spoken by Daniel, of nothing more than the Short Persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes; Which that it cannot be, I have shown (9) above. But suppose it were, and that it was all forged after the Event: Yet This cannot be the Case of St Paul, and St John, who describe exactly a Like Power, and in like Words; speaking of things to come in the Latter Days, of things still Future in Their time, and of which there was Then no Footsteps, no Appearance in the World. The day of Christ, saith (10) St Paul, shall not come, except there come a Falling away first, and That Man of Sin be revealed, the Son of Perdition; Who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as

(5) The God of Gods, as in the foregoing verie.

(6) Forbidding to marry, 1 Tim. iv. 3.

(7) Gods-Protector, as 'tis in the margin of the Bible; or Saints Protectors.

(8) Changing Times and Laws, ch. vii. 25; setting up New Religions.

(9) pag. 430, 431.

(10) 2 Thess. ii. 3, &c.

(1) 'Tis therefore a *Christian* (not an *Infidel*) *Power*, that he here speaks of.

God, sitteth (1) in the Temple of God, shewing himself that he is God:—Whose Coming is after the Working of Satan, with all

Power, and Signs, and Lying Wonders, and with (2) 1 Tim. all deceivableness of Unrighteousness. Again: (2) iv. 1, &c. The Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the Latter times Some shall depart from the Faith, giving heed to se-

(3) Doctrines concerning *Dæmons*, that is, *Ghosts* or *Souls* of (good or bad) men *Departed*. Epiphanius, citing This Text, alledges the following Words, as part of the Text itself; ἔσονται γὰρ, φησὶ νεκροὺς λατρεύοντες, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἰσραὴλ ἐπεβόησαν. "For they shall be, says the Apostle, Worship- pers of the Dead, even as the Dead were antiently worship- ped in Israel. And he applies the Whole, to the Wor- shippers of the Blessed Virgin. Hæref. 78. § 22.

(4) Rev. and Nations; And all that dwell upon the Earth, shall xiii. 2, 5, worship him.—And he that exerciseth his Power be- 6, 7, 8, fore him,—doth great Wonders,—and deceiveth 12, 13, 14, them that dwell on the Earth, by the means of those Mi- 16, 17, racles which he had power to do.—And he causeth—that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the Mark of the Name of the Beast. And the Kings of

(5) Rev. the Earth (5) have one Mind, and shall give their xvii. 13, Power and strength unto the Beasts;—even peoples, and 15, 17, multitudes, and nations, and tongues.—For God hath put in their hearts [in the hearts of the Kings, to fulfill his Will, and to agree, and give their King- dom unto the Beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled. The Name of the Person, in whose

(6) Rev. hands the (6) Reins or Principal Direction of the Exer-

ducing Spirits, and (3) doctrines of Devils;—Forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, &c. St John in like manner prophesies of a *Wild Beast*, or *Tyrannical Power*, to whom was given (4) Great Authority, and a Mouth speaking Great things, and Blasphemies: And he opened his Mouth in Blasphemy against God: And it was given unto him to make War with the Saints, and to overcome them; and Power was given him over all kindreds and tongues

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Exercise of this Power is lodged, is (1) *Mystery*, (1) Rev. *Babylon the Great, the Mother of Harlots, and A-* xvii. 5.

dominations of the Earth: (2)

With whom the Kings of the Earth

(2) Ver. 2.

(3) *have committed Fornication,*

(3) *Have been led into Idolatrous Practices.*

and the Inhabitants of the Earth

have been made drunk with the Wine of her fornication:

And She herself is (4) drunken with the Blood (4) Rev. of the Saints, and with the Blood of the Martyrs of xvii. 6.

Jesus: And (5) by her (6) *Sorceries*

(5) Rev. xviii. 23, 24.

are all Nations deceived: And

(6) *Φαρμακεία, [σοφοῖς φαρμακοῖς] Methods of making men Religious without Virtue.*

in Her is found the Blood of Prophets,

and of Saints, and of All

that are slain upon the Earth.

And This Person, [the political Person,] to whom

these Titles and Characters belong, is (7) *That* (7) Rev.

Great City, (standing (8) upon Seven Mountains,) xvii. 18.

which Reigneth over the Kings of the Earth. (8) ver. 9.

If in the days of *St Paul*, and *St John*, there was

any Footstep of such a Sort of Power as This in the

World: Or, if there ever had been any such Power

in the World; Or if there was Then any Ap-

pearance of Probability, that could make it enter

into the heart of Man to imagine, that there ever

could be any such Kind of Power in the *World*, much

less in (9) *the Temple or Church of God*; And, if (9) 2 Thes.

there be not *Now* such a Power actually and conspi-

cuously exercised in the World; And if any Picture

of this Power, drawn *after the Event*, can now de-

scribe it more plainly and exactly, than it was ori-

ginally described in the words of the Prophecy:

Then may it with some degree of plausibleness be

suggested, that the *Prophecies* are nothing more than

Enthusiastick Imaginations.

Thirdly; The chief Evidence of the *Facts* on *Of the Testi-*

which the Truth and Certainty of the Christian *timony of*

Revelation depends, to *Us who live now at this* *our Savi-*

distance *ciples, as*

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What
things are
requisite to
make the
Testimony
of our Sa-
viour's
Disciples a
complete
Evidence.

That the
Apostles
could not
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distance of Time, is the *Testimony of our Saviour's Followers*; Which, in all its Circumstances, was the most credible, certain and convincing Evidence, that ever was given to any Matter of Fact in the World.

To make the Testimony of our Saviour's Followers a sufficient Evidence to Us in This Case, there can be required but these three things. 1st, That it be certain, the Apostles could not be imposed upon, *Themselves*. 2. That it be certain, they neither had nor could have any design to impose upon Others. And, 3. That it be certain, their Testimony is *truly conveyed down* to us, unto this Day. All which things are indeed abundantly certain, and clear enough to satisfy any reasonable and unprejudiced Person.

For 1. That the Apostles could not be imposed upon *Themselves*, is evident from what has been already said concerning the *Nature and Number and Publickness* of our Saviour's *Miracles*. They conversed from the beginning with our Saviour himself; They *heard* with their Ears, and *saw* with their Eyes; they *looked upon*, and they *handled with their Hands of the Word of Life*, as St *John* expresses it, 1 *John* i. 1. They saw all the *Prophecies* of the Old Testament precisely fulfilled in his *Life and Doctrine*, his *Sufferings and Death*. They saw him confirm what he taught, with such *mighty and evident Miracles*, as his bitterest and most malicious Enemies could not but confess to be supernatural, even at the same time that they obstinately blasphemed the Holy Spirit that worked them. They saw him *alive after his Passion*, by many *infallible Proofs*; he appearing, not only to one or two, but to all the Eleven, several times, and once to above five hundred together. And this, not merely in a transient manner; but they conversed with him familiarly for no less than

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forty Days; and at last they beheld him ascend visibly into Heaven; and, soon after, they received the Spirit, according to his Promise. These were such sensible *Demonstrations* of his being a Teacher sent from Heaven, and consequently that his Doctrine was an immediate and express Revelation of the Will of God; that if the Apostles, even though they had been men of the *weakest* Judgments and *strongest* Imaginations that can be supposed, could be all and every one of them deceived in all these several Instances; men can have no use of their Senses, nor any possible Proof of any Facts whatsoever; nor any Means to distinguish the best attested Truths in the World, from Enthusiastick Imaginations.

2. 'Tis certain, the Apostles neither had nor could have any design of imposing upon Others. This is evident both from the Nature of the things they did and suffered, and from the Characters of the Persons themselves. They confirmed what they taught, by *Signs and Miracles*: they lived according to the Doctrine they preached, though manifestly contrary to all the Interests and Pleasures of this present World; and, which Deceivers can never be supposed to do, they died with all imaginable chearfulness and joy of Mind, for the Testimony of their Doctrine, and the confirmation of their Religion. This, I say, is what *Deceivers* can never possibly be supposed to do. For, 'tis very remarkable, the Apostles did not lay down their Lives for their *Opinions*, (which *Enthusiasts* may possibly be supposed to do,) but in Attestation to *Facts* of their own Knowledge. They were innocent and plain Men, Men that had no bad *Ends* to serve, nor *Preferment* to hope for in the World. Their Religion itself taught them to expect, not dominion and glory, not the praise of Men, not riches and honour, not Power and Ease,

That the Apostles could have no design of imposing upon others.

Ease, not pleasure nor profit ; but poverty and want, trouble and vexation, persecution and oppression, imprisonments, banishments, and death. These things are not the marks and tokens of Impostors. Besides, The *Success and Event* of their Undertaking ; that plain and illiterate Men should be able to preach their Doctrine to many different Nations of different Languages, and prevail also in establishing the Belief of it ; that they should all agree exactly in their Testimony, and none of them be prevailed upon either by Hopes or Fears to desert their Companions and discover the Imposture, if there had been any ; These things plainly show, that their Doctrine was more than Human, and not a Contrivance to impose upon the World. This Argument is excellently urged by *Eusebius* : Is it a thing possible to be conceived,

* Καί κείνο ὃ πῶς ἔμελλον ἐκ-
πλήξεως, τὸ πλάνης ἀνδρας καὶ ἰ-
διώτας, μήτε λαλεῖν μήτε ἀκχεῖν
πλὴν τῆς πατρὸς Φωνῆς ἐπισταμέ-
νους, μὴ μόνον ἀνανοήτους τολ-
μῆσαι προελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην
ἀπάντων περίοδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προελ-
θόντας κατορθῶσαι τὸ ἐπιτηδεύμα ;
Σκέψαι ὃ, ὅποιον ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μη-
δεῖνα μηδεμιᾷ ἀφ' ὧν ἐξενεγκεῖν
περὶ τοῦ πράξεω τῆς Ἰησοῦ λόγον.
Εἰ, ὅτι ἐπὶ πάντων ἀμφιγνωμέ-
ναν πραγμάτων, ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ
νόμους δικαστηρίοις, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοι-
νῇς ἀμφισπότησεσι, ὅτι μαρτύρων
συμφωνία κυρεῖ τὸ ἀμφιγνω-
μόν πῶς εἴη ἢ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶνδε συστάει, δώδεκα μὲν ὄν-
των Ἀποστόλων, ἐξοδηκόντα δὲ
Μαθητῶν, μυριάς τε πλῆθους τέτων
ἐκτός, ἀπάντων θαυμαστῶν συμ-
φωνίαν ἐπιδεδειγμέναν, καὶ μαρτυ-
ρησάντων γε τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς Ἰησοῦ
πιπραγμένους, εἴη ἀνθρώπι, ἀφ'

faith * he, that Deceivers and un-
learned Men, Men that understood
no other Language but their Mother
tongue, should ever think of attempt-
ing so extravagant a thing, as to
travel over all Nations ? and not
only so, but that they should be able
also to accomplish their design, and
establish their doctrine in all parts of
the World ? Consider moreover how
remarkable a thing it is, that they
should in no respect disagree one
from another, in the Account they
gave of the Actions of Christ. For
if in all Questions of Fact, and in
all Trials at Law, and in all ordi-
nary Disputes, the agreement of se-
veral Witnesses is always accounted
sufficient to determine satisfactorily
the Matter in Question ; is it not an

abundant

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abundant Evidence of the Truth in This case, that Twelve Apostles, and Seventy Disciples, and innumerable other Believers, have born witness to the Actions of Christ, with the most exact and perfect Agreement among themselves; and not only so, but have endured also all kinds of Torments, and even Death itself, to confirm their Testimony? Again;

That illiterate Men, saith * he, should preach the Name of Christ in all parts of the World; some of them in Rome itself, the imperial City; others, in Persia; others, in Armenia; others, in Parthia; others, in Scythia; others in India and the farthest Parts of the World; and others, beyond the Sea, in the British Isles: This I cannot but think to be a Thing far exceeding the Power of Man; much more, the Power of ignorant and unlearned Men; and still much more, the Power of Cheats and Deceivers.

And again: No one of them, saith † he, being ever terrified at the Torments and Deaths of others, forsook his Companions, or ever preached contrary to them, and detected the forgery. Nay, on the contrary, That One, who did forsake his Master in his Life-time, and betray him to his Enemies; being Self-condemned, destroyed himself with his own Hands. And much more to the same purpose, may be found excellently said by the same Author, in the Seventh Chapter of the Third Book of his *Demonstratio Evangelica*.

3. 'Tis very certain, that the Apostles Testimony concerning the Works and Doctrine of Christ, Testimony

ἡ βασιλείαν ὑπομένους, καὶ πάσης αἰκίας ὁ θανάτου; Euseb. Demonstrat. Evang. lib.3. cap. 2.

* Κηρύττειν δὲ ἀγροίκους ἀνδρας εἰς πάντας τὸ τῷ Ἰησοῦ ὄνομα, καὶ τὸς μὲν αὐτῶν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρχὴν καὶ αὐτὴν τε τὴν βασιλικὴν πόλιν νεύματα. τὸς δὲ τὴν Περσῶν, τὸς δὲ τὴν Ἀρμενίων, ἑτέρους δὲ τὸ Παρθῶν ἔθνος, καὶ αὐτοὶ πάλιν τὸ Σκυθῶν, τινὰς δὲ ἤδη ὁ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐλθεῖν τὰ ἄκρα, ἐπὶ τε τὴν Ἰνδῶν φθάσαι χώραν, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑπὲρ τὸν Ὀκεανὸν παρελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καλουμένας Ἑρετανικὰς νήσους ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἔγωγε ἠγέσθαι κατὰ ἀνθρώπον εἶναι, μηδὲ γὰρ κατὰ εὐτελεῖς καὶ ἰδιώτας, πολλὰ δὲ κατὰ πλανοὺς καὶ γόητας. Id. ibid. cap. 7.

† Οὐδεὶς τε αὐτῶν πώποτε τὰ συμβέαντα τοῖς προαναηρημένοις τρέσας, ἐξέστη τῇ ἐταίρειας, ἢ ἀντικήρυξε τοῖς ἄλλοις, εἰς φῶς ἀγαθῶν τὰ σωθισμένα. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ζῶντα προδόναι τολμήσας αὐτὸν, αὐτοχειρία καθ' ἑαυτὸν παρέχοντα τὴν δίκην ἐπέσπασατο. Id. Ibid.

*had been
truly con-
veyed down
to us.*

Christ, is, *truly and without corruption conveyed down to Us*, even unto this Day. For they left this their Testimony in their Writings: Which Writings have been delivered down to us by an uninterrupted Succession through all intermediate Ages. Their Books were all translated very early into several Languages, and dispersed through all parts of the World; and have most of them been acknowledged to be the genuine Writings of those whose Names they bear, even by the bitterest Enemies of Christianity in all Ages. Passages, containing the most material Doctrines, have been cited out of them by numberless Authors, who lived in every Age from the very Days of the Apostles unto this time: So that there is no room or possibility of any considerable *corruption*, such as might in any wise diminish our certainty of the Truth of the whole. In Summ; There is no matter of Fact in the World, attested in any History, with so many circumstances of credibility, with so many collateral Evidences, and in every respect attended with so many Marks of Truth; as This concerning the Doctrine and Works of Christ.

*Of the Au-
thority of
the Books
of Holy
Scripture.*

And here, by the way 'tis to be observed, that the peculiar *Authority* which we attribute to the Books of *Holy Scripture* contained in the *New Testament*, is founded in this; that they were written or dictated by the *Apostles themselves*. The Apostles were indued with the miraculous Gifts of the Holy Ghost, at *Pentecost*: And this not only inabled them to preach the Doctrine of Christ with Power, but also effectually secured them from making any error, mistake, or false representation of it. And the very same Authority that by this singular Privilege was added to their *Preaching*, 'tis manifest ought for the same reason to be equally attributed to their *Writings* also. Now all the

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Books of the New Testament were either *written* by the Apostles ; or, which is the very same thing, *approved and authorized* by them. Most of the Books were uncontrovertedly written by the *Apostles themselves* ; St Paul having been made one of that number by a Commission from Heaven, no less visible and sensible, than that which was granted to the rest at *Pentecost*. And those Books which were written by the *Companions* of the Apostles, were either dictated or at least approved and authorized by the Apostles Themselves. Thus *Eusebius* expressly tells us, that St Peter reviewed and approved the Gospel of St Mark, and that

* *it was this approbation that authorized it to be received by the Churches*. And *Irenæus* ; that † *what St Mark wrote, was dictated by St Peter* ; and that || *the Gospel of St Luke ; was only a Transcript of St Paul's preaching*. And *Tertullian* in like manner ; † *St Mark was only St Peter's Scribe, and St Luke St Paul's*. And *Eusebius* ; that St John ** *also reviewed the Gospels of St Mark and St Luke, and confirmed the Truth of them*. And, to mention no more, the same Historian tells us, that (besides some smaller reasons drawn from some mistaken Passages in the Book itself) the chief reason why the Authority of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* was questioned by some, was †† *because they thought it not to be written by St Paul himself*.

* Κυῶσαι τε τὴν γραφὴν εἰς ἔντευξιν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. *Euseb. Histor. l. 2. c. 15.*

† Marcus discipulus & interpres Petri, quæ à Petro annuntiata erant, edidit. *Iren. lib. 3. c. 1.*

|| Lucas sectator Pauli, quod ab illo prædicabatur Evangelium in libro condidit. *Id. Ibid. Vide & Tertullian. adv. Marcion. lib. 4.*

† Licet & Marcus quod edidit, Petri adfirmetur, cujus interpres Marcus: nam & Lucas Digestum, Paulo adscribere solent. *Tertull. adv. Marcion. lib. 4.*

** Ἡδὲ δὲ Μάρκου καὶ Λουκᾶ κατ' αὐτὰς εὐαγγελίων τὴν ἐκδοσιν πεποιημένων, Ἰωάννην ἀποδεξαδὲ μὴ φασίν, ἀλήθειαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιμαρτυρήσαντα. *Euseb. Hist. l. 3. c. 24.*

†† Τινὲς ἡθετήκασι τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραῖους, πρὸς τῆς Ρωμαίων ἐκκλησίας ὡς μὴ Παῦλος ἦσαν αὐτὴν ἀντιλέγουσ φήσαντες. *Id. lib. 3. c. 3.*

XV. *Lastly ;*

XV. Lastly; *They who will not, by the Arguments and Proofs before-mentioned, be convinced of the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Religion, and be persuaded to make it the Rule and Guide of all their Actions; would not be convinced, (so far as to influence*

That the Evidence which God has afforded us of the Truth of our Religion, is abundantly sufficient. *their Practice and reform their Lives,) by any other Evidence whatsoever; no, not though one should rise on purpose from the Dead to endeavour to convince them.*

From what has been said upon the foregoing Heads, 'tis abundantly evident that Men are not called upon to believe the Christian Religion without very reasonable and sufficient Proof; much

* Ἄλλοις δὲ, ὅση δύναμις, ἀποδεικτικῶς δι' ἐρωτήσεων καὶ ἀποκρίσεων προσερχόμεθα. Ὁυδὲ λέγομεν, (τὸ μετὰ χλεῦς ἰσὺ τῷ Κέλσου ἐξημένον) ὅτι Πίσευσον, ὃν ἐισηγοῦμαι σοι, τοῦτον εἶναι υἱὸν Θεοῦ, κἂν ἢ δεδεμένῳ ἀτιμώτατα, ἢ κεκολασμένῳ αἰχίῃα — Ὁυδὲ φαρμῶν, ταύτη καὶ μᾶλλον πῖσεισον. *Orig. adv. Cels. lib. 1.*

less are they * required to set up *Faith* in opposition to *Reason*; or to believe any thing for That very reason, because it is incredible. On the contrary, God has given us all the Proofs of the Truth of our Religion, that the Nature of the Thing would bear, or that were reasonable either for God to give, or Men to expect.

And unless God should work upon Men by such Methods, as are wholly inconsistent with the Design of Religion and the Nature of Virtue and Vice; which we are sure he will never do; nothing could have been done more, than has already been done, to convince Men of the Truth of Religion, and to persuade them to embrace their own Happiness. And indeed no *reasonable* Man can fail of being persuaded by the Evidence we now have. For if, in *other* Cases, we assent to those Things as *certain and demonstrated*, which, if our *Faculties of judging and reasoning* do not necessarily deceive us, do upon the most impartial view appear clearly and plainly

plainly to be true ; there is the same Reason why in *Moral* and *Religious* Matters we should look upon those things likewise to be *certain* and *demonstrated*, which, upon the exactest and most deliberate Judgment we are capable of making, do appear to us to be as clearly and certainly true, as 'tis certain that our *Faculties* do not *necessarily* and *unavoidably* deceive us, in all our *Judgments* concerning the *Nature of God*, concerning the *proper Happiness of Man*, and concerning the *Difference of Good and Evil*. And if, in *other Cases*, we always act without the least hesitation, upon the Credit of good and sufficient *Testimony*; and look upon that Man as foolish and ridiculous, who sustains great Losses, or lets slip great Opportunities and Advantages in Business, only by distrusting the most credible and well-attested Things in the World; 'tis plain there is the same Reason, why we should do so also in Matters of Religion. So that unless our Actions be determined by some other Thing, than by Reason and right Judgment; the Evidence which we have of the great Truths of Religion, ought to have the same Effect upon our Lives and Actions, as if they were proved to us by any other sort of Evidence that could be desired.

'Tis true ; the Resurrection of Christ, and his other mighty Works, must after all be confessed not to be such ocular Demonstrations of the Truth of his Divine Commission to After-Generations, as they were to those Men who *then lived* and *saw him* and *conversed with him*. But since the Matters of Fact are as clearly proved to *Us*, as 'tis possible for any matter of Fact at that distance of Time to be ; since the Evidence of *This*, is as great and greater, than of most of those Things on which Men venture the whole of their secular Affairs, and on which they are willing to spend all their Time and Pains : Since

(I say)

That the Cause of Mens Unbelief, is not want of better Evidence to prove the great Truths of Religion.

(I say) the case is thus ; He that will rather venture all that he can possibly enjoy, or suffer ; he that will run the hazard of losing Eternal Happiness, and falling into Eternal Misery, rather than believe the *most credible and rational* Thing in the World, merely because he does *not see it with his eyes* ; 'tis plain that That Man does not disbelieve the thing because he thinks the *Evidence of it not sufficiently strong*, but because 'tis *contrary to some particular Vice of his*, which makes it his *Interest* that it should not be true ; and, for *that* Reason, he *might* also have disbelieved it, though he had seen it himself. Men may invent what vain Pretences they please, to excuse their Infidelity and their Wickedness : But certainly That Man, who can despise the Authority both of Reason and Scripture in conjunction ; who can elude the plainest Evidence of matter of Fact ; who can be deaf to all the Promises and kind Admonitions of the Gospel, and to all the threatnings and terrible denuntiations of the Wrath of God, made known in good measure by the Light of Nature, and confirmed by the addition of express Revelation ; Certainly (I say) That Man must have some *other Reason* for his Unbelief, than the pretended Want of sufficient Evidence. Did Men follow the unprejudiced Judgment of their own Minds, and the impartial Dictates of natural Reason ; the least possibility of obtaining eternal Happiness, or the least suspicion of falling into endless Misery, would immediately determine them to make it the great Study and Business of their Lives, to obtain the One, and to avoid the Other. If then we see Men act directly contrary to this natural Principle, and almost wholly neglect these Things, not only when there is a fair Appearance and *Probability* of their being true, which the Light of Nature itself affords ; but also when there is all
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reasonable Evidence given of their being *Certainly* true, by exprefs Revelation in the Gospel; Is it not very plain, that fuch Men are governed, not by Reason and the force of Evidence, but by fome *Other* very different *Cause* of their Actions?

What *that Cause* is, is very apparent from the Lives and Actions of moft of thofe Persons, who pretend want of Evidence to be the Ground of their Infidelity. Their *Lusts*, their *Appetites*, their *Affections* are interefted: They are Lovers of Vice and Debauchery, and Slaves to Evil Habits and Customs: And therefore they are not willing to difcern the Evidence, which would compel them to believe That, which yet they cannot believe with any Comfort, fo long as they refolve not to part with their beloved Vices. Their Hearts and Affections are habitually fixt upon Things here *below*; and therefore they will not attend to the force of any Argument, that would raife their Affections to Things *above*. They are inflaved to the fenfual Pleafures and finful Enjoyments of *Earth*; and therefore they will not hearken to any reasonable Conviction, which would perfuade them to relinquish thefe prefent Gratifications, for the future and more Spiritual Joys of *Heaven*. The Love of this prefent World has * *blinded* their Eyes; and therefore they *receive not the Things of the Spirit of God*; For they are *foolifhnefs* unto them; Neither can they know them, becaufe they are *fpiritually difcerned*. In a word: The true and only Reason, why Men love *Darknefs* rather than *Light*; is, becaufe their *Deeds* are *Evil*.

But that Wickednefs and ungoverned Lusts, are the only Causes of obftinate Infidelity.

* 1 Cor. ii. 14.

Ἐποὶ ὑποκρυμένους ἔχουσὶ τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς, καὶ μὴ βλέποντας τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου. Οὕτω καὶ σὺ, ὦ ἄνδραπε, ἔχεις ὑποκρυμένους τὰς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς σου ὑπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν πράξεων σου τῶν πονηρῶν. Theophil. Antioch. l. 1.

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And This Reason, affords a sufficient Account indeed, why Men should be very unwilling to believe the Doctrines of Christianity. If they are resolved not to reform their Lives, 'tis no wonder they care not to discern the Evidence of those Truths, which must needs make them very uneasy in the midst of the Enjoyment of all their sinful Pleasures. In this Case, were the Proofs of the Truth of our Religion much stronger than they are, or than they can be imagined or desired to be ; yet still these Men would be in the very same Case, and perpetually want stronger and stronger Evidence. 'Tis true ; many Men, who now are conscious and willing to acknowledge, that they act contrary to all the reasonable Evidence and Convictions of Religion ; are nevertheless very apt to imagine within themselves, that if the great Truths of Religion were proved to them by some stronger Evidence, they *should* by that means be worked upon to act otherwise than they do. But if the true Reason why these Men act thus foolishly, is not because the *Doctrines of Religion* are not sufficiently evidenced, but because *They themselves* are, without allowing themselves time for Consideration, hurried away by some unruly Passions to act directly contrary to all Reason and Evidence ; 'tis plain (unless God should irresistibly compel them) they might well continue to act as they do, though the Evidence of these Things were really greater than it is. They are willing fondly to imagine, that if they had lived in our Saviour's time ; if they had heard his Preaching, and seen his Miracles ; if they had had the Advantage of beholding those mighty Works which he performed for the Proof of his Divine Commission, as the Jews then had : they should not like Them have *rejected the Counsel of God against themselves*, but with all chearfulness have be-
lieved

lieved his Doctrine, and embraced his Religion. They fancy, they should immediately have become Disciples of Christ; and that the Truths which he taught, would have had a most powerful Influence upon the whole course of their Lives. And if their Hearts and Affections were not set upon *This World*, more than upon *the next*; if they valued not the *present sinful enjoyments of Sense*, above the *expectation of the Glory that shall be revealed*; most certainly they would do the same *now*. But if their Hearts *be* set upon earthly Things, and their Passions *be* stronger than all the Arguments of Reason; if they *do* indeed so love the Pleasures of Sin now, as that they cannot persuade themselves by all the Motives of Religion to live like Christians; we need not doubt to affirm, that they might very well have been in the same Case, though they *had* lived in our Saviour's time. The *Jews* are a notorious and standing Instance, how far Prejudice, Envy, Pride and Affection, are able to prevail over the strongest Convictions. When our Saviour began to preach that he was sent from God to instruct them in their Duty, they required a *Sign* of him, and they *would believe him*; but when he had worked so many Miracles, that *even the World itself could not contain the Books* if they *should all be written*, they persisted still in their Infidelity. When they saw him hanging upon the Cross, and thought themselves secure of him, they said, *Let him now come down from the Cross, and we will believe him*: But when he arose out of the Grave, wherein he had lain three Days, which was a much greater and more convincing Miracle; they grew more hardened and obstinate in their Unbelief.

Matt.

xxvii. 42.

Others there are, who imagine, that if they could but be convinced of the Truth of another World, by the appearance of one sent directly from that

Nay, not even tho' one should rise on purpose from

*the Dead
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unknown State, they would immediately become new Creatures. But if God should satisfy their unreasonable Demands, by sending one on purpose from the Dead to convince them; there is little Room to doubt, but as they hearkened not to *Moses and the Prophets*, to Christ and his Apostles; so *neither would they be persuaded by one rising on purpose from the Dead.* They might indeed be at first surprized and terrified, at the Appearance of so unusual and unexpected a Messenger. But as wicked Men upon a Bed of Sicknes, at the amazing approach of Death and Eternity, resolve in the utmost Anguish of Horror and Despair, to amend their Lives and forsake their Sins; but as soon as the Terrour is over, and the Danger of Death past, return to their old Habits of Sin and Folly: So 'tis more than probable, it would be in the present Case. Should God send a Messenger from the Dead, to assure Men of the Certainty of a future State, and the Danger of their present Wickedness; as soon as the Fright was over, and their present terrible Apprehensions ceased, 'tis by no means impossible or improbable that their old vicious Habits and beloved Sins, should again by degrees prevail over them. Some there are in our present Age, who pretend to be convinced of the Being of Spirits, by the powerful demonstration of their own Senses; and yet we do not observe, that their Lives are more remarkably eminent for exemplary Piety, than other good Men's, who being convinced by the rational Evidence of the Gospel, go on in a sober, constant, and regular Exercise of Virtue and Righteousness.

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'Tis not therefore for want of sufficient Evidence, that Men disbelieve the great Truths of Religion; but plainly for want of Integrity, and of dealing ingenuously and impartially with themselves;

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that they suffer not the Arguments of Religion to have that Weight and Influence upon them, which in the judgment of right reason they ought manifestly to have. So long as Men permit their Passions and Appetites to over-rule their Reason, 'tis impossible they should have due Apprehensions in matters of Religion, or make any right and true Judgment concerning these things. Men that are strongly biased and prejudiced even in worldly affairs, 'tis well known how hard and difficult it is for them to judge according to reason, and to suffer the Arguments and Evidences of Truth to have their due Weight with them. How much more in matters of Religion which concern things future and remote from Sense, must it needs be, that Mens present Interests, Lusts and Passions, will pervert their judgment, and blind their understandings! Wherefore, Men that pretend to be followers of right Reason, if they will judge truly of the reasonableness and credibility of the Christian Revelation, 'tis absolutely necessary that in the first Place, in order to that End, they become impartially willing to embrace whatever shall upon the whole appear to be agreeable to Reason and Truth, and grounded upon good Evidence, without interesting their Lusts and Appetites in the judgment; and that before all things they resolve to be guided in all their Actions, by whatever Rule shall at any time be well proved to them to be the Will of God. And when they have put themselves into this Temper and Frame of Mind; then let them try if they can any longer reject the Evidence of the Gospel. *If any Man will do his will, he shall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God.* Joh. vii. 17. For, *them that are meek, God will guide in judgment; and such as are gentle, them he will teach his Way.* Ps. xxv. 8.

Indeed, Men that are of this good Disposition, willing to be governed by Reason, and not prejudiced

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judiced by Lufts and Vicious Appetites; could not but give their Assent to the Doctrines of Christianity, upon account of the very intrinsick Excellency and Reasonableness of the Things themselves, even though the external Evidence of their Certainty had been much less than it at present is. Nay, were there hardly any other Evidence at all, than barely the Excellency and Reasonableness and natural Probability of the great Truths of Religion, together with the Consideration of the vast Importance of them; yet even in That Case it would be infinitely wisest and most agreeable to Reason, for Men to live according to the Rules of the Gospel. And though their Faith extended no further, than only to a Belief of the Possibility of the Truth of the Christian Revelation; yet even This alone ought in all reason to have Weight enough to determine reasonable Creatures, to live soberly,

righteously and godly. For, is it not plainly most reasonable, as * an antient Writer expresses it, if each of the opposite Opinions were equally doubtful and uncertain, yet by all means to embrace and entertain That which brings some Hope along with it, rather than that which brings none? For on one side of the Question there is no danger at all of incurring any Calamity, if that which we believe and expect, should at last prove false; But on the other side,

there is the greatest Hazard in the World, the loss of eternal Life, if the Opinion which Unbelievers rely upon, should at last prove an Error.

And † again: What say ye, O ye ignorant Men, ye Men of miserable and most deplorable Folly? Can

* Non purior ratio est, ex duobus incertis & in ambigua expectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam quod nullas? In illo enim, periculi nihil est, si, quod dicitur imminere, cassum fiat & vacuum; in hoc, damnum est maximum (id est, salutis amissio,) si, cum tempus advenerit, aperiatur hoc fuisse mendacium. *Arnob. adv. Gentes, lib. 2.*

† Quid dicitis, o nescii, etiam fletu & miseratione dignissimi? ita non tam extimefcitis, ne forte hæc vera

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ye forbear fearing within your selves, that at least those things may possibly prove true, which ye now despise and mock at? Have ye not at least some misgivings of Mind, lest possibly That which ye now per- versely and obstinately refuse to be- lieve, ye should at last be convinced of by sad experience, when it will be too late to repent? Nor is this the judgment of Christian Writers only, but also of the wisest and most considerate Heathens. We ought to spare no pains, saith * Plato, to ob- tain the Habits of Virtue and Wis- dom in this present Life; For the Prize is noble, and the Hope is very great. And † Cicero: They have gained a great Prize indeed, who have persuaded themselves to believe, that when Death comes, they shall perish utterly: What com- fort is there, What is there to be boasted of, in that Opinion? And again: If after Death, saith || he, as some little and contemptible Philo- sophers think, I shall be nothing; yet there is no danger, that when we are all dead, those Philosophers should laugh at me for my Errour.

But this is not Our Case. God has afforded Us, as has been largely and particularly shown in the foregoing Discourse, many and certain Proofs of the Truth of our Religion; even as certain, as any matter of Fact is capable of having. And we now exhort Men to believe, not what is barely possible, and excellent, and probable, and of the utmost Impor- tance in itself; but what moreover they have all the positive Evidence, and all the reason in the World to oblige them to believe.

sint, quæ sunt despectui vobis & præbent materiam risus? nec saltem vobiscum sub obscuris cogitationibus volvitis, ne, quod hoc die credere obstinata renuitis perversitate, redarguat serum tempus, & irrevocabilis pœnitentia castiget? *Id. ibid.*

* Χρὴ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρ- τὴς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ με- τασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον, καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη. *Plato in Phæd.*

† Præclarum nescio quid adepti sunt, qui didicerunt se, cum tempus mortis venisset, totos esse perituros. — Quid habet ista res aut lætabile aut gloriosum? *Cic. Tusc. Qu. lib. 1.*

|| Sin mortuus, ut quidam minuti Philosophi censent, ni- hil sentiam; non vereor ne hunc errorem meum mortui philosophi irrideant. *Cic. De Senect.*

*That God
may re-
quire us to
take notice
of certain
things, and
to inquire
into them
and consider
them, at
our peril.*

To conclude: No Man of reason can pretend to say, but God *may* require us, to *take notice* of some things at our peril, to *inquire into* them, and to *consider* them throughly. Any pretence of want of greater Evidence, will not excuse *Carelessness* or *unreasonable Prejudices*, when God has vouchsafed us all That Evidence, which was either Fit for Him to grant, or Reasonable for Men to desire; or indeed which the Nature of the Thing itself to be proved, was capable of.

F I N I S.



SEVERAL
LETTERS
TO THE
Reverend D^r CLARKE,
FROM A
Gentleman in Gloucestershire,
Relating to the
FIRST VOLUME
OF THE
Foregoing SERMONS;
WITH THE
D^R'S ANSWERS
THEREUNTO.

THE SIXTH EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON, at the
Crown in Ludgate-Street. MDCCXXXVIII,

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"**I**
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T H E
First L E T T E R.

Reverend Sir,

“ I Suppose you will wonder at the present trouble from one who is a perfect Stranger to you, tho’ you are not so to him ; but I hope the Occasion will excuse my Boldness. I have made it, Sir, my Business ever since I thought my self capable of such sort of Reasoning, to prove to my Self the *Being* and Attributes of God. And being sensible that ’tis a matter of the last consequence, I endeavour’d after a *demonstrative* Proof ; not only more fully to *satisfy* my own Mind, but also in order to *defend* the great Truths of Natural Religion, and those of the Christian Revelation which follow from them, *against all Opposers* : But must own with concern, that hitherto I have been unsuccessful ; and tho’ I have got very probable Arguments, yet I can go but a very little way with *Demonstration* in the Proof of those things. When first your Book on those Subjects (which by all, whom I have discoursed with, is so justly esteemed,) was recommended to me ; I was in great hopes of having all my Enquiries answered. But since in some places, either through my not understanding your Meaning, or what else I know not, even *That* has failed me ; I almost despair of ever arriving to *such a Satisfaction* as I aim at, unless by the method I now use. You cannot but know, Sir, that of *two* different *expressions* of the *same* thing, though equally clear to *some* Persons, yet, to *others*, one of them is sometimes very obscure,

3

“ though

“ though the *other* be perfectly intelligible. Perhaps
 “ this may be my Case here ; And could I see
 “ those of your Arguments, of which I doubt, dif-
 “ ferently proposed, possibly I might yield a ready
 “ assent to them. This, Sir, I cannot but think a
 “ sufficient Excuse for the present Trouble ; it be-
 “ ing such an one as I hope may prevail for an An-
 “ swer, with one who seems to aim at nothing more
 “ than that good Work of instructing others.

“ In your *Demonstration of the Being and Attri-*
 * Pag. 45. butes of God, Prop. VI. * [Edit. 2d, p. 69 and
 Edit. 4th. “ 70,] you propose to prove the *Infinity* or *Omni-*
 Pag. 41. “ *presence* of the Self-existent Being. The former
 Edit. 6th. “ part of the Proof, seems highly probable ; but
 Pag. 43. “ the latter part, which seems to aim at Demon-
 Edit. 7. “ stration, is not to me convincing. The latter
 Pag. 44. “ part of the Paragraph is, if I mistake not, an
 Edit. 8. “ *entire Argument of itself*, which runs thus ;” To
 suppose a finite Being to be Self-Existent, is to say that
 ’tis a Contradiction for that Being not to exist, the ab-
 sence of which may yet be conceived without a Contra-
 diction ; Which is the greatest absurdity in the World.
 “ The sense of these Words [*the absence of which*]
 “ seems plainly to be determined by the following
 “ Sentence, to mean its absence from any particular
 “ Place. Which Sentence, is to prove it to be an
 “ Absurdity ; And is this :” For if a Being can,
 without a Contradiction, be absent from one place ; it may,
 without a Contradiction, be absent from another place,
 and from all places. “ Now supposing this to be a
 “ Consequence, all that it proves is, that if a Be-
 “ ing can, without a Contradiction, be absent from
 “ one place at one time, it may without a Contradic-
 “ tion be absent from another place, and so from
 “ all places, at different times ; (for I cannot see,
 “ that if a Being can be absent from one place at one
 “ time, therefore it may without a Contradiction be
 “ absent from all places at the same time, i. e. may
 “ cease

“ *cease to exist.*) Now, if it proves no more than
 “ this, I cannot see that it reduces the Supposition
 “ to any Absurdity. Suppose I could *demonstrate*,
 “ that any particular Man should live a Thousand
 “ Years ; this Man might without a Contradiction
 “ be absent from *one*, and from *all places*, at *diffe-*
 “ *rent times* ; but it would not from thence follow,
 “ that he might be absent from *all places* at the *same*
 “ *time*, i. e. that he might *cease to exist*. No ;
 “ this would be a Contradiction, because I am
 “ supposed to have *demonstrated* that he should live a
 “ Thousand Years. It would be exactly the same,
 “ if, instead of a *Thousand Years*, I should say, *for*
 “ *ever* ; And the proof seems the same, whether it
 “ be applied to a *Self-Existent* or a *Dependent* Being.

“ What else I have to offer, is in relation to your
 “ Proof that the Self-Existent Being must of neces-
 “ sity be but *One*. Which proof is as follows, in

“ *Prop. VII, * [Edit. 2d. p. 74,] To suppose two or*
 “ *more different Natures existing of themselves, necessa-*
 “ *rily and independent from each other, implies this plain*
 “ *Contradiction ; that each of them being independent from*
 “ *the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist A-*
 “ *lone ; so that it will be no Contradiction to imagine the*
 “ *other not to exist, and consequently neither of them will*
 “ *be necessarily existing.* “ The Supposition indeed im-
 “ plies, that *since each of these Beings is Independent*
 “ *from the other, they may either of them exist Alone,*
 “ i. e. without any relation to, or dependence on
 “ the other : But *Where* is the *third* Idea, to connect
 “ this Proposition and the following one, viz. *so*
 “ *that it will be no Contradiction to imagine the other*
 “ *not to Exist?* Were this a Consequence of the for-
 “ mer Proposition, I allow it would be *Demonstra-*
 “ *tion*, by the *first Corollary* of *Prop. III, † [2d Ed. †*
 “ *p. 26.] But since these two Propositions, [they*
 “ *may either of them be supposed to exist alone,] and*
 “ *[so that it will be no Contradiction to imagine the*

* Pag. 48.

Edit. 4.

Pag. 44.

Edit. 6.

Pag. 46.

Edit. 7.

Pag. 47.

Edit. 8.

† Pag. 16,

17. Edit.

4th & 6th.

& 7th,

& 8th.

“ other

“ *other not to exist*,] are very widely *different* ; since
 “ likewise ’tis no immediate Consequence, that be-
 “ cause Either may be supposed to exist *independent*
 “ from the other, therefore the other may be sup-
 “ posed *not to exist at all* ; how is what was pro-
 “ posed, proved ? That the Propositions are *diffe-*
 “ *rent*, I think is plain ; and whether there be an
 “ *immediate Connexion*, every Body that reads your
 “ Book, must judge for themselves. I must say,
 “ for my own part, the Absurdity does not appear
 “ at first sight, any more than the Absurdity of
 “ saying that the Angles below the Base in an I-
 “ sosceles Triangle are unequal ; which though it
 “ is absolutely false, yet I suppose no one will lay
 “ down the contrary for an *Axiom* ; because, tho’
 “ it is true, yet there is need of a Proof to make it
 “ appear so.

“ Perhaps it may be answered, that I have not
 “ rightly explained the Words, *to exist alone* ; And
 “ that they do not mean only, to exist *independent*
 “ *from the other* ; but that, *existing Alone*, means
 “ that *nothing exists with it*. Whether this or the
 “ other was meant, I cannot determine : But, which
 “ ever it was ; what I have said, will hold. For if
 “ this *last* be the Sense of those Words, [*They ei-*
 “ *ther of them may be supposed to exist alone* ;] it in-
 “ deed implies that it will be no Contradiction to
 “ suppose the *other not to exist* : But then I ask,
 “ how come these two Propositions to be *connected* ;
 “ that, to suppose *two different* Natures existing of
 “ themselves *necessarily* and independent from each
 “ other, implies that *each* of them may be supposed
 “ to *exist Alone* in *This* Sense ? Which is exactly the
 “ same as I said before, only applied to different
 “ Sentences. So that if *Existing Alone*, be under-
 “ stood as I *first* took it ; I allow it is implied in
 “ the *Supposition* ; but cannot see that the *Consequence*
 “ is, that it will be no Contradiction to suppose the
 “ other

“ other not to exist. But if the words, *Existing*
 “ *Alone*, are meant in the *latter* Sense ; I grant,
 “ that if either of them may be *supposed* thus to *exist*
 “ *Alone*, it will be no Contradiction to *suppose* the
 “ other not to exist : But then I cannot see, that to
 “ suppose *two different Natures existing, of them-*
 “ *selves, necessarily and independent from each other,*
 “ implies that *either* of them may be supposed to
 “ *exist Alone* in *This* Sense of the Words ; but only,
 “ that *either* of them may be supposed to exist
 “ *without* having any *relation* to the *other*, and that
 “ there will be *no need of the existence of the One in*
 “ *order to the existence of the other.* But though up-
 “ on this Account, were there no other Principle of
 “ its existence, it might cease to exist ; yet on the
 “ account of the necessity of its own Nature, which
 “ is quite distinct from the other, 'tis an absolute
 “ Absurdity to suppose it *not to exist*.

“ Thus, Sir, I have proposed my Doubts, with
 “ the Reasons of them. In which if I have wrested
 “ your Words to another Sense than you designed
 “ them, or in any respect argued unfairly, I assure
 “ you it was without design. So I hope you will
 “ impute it to mistake. And, if it will not be too
 “ great a Trouble, let me once more beg the Fa-
 “ vour of a Line from you, by which you will lay
 “ me under a *particular* Obligation to be, what,
 “ with the rest of the World, I now am,

Reverend SIR,

Novemb. 4. 1713.

Your most Obliged Servant, &c.

T H E

T H E
A N S W E R
T O T H E
First LETTER.

S I R,

D I D Men who publish controversial Papers, accustom themselves to write with that Candour and Ingenuity, with which you propose your Difficulties; I am persuaded almost all Disputes might be very amicably terminated, either by Men's coming at last to agree in Opinion, or at least finding Reason to suffer each other friendly to differ.

Your *Two Objections* are very Ingenious, and urged with great Strength and Acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes, of being able to give you *Satisfaction* in *Both* of them. To your *First* therefore, I answer. Whatever may, without a Contradiction, be absent from any one Place at *any one Time*; may also, without a Contradiction, be absent from *all Places* at *all Times*. For, whatever is *absolutely necessary* at all, is absolutely necessary in *every part of Space*, and in *every point of Duration*. Whatever can at any time be conceived *possible to be absent* from *any One part of Space*, may for the same Reason, [*viz.* the implying no Contradiction in the nature of Things,] be conceived *possible to be absent* from

from every Other part of Space at the same time ; either by *ceasing to be*, or by supposing it *never to have begun to be*. Your Instance about *demonstrating* a Man to live 1000 Years, is what (I think) led you into the Mistake ; and is a good Instance to lead you out of it again. You may *suppose* a Man *shall* live 1000 Years, or God may *reveal* and *promise* he *shall* live 1000 Years ; And upon *That Supposition*, it shall not be *possible* for the Man to be absent from all *Places* in any part of that time. Very true : But *why* shall it not be *possible* ? Only because 'tis contrary to the *Supposition*, or to the *Promise of God* ; but not contrary to the *absolute Nature of Things* ; which would be the Case, if the *Man* existed *necessarily*, as every part of *Space* does. In *supposing* you could *Demonstrate*, a Man should live 1000 Years, or one Year ; you make an *impossible* and *contradictory* Supposition. For though you may know *certainly*, (by Revelation suppose,) that he *will* live so long ; yet this is only the *Certainty* of a thing *true in Fact*, not in *itself necessary* : And *Demonstration* is applicable to nothing but what is *necessary in itself*, *necessary in all Places* and at *all Times* equally.

To your *second Difficulty*, I answer. What exists *necessarily*, not only *must* so exist *Alone*, as to be independent of any thing else ; but (being *Self-sufficient*,) may also so exist *Alone*, as that every thing else may *possibly* (or *without any Contradiction* in the *Nature of Things*) be supposed *not to exist at all* : And consequently, (since That which may *possibly* be supposed *not to exist at all*, is not *necessarily* existent,) *no other thing* can be *necessarily* existent. Whatever is *necessarily* existing, there is need of its existence in order to the *supposal* of the existence of any other thing ; so that nothing can *possibly* be supposed to exist, without *presupposing* and *including* antecedently the existence of that which is *necessary*. For instance ; The *supposal* of the existence of any thing *whatever*, includes

H h necessarily

necessarily a *Presupposition* of the existence of *Space* and *Time*; and if any thing could exist *without Space or Time*, it would follow that *Space* and *Time* were not *necessarily-existing*. Therefore, the supposing any thing *possibly to exist Alone*, so as not *necessarily to include the presupposal of some other Thing*, proves demonstrably that *That other Thing* is not *Necessarily-existing*; because, *whatever has Necessity of existence*, cannot possibly, in any conception whatsoever, be supposed *Away*. There cannot possibly be any Notion of the *existence of any Thing*, there cannot possibly be any Notion of *existence at all*, but what shall necessarily *preinclude* the Notion of *That which has necessary Existence*. And consequently the *Two Propositions* which you judged *independent*, are really *necessarily connected*. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to *express*, and not easy to be *conceived* but by very *Attentive Minds*: But to such as *can* and *will* attend, nothing (I think) is more demonstrably convictive.

If any thing still sticks with you in *This*, or any other Part of my Books; I shall be very willing to be informed of it; who am,

S I R, *Your assured Friend,*

Nov. 10. 1713.

and Servant, S. C.

P. S. Many Readers, I observe, have misunderstood my *Second General Proposition*; as if the Words [*Some One unchangeable and independent Being*,] meant [*One Only—Being*.] Whereas the true Meaning, and all that the Argument there requires, is, [*Some One at least*.] That there can be *But One*, is the thing proved *afterwards* in the *Seventh Proposition*.

THE

T H E

Second LETTER.

Reverend Sir,

“ I Have often thought that the *chief* Occasi-
 “ ons of Mens differing so much in their O-
 “ pinions, were, either their not understand-
 “ ing each other ; or else, that instead of ingenu-
 “ ously searching after *Truth*, they have made it
 “ their Business to find out Arguments for the Proof
 “ of what they have once asserted. However, 'tis
 “ certain there may be *other* Reasons for Persons not
 “ agreeing in their Opinions : And where it is so,
 “ I can't but think with you, that they will find
 “ Reason to suffer each other to *differ* friendly ;
 “ every Man having a way of Thinking, in some
 “ respects, peculiarly his own.

“ I am sorry I must tell you, your Answers to
 “ my Objections are not satisfactory. The *Reasons*
 “ why I think them not so, are as follow.

“ You say ;” *whatever is absolutely necessary at
 all, is absolutely necessary in every part of Space, and
 in every point of Duration.* “ Were this evident,
 “ 'twould certainly prove what you bring it for ;”
 viz. that *whatever may, without a Contradiction, be
 absent from one place at one time, may also be ab-
 sent from all places at all times.* “ But I do not
 “ conceive, that the Idea of Ubiquity is contained
 “ in the Idea of Self-Existence, or *directly* follows
 “ from it ; any otherwise than as, whatever ex-
 “ ists, must exist *somewhere*. You add ;” *What-
 ever can at any time be conceived possibly to be absent*
 H h 2 *from*

from any one part of Space, may for the same reason [viz. the implying no Contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived possibly to be absent from every other part of Space, at the same time. " Now I cannot see, that I can make these two Suppositions for the same Reason, or upon the same Account. The Reason why I conceive this Being may be absent from one Place, is because it doth not contradict the former Proof [drawn from the nature of things,] in which I proved only that it must necessarily exist. But the other Supposition, viz. that I can conceive it possible to be absent from Every part of Space at one and the same time, directly contradicts the Proof that it must exist *SOMEWHERE*; and so is an express Contradiction. Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three Angles of a Triangle equal to two right Ones, That relation of the equality of its Angles to two right Ones, will be *where-ever* a Triangle exists; so, when we have proved the necessary Existence of a Being, this Being must exist *every where*. But there is a great difference between these two things: The one being the Proof of a certain Relation, upon Supposition of such a Being's Existence with such particular Properties; and consequently, where-ever this Being and these Properties exist, this Relation must exist too. But from the Proof of the necessary Existence of a Being, 'tis no evident consequence that it exists *every where*. My using the word *Demonstration*, instead of *Proof* which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of Matter of Fact.

" In your Answer to my Second Difficulty, you say;" *whatsoever is necessarily-existing, there is Need of its Existence, in order to the supposal of the*

Existence of any other thing. “ All the Consequen-
 “ ces you draw from this Proposition, I see proved
 “ demonstrably ; and consequently, that the two
 “ Propositions I thought independent, are closely
 “ connected. But *how*, or *upon what account*, is
 “ there *need* of the Existence of whatever is neces-
 “ sarily-existing, *in order* to the Existence of any
 “ other thing? Is it *as there is need of Space and*
 “ *Duration*, in order to the Existence of any thing ;
 “ or *is it needful only as the Cause* of the Existence
 “ of all other things? If the *former* be said, as
 “ your Instance seems to intimate: I answer ;
 “ *Space and Duration* are very *abstruse* in their Na-
 “ tures, and, I think can’t properly be called *Things*,
 “ but are considered rather as *Affections which be-*
 “ *long, and in the order of our Thoughts are antece-*
 “ *dently necessary, to the Existence of all Things.*
 “ And I can no more conceive how a *necessarily-*
 “ *existing Being* can, on the *same account* or *in the*
 “ *same manner* as *Space and Duration* are, be needful
 “ in order to the Existence of any other Being,
 “ than I can conceive *Extension* attributed to a
 “ *Thought* : That *Idea* no more belonging to a *Thing*
 “ *existing*, than *Extension* belongs to *Thought*. But
 “ if the *latter* be said, that there is *Need* of the Ex-
 “ istence of whatever is a necessary Being, *in order*
 “ *to the Existence* of any other thing ; *only as this*
 “ *Necessary Being must be the Cause of the Existence*
 “ *of all other things* : I think this is plainly beg-
 “ ging the Question ; For it *supposes* that there is *no*
 “ *Other Being* exists, but *what is Casual*, and so not
 “ *necessary*. And on *what Other account*, or *in what*
 “ *Other manner* than one of these two, there can
 “ be *Need of the Existence* of a necessary Being *in*
 “ *order to the Existence* of any thing else, I cannot
 “ conceive.

“ Thus, Sir, you see I entirely agree with you
 “ in all the *Consequences* you have drawn from
 “ your *Suppositions*, but cannot see the *Truth* of the
 “ *Suppositions themselves*.

“ I have aimed at nothing in my *Stile*, but only
 “ to be *intelligible*; being sensible that 'tis very
 “ difficult (as you observe) to express one's self
 “ on these sorts of *Subjects*, especially for one
 “ who is altogether unaccustomed to write upon
 “ them.

“ I have nothing at present more to add, but
 “ my sincerest Thanks for your Trouble in an-
 “ swering my Letter, and for your professed rea-
 “ diness to be acquainted with any other Difficulty
 “ that I may meet with in any of your Writings.
 “ I am willing to interpret this, as somewhat like
 “ a Promise of an Answer to what I have now
 “ written, if there be any thing in it which de-
 “ serves one.”

I am,

Nov. 23. 1713.

Reverend S I R,

Your most Obliged Humble Servant.

T H E

T H E
A N S W E R
T O T H E
Second L E T T E R.

S I R,

IT seems to *Me*, that the Reason why you do not apprehend *Ubiquity* to be necessarily connected with *Self-Existence*, is because, in the order of your Ideas, you *first* conceive a *Being*, (a *Finite Being*, suppose ;) and then conceive *Self-existence* to be a *Property* of *That Being*; as the *Angles* are *Properties* of a *Triangle*, when a *Triangle* exists: Whereas, on the contrary, *Necessity of Existence*, not being * a *Property Consequent upon* the Supposition of the Things existing, but *Antecedently* the Cause or Ground of that Existence; 'tis evident this *Necessity*, being not *limited* to any Antecedent Subject, as *Angles* are to a *Triangle*; but being itself *Original, Absolute*, and (in order of Nature) *antecedent to all Existence*; cannot but be *every where*, for the same Reason that it is *any where*. By applying this Reasoning to the Instance of *Space*; you will find, that by Consequence it belongs truly to *That Substance*, whereof *Space* is a † *Property*, as † *or, Mode* *Duration* also is. What you say about a *Necessary* of Existence. *Being existing Somewhere*, supposes it to be *Finite*; and being *Finite*, supposes some Cause which deter-
mined

mined that such a *certain Quantity* of That Being should exist, neither more nor less : And *That Cause*, must either be a *Voluntary Cause* ; or else *such a necessary Cause*, the *Quantity* of whose Power must be *determined and limited* by some *Other Cause*. But in *original absolute Necessity*, antecedent (in order of Nature) to the existence of any thing ; nothing of all This, can have Place ; but the Necessity is, *necessarily every where* alike.

Concerning the *Second Difficulty*, I answer, *That which exists necessarily, is needful to the existence of any other thing* ; Not considered now as a *Cause*, (for That indeed is begging the Question) but as a *sine qua non* ; in the sense as *Space* is necessary to every thing, and nothing can possibly be conceived to exist, without thereby presupposing *Space* : Which therefore I apprehend to be a *Property* or *Mode* of the Self-existent Substance ; and that, by being evidently necessary *itself*, it proves that the *Substance*, of which it is a *Mode*, must also be *necessary* ; *Necessary* both in *itself*, and needful to the existence of *any thing else* whatsoever. Extension indeed does not belong to *Thought*, because *Thought* is not a Being ; But there is *Need* of Extension to the existence of every *Being*, to a Being which has or has not *Thought*, or any other Quality whatsoever.

I am, SIR,

London, Nov.
28. 1713.

Your real Friend and Servant.

THE

T H E

Third LETTER.

Reverend Sir,

“ I Don’t very well understand your Meaning,
 “ when you say that you think, *in the order of*
 “ *my Ideas I first conceive a Being, (finite sup-*
 “ *pose,) to exist, and then conceive Self-existence to be*
 “ *a Property of that Being.* If you mean that I
 “ first suppose a finite Being to exist I know not why;
 “ affirming necessity of Existence, to be only a con-
 “ sequent of its Existence; and that, when I have
 “ supposed it *Finite*, I very safely conclude it is not
 “ *Infinite*; I am utterly at a loss, upon *what Ex-*
 “ *pressions in my Letter this Conjecture can be*
 “ *founded.* But if you mean, that I first of all
 “ prove a Being to *Exist from Eternity*, and then,
 “ from the reasons of things, prove that such a Be-
 “ ing must be eternally *Necessary*; I freely own it.
 “ Neither do I conceive it to be irregular or absurd;
 “ For there is a great difference between the order
 “ in which *things exist*, and the order in which I
 “ prove to my self that *they exist*. Neither do I
 “ think my saying a necessary Being exists *Some-*
 “ *where*, supposes it to be *finite*; it only supposes
 “ that this Being exists *in Space*, without determining
 “ whether *here, or there, or every where.*

“ To my second Objection, you say: *That*
 “ *which exists necessarily, is needful to the Existence of*
 “ *any other thing, as a sine qua non; in the sense*
 “ *Space is necessary to every thing: Which is proved*
 “ (you say) by *This Consideration, that Space is a*
 “ *property*

“ property of the Self-existent Substance ; and, being
 “ both Necessary in itself, and needful to the Existence
 “ of every thing else ; consequently the Substance, of
 “ which it is a property, must be so too. Space, I
 “ own, is in one Sense a property of the Self-existent
 “ Substance ; but, in the same Sense, 'tis also a pro-
 “ perty of all other Substances. The only diffe-
 “ rence, is in respect to the Quantity. And since
 “ every part of Space, as well as the whole, is ne-
 “ cessary ; every Substance consequently must be
 “ Self-existent, because it hath this Self-existent Pro-
 “ perty. Which since you will not admit for true ;
 “ if it directly follows from your Arguments, they
 “ cannot be conclusive.

“ What you say under the first Head, proves (I
 “ think) to a very great probability, though not to
 “ Me with the evidence of *Demonstration* : But
 “ your Arguments under the second, I am not able
 “ to see the force of.

“ I am so far from being pleased that I can
 “ form Objections to your Arguments ; that, be-
 “ sides the *Satisfaction* it would have given me in
 “ my own Mind, I should have thought it an
 “ Honour to have entered into your Reasonings,
 “ and seen the force of them. I cannot desire to
 “ trespass any more upon your better employed
 “ Time ; so shall only add my hearty Thanks for
 “ your Trouble on my account, and that I am
 “ with the greatest respect,

Reverend SIR,

Decemb. 5. 1713. Your most Obliged Humble Servant.

T H E

T H E
A N S W E R
T O T H E
Third L E T T E R.

S I R,

THough, when I turn my Thoughts every way, I fully persuade my self there is no defect in the *Argument itself*; yet in my *manner of Expression* I am satisfied there must be some want of clearness, when there remains any Difficulty to a Person of your Abilities and Sagacity. I did not *mean* that your saying a necessary Being exists *Somewhere*, does *necessarily* suppose it to be *finite*; but that the *manner of Expression* is apt to excite in the Mind an Idea of a *Finite Being*, at the same time that you are thinking of a *Necessary Being*, without accurately attending to the *Nature of that Necessity* by which it exists. Necessity *absolute*, and *antecedent* (in order of Nature) to the Existence of Any Subject, has nothing to *limit* it; but, if it operates at all, (as it must needs do,) it must *operate* (if I may so speak,) *every where and at all times alike*. Determination of a *particular Quantity*, or *particular Time* or *Place* of Existence of any thing, cannot arise but from somewhat *external* to the thing itself. For Example: Why there should exist just such a small determinate Quantity of *Matter*, neither *more* or *less*, interspersed
in

in the immense Vacuities of Space ; no reason can be given. Nor can there be any thing in Nature, which could have *determined* a thing so indifferent in itself, as is the *Measure of that Quantity* ; but only the *Will* of an *Intelligent and free Agent*. To suppose *Matter*, or any Other Substance, *Necessarily-existing* in a *Finite determinate Quantity* ; in an Inch-cube, for instance ; or in *Any* certain number of Cube-Inches, and *no more* ; is exactly the same Absurdity, as supposing it to exist *Necessarily*, and yet for a *Finite Duration* only : Which every one sees to be a plain Contradiction. The Argument is likewise the same, in the Question about the Original of *Motion*. *Motion* cannot be *necessarily-existing* ; because, it being evident that *All Determinations of Motion* are *equally possible* in themselves, the original *Determination* of the Motion of any particular Body *this way* rather than the *contrary way*, *could not be necessary in itself*, but was either caused by the *Will* of an *Intelligent and Free Agent*, or else was an *Effect* produced and determined without *Any Cause at all* ; which is an express Contradiction : As I have shown in my *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, pag. 14, [Edit. 4th, and 5th.] pag. 12, [Edit. 6th, 7th, and 8th.]

To the *Second Head* of Argument, I answer. *Space*, is a Property [or *Mode*] of the Self-existent Substance ; but not of any other Substances. All other Substances are *IN Space*, and are *penetrated by it* ; but the Self-existent Substance is not *IN Space*, nor *penetrated by it*, but is itself (if I may so speak) the *Substratum* of *Space*, the *Ground* of the Existence of *Space* and *Duration itself*. Which [*Space and Duration*] being evidently *necessary*, and yet Themselves not Substances, but *Properties* or *Modes* ; show evidently that the Substance, without which these Modes could not subsist, is itself *much more* (if that were possible) *Necessary*. And as
Space

The ANSWER to the Third LETTER.

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Space and Duration are needful, (i. e. sine qua non,) to the Existence of every thing else; so consequently is the Substance, to which These Modes belong in that peculiar manner which I before mentioned.

I am, S I R,

Decemb. 10.

1713.

Your Affectionate Friend,

and Servant.



THE

T H E

Fourth LETTER.

Reverend Sir,

“ **W**Hatever is the Occasion of my not see-
 “ ing the Force of your Reasonings, I
 “ cannot impute it to (what you do)
 “ the want of *Clearness* in your Expression. I am
 “ too well acquainted with my self, to think *my*
 “ *not understanding* an Argument, a sufficient Rea-
 “ son to conclude that it's either improperly expres-
 “ sed, or not conclusive; unless I can clearly show
 “ the *Defect* of it. It is with the greatest Satisfaction
 “ I must tell you, that the more I reflect on your
 “ *first* Argument, the more I am convinced of the
 “ Truth of it; and it now seems to me altogether
 “ unreasonable to suppose *Absolute Necessity* can have
 “ any Relation to *one Part* of Space more than to
 “ *Another*; and if so, an *Absolutely-necessary Being*
 “ must exist *every where*.

“ I wish I was as well satisfied in respect to the
 “ *other*. You say; *all Substances, except the Self-*
 “ *existent one, are In Space, and are penetrated by*
 “ *it*. All Substances doubtless, whether Body or
 “ Spirit, exist *in Space*: But when I say that a
 “ Spirit exists *in Space*, were I put upon telling
 “ my meaning, I know not how I could do it
 “ any other way than by saying, such a particular
 “ quantity of Space terminates the *Capacity of act-*
 “ *ing* in finite Spirits *at one and the same time*; so
 “ that they cannot act beyond that determined
 “ Quantity. Not but that I think there is some-

“ *what*

“ *what* in the manner of Existence of *Spirits* in
 “ respect of *Space*, that more directly answers to the
 “ manner of the Existence of *Body*; but *what That*
 “ *is*, or of the manner of their Existence, I cannot
 “ possibly form an Idea. And it seems (if possi-
 “ ble) much more difficult to determine what rela-
 “ tion the *Self-existent Being* hath to *Space*. To say
 “ he exists *In Space*, after the same manner that other
 “ *Substances* do, (somewhat like which I too rashly
 “ asserted in my last,) perhaps would be placing the
 “ *Creator* too much on a level with the *Creature*;
 “ or however, it is not plainly and evidently true:
 “ And to say the *Self-existent Substance* is the *Sub-*
 “ *stratum* of *Space*, in the common sense of the
 “ Word, is scarce intelligible, or at least is not evi-
 “ dent. Now though there may be an hundred Re-
 “ lations distinct from either of these; yet how we
 “ should come by *Ideas* of them, I cannot con-
 “ ceive. We may indeed have *Ideas to the Words*,
 “ and not altogether depart from the common sense
 “ of them, when we say the *Self-existent Substance*
 “ is the *Substratum* of *Space*, or the *Ground* of its
 “ existence: But I see no Reason to think it *True*;
 “ because *Space* seems to me to be as absolutely *Self-*
 “ *existent*, as 'tis possible any thing can be: So that,
 “ make what other Supposition you please, yet we
 “ cannot help supposing *Immense Space*; because
 “ there must be either an *Infinity* of *Being*, or (if
 “ you'll allow the Expression) an *Infinite Vacuity* of
 “ *Being*. Perhaps it may be objected to this, that
 “ tho' *Space* is really Necessary, yet the reason of
 “ its being Necessary, is its being a *Property* of the
 “ *Self-existent Substance*; and that *It* being so evi-
 “ dently Necessary, and its dependence on the *Self-*
 “ *existent Substance* not so evident, we are ready to
 “ conclude it absolutely *Self-existent*, as well as ne-
 “ cessary; and that this is the reason why the *Idea*
 “ of *Space* forces itself on our Minds, antecedent
 “ to,

“ to, and exclusive of (as to the Ground of its ex-
 “ istence) all other things. Now this, though it
 “ is really an *Objection*, yet it is no direct *Answer*
 “ to what I have said; because it *supposes* the only
 “ thing to be *proved*, viz. that the *reason* why
 “ Space is necessary, is its being a *Property* of a
 “ Self-existent Substance. And supposing it *not*
 “ to be *evident*, that Space is *absolutely self-existent*;
 “ yet, while it is *doubtful*, we cannot argue as tho’
 “ the contrary were *certain*, and we were *sure* that
 “ Space was only a *Property* of the Self-existent
 “ Substance. But now, if Space be not *absolutely*
 “ *Independent*, I don’t see what we can conclude is
 “ so: For ’tis manifestly *Necessary Itself*, as well as
 “ *antecedently needful* to the existence of all other
 “ Things, not excepting, (as I think) even the
 “ Self-existent Substance.

“ All your Consequences I see follow demon-
 “ strably from your Supposition; and were *That*
 “ evident, I believe it would serve to prove several
 “ other things as well as what you bring it for.
 “ Upon which account, I should be extremely
 “ pleased to see it proved by any one. For as I
 “ design the Search after Truth as the Business of
 “ my Life, I shall not be ashamed to learn from
 “ any Person; though at the same time I cannot
 “ but be sensible, that Instruction from some Men,
 “ is like the Gift of a Prince, it reflects an Ho-
 “ nour on the Person on whom it lays an Obli-
 “ gation.”

I am,

Decemb. 16. 1713.

Reverend SIR,

Your Obliged Servant.

THE

THE ANSWER

TO THE

Fourth LETTER.

SIR,

MY being out of Town most part of the Month of *January*, and some other accidental Avocations, hindered me from answering your Letter sooner. The Sum of the Difficulties it contains, is (I think) this: That *'tis difficult to determine, what Relation the Self-existent Substance has to Space*: That, to say *It is the Substratum of Space, in the common Sense of the Word*; is scarce intelligible, or, at least, is not evident: That *Space seems to be as Absolutely Self-Existent, as 'tis possible any thing can be*: And that, *its being a Property of the Self-existent Substance*; is, supposing the thing that was to be Proved. This is entring indeed into the very bottom of the Matter; and I will endeavour to give you as brief and clear an Answer as I can.

That the Self-Existent Substance, is the *Substratum* of Space, or Space a *Property* of the Self-Existent Substance, are not perhaps very proper *Expressions*; nor is it easy to find such. But what I mean, is This. The Idea of *Space*, (as also of *Time* or *Duration*,) is an *Abstract* or *Partial Idea*; an Idea of a certain *Quality* or *Relation*, which we evidently

I i

see

see to be *necessarily-existing*; and yet which (not being itself a *Substance*,) at the same time necessarily *presupposes* a *Substance*, without which it could not exist; Which *Substance*, consequently, must be itself (much more, if possible,) *necessarily-Existing*. I know not how to explain this so well, as by the following Similitude. A *Blind Man*, when he tries to frame to himself the *Idea* of *Body*, his *Idea* is nothing but That of *Hardness*. A *Man* that had *Eyes*, but no power of *Motion*, or sense of *Feeling* at all; when he tried to frame to himself the *Idea* of *Body*, his *Idea* would be nothing but that of *Colour*. Now as, in these cases, *Hardness* is not *Body*; and *Colour* is not *Body*; but yet, to the Understanding of these Persons, those Properties necessarily *infer* the Being of a *Substance*, of which *Substance* itself the Persons have no *Idea*: So *Space* to *Us*, is not itself *Substance*, but it *necessarily infers* the being of a *Substance*, which affects none of our *present* Senses; And being *itself Necessary*, it follows that the *Substance*, which it *infers*, is (much more) *Necessary*.

I am, S I R,

Jan. 29. 1713.

Your affectionate Friend,

and Servant.

THE

T H E

Fifth LETTER.

Reverend Sir,

“ **Y**OU have very comprehensively expressed in six or seven Lines, all the Difficulties of my Letter ; which I should have endeavoured to have made Shorter, had I not been afraid an improper Expression might possibly occasion a mistake of my Meaning. I am very glad, the Debate is come into so narrow a compass ; For I think now it entirely turns upon this, whether our *Ideas* of *Space* and *Duration* are *partial*, so as to *præsuppose* the existence of some other Thing. Your Similitude of the Blind Man, is very *apt*, to explain your Meaning, (which I think I fully understand ;) but does not seem to come entirely up to the Matter. For, what is the reason that the Blind Man concludes there must be *Somewhat external*, to give him that Idea of *Hardness* ? 'Tis because he supposes it impossible for him to be thus affected, unless there were some Cause of it ; which Cause, should it be removed, the Effect would immediately cease too ; and he would no more have the Idea of *Hardness*, but by Remembrance. Now to apply this, to the Instance of *Space* and *Duration*. Since a Man, from his having these *Ideas*, very justly concludes that there must be *somewhat External*, which is the Cause of them ; consequently, should This Cause (whatever it is) be taken away, his Ideas would be so too : Therefore, if *what is supposed to be*

“ *the Cause* be removed, and yet the *Idea* remains,
 “ *That supposed Cause* cannot be the *Real one*.
 “ Now, granting the Self-Existent Substance to
 “ be the *Substratum* of these Ideas; could we make
 “ the *Supposition* of *its ceasing to be*, yet Space
 “ and Duration would still *remain unaltered*:
 “ Which seems to show, that the Self-Existent
 “ Substance is not the *Substratum* of *Space and Du-*
 “ *ration*. Nor would it be an Answer to the
 “ Difficulty, to say that *every Property* of the
 “ Self-Existent Substance, is as *necessary* as the
 “ *Substance itself*; since *That* will only hold, *While*
 “ the *Substance itself exists*: For there is implied in
 “ the Idea of a *Property*, an impossibility of Sub-
 “ sisting without its *Substratum*. I grant, the
 “ *Supposition* is *absurd*: But how otherwise can we
 “ know whether any thing be a *Property* of such
 “ a Substance, but by examining whether it
 “ would *cease to be*, if its supposed Substance
 “ should do so? Notwithstanding what I have
 “ now said, I cannot say that I believe your Ar-
 “ gument *not conclusive*; for I must own my Ig-
 “ norance, that I am really at a loss about the
 “ nature of *Space* and *Duration*. But did it
 “ plainly appear that they were *Properties* of a
 “ *Substance*, we should have an *easie* way with
 “ the Atheists: For it would at once prove de-
 “ monstrably an *Eternal, Necessary, Self-existent*
 “ *Being*; that there is *but One* such; and that he
 “ is *needful* in order to the existence of all other
 “ Things. Which makes me think, that though
 “ it *may be true*, yet ’tis not *obvious* to every Capa-
 “ city: Otherwise ’twould have been generally used,
 “ as a fundamental Argument to prove the Being
 “ of God.

“ I must add one thing more; that your Argu-
 “ ment for the *Omnipresence* of God, seemed *al-*
 “ *ways* to me *very probable*. But being very de-
 “ *firm*

“ firous to have it appear *demonstrably conclusive*,
“ I was sometimes forced to say what was *not alto-*
“ *gether my Opinion* : Not that I did this for the
“ sake of *disputing*, (for besides the particular
“ disagreeableness of this to my own Temper, I
“ should surely have chosen another Person to
“ have trifled with ;) but I did it to set off the
“ Objection to Advantage, that it might be more
“ fully answered. I heartily wish you as *fair*
“ *Treatment* from your Opponents in Print, as I
“ have had from *you* : Tho’, I must own, I can-
“ not see, in those that I have read, That unpre-
“ judiced Search after Truth, which I would have
“ hoped for.

I am,

Feb. 3. 1713.

Reverend SIR,

Your most Humble Servant.

THE
ANSWER
TO THE
Fifth LETTER.

S I R,

IN a multitude of Business, I mislaid your last Letter; and could not answer it, till it came again to my Hands by Chance. We seem to have pushed the Matter in question between us, as far as it will go; and upon the whole, I cannot but take notice, I have very seldom met with Persons so reasonable and unprejudiced as your self, in such Debates as these.

I think all I need say in Answer to the *Reasoning* in your Letter, is; that your granting the *Absurdity* of the *Supposition* you were endeavouring to make, is consequently granting the *necessary Truth* of my *Argument*. If * *Space* and *Duration* necessarily remain, even after they are *supposed* to be taken away; and be not (as 'tis plain they are not) *Themselves Substances*; then the † *Substance*, on whose Existence they depend, will necessarily remain likewise, even after it is *supposed* to be taken away: Which shows *That Supposition* to be *impossible* and *contradictory*.

As to your Observation at the End of your Letter; that the
Argument

* Ut partium *Temporis* Ordo est immutabilis, sic etiam Ordo partium *Spatii*. Moveantur hæ de locis suis, & movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. NEWTON Princip. Mathemat. Schol. ad Definit. 8.

† Deus non est *Æternitas* vel *Infinitas*, sed æternus & infinitus; non est *Duratio* vel *Spatium*, sed Durat, & Adest. Durat semper, & Adest ubique; & existendo semper & ubique, *Durationem* & *Spatium*, æternitatem & infinitatem, constituit. Cum unaquæ-

Argument I have insisted on, if it were *obvious* to every Capacity, should have more frequently been used as a Fundamental Argument for a Proof of the Being of God: The *True Cause* why it has been *seldom* urged, is, I think, This; That the Universal Prevalency of *Cartes's* absurd Notions, (teaching that * *Matter* is necessarily *Infinite* and necessarily *Eternal*, and ascribing all things to mere *Mechanick* Laws of *Motion*, exclusive of *final* Causes, and of all *Will* and *Intelligence* and *Divine Providence* from the *Government* of the World;) hath incredibly blinded the Eyes of *Common Reason*, and prevented Men from discerning *Him* in whom they live and move and have their Being. The like has happened in some *Other* Instances. How universally have Men for many Ages believed, that *Eternity* is no *Duration* at all, and *Infinity* no *Amplitude*? Something of the like kind has happened in the matter of *Transubstantiation*, and (I think) in the *Scholastick* Notion of the *Trinity*, &c.

que *Spatii* particula, sit *Semper*; & unumquodque *Durati-
onis* indivisibile momentum, *U-
bique*; certè rerum omnium
Fabricator ac Dominus, non
erit *Nunquam* *Nusquam* *Om-
nipræsens* est, non per *Virtutem*
solam, sed etiam per *substan-
tiam*: nam *virtus* sine *substan-
tia* subsistere non potest. In
ipso continentur & moventur
Universa, &c. NEWTON.
*Princip. Mathemat. Schol. gene-
ral. sub finem.*

* Puto implicare contradic-
tionem, ut *Mundus* [meaning the
Material World] sit *Finitus* *Car-
tes. Epist. 69. Partis primæ.*

I am, SIR,

April 8. 1713.

Your Affectionate Friend

and Servant.

T H E
A N S W E R
T O A
Sixth L E T T E R.

Being Part of a

L E T T E R writ to *Another Gentleman*, who
had proposed several of the same Objections
with the foregoing.

S I R,

YOU will give me leave, without any Pre-
face or Apology, to propose directly the
best *Answer* I can, to the Objections you
have offered.

There are but *Two* ways, by which the *Being*,
and *All* or *Any* of the *Attributes* of *God*, can pos-
sibly be proved. The one, *a priori* ; the other,
a posteriori.

* Rom. i. 20; *The invisible things of Him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen, being understood*

The Proof *a posteriori*, * is level to *All* Mens Capacities : Because there is an endless *gradation* of *wise and useful* phænomena of Nature, from the most *obvious* to the most *abstruse* ; which afford (at least a *moral* and *reasonable*) Proof of the Being of *God*, to the *several Capacities* of *All unprejudiced Men*, who have any Probity of Mind. And this is what (I suppose) *God* expects (as a

Moral

Moral Governour,) that *Moral Agents* should be determined by.

The Proof *a priori*, is (I fully believe) strictly demonstrative ; but (like numberless *Mathematical Demonstrations*,) capable of being understood by only a few attentive Minds ; because 'tis of Use, only against *Learned and Metaphysical Difficulties*. And therefore it must never be expected, that this should be made obvious to the *Generality* of Men, any more than *Astronomy* or *Mathematicks* can be.

by the things that are made ; even his Eternal Power and Godhead.

This being premised in general, I proceed to Particulars.

Concerning the Notion of *Self-Existence*, I explain my self thus. Of every thing that *Is*, there is a *Reason* which now does, or Once or Always did, determine the *Existence* rather than the *Non-existence* of that Thing. Of That which derives not its Being from Any Other thing, this *Reason* or *Ground* of *Existence*, (whether we can attain to any *Idea* of it, or no,) must be *In* the Thing itself. For though the bare proof by *Ratiocination*, that there cannot but exist such a Being ; does not indeed give us any distinct *Notion* of *Self-existence*, but only shows the *Certainty* of the thing : yet when once a thing is known, by reasoning *a posteriori*, to be *Certain* ; it unavoidably follows that there *Is in Nature* a *Reason a priori*, (whether we can discover it or no,) of the *Existence* of That which we know cannot but exist. Since therefore, in that which derives not its Being from any Other Thing, the *Ground* or *Reason* why it exists rather than not exists, must be in the thing itself ; and 'tis a plain Contradiction to suppose its own *Will*, by way of *efficient Cause*, to be the reason of its *Existence* ; it remains that *absolute Necessity* (the same Necessity that is the Cause of the unalterable *Proportion* between 2 and 4,) be,

by

by way of *Formal Cause*, the *Ground* of That Existence. And this Necessity is indeed *antecedent*, though not in *Time*, yet in the *Order of Nature*, to the *Existence* of the Being itself: Whereas on the contrary, its own *Will*, is, in the *Order of Nature*, *subsequent* to the Supposition of the Existence of the Being; and therefore cannot be the *formal Cause* of that Existence.

Nothing can be more *absurd*, than to suppose that any thing (or any Circumstance of any thing) *is*; and yet that there be absolutely *no reason Why it Is*, rather than *not*. 'Tis easy to conceive, that *We* may indeed be utterly ignorant of the *reasons*, or *grounds*, or *causes* of many things. But, that any thing *is*; and that there is a *real reason* in Nature *why it is*, rather than *is not*; these two are as necessarily and essentially connected, as any two *Correlates* whatever, as *Height* and *Depth*, &c.

The Scholastick way of proving the Existence of the Self-existent Being, from *the absolute perfection of his Nature*; is *ὑπερον πρότερον*. For *All* or *Any* *perfections*, presuppose Existence; Which is *Petitio Principii*. But *bare Necessity of Existence*, does not presuppose, but infer Existence. That which exists by *absolute Necessity of Nature*, will always (whether you will or no) be *supposed* or *included* in any possible Idea of Things, even where you never so expressly *endeavour* to *exclude* it: Just as the *Proportion* between 2 and 4, remains *included* in the very Terms, wherein any man would *endeavour* expressly to *deny* it.

To *exist at all*, and to *exist every where*, are one and the very same thing, where the *Cause* or *Ground* of the Existence, is not either *confined to*, or *operates only in*, some *particular Place*. For 2 and 4 to have *at all* a certain proportion to each other, and to have

That

That same Proportion *every where* ; is the very same thing. And the like is true, of every thing that is *necessary in itself*. To suppose (as you suggest) that the Self-existent Being may be *limited* by its own *Nature* ; is *presupposing* a *Nature*, or *limiting Quality* : Whereas, in this case, here must nothing be presupposed ; no *Nature*, no *Quality* whatsoever, but what *arises* (and consequently *every where alike*) from a *Necessity absolute in itself*, and antecedent (in the Order of our Ideas) to any *Nature*, *Place*, *Quality*, *Time*, or *Thing* whatsoever.

When I say, that *Necessity*, *absolutely such in itself*, has no relation to *Time* or *Place* : My meaning is, that it has no relation to, or dependence upon, any *particular Time* or *Place*, or *any thing in any particular Time* or *Place* ; but that it is the *Same in All Time*, and in *All Place*. What you mean by *Time* and *Place* being *finite*, I understand not. The Schoolmens Notion of *Time's* depending on the *Motions* or *Existence* of the Material World, is as *Senseless*, as the supposing it to depend on the *turning* or *not turning* of an *Hour-glass*. The same also is true of *Place*.

Infinite *Space*, is infinite *Extension* : and *Eternity*, is infinite *Duration*. They are the Two first and most obvious and simple Ideas, that every Man has in his mind. *Time* and *Place* are the *sine qua non* of all other *things*, and of all other *Ideas*. To suppose Either of them *Finite*, is an express *Contradiction* in the Idea itself. No man *does* or *can* possibly imagine Either of them to be *finite* ; but only, either by *non-attention*, or by *choice*, he attends perhaps to *Part* of his Idea, and *forbears attending* to the remainder. All the Difficulty that has ever arisen about this Matter, is nothing but *Dust* thrown by mens using *Words* (or rather *Sounds only*) in their Philosophy, instead of *Ideas*. And the Arguments drawn from the *Jargon* of the Schoolmen, will equally

qually prove every *Axiom* in *Euclid* to be uncertain and unintelligible.

They who remove the Idea of *Infinity*, (or of a *Being* whose Attribute *Infinity* is,) by supposing *Space* to be nothing but a relation between two *Bodies*; are guilty of the *Absurdity* of supposing That, which is *Nothing*, to have real *Qualities*. For the *Space* which is between two *Bodies*, is always unalterably just what it was; and has the very same *Dimensions*, *Quantity*, and *Figure*; whether *These*, or any other *Bodies* be there, or any where else, or

not at all: Just as *Time* or *Duration* is the * same, whether you turn your *Hour-Glass*, or no; or whether the *Sun* moves, or stands still; or whether there was, or was not any *Sun*, or any *Material World* at all.

* Eadem est *Duratio* seu perseverantia *Existentiæ* rerum; five *Motus* sint *celeres*, five *tardi*, five *nulli*. NEWTON. *Princip. Mathem. Schol. ad Definit. 8.*

The Schoolmens Distinctions, about *Spirits* existing in *Ubi*, and not in *Loco*; are mere empty *Sounds*, without any manner of signification.

To set *Bounds* to *Space*, is to suppose it bounded by something which itself takes up *Space*; and That's a *Contradiction*: Or else that 'tis bounded by *Nothing*; and then the Idea of *That Nothing*, will still be *Space*; Which is another *Contradiction*. *Beings* which exist in *Time*, and in *Space*, (as every finite thing must needs do,) presuppose *Time* and *Space*: But *That Being*, whose *Existence* makes *Duration* and *Space*, must be infinite and eternal, because *Duration* and *Space* can have no *Bounds*. Not, that *Duration* and *Space* are the *Formal Cause* of *That Existence*; but, that necessary Attributes do necessarily and inseparably infer, or show to us a *Necessary Substance*; of which *Substance* itself we have no *Image*, because 'tis the *Object* of none of our *Senses*: But we perceive its *Existence* by its *Effects*;

Effects; and the *Necessity* of that Existence, by the *Necessity* of certain *Attributes*; and by other *Arguments* of *Reason* and *Inference*. To suppose Space removed, destroyed, or taken away; amounts to the absurd Supposition of removing a thing away from itself. That is: If in your imagination you annihilate the *Whole* of *Infinite Space*, the *Whole* *Infinite Space* will still remain; and if you annihilate any *Part* of it, *That Part* will still necessarily remain; as appears by the *unmoved situation* of the *Rest*. And to suppose it *divided* or *Divisible*, amounts to the same Contradiction.

The Objection, of *Immensify* being inconsistent with *Spirituality* and *Simplicity*; arises merely from the *Jargon* of the Schoolmen: Who (in order to help out *Transubstantiation*) have used themselves to speak of This and of many other things, in *Phrases* which had no *Meaning* or *Ideas* belonging to them. By denying the *real Immensity* and the *real Eternal Duration* of God, they in *true Consequence* (though 'tis reasonable to suppose they saw not *That Consequence*,) denied his *Being*. The *Immensify* of Space, (it being throughout *absolutely uniform* and *essentially indivisible*,) is no more inconsistent with *Simplicity*, than the *uniform successive flowing* of the *Parts* of *Duration*, (as you most rightly observe,) are inconsistent with *Simplicity*. There is no Difficulty at all in this Point, but a mere *Prejudice*, and *False Notion* of *Simplicity*.

As to *Spirituality*: The individual Consciousness of the One Immense Being, is as truly *One*; as the present Moment of Time is *individually One*, in all Places at once. And the One can no more properly be said to be an *Ell* or a *Mile* of *Consciousness*, (which is the Sum of your Objection,) than the other can be said to be an *Ell* or a *Mile* of

of Time. This Suggestion seems to deserve particular consideration.

To the Objection, that the supposing God to be really and *substantially* Omnipresent, is supposing him to be the *Soul of the World*: I answer; This is a great Mistake. For the word, *Soul*, signifies a *Part* of a *Whole*, whereof *Body* is the *Other Part*; And they, being united, *mutually affect* each other, as *Parts* of the same *Whole*. But God is present to every part of the Universe, not as a *Soul*, but as a *Governour*; so as to act upon every thing, in what manner he pleases; himself being *acted upon* by Nothing.

What you suggest about *Space* having *no Parts*, because 'tis *Infinite*; is a mere *Quibble* indeed, and has nothing in it. The meaning of *Parts*, (in Questions of this Nature,) is, *separable, compounded, un-united Parts*, such as are the *Parts of Matter*: Which, for That reason, is always a *Compound*, not a *simple Substance*. No *Matter* is *One Substance*, but a *Heap of Substances*. And That I take to be the Reason, why *Matter* is a Subject incapable of *Thought*. Not because 'tis *extended*; but because its *Parts* are *distinct Substances, un-united, and independent on each other*. Which (I believe) is not the Case of *Other Substances*. The *Kinds of Substance* may perhaps be *More*, and more *different* from each other, than we (at *present*,) for want of *more Senses*, are aware of. *Matter and Spirit*, is no other Division, than *Matter and not-Matter*: Just as if one should divide the Species of Animals, into *Horses and not-Horses*.

As to the Question, why *Absolute Necessity* will not admit of the Existence of *Two distinct Independent Beings*, as well as of *different Attributes and Properties in One Independent Being*; I answer: *Absolute Necessity*, in which there is no where any
Variation,

Variation, cannot be the *Ground* of Existence of a *Number* of *Finite* Beings, however agreeing and harmonious ; because That (*viz. Number*, or *Finiteness*,) is itself a manifest *Difformity* or *Inequality*. But it may be the *Ground* or Existence of *One Uniform* infinite Being. The *different Attributes* of which *One* uniform Being, are not a *Variety* of *Parts*, or an *un-Uniformness*, (if I may so speak) of the Necessity by which it exists ; but they are *All* and each of them *Attributes* of the *Whole*, *Attributes* of the *One simple infinite Being* : Just as the Powers of *Hearing* and *Seeing*, are not *Inequalities* or *Difformities* in the *Soul of Man* ; but each of them, Powers of the *Whole Soul*.

As to the *Last* Argument you refer to : My Meaning therein is This ; that 'tis a Contradiction to suppose *Two* (or *More*) *necessarily-existing* Beings ; because *Each* of them, by the *Supposition*, being independent, and *sufficient* to itself, though the *Other* were supposed *not to exist* ; they thereby *Each* of them *mutually* destroy the *supposed necessity* of the *Other's* Existence ; and consequently *Neither* of them indeed will be *necessary* or *Independent*. For instance : If *Matter*, or *Spirit*, or any *Other Substance* could as *possibly* be conceived to exist *without that in which they all exist*, as *That in which they all exist* can be conceived to exist *without Them* ; then there would be *necessary-Existence* on *Neither* part.

As to the Question concerning the possible *Plurality* of *Infinities* : 'Tis certainly true that the Infinity of Space, neither excludes *finite Bodies* nor *finite Spirits*, nor *infinite Body*, nor *infinite Spirit*. But it excludes every thing of the *same Kind*, whether *finite* or *infinite*. Which is all that my Argument requires. There can be but *One Infinite Space*, and but *One Infinite Time*, and but *One Infinite Spirit*, (taking *Spirit* to mean a particular *positive* distinct Substance ;

Substance, and not the mere negative *non-matter*, of which there may be innumerable Kinds:) And, if *Matter* could be infinite, there could likewise be but *One Infinite Body*; and so on. For *One Infinite* in all dimensions, exhausts always the whole possibility of *That Kind*, though it excludes not Others.

The *Ubi* of *Spirits*, being their *Perception* only; and the *Omnipresence* of God, being his *infinite Knowledge* only; are mere Words, without any *Sense* at all. And by the like Confusion, *any thing* may be said to be *any thing*; and we have in us no Principles of Knowledge at all, nor any Use either of Words or Ideas.

I am, S I R,

Your assured Friend

and Servant, &c.

THE

T H E
A N S W E R
T O A
Seventh L E T T E R,

Concerning the A R G U M E N T *a priori*.

*To the Reverend Dr. * * **

— **Y**OUR Objection against arguing at all *a priori*, concerning the Existence and Perfections of the *First Cause*; is what Many Learned Men have indeed stuck at. And it being evident, that Nothing can be *prior* to the *First Cause*; they have therefore thought it sufficient to say, that the *First Cause* exists “*absolutely without Cause* ;” and that therefore there can be no such thing, as reasoning or arguing about it *a priori* at all. But if you attend carefully, you will find This way of speaking, to be by no means satisfactory. For though 'tis indeed most evident, that no *Thing*, no *Being*, can be *prior* to *That Being*, which is the *First Cause* and *Original* of all things ; yet there must be in nature a *Ground* or *Reason*, a *permanent Ground* or *Reason* of the *existence* of the

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First

First Cause. Otherwise its *Existence* would be owing to, and depend upon, *mere Chance*. And all that could be said upon This Head, would amount to *This* only ; that it exists, *because* it exists ; that it *therefore* does and always did exist, *because* it does and always did exist. Which the Followers of *Spinoza* will, with equal strength of reason, affirm concerning *every Substance* that *exists* at all.

* *Nothing*, is That, of which *every thing* can truly be denied, and *no thing* can truly be affirmed. So that the *Idea* of *Nothing*, (if I may so speak,) is absolutely the *Negation* of *All Ideas*. The *Idea* therefore either of a *Finite* or *Infinite Nothing*, is a contradiction in *Terms*.

If the *Idea* of an *Eternal* and * *Infinite Nothing*, were a *possible Idea*, and not *contradictory* in itself ; the *Existence* of the *First Cause* would not be *necessary* : (For *Necessity* of being, and *Possibility* of not being, are *contradictory Ideas*.) And if the *Existence* of the *First Cause*, was not *necessary* ; it would be no *contradiction*, to

suppose it either *not to have existed* in time past, or to *cease to exist* at any time to come. The *Existence* therefore of the *First Cause*, is *Necessary* ; *Necessary absolutely*, and *in itself*. And therefore *That Necessity* is, *a priori*, and in the *Order of Nature*, the *Ground* or *Reason* of its existence. For *That*, which *exists Necessarily* ; or in the *Idea* of which, *Existence* and *Necessity* are *inseparably* and *necessarily Connected* ; must either *therefore* be *necessary*, *because* it *exists* ; or else it must *therefore* exist, *because* its *Existence* is *Necessary*. If it was *therefore* *necessary, because* it *existed* ; then, for the same reason, *every thing* that *exists*, would *exist necessarily* ; and either *every thing*, or *nothing*, would be the *First Cause*. On the contrary ; if the *First Cause* does *therefore* exist, *because* its *Existence* is *Necessary* ; then *Necessity* is the *Ground* or *Reason* or *Foundation* of that *Existence* : And the *Existence* does not *infer*, (that is, *a priori*, or in the *order of Nature*

Nature and Consequence, antecede) the *Necessity of Existing*; but the *Necessity of existing* does on the contrary *infer*, (that is, *a priori*, or in the order of nature, antecede) the Supposition of the *Existence*. Which is, what I proposed to prove.

The Argument *a posteriori*, is indeed by far the most generally useful Argument, most easy to be understood, and in some degree suited to all Capacities; And therefore it ought always to be distinctly insisted upon. But forasmuch as Atheistical Writers have sometimes opposed the Being and Attributes of God by such *metaphysical* Reasonings, as can no otherwise be obviated, than by arguing *a priori*; therefore *This* manner of arguing also, is *useful*, and *necessary* in its proper place.

The *Eternity* of God, can no otherwise be proved, than by considering *a priori* the Nature of a *Necessary* or *Self-Existent* Cause. The *Temporary* phænomena of nature, prove indeed demonstrably *a posteriori*, that there *is*, and *has been from the Beginning of those phænomena*, a Being of Power and Wisdom *sufficient* to produce and preserve those phænomena. But that *This First Cause* has existed *from Eternity*, and shall exist *to Eternity*, cannot be proved from those *Temporary phænomena*; but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic Nature of *Necessary-Existence*. If the First Cause exists "*absolutely without any Ground or Reason of Existence*;" it might as possibly in Times past, *without any Reason*, have not existed; and may as possibly in Times to come, *without any reason*, cease to exist. Can it be proved *a posteriori*, that the *First Cause* of all things *will exist to-morrow*? Or can it be proved any otherwise, than by showing that *Necessity* is a *certain ground of Future* as well as of *Present* existence? And if so; then the *Ground* or *Reason*, upon which the

First Cause *now* does, and hereafter *always* will, and *cannot but* exist ; is the very same Ground or Reason, upon which he always *did* exist : And consequently it cannot with Truth be affirmed, that the First Cause exists “ *absolutely without Any Ground or Reason of Existence.* ” ’Tis true indeed, there is no *antecedent reason* why *Necessity* is *Necessity*. ’Tis in itself essentially *immediate* ; and ’tis absurd to suppose that it can be perceived, otherwise than *immediately* and *intuitively*. Yet, I think, it is not an absurd Question to ask, *why* that which is *Now* a *Necessary Being*, must *equally* in all *past time* have been, and in all *future time* continue to be, a *Necessary Being*. And the Answer to That Question, will express fully all that I mean, by affirming the *Necessity* to be the Ground or Reason of the *Existence*. When Atheistical Writers affirm, that the *material Universe*, and every existing Substance in particular, was Eternal “ *absolutely without any Ground or Reason of Existence ;* ” can This assertion be confuted by Him, who shall *himself* affirm, that God was Eternal *absolutely without Any Ground or Reason of Existence* ? Or can it be *any other way* confuted at all, than by showing that *Something* must be *necessarily-existent*, (else nothing would ever have existed ;) and that *That* which is *necessarily-existent*, cannot possibly be either *Finite*, or *Moveable*, or at *any time* capable of Any *Alterations*, *Limitations*, *Variations*, *Inequalities*, or *Diversifications* whatsoever, either in *whole*, or in *part*, or in *different parts*, either of *Space* or *Time* ?

In like manner, the *Infinity* or *Immensity* or *Omnipresence* of God, can no otherwise be proved, than by considering *a priori* the nature of a *Necessary* or *Self-Existent* Cause. The *Finite* phenomena of nature, prove indeed demonstrably a

posteriori, that there is a Being which has *Extent* of *Power* and *Wisdom* sufficient, to produce and preserve all these phænomena. But that This *Author of Nature* is *Himself* absolutely *Immense* or *Infinite*, cannot be proved from these *Finite* phænomena; but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of *Necessary Existence*. If the First Cause exists “*absolutely without any Ground or Reason of Existence*,” it may as possibly be *Finite*, as *Infinite*; it may as possibly be *Limited*, as be *Immense*. It may as possibly in *Other places*, without any reason, not exist; as it does, without any reason, exist in *Those Places*, where the *phænomena of nature* prove that it does exist. Can it be proved *a posteriori*, that *That Governing Wisdom and Power*, which the *phænomena of Nature in this material World* demonstrate to be present *Here*; must therefore be *Immense*, *Infinite*, or *Omnipresent*? must be present likewise in those boundless Spaces, where we know of no *phænomena* or *Effects* to prove its existence? Or can the *Immensity* and *Omnipresence* of the First Cause, be at all proved any other way, than by showing that *Necessity of Existence* is capable of no *Limitation*; but must for the same reason be the ground of *Immense* or *Omnipresent existence*, as 'tis the Ground or Foundation of any Existence at all?

Again: The *Unity of God*, (which, I think, has always been allowed to be a *Principle of Natural Religion*; Otherwise St Paul could not justly have blamed the *Heathen* as *inexcusable*, in that *they did not like to retain God in their Knowledge*, and that, *when they knew God, they glorified him not as God*: The *Unity of God*, I say,) can no otherwise be demonstrated, than by considering *a priori* the nature of a *Necessary or Self-Existent Cause*. The *Phænomena of Nature* which come within the reach of Our observation, prove indeed demonstrably, that there

there is a *Supreme Author and Director* of *That Nature*, or of *Those phænomena*, whereof we have any Knowledge. But that *This Supreme Author and Governour of THIS NATURE*, or of *THESE phænomena*, is likewise the *Supreme Author and Governour of UNIVERSAL Nature*; cannot be proved by *Us* from our *partial and imperfect* Knowledge of a *Few phænomena*, in that *small part* of the Universe, which comes within the reach of Our Senses; but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of *necessary existence*. If the *First Cause* exists “*absolutely without any Ground or Reason of existence* ;” ’tis altogether as possible, and as probable, and as *reasonable* to suppose, that there may, without any reason, exist *numberless Finite independent co-existent First Causes* (either of like *Nature and Substance* to each other, or of *different Nature and Substance* from each other,) in *different Parts* of the immense Universe; as that there should, without any reason, exist *One only, Infinite, Immense, Omnipresent, First Cause, Author, and Governour of the Whole*.

That there is, and cannot but be *One, and One only*, such *First Cause, Author and Governour of the Universe*; is (I conceive) capable of strict *Demonstration*, including *That part* of the Argument which is deduced *a priori*. The *Subject* of the Question, is *no Trifle*. If any sober-minded man is persuaded, he can find any Flaw in *That Demonstration*; or cares not to examine it, least any of its Consequences should prove inconsistent with some other notions he may perhaps through prejudice have imbibed; I should be very Thankful to him, to show *How the Unity of God* (the *First Principle of Natural Religion*) can at all be proved by Reason *a posteriori* only.

Some such considerations as these (I suppose) they were, or others of the like nature, which
moved

removed Mr. Limborch to write thus to Mr. Locke* *Argumentum desiderat Vir magnificus, quo probetur Ens, cujus existentia est necessaria, tantum posse esse Unum; & quidem ut id argumentum à necessitate existentiae desumatur, & a priori (ut in Scholis loquuntur,) non a posteriori concludat; hoc est, ex natura necessariae existentiae probetur, eam pluribus non posse esse communem.* To which Mr. Locke replies: † *Les Theologiens, les Philosophes, & Descartes luy-meme, supposent l' Unité de Dieu, sans la prouver.* After which, having suggested his Own Thoughts, he thus concludes: *C'est là, selon moy, une Preuve a priori, que l'Etre éternel independent n'est qu'Un.*

Locke's
Familiar
Letters,
pag. 409.

† Ibid. p.
422, 423.

To argue therefore *a priori* concerning the Existence and Attributes of the First Cause, is no absurdity. For though No Thing, no Being, can indeed be prior to the First Cause; yet Arguments may, and must, be drawn from the Nature and Consequences of that necessity, by which the First Cause exists. Mathematical Necessary Truths, are usually demonstrated *a priori*, and yet nothing is prior to Truths eternally necessary. To confine therefore the Use of the Term, to argumentations about Such things only, as have Other Things prior to them in Time; is only Quibbling about the Signification of Words.

To the Objection, that an Attribute cannot be the Ground or Reason of the Existence of the Substance itself, which is always on the contrary the Support of the Attributes: I answer; that, in strictness of Speech, Necessity of Existence is not an Attribute, in the Sense that Attributes are properly so styled; but 'tis, [Sui generis,] the Ground or Foundation of existence, both of the Substance, and of All the Attributes. Thus, in Other Instances; Immensity is not an Attribute, in the Sense that Wisdom, Power, and the like, are strictly so called; but 'tis [Sui generis,] a Mode of Existence, both of
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the Substance, and of All the Attributes. In like manner ; Eternity, is not an Attribute or Property, in the sense that other Attributes, inhering in the Substance, and supported by it, are properly so called ; but 'tis, [Sui generis,] the Duration of existence, both of the Substance, and of All the Attributes. Attributes or Properties, strictly so called, cannot be predicated one of another. Wisdom cannot properly be said to be Powerful ; or Power to be Wise. But Immensity, is a MODE of existence, both of the Divine Substance, and of All the Attributes. Eternity, is the DURATION of existence, both of the Divine Substance, and of All the Attributes. And Necessity, is the GROUND, or Reason, or Foundation of Existence, both of the Divine Substance, and of all the Attributes.

I am, SIR,

Your very humble Servant, &c.



